2011-10881

Federal Register, Volume 76 Issue 92 (Thursday, May 12, 2011)[Federal Register Volume 76, Number 92 (Thursday, May 12, 2011)]

[Proposed Rules]

[Pages 27802-27841]

From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]

[FR Doc No: 2011-10881]

[[Page 27801]]

Vol. 76

Thursday,

No. 92

May 12, 2011

Part III

Commodity Futures Trading Commission

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17 CFR Parts 1, 23, and 140

Capital Requirements of Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants;

Proposed Rule

Federal Register / Vol. 76 , No. 92 / Thursday, May 12, 2011 /

Proposed Rules

[[Page 27802]]

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COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION

17 CFR Parts 1, 23, and 140

RIN 3038-AD54

Capital Requirements of Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants

AGENCY: Commodity Futures Trading Commission.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.

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SUMMARY: The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (Commission or CFTC)

is proposing regulations that would implement the new statutory

framework in the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA), added by the Wall Street

Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act). These new

provisions of the CEA require, among other things, the Commission to

adopt capital requirements for certain swap dealers (SDs) and major

swap participants (MSPs). The proposed rules also provide for related

financial condition reporting and recordkeeping by SDs and MSPs. The

Commission further proposes to amend existing capital and financial

reporting regulations for futures commission merchants (FCMs) that also

register as SDs or MSPs. The proposed regulations also include

requirements for supplemental FCM financial reporting to reflect

section 724 of the Dodd-Frank Act. In order to align the comment

periods for this proposed rule and the Commission's earlier proposed

rulemaking on margin requirements for uncleared swaps,\1\ the comment

period for the proposed margin rulemaking is being extended elsewhere

in the Federal Register today, so that commenters will have the

opportunity to review the proposed capital and margin rules together

before the expiration of the comment periods for either proposed rule.

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\1\ See 76 FR 23732 (April 28, 2011).

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DATES: Comments must be received on or before July 11, 2011.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, identified by RIN 3038-AD54, by any

of the following methods:

Agency Web site, via its Comments Online process: http://comments.cftc.gov. Follow the instructions for submitting comments

through the Web site.

Mail: Send to David A. Stawick, Secretary, Commodity

Futures Trading Commission, 1155 21st Street, NW., Washington, DC

20581.

Hand delivery/Courier: Same as Mail above.

Federal eRulemaking Portal: http://www.regulations.gov/search/index.jsp. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.

All comments must be submitted in English, or if not, accompanied

by an English translation. Comments will be posted as received to

http://www.cftc.gov. You should submit only information that you wish

to make available publicly. If you wish the Commission to consider

information that is exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of

Information Act, a petition for confidential treatment of the exempt

information may be submitted according to the procedures set forth in

Sec. 145.9 of the Commission's regulations.\2\

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\2\ Commission regulations referred to herein are found at 17

CFR Ch. 1 (2010). Commission regulations are accessible on the

Commission's Web site, http://www.cftc.gov.

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The Commission reserves the right, but shall have no obligation, to

review, pre-screen, filter, redact, refuse or remove any or all of your

submission from http://www.cftc.gov that it may deem to be

inappropriate for publication, such as obscene language. All

submissions that have been redacted or removed that contain comments on

the merits of the rulemaking will be retained in the public comment

file and will be considered as required under the Administrative

Procedure Act and other applicable laws, and may be accessible under

the Freedom of Information Act.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Thomas Smith, Deputy Director, Thelma

Diaz, Associate Director, or Jennifer Bauer, Special Counsel, Division

of Clearing and Intermediary Oversight, 1155 21st Street, NW.,

Washington, DC 20581. Telephone number: 202-418-5137 and electronic

mail: [email protected]; [email protected]; or [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background

A. Legislation Requiring Rulemaking for Capital Requirements of SDs and

MSPs

On July 21, 2010, President Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Act.\3\

Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act amended the CEA \4\ to establish a

comprehensive regulatory framework to reduce risk, increase

transparency, and promote market integrity within the financial system

by, among other things: (1) Providing for the registration and

comprehensive regulation of SDs and MSPs; (2) imposing clearing and

trade execution requirements on standardized derivative products; (3)

creating rigorous recordkeeping and real-time reporting regimes; and

(4) enhancing the Commission's rulemaking and enforcement authorities

with respect to all registered entities and intermediaries subject to

the Commission's oversight.

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\3\ See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection

Act, Public Law 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). The text of the

Dodd-Frank Act may be accessed at http://www.cftc.gov/LawRegulation/OTCDERIVATIVES/index.htm.

\4\ 7 U.S.C. 1 et seq.

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The legislative mandate to establish registration and regulatory

requirements for SDs and MSPs appears in section 731 of the Dodd-Frank

Act, which adds a new section 4s to the CEA. Section 4s(e) explicitly

requires the adoption of rules establishing capital and margin

requirements for SDs and MSPs, and applies a bifurcated approach that

requires each SD and MSP for which there is a prudential regulator to

meet the capital and margin requirements established by the applicable

prudential regulator, and each SD and MSP for which there is no

prudential regulator to comply with Commission's capital and margin

regulations.

The term ``prudential regulator'' is defined in a new paragraph 39

of the definitions set forth in section 1a of the CEA, as amended by

section 721 of the Dodd-Frank Act. This definition includes the Board

of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve Board); the

Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC); the Federal Deposit

Insurance Corporation (FDIC); the Farm Credit Administration; and the

Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA). The definition also specifies

the entities for which these agencies act as prudential regulators, and

these consist generally of federally insured deposit institutions; farm

credit banks; federal home loan banks; and the Federal Home Loan

Mortgage Corporation and the Federal National Mortgage Association. In

the case of the Federal Reserve Board, it is the prudential regulator

not only for certain banks, but also for bank holding companies and any

foreign banks treated as bank holding companies. The Federal Reserve

Board also is the prudential regulator for subsidiaries of these bank

holding companies and foreign banks, but excluding their nonbank

subsidiaries that are required to be registered with the Commission as

SDs or MSPs.

In general, therefore, the Commission is required to establish

capital requirements for all registered SDs and MSPs that are not

banks, including nonbank subsidiaries of bank holding companies

regulated by the Federal Reserve Board. In addition, certain swap

activities currently engaged in by banks may be conducted in such

nonbank subsidiaries and affiliates as a result of the prohibition on

Federal assistance to swap entities under section 716 of the

[[Page 27803]]

Dodd-Frank Act. Generally, insured depository institutions (IDIs) that

are required to register as SDs may be required to comply with section

716 by ``pushing-out'' to an affiliate all swap trading activities with

the exception of: (1) The IDI's hedging or other similar risk

mitigating activities directly related to the IDI's activities; and (2)

the IDI acting as a SD for swaps involving rates or reference assets

that are permissible for investment under banking law.

The Commission is further required to adopt other regulations that

implement provisions in section 4s related to financial reporting and

recordkeeping by SDs and MSPs. Section 4s(f)(2) of the CEA specifically

directs the Commission to adopt rules governing financial condition

reporting and recordkeeping for SDs and MSPs, and section 4s(f)(1)(A)

expressly requires each registered SD and MSP to make such reports as

are required by Commission rule or regulation regarding the SD's or

MSP's financial condition. The Commission also is authorized to propose

record retention and inspection requirements consistent with the

provisions of section 4s(f)(1)(B).\5\

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\5\ The Commission previously has proposed certain record

retention requirements for SDs and MSPs regarding their swap

activities. See 75 FR 76666 (Dec. 9, 2010).

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B. Consultation With U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and

Prudential Regulators

Section 4s(e)(3)(D) of the CEA calls for comparability of the

capital requirements that the Commission, United States Securities and

Exchange Commission (SEC) and prudential regulators (together, referred

to as ``Agencies'') adopt for SDs, MSPs, security-based swap dealers

(SSDs) and major security-based swap participants (MSSPs) (together,

referred to as ``swap registrants''). Section 4s further specifies the

expected scope and frequency of consultation by the Agencies regarding

the capital requirements of swap registrants. Section 4s(e)(3)(D)

requires the Agencies to establish and to maintain, to the maximum

extent practicable, comparable minimum capital requirements. Section

4s(e)(3)(D) also requires the Agencies to periodically, but not less

frequently than annually, consult on minimum capital requirements for

swap registrants.

As directed by Dodd-Frank, and consistent with precedent for

harmonizing where practicable the minimum capital and financial

condition and related reporting requirements of dual registrants, staff

from each of the Agencies has had the opportunity to provide oral and/

or written comments to the regulations for SDs and MSPs in this

proposing release, and the proposed regulations incorporate elements of

the comments provided. The Commission will continue its discussions

with the Agencies in the development of their respective capital

regulations to implement the Dodd-Frank Act.

The Commission is relying to a great extent on existing regulatory

requirements in proposing capital requirements for SDs and MSPs.

Specifically, under this proposal, any SD or MSP that is required to

register as an FCM would be required to comply with the Commission's

existing capital requirements set forth in Sec. 1.17 for FCMs.

Furthermore, any SD or MSP that is neither a registered FCM nor a bank,

but is part of a U.S. bank holding company, would be required to comply

with the applicable bank capital requirements that are established by

the Federal Reserve Board for bank holding companies. Lastly, any SD or

MSP that was not required to register as an FCM and is not part of a

U.S. bank holding company would compute its capital in accordance with

proposed regulations summarized in part II of this release.

C. Considerations for SD and MSP Rulemaking Specified in Section 4(s)

Section 4s(e)(2)(C) of the CEA requires the Commission, in setting

capital requirements for a person designated as a swap registrant for a

single type or single class or category of swap or activities, to take

into account the risks associated with other types/classes/categories

of swap and other activities conducted by that person that are not

otherwise subject to regulation by virtue of their status as an SD or

MSP. Section 4s(e)(3)(A) also refers to the need to offset the greater

risk that swaps that are not cleared pose to SDs, MSPs, and the

financial system, and the Commission, SEC, and prudential regulators

are directed to adopt capital requirements that: (1) Help ensure the

safety and soundness of the registrant; and (2) are appropriate for the

risk associated with the uncleared swaps held by the registrants.

D. Other Considerations Under the CEA for FCM Financial Responsibility

Requirements

Entities that register as SDs and MSPs may include entities that

also are registered as FCMs.\6\ FCM registrants are subject to existing

Commission regulations establishing capital, segregation, and financial

reporting requirements under the CEA.\7\ Two primary financial

safeguards under the CEA are: (1) The requirement under section

4d(a)(2) that FCMs segregate from their own assets all money and

property belonging to their customers trading on U.S. markets; \8\ and

(2) the requirement under section 4f(b) for compliance with minimum

capital requirements for FCMs.\9\ The capital requirements for FCMs are

set forth in Commission Sec. 1.17, and reporting requirements related

to capital and the FCM's protection of customer funds are set forth in

Sec. Sec. 1.10, 1.12, and 1.16 of the Commission's regulations.\10\

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\6\ An FCM is defined as an individual, association,

partnership, corporation, or trust that engages in soliciting or in

accepting orders for: (1) The purchase or sale of a commodity for

future delivery, (2) a security futures product, (3) a swap, (4) any

commodity option authorized under Section 4c of the CEA, or (5) any

leverage transaction authorized under section 19 of the CEA, or that

is engaged in soliciting or accepting orders to act as a

counterparty in any agreement, contract, or transaction described in

sections 2(c)(2)(C)(i) or 2(c)(2)(D)(i) of the CEA, and in

connection with such activities, accepts any money, securities or

property (or extends credit) to margin, guarantee, or secure trades

or contracts.

\7\ The Commission's regulatory responsibilities include

monitoring the financial integrity of the commodity futures and

options markets and intermediaries, such as FCMs, that market

participants employ in their trading activities. The Commission's

financial and related recordkeeping and reporting rules are part of

a system of financial safeguards that also includes exchange and

clearinghouse risk management and financial surveillance systems,

exchange and clearinghouse rules and policies on clearing and

settlements, and financial and operational controls and risk

management employed by market intermediaries themselves.

\8\ The requirement that FCMs segregate customer funds is set

forth in section 4d(a)(2) of the CEA. Section 4d(a)(2) requires,

among other things, that an FCM segregate from its own assets all

money, securities, and other property held for customers as margin

for their commodity futures and option contracts, as well as any

gains accruing to such customers from open futures and option

positions. Part 30 of the Commission's regulations also requires

FCMs to hold ``secured amount'' funds for U.S. customers trading in

non-U.S. futures markets separate from the firms' proprietary funds.

\9\ Section 4f(b) of the CEA provides that FCMs must meet the

minimum financial requirements that the Commission ``may by

regulation prescribe as necessary to insure'' that FCMs meet their

obligations as registrants.

\10\ Regulation 1.10 includes a requirement for FCMs to file

annual financial statements that have been certified by an

independent public accountant in accordance with Sec. 1.16.

Regulation 1.10 also requires generally that FCMs file with the

Commission non-certified Form 1-FR-FCM financial reports each month.

Regulation 1.12 requires FCMs to provide notice of a variety of

predefined events as or before they occur. Such notice is intended

to provide the Commission with the opportunity to assess the FCM's

ability to meet its financial requirements on an ongoing basis.

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1. Background on FCM Capital Requirements in Sec. 1.17

FCM capital requirements in Sec. 1.17 are designed to require a

minimum level

[[Page 27804]]

of liquid assets in excess of the FCM's liabilities to provide

resources for the FCM to meet its financial obligations as a market

intermediary in the regulated futures and options market. The capital

requirements also are intended to ensure that an FCM maintains

sufficient liquid assets to wind-down its operations by transferring

customer accounts in the event that the FCM decides, or is forced, to

cease operations as an FCM.

Paragraph (a) of Sec. 1.17 addresses the first component of the

FCM capital rule by specifying the minimum amount of adjusted net

capital that a registered FCM is required to maintain. Specifically,

Sec. 1.17 sets the minimum adjusted net capital requirement as the

greatest of: (1) $1,000,000; (2) for an FCM that engages in off-

exchange foreign currency transactions with persons that are not

eligible contract participants as defined in section 1a(12) of the CEA

(i.e. retail participants), $20,000,000, plus 5 percent of the FCM's

liabilities to the retail forex participants that exceeds $10,000,000;

(3) 8 percent of the risk margin (as defined in Sec. 1.17(b)(8)) of

customer and non-customer exchange-traded futures positions and over-

the-counter (OTC) swap positions that are cleared by a clearing

organization and carried by the FCM; (4) the amount of adjusted net

capital required by a registered futures association of which the FCM

is a member; and (5) for an FCM that also is registered as securities

broker or dealer, the amount of net capital required by rules of the

SEC.

The requirements for the calculation of the FCM's adjusted net

capital represent the second component of the FCM capital rule.

Regulation 1.17(c)(5) generally defines the term ``adjusted net

capital'' as an FCM's ``current assets'', i.e., generally liquid

assets, less all of its liabilities (except certain qualifying

subordinated debt), and further reduced by certain capital charges (or

haircuts) to reflect potential market and credit risk of the firm's

current assets.

2. Capital Required for Uncleared Swaps Under Sec. 1.17

FCMs historically have not engaged in significant OTC derivatives

transactions. The capital treatment of such transactions under Sec.

1.17 is one of the factors that has resulted in OTC transactions being

conducted in affiliated entities. Specifically, an FCM in computing its

adjusted net capital is required to mark its OTC derivatives position

to market, and to reflect any unrealized gain or loss in its statement

of income. If the FCM experiences an unrealized loss on its OTC

derivatives position, the unrealized loss is recorded as a liability to

the counterparty and results in a reduction of the firm's adjusted net

capital. If the FCM experiences an unrealized gain on the OTC

derivatives position, the FCM would record a receivable from the

counterparty. If the receivable was not secured through the receipt of

readily marketable financial collateral, the FCM would be required to

exclude the receivable from the calculation of its current assets under

Sec. 1.17(c)(2)(ii).

An FCM, in computing its adjusted net capital, is further required

to compute a capital charge to reflect the potential market risk

associated with its OTC derivatives positions. Regulation 1.17(c)(5)

establishes specific capital charges for market risk for an FCM's

proprietary positions in physical inventory, forward contracts, fixed

price commitments, and securities. Historically, the Commission has

required an FCM to use the capital charge provisions specified in Sec.

1.17(c)(5)(ii), or capital charges established by the SEC for

securities brokers or dealers, for its OTC derivatives positions.

3. Capital and Reporting Requirements for FCMs That Also Are SDs or

MSPs

Section 4s(e)(3)(B)(i) of the CEA recognizes that the requirements

applicable to SDs and MSPs under section 4s do not limit the

Commission's authority with respect to FCM regulatory requirements.

Furthermore, with respect to cleared swaps, section 724 of the Dodd-

Frank Act provides that if a SD or MSP accepts any money, securities,

or property (or extends credit in lieu of money, securities, or

property) from, or on behalf of, a swaps customer to margin, guarantee,

or secure a swap position cleared by or through a derivatives clearing

organization, the SD or MSP must register with the Commission as an

FCM.\11\ Therefore, the requirement to comply with CFTC FCM capital

requirements extends to SDs and MSPs that are required to register as

FCMs as a result of carrying customer accounts containing cleared swap

positions. This would include SDs and MSPs that are subject to

regulation by prudential regulators, and are required to register as

FCMs. In part II.B of this release, the Commission proposes specific

capital and financial reporting requirements applicable to FCMs that

also are registered as SDs or MSPs.

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\11\ Section 724 of the Dodd-Frank Act amends Section 4d of the

CEA by adding a new provision, Section 4d(f)(1), which provides that

it is unlawful for any person to accept money, securities, or other

property from or on behalf of a swap customer to margin, guarantee

or secure a swap cleared by or through a derivatives clearing

organization unless the person is registered as an FCM under the

CEA. See, also, Section 4s(e)(3)(B)(i)(I) of the CEA, as amended by

Section 731 of the Dodd-Frank Act, which provides the Commission

with authority to impose capital requirements upon SDs and MSPs that

are registered as FCMs.

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E. Structure and Approach

Consistent with the objectives set forth above, part II of this

release summarizes regulations that the Commission proposes in order to

establish minimum capital and financial reporting requirements for SDs

and MSPs that are not banks. As noted in previous proposed rulemaking

issued by the Commission, the Commission intends, where practicable, to

consolidate regulations implementing section 4s of the CEA in a new

part 23.\12\ By this Federal Register release, the Commission is

proposing to adopt the capital requirements and related financial

condition reporting requirements of SDs and MSPs under subpart E of

part 23 of the Commission's regulations.

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\12\ See 75 FR 71379, 71383 (November 23, 2010).

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In addition to the amendments being proposed for subpart E of part

23, the Commission also is proposing certain other amendments to FCM

regulations contained in part 1. The proposed regulations for SD and

MSP capital and financial reporting, as well as capital and financial

reporting requirements for FCMs, are discussed in part II of this

release. Additional amendments for part 140 of the Commission's

regulations are discussed in part III of this release.

II. Proposed Capital and Financial Reporting Regulations Under Part 23

for SDs and MSPs and Part 1 for FCMs

Proposed Sec. 23.101 would specify capital requirements applicable

to SDs and MSPs. Regulation 23.101 includes language specifying

exemptions from the Commission's proposed SD-MSP capital rules,

however, for any SD or MSP that is: (1) Subject to regulation by a

prudential regulator; (2) designated by the Financial Stability

Oversight Council as a systemically important financial institution

(SIFI) and subject to supervision by the Federal Reserve Board; or (3)

registered as an FCM.

The capital requirements of SDs and MSPs that are subject to

regulation by a prudential regulator would be established by the

prudential regulator. As identified by the prudential regulators,

applicable capital regulations for the entities they regulate include

the following: (1) In the case of insured depository institutions, the

capital adequacy guidelines adopted under 12

[[Page 27805]]

U.S.C. 1831o; (2) in the case of a bank holding company or savings and

loan holding company, the capital adequacy guidelines applicable to

bank holding companies under 12 CFR part 225; (3) in the case of a

foreign bank or the U.S. branch or agency of a foreign bank, the

applicable capital rules pursuant to 12 CFR 225.2(r)(3)(i); (4) in the

case of ``Edge corporations'' or ``Agreement corporations'', the

applicable capital adequacy guidelines pursuant to 12 CFR 211.12(c)(2);

(5) in the case of any regulated entity under the Federal Housing

Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992 (i.e., Fannie

Mae and its affiliates, Freddie Mac and its affiliates, and the Federal

Home Loan Banks), the risk-based capital level or such other amount as

required by the Director of FHFA pursuant to 12 U.S.C. 4611; (6) in the

case of the Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation, the capital

adequacy regulations set forth in 12 CFR part 652; and (7) in the case

of any farm credit institution (other than the Federal Agricultural

Mortgage Corporation), the capital regulations set forth in 12 CFR part

615.\13\

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\13\ See joint proposed rulemaking issued by the prudential

regulators on April 12, 2011, titled ``Margin and Capital

Requirements for Covered Swap Entities.''

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Any SD or MSP that was determined to be a SIFI by the Financial

Stability Oversight Council would be subject to supervision by the

Federal Reserve Board.\14\ In this proposal, the Commission is electing

not to impose an additional capital requirement on a SD or MSP that is

designated a SIFI and subject to regulation of the Federal Reserve

Board. As part of the application process (and similar to FCM

application requirements under Sec. 1.17), proposed Sec. 23.101 would

require an applicant for registration as an SD or MSP to demonstrate

its compliance with the applicable Commission-imposed regulatory

capital requirements, or to demonstrate instead that it is supervised

by a prudential regulator or is designated as a SIFI.

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\14\ Section 113 of the Dodd-Frank Act sets forth the process by

which U.S. nonbank financial companies (as defined in section

102(a)(4)(B) of the Dodd-Frank Act) may be designated as

systemically important. Accordingly, a company that is registered as

a SD or MSP with the Commission may be designated as a SIFI by the

Financial Stability Oversight Council under a process laid out in

Title I of the Dodd-Frank Act. Entities that are designated as SIFIs

under Title I of the Dodd-Frank Act are considered to be supervised

by the Federal Reserve Board.

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While the Commission is not proposing to impose capital

requirements on a registered SD or MSP that is subject to prudential

regulation or is designated as a SIFI, the Commission is proposing to

require such an entity to file capital information with the Commission

upon request. Proposed Sec. 23.105(c)(2) provides that, upon the

request of the Commission, each SD or MSP subject to prudential

supervision or designated as a SIFI must provide the Commission with

copies of its capital computations and accompanying schedules and other

supporting documentation. The capital computations must be in

accordance with the regulations of the applicable prudential regulator

with jurisdiction over the SD or MSP.

Furthermore, any SD or MSP that is required to register as an FCM,

including an SD or MSP that is subject to supervision by a prudential

regulator or is designated a SIFI and subject to regulation by the

Federal Reserve Board, would be subject to the capital requirements set

forth in Sec. 1.17 for FCMs. Part II.B.2 of this release discusses the

applicable requirements for FCMs that also are registered as SDs or

MSPs.

A. Proposed Minimum Capital Requirements for SDs and MSPs That Are Not

FCMs

1. Subsidiaries of Bank Holding Companies

The requirements for SDs and MSPs under proposed Sec. 23.101

reflect the fact that these firms may include subsidiaries of U.S. bank

holding companies that are required by section 716 of Dodd-Frank to

``push out'' to an affiliate certain swap trading activities. The

prudential regulators for the banks that may be required to comply with

section 716 include the Federal Reserve Board, the FDIC, and the OCC.

The capital rules of these banking agencies have addressed OTC

derivatives since 1989, when the banking agencies implemented their

risk based capital adequacy standards under the first Basel Accord.\15\

As noted by these banking agencies, they have amended and supplemented

their capital rules over time to take into account developments in the

derivatives markets, including through the addition of market risk

amendments which required banks and bank holding companies meeting

certain thresholds to calculate their capital requirements for trading

positions through models approved by the appropriate banking regulator.

The banks affected by the provisions of Section 716 also may include

certain large, complex banks, which together with certain bank holding

companies are subject to other requirements for computing credit risk

requirements under Basel II capital standards that have been

implemented by these banking agencies.\16\ The Federal Reserve, OCC,

and FDIC also have stated their intention to implement requirements

under recent Basel III proposals, which would establish additional

capital requirements for the banks and bank holding companies for which

these banking agencies are the prudential regulator.

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\15\ The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is a committee

of banking supervisory authorities established in 1974 by the

central-bank Governors of the Group of Ten countries. In 1988, the

Basel Committee published a document titled the ``International

Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards'' (the

``Basel Capital Accord''), which set forth an agreed framework for

measuring capital adequacy and the minimum requirements for capital

for banking institutions. There have been several amendments to the

Basel Capital Accord in the intervening years, including, in January

of 1996, the ``Amendment to the Capital Accord to Incorporate Market

Risks.'' The Basel Committee issued a revised framework in June of

2004 (``Basel II''), and has continued to propose additional

amendments thereafter. In 2010, the Basel Committee issued further

requirements for internationally active banks that are set forth in

``Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework for More Resilient Banks

and Banking Systems.''

\16\ The advanced approaches rules are codified at 12 CFR part

325, appendix D (FDIC); 12 CFR part 3, appendix C (OCC); and 12 CFR

part 208, appendix F and 12 CFR part 225, appendix G (Federal

Reserve Board).

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Described in very general terms, the capital rules adopted by these

banking agencies establish the required minimum amount of regulatory

capital in terms of a ``minimum ratio of qualifying total capital to

weighted risk assets of 8 percent, of which at least 4.0 percentage

points should be in the form of Tier 1 capital.'' \17\ For purposes of

this requirement, the assets and off-balance sheet items of the bank or

bank holding company are weighted relative to their risk (primarily

credit risk): The greater the risk, the greater the weighting. Large,

complex banks must make further adjustments to these risk-weighted

assets for the additional capital they must hold to reflect the market

risk of their trading assets. The bank or bank holding company's total

capital must equal or exceed at least 8 percent of its risk-weighted

assets, and at least half of its total capital must meet the more

restrictive requirements of the definition of Tier 1 capital. For

example, a bank's total capital, but not its Tier 1 capital, may

include certain mandatory convertible debt.\18\

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\17\ See, 12 CFR part 225, appendix A, Sec. II.A.

\18\ Mandatory convertible debt securities are subordinated debt

instruments that require the issuer to convert such instruments into

common or perpetual preferred stock by a date at or before the

maturity of the debt instruments.

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The terms of proposed Sec. 23.101 have been drafted to maintain

consistent capital requirements among bank and nonbank subsidiaries

(other than FCM

[[Page 27806]]

subsidiaries) of a U.S. bank holding company. By meeting requirements

in the specified banking regulations, the SD or MSP will be subject to

comparable capital regulations applicable to their parent U.S. bank

holding companies, including the same credit risk and market risk

capital requirements. Establishing a regime that imposes consistent

capital requirements on nonbank subsidiaries, bank holding companies,

and banks with respect to their swap activities further enhances the

regulatory regime by attempting to remove incentives for registrants to

engage in regulatory arbitrage.

The Commission has determined that it is appropriate to defer to

the Federal Reserve Board's existing capital requirements for SDs and

MSPs that are nonbank subsidiaries of a U.S. bank holding company

because the existing capital requirements encompass the scope of the

swaps activity and related hedging activity contemplated under the

Dodd-Frank Act; the existing requirements sufficiently account for

certain risk exposures, including credit and market risks; and the

existing requirements meet the statutory requirement of ensuring the

safety and soundness of the SD or MSP and are appropriate for the risk

associated with the non-cleared swaps held by the SD or MSP.\19\

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\19\ Section 4s(e)(3)(A)(i) and (ii) of the CEA.

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The proposed regulation provides that a SD or MSP that is a nonbank

subsidiary of a U.S. bank holding company would have to comply with a

regulatory capital requirement specified by the Federal Reserve Board

as if the subsidiary itself were a U.S. bank holding company. The scope

of such a regulatory capital requirement would include the swap

transactions and related hedge positions that are part of the SD's or

MSP's swap activities. Specifically, the SD or MSP would be required to

comply with a regulatory capital requirement equal to or in excess of

the greater of: (1) $20 million of Tier 1 capital as defined in 12 CFR

part 225, appendix A, Sec. II.A; \20\ (2) the SD's or MSP's minimum

risk-based ratio requirements, as if the subsidiary itself were a U.S.

bank holding company subject to 12 CFR part 225, and any appendices

thereto; or (3) the capital required by a registered futures

association of which the SD or MSP is a member.

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\20\ The Federal Reserve Board regulations governing bank

holding companies are set forth in at 12 CFR part 225. These

regulations establish a minimum ratio of qualifying total capital to

weighted risk assets of 8 percent, of which at least 4.0 percentage

points should be in the form of Tier 1 capital.

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The proposed $20 million minimum Tier 1 capital requirement is

consistent with the minimum adjusted net capital requirement that

Congress established for Commission registrants engaging in bilateral

off-exchange foreign currency transactions with retail

participants.\21\ The Commission believes that SDs and MSPs that engage

in bilateral swap transactions should be subject to a minimum capital

requirement that is at least equal to the minimum level of capital

Congress established for registrants engaged in retail bilateral off-

exchange foreign currency transactions.

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\21\ See sections 2(c)(2)(B)(i) and (ii) of the CEA.

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The additional proposed minimum capital requirement based on

membership requirements of a registered futures association is similar

to FCM requirements under Sec. 1.17, and is appropriate in light of

proposed Commission rules that would require each SD and MSP to be a

member of a registered futures association. Currently, the National

Futures Association (NFA) is the only registered futures association.

The proposal recognizes that NFA may adopt SD and MSP capital rules at

some later date, and would incorporate such requirements into the

Commission's regulation.

2. Commercial and Other Firms That Are Not Part of Bank Holding

Companies

Certain SDs and MSPs subject to proposed regulation Sec. 23.101

may be commercial firms or other entities with no affiliations to U.S.

bank holding companies. For such SDs and MSPs, the proposed rule would

require that their regulatory capital requirement as measured by

``tangible net equity'' meet or exceed: (1) $20 million of ``tangible

net equity,'' plus the amount of the SD's or MSP's over-the-counter

derivatives credit risk requirement and additional market risk exposure

requirement (as defined below), or (2) the capital required by a

registered futures association of which the SD or MSP is a member.

For purposes of the proposed capital requirement, the term

``tangible net equity'' is defined in proposed Sec. 23.102 as a SD's

or MSP's equity as computed under generally accepted accounting

principles as established in the United States, less goodwill and other

intangible assets.\22\ The proposal would further require an SD or MSP

in computing its tangible net equity to consolidate the assets and

liabilities of any subsidiary or affiliate for which the SD or MSP

guarantees the obligations or liabilities. In accordance with similar

provisions in existing capital rules for FCMs, the proposal further

provides that the SD or MSP may consolidate the assets and liabilities

of a subsidiary or affiliate of which the SD or MSP has not guaranteed

the obligations or liabilities, provided that the SD or MSP has

obtained an opinion of counsel stating that the net asset value of the

subsidiary or affiliate, or the portion of the net asset value

attributable to the SD or MSP, may be distributed to the SD or MSP

within 30 calendar days. Lastly, the proposal would further require

that each SD or MSP included within the consolidation shall at all

times be in compliance with its respective minimum regulatory capital

requirements. The requirement for the SD or MSP to calculate its

tangible net equity on a consolidated basis is consistent with the

requirements in Sec. 1.17 for FCMs, and ensures that the SD's or MSP's

tangible net equity reflects any liabilities and other obligations for

which the SD or MSP may be directly or indirectly responsible.

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\22\ The Commission is explicitly requesting comment on whether

certain intangible assets, such as royalties, should be permitted in

the SD's or MSP's calculation of tangible net equity.

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The term ``over-the-counter derivatives credit risk requirement''

is defined in proposed Sec. 23.100 and refers to the capital that the

SD or MSP must maintain to cover potential counterparty credit

exposures for receivables arising from OTC swap positions that are not

cleared by or through a clearing organization. The term ``additional

market risk exposure requirement'' is defined in proposed Sec. 23.100

and refers to the additional amount of capital the SD or MSP must

maintain for the total potential market risk associated with such swaps

and any product used to hedge such swaps, including futures, options,

other swaps or security-based swaps, debt or equity securities, foreign

currency, physical commodities, and other derivatives. The Commission

is proposing to include swap transactions and related hedge positions

that are part of the SD's swap activities in the over-the-counter

derivatives credit risk requirement and market risk exposure

requirement, and not swap positions or related hedges that are part of

the SD's commercial operations.\23\ MSPs would

[[Page 27807]]

include all swap positions in the market risk and over-the-counter

derivatives credit exposure requirement. A discussion of the

methodology for computing the over-the-counter derivatives credit risk

requirement and the market risk exposure requirement is set forth in

part II.C. of this release.

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\23\ For example, if an SD entered into a swap transaction with

a counterparty as part of its swap dealing activities, the over-the-

counter derivatives credit risk requirement and market risk exposure

requirement associated with the swap position and any positions

hedging or otherwise related to the swap position would be included

in the SD's calculation of its minimum capital requirement. If,

however, an SD entered into a swap transaction to mitigate risk

associated with its commercial activities, the swap position and any

related positions would not be included in the SD's calculation of

its minimum capital requirement.

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The computation of regulatory capital based upon an SD's or MSP's

tangible net equity is a significant, but necessary, departure from the

Commission's traditional adjusted net capital rule for FCMs. A primary

distinction between the tangible net equity and adjusted net capital

methods is that the tangible net equity approach does not require that

a registrant maintain the same degree of highly liquid assets as the

traditional FCM adjusted net capital computation. The proposed tangible

net equity computation would allow SDs and MSPs to include in their

minimum capital computation assets that would not qualify as current

assets under FCM adjusted net capital requirements, such as property,

plant and equipment, and other potentially-illiquid assets.

The Commission is proposing a capital requirement based upon a SD's

or MSP's tangible net equity based upon its understanding that

potential SD and MSP registrants do not conduct their business

operations in a manner comparable to traditional FCMs. For example,

certain entities that are extensively or primarily engaged in the

energy or agricultural business may be required to register as SDs or

MSPs. Although these SDs and MSPs may have significant amounts of

balance sheet equity, it may also be the case that significant portions

of their equity is comprised of physical and other non-current assets,

which would preclude the firms from meeting FCM capital requirements

without engaging in significant corporate restructuring and incurring

potentially undue costs.

The Commission believes that setting a capital requirement that is

different from the traditional FCM adjusted net capital approach is

acceptable for SDs and MSPs that are not acting as market

intermediaries in the same manner as FCMs. Readily available liquid

assets are essential for FCMs to meet their key financial obligations.

FCMs have core obligations for the funds they hold for and on behalf of

their customers, and FCMs further guarantee their customers' financial

obligations with derivatives clearing organizations, including

obligations to make appropriate initial and variation margin payments

to derivatives clearing organizations. SDs and MSPs, however, do not

interact with derivatives clearing organizations to clear customer

transactions and cannot engage in transactions with customers trading

on designated contract markets without registering as FCMs.

B. Proposed Minimum Capital Requirements for SDs and MSPs That Are FCMs

The Commission is proposing to essentially impose the current FCM

capital regime on SDs and MSPs that also are registered as FCMs. FCMs

currently are required, pursuant to Sec. 1.17, to maintain a minimum

level of adjusted net capital that is equal to or greater than the

greatest of: (1) $1,000,000; (2) $20,000,000 for an FCM engaged in off-

exchange foreign currency transactions with retail participants, plus

an additional 5 percent of the total liabilities to the retail foreign

currency customers that exceeds $10,000,000; (3) the sum of 8 percent

of the risk margin on cleared futures and cleared swap positions

carried in customer and non-customer accounts; (4) the amount of

adjusted net capital required by a registered futures association of

which the FCM is a member; and (5) for an FCM that also is registered

as a securities broker-dealer, the amount of net capital required by

rules of the SEC.\24\

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\24\ FCMs that register as security-based swap dealers also will

be subject to minimum capital requirements established by the SEC

for security-based swap dealers.

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The Commission is proposing amendments to Sec. 1.17 that would

impose a minimum $20 million adjusted net capital requirement if the

FCM also is an SD or MSP. The $20 million minimum requirement is

consistent with the Commission's proposal to adopt a $20 million

minimum capital requirement for SDs and MSPs that are not FCMs, and is

further consistent with the Commission's recent adoption of a $20

million minimum capital requirement for FCMs that engage in off-

exchange foreign currency transactions with retail participants.

Furthermore, the Commission notes that the current capital

regulations would impose a risk-based capital requirement on SDs and

MSPs that are required to register as FCMs as a result of their

carrying and clearing of customer swap or futures transactions with a

clearing organization. As noted above, the current regulation requires

an FCM to maintain adjusted net capital that is equal to or greater

than 8 percent of the risk margin associated with cleared futures and

swap transactions carried by the FCM in customer and non-customer

accounts. The 8 percent of margin, or risk-based capital rule, is

intended to require FCMs to maintain a minimum level of capital that is

associated with the level of risk associated with the customer

positions that the FCM carries.

C. Required Calculations for Credit Risk and Market Risk Requirements

The proposed regulations include an application process by which

certain SDs and MSPs may apply to the Commission for approval to use

proprietary internal models for their capital calculations required by

part 23. For those SDs and MSPs whose calculations are not permitted to

be based upon such models, the proposed regulations sets forth other

specified requirements for the SD's or MSP's required market and credit

risk calculations.

1. Request for Approval of Calculations Using Internal Models

The Commission recognizes that internal models, including value-at-

risk (VaR) models, can provide a more effective means of recognizing

the potential economic risks or exposures from complex trading

strategies involving OTC derivatives and other investment instruments.

In this connection, the Commission has previously adopted Sec.

1.17(c)(6), which allows certain FCMs that are dually-registered with

the SEC to elect to use internally developed models to compute market

risk deductions for proprietary positions in securities, forward

contracts, foreign currency, and futures contracts, and credit risk

deductions for unsecured receivables from counterparties in OTC

transactions (the ``Alternative Capital Computation'') in lieu of the

standard deductions set forth in Sec. 1.17(c). A precondition of using

the Alternative Capital Computation is the SEC's review and written

approval of the firm's application to use internal models in computing

its capital under SEC regulations, and the requirement that the model

and the firm's risk management meet certain qualitative and

quantitative requirements set forth in SEC Rule 15c3-1e. The firm also

was required to maintain at least $1 billion of tentative net capital

and $500 million in net capital.\25\ The firm further was obligated to

report to the SEC and to the

[[Page 27808]]

CFTC if its tentative net capital fell below $5 billion.\26\

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\25\ See 17 CFR 15c3-1(a)(7).

\26\ See 17 CFR 15c3-1e(e)(1).

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Significant resources, however, are necessary for regulators to

effectively assess and to periodically review proprietary internal

models. Absent concerns regarding future Commission resources to

implement an adequate program for the effective direct supervision of

internal models used by SDs and MSPs, the Commission would propose

regulations to establish a framework by which FCMs that are registered

as SDs or MSPs could submit internal models to the Commission for

review and approval for use in their required capital calculations.

Such a program would include the continuous and direct review by

Commission staff of the policies and procedures applicable to, and

output of, such proprietary models.

In view, however, of current Commission resources which does not

support the development of a program to conduct the initial review and

ongoing assessment of internal models, and the uncertainty of future

funding levels for the necessary staffing resources, this release

provides for an application process for approval of SD and MSP capital

calculations using internal models, but limits the initial pool of

applicants to those whose internal models are subject to review by the

Federal Reserve Board or the SEC. Specifically, proposed Sec. 23.103

would permit a nonbank SD or MSP that also is part of a U.S. bank

holding company subject to oversight by the Federal Reserve Board to

apply to the Commission for approval by written order to use

proprietary internal models to compute market risk and credit risk

capital requirements under the applicable U.S. bank holding company

regulations. The SD or MSP also may apply for such approval if it also

is registered as an SSD or MSSP, and the internal models for which it

seeks approval have been reviewed and are subject to the regular

assessment by the SEC.

a. Application Process and Requirements for Internal Models

As set forth in the proposed regulation, the application must

address several factors including: (1) Identifying the categories of

positions that the SD or MSP holds in its proprietary accounts; (2)

describing the methods that the SD or MSP will use to calculate its

market risk and credit risk capital requirements; (3) describing the

internal models; and (4) describing how the SD or MSP will calculate

current exposure and potential future exposure. The SD or MSP also must

explain the extent to which the internal models have been reviewed and

approved by the Federal Reserve Board, or, as applicable, the SEC.

The proposal would further provide that the internal models must

meet such requirements as are adopted by U.S. regulators under the

Basel Accord, including requirements implemented as part of Basel III.

In particular, the internal models must meet the requirements that are

set forth in regulations of the Federal Reserve Board at 12 CFR part

225, appendix E and appendix G applicable to market risk and OTC

counterparty credit risk; or, as applicable to SSDs or MSSPs, the

requirements set forth in SEC regulations. Such requirements include,

but are not limited to, the requirements in these regulations to assess

the effectiveness of such models by conducting appropriate backtesting

and for the application of multipliers to the model outputs that would

be based on the results of such backtesting.

The proposed regulation further specifies that the application

shall be in writing and filed with the regional office of the

Commission having jurisdiction over the SD or MSP as set forth in Sec.

140.2 of the Commission's regulations. The application may be filed

electronically in accordance with instructions approved by the

Commission and specified on the Commission's Web site. A petition for

confidential treatment of information within the application may be

submitted according to procedures set forth in Sec. 145.9. The

proposed rule further provides that the SD or MSP must promptly, upon

the request of the Commission at any time, provide any other

explanatory information as the Commission may require at its discretion

regarding the SD's or MSP's internal models and related capital

computations.

As set forth in proposed Sec. 23.103, upon recommendation by

Commission staff, the Commission may approve the application, or

approve an amendment to the application, in whole or in part, subject

to any conditions or limitations the Commission may require, if the

Commission finds the approval to be necessary or appropriate in the

public interest or for the protection of investors, after determining,

among other things, whether the applicant has met the requirements of

this section and is in compliance with other applicable rules

promulgated under the Act and by self-regulatory organizations. The

proposed rule also specifies the following conditions under which such

Commission approval may be terminated: (1) Internal models that were

previously approved are no longer approved or periodically reviewed by

the Federal Reserve Board or the SEC; (2) the SD or MSP has changed

materially a mathematical model described in the application or changed

materially its internal risk management control system without first

submitting amendments identifying such changes and obtaining Commission

approval for such changes; (3) the Commission in its own discretion

determines that as a result of changes in the operations of the SD or

MSP the internal models are no longer sufficient for purposes of the

capital calculations of the SD or MSP; (4) the SD or MSP fails to come

into compliance with its requirements under the terms of the

Commission's approval under Sec. 23.103, after having received from

the Commission's designee written notification that the firm is not in

compliance with its requirements, and must come into compliance by a

date specified in the notice; or (5) upon any other condition specified

in the Commission approval order.

b. Approval Criteria if SD or MSP Also Is an FCM

If the application made under proposed part 23 is from an SD or MSP

that also is an FCM, proposed Sec. 23.103 provides that the

application shall specify that the firm requests approval to calculate

its adjusted net capital (not tangible net equity or other regulatory

capital) using proprietary internal models. The Commission also is

proposing to provide in Sec. 1.17(c)(7) that any FCM that also is

registered as an SD or MSP, or also is registered as an SSD or MSSP,

and which has received approval of its application to the Commission

under Sec. 23.103 for capital computations using the firm's internal

models, shall calculate its adjusted net capital in accordance with the

terms and conditions of such Commission approval. The Commission

further is proposing to amend Sec. 1.17(c)(6)(i) to recognize the

possibility that FCMs that have been authorized to elect to use the

Alternative Capital Computation may be SDs or MSPs and required to

register as such with the Commission. The amended Sec. 1.17(c)(6)(i)

would permit these FCMs to continue to apply the Alternative Capital

Computation pending the Commission's determination of the application

that such FCMs must file under proposed part 23.

[[Page 27809]]

2. Calculations by SDs and MSPs That Are Not Using Internal Models and

Are Not FCMs

As noted earlier, the internal models that may be approved for use

in the capital calculations of SDs and MSPs must meet qualifying

standards under the Basel Accord. In addition to specifying qualifying

criteria for internal models, the Basel Accord also includes other

requirements for capital calculations that do not incorporate

measurements from the firm's internal models.

a. OTC Derivatives Credit Risk

Proposed Sec. 23.104 sets forth capital calculations for OTC

derivatives credit risk that are based on Basel requirements that do

not incorporate internal models. The proposed required credit risk

deduction also includes a concentration charge specified in SEC Rule

15c3-1e. The charge as proposed would equal the sum of (1) a

counterparty exposure charge (summarized below) and (2) a counterparty

concentration charge, which would equal 50 percent of the amount of the

current exposure to any counterparty in excess of 5 percent of the SD's

or MSP's applicable minimum capital requirement, plus a portfolio

concentration charge of 100 percent of the amount of the SD's or MSP's

aggregate current exposure for all counterparties in excess of 50

percent of the SD's or MSP's applicable minimum capital requirement.

The counterparty exposure charge would equal the sum of the net

replacement values in the accounts of insolvent or bankrupt

counterparties plus the ``credit equivalent amount'' of the SD's or

MSP's exposure to its other counterparties. The SD or MSP would be

permitted to offset the net replacement value and the credit equivalent

amount by the value of collateral submitted by the counterparty, as

specified and subject to certain haircuts in the proposed rule. The

resultant calculation would be multiplied by a credit risk factor of 8

percent.

For purposes of this computation, the credit equivalent amount

would equal the sum of the SD's or MSP's current exposure and potential

future exposure to each of its counterparties that is not insolvent or

bankrupt. The current exposure for multiple OTC positions would equal

the greater of (i) the net sum of all positive and negative mark-to-

market values of the individual OTC positions, subject to permitted

netting pursuant to a qualifying master netting agreement; or (ii)

zero.\27\ The potential future exposure for multiple OTC positions that

are subject to a qualifying master netting agreement is calculated in

accordance with the following formula: Anet = (0.4 x Agross) + (0.6 x

NGR x Agross), where: (i) Agross equals the sum of the potential future

exposure for each individual OTC position \28\ subject to the swap

trading relationship documentation that permits netting; \29\ and (ii)

NGR equals the ratio of the net current credit exposure to the gross

current credit exposure. In calculating the NGR, the gross current

credit exposure equals the sum of the positive current credit exposures

of all individual OTC derivative contracts subject to any netting

provisions of the swap trading relationship documentation, which must

be legally enforceable in each relevant jurisdiction, including in

insolvency proceedings. The proposed rule also requires that the gross

receivables and gross payables subject to the netting agreement can be

determined at any time; and that the SD or MSP, for internal risk

management purposes, monitors and controls its exposure to the

counterparty on a net basis. The credit risk equivalent amount may be

reduced to the extent of the market value of collateral pledged to and

held by the swap dealer or major swap participant to secure an over-

the-counter position. The collateral would be subject to the following

requirements:

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\27\ For a single OTC position, the current exposure is the

greater of the mark-to-market value of the over-the-counter position

or zero.

\28\ For a single over-the-counter position, the potential

future exposure, including an over-the-counter position with a

negative mark-to-market value, is calculated by multiplying the

notional principal amount of the position by the appropriate

conversion factor in Table E of the proposed rules. Table E is the

same as the table proposed as ``Table to 1.3(sss)'' in proposed

rulemaking issued jointly by the CFTC and SEC for purposes of the

further definition of the term ``major swap participant.'' See 75 FR

80174, 80214 (December 21, 2010). Both tables remove any references

to credit ratings and require the same charge to be applied to all

corporate debt regardless of rating.

\29\ 76 FR 6715.

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The collateral must be in the swap dealer or major swap

participant's physical possession or control; Provided, However,

collateral may include collateral held in independent third party

accounts as provided under part 23;

The collateral must meet the requirements specified in a

credit support agreement meeting the requirements of Sec. 23.151;

If the counterparty is a swap dealer, major swap

participant or financial entity as defined in Sec. 23.150, certain

additional requirements apply as described in the proposed rule at

Sec. 23.104(j); and

Applicable haircuts must be applied to the market value of

the collateral.

Once the credit equivalent amount is computed as described above,

the SD or MSP would be required to apply a credit risk factor of 50

percent, regardless of any credit rating of the counterparty by any

credit rating agency.\30\ However, the SD or MSP also may apply to the

Commission for approval to assign internal individual ratings to each

of its counterparties, or for an affiliated bank or affiliated broker-

dealer to do so. The application will specify which internal ratings

will result in application of a 20 percent risk weight, 50 percent risk

weight, or 150 percent risk weight. Based on the strength of the

applicant's internal credit risk management system, the Commission may

approve the application. The SD or MSP must make and keep current a

record of the basis for the credit rating for each counterparty, and

the records must be maintained in accordance with Sec. 1.31 of the

Commission's regulations.

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\30\ The Basel credit risk factors are determined for

counterparties based on credit ratings assigned by credit rating

agencies to such counterparties. Section 939A of the Dodd-Frank Act

requires the Commission to review and modify regulations that place

reliance on credit rating agencies. Accordingly, the Commission is

proposing a 50 percent credit risk factor in lieu of assigning a

credit risk factor based on ratings issued by credit rating

agencies.

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b. Additional Market Risk Exposure

Proposed Sec. 23.103 specifies required calculations for market

risk that are based on Basel ``standardized'' measurement procedures

for assessing market risk arising from positions in traded debt and

equity and in commodities and foreign currencies. The Basel

standardized approach also includes market risk exposure requirements

for options that have debt instruments, equities, foreign currency, or

commodities as the underlying positions. Although proposing

requirements based on the Basel standardized approach for market risk

calculations, Commission staff recognizes that the Basel Accord

expressly supports capital requirements based on internal risk

measurement models as the better approach for a bank that has a

significant business in options or commodities.\31\ However, as

discussed above, absent a program for the review and approval of

internal

[[Page 27810]]

models, the Commission believes that this established approach is the

most appropriate method for computing market risk charges.

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\31\ See ``Basel II: International Convergence of Capital

Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework--

Comprehensive Version,'' issued by the Basel Committee on Banking

Supervision in June 2006.

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The Basel standardized charges seek to address ``general market

risk,'' meaning the risk of changes in the market value of transactions

that arise from broad market movements, such as changing levels of

market interest rates, broad equity indices, or currency exchange

rates. Where applicable, the Basel standardized charges also seek to

address ``specific'' risk, which is defined as changes in the market

value of a position due to factors other than broad market movements.

Such specific risk may include default risk,\32\ event risk (the risk

of loss on a position that could result from sudden and unexpected

large changes in market prices or specific events other than the

default of the issuer), and idiosyncratic risk (the risk of loss in the

value of a position that arises from changes in risk factors unique to

that position).

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\32\ Default risk is the risk of loss on a position that could

result from the failure of an obligor to make timely payments of

principal or interest on its debt obligation, and the risk of loss

that could result from bankruptcy, insolvency, or similar

proceeding. For credit derivatives, default risk means the risk of

loss on a position that could result from the default of the

reference exposure(s).

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Applying the Basel standardized approach, the proposed rules

require the calculation of separate charges for general and specific

market risk for positions in equities and debt instruments (including

options with underlying instruments in these categories), which are

summed to determine the total charge required with respect to such

positions. Only general market charges are calculated for positions in

commodities and foreign currencies (including options with underlying

instruments in these categories). For purposes of computing such

specific and general market risk charges, off-balance sheet positions

are included. For example, swaps are included in the calculation as two

positions, with a receiving side treated as a long position and a

paying side treated as a short position, and using market values of the

notional position in the underlying debt or equity instrument, or index

portfolio. The required calculations for specific risk and general

market risk charges are described in more detail below.

i. Specific Risk

For positions in equities, the proposed specific risk charge equals

8 percent of the firm's gross equity positions, i.e., the absolute sum

of all long equity positions and of all short equity positions, with

netting allowed when the SD or MSP has long and short positions in

exactly the same instrument.

The specific risk charge required for debt instruments is based on

risk-weight factors applied to the debt instrument positions of the SD

or MSP. The applicable required risk weight factor is based in part on

the identity of the obligor. For example, all positions in debt

instruments of national governments of the Organization of Economic Co-

operation and Development (``OECD'') countries are assigned zero

specific risk. Other debt securities issued by ``qualifying'' borrowers

are assigned risk weights that vary by maturity; specifically, 0.25

percent (6 months or less); 1 percent (6 to 24 months); or 1.6 percent

(over 24 months). Qualifying debt instruments include those issued by

U.S. government-sponsored agencies; general obligation debt instruments

issued by states and other political subdivisions of OECD countries and

multilateral development banks; and debt instruments issued by U.S.

depository institutions or OECD-banks that do not qualify as capital of

the issuing institution.

The Basel standardized approach also permits certain rated

corporate debt securities to be included as qualifying debt. However,

given the legislative directive to eliminate the use of credit ratings

in Commission regulations, the proposed rules do not permit any

differentiation among the charges applied to corporate debt securities.

As a result, the proposed rule would apply the same haircut to highly-

rated debt as to debt that is not highly-rated, i.e., the maximum

specific risk weight of 8 percent. The total proposed specific risk

charge for debt instruments would equal the sum of the risk-weighted

positions, with netting allowed for long and short positions (including

derivatives) in identical debt issues or indices.

In drafting the terms of proposed Sec. 23.103, the Commission has

taken into consideration Basel provisions relating to specific risk

that have been incorporated into banking regulations of the Federal

Reserve Board, FDIC, and OCC.\33\ These agencies have recently,

however, proposed revisions to their general market risk and specific

risk rules in light of certain amendments to the Basel Accord developed

in 2005 and 2009.\34\ The revisions proposed by these banking agencies

include requirements applicable to the treatment of credit derivatives

in the calculation of standardized specific risk charges, and the

proposed rules also set forth other offsetting permitted under the

Basel Accord for positions in a credit derivative and its corresponding

underlying instrument. The Commission's proposed requirements for

credit derivatives include text that is based on the banking agencies'

proposed rules. In particular, the text in proposed Sec. 23.104(c)(5)

is the same as the text proposed by the proposed banking agencies.

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\33\ The market risk capital rules of the OCC, Federal Reserve

Board, and FDIC appear respectively at 12 CFR part 3, appendix B; 12

CFR part 208, appendix E and part 225, appendix E, and 12 CFR part

325, appendix C.

\34\ See 76 FR 1890 (January 11, 2011)(proposing amendments that

include revisions to standardized specific risk charges). This

proposed rulemaking refers to Basel Accord revisions set forth in

``The Application of Basel II to Trading Activities and the

Treatment of Double Default Effects'', issued by the Basel Committee

on Banking Supervision and the International Organization of

Securities Commissions (IOSCO) in July 2005, and to the ``Revisions

to the Basel II Market Risk Framework, Guidelines for Computing

Capital for Incremental Risk in the Trading Book'' and ``

Enhancements to the Basel II Framework'' issued by the Basel

Committee on Banking Supervision in July of 2009.

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ii. General Market Risk Charges

In contrast to the Basel standardized approach to specific risk

charges, the federal banking agencies have not adopted the Basel

standardized approach for computing general market risk capital

charges.\35\ In 1995, U.S. banking regulators considered proposed rules

to implement two approaches under the Basel Accord for the capital

treatment of market risk: the internal models approach and the

standardized approach. These agencies subsequently determined, however,

that only the internal models approach would apply to general market

risk capital charges, noting that ``an institution with significant

exposure to market risk can most accurately measure that risk using

detailed information available to the institution about its particular

portfolio processed by its own risk measurement model.'' \36\ The

Commission, however, is proposing the Basel standardized approach since

such an approach does not rely upon proprietary internal models. The

terms in the proposed Sec. 23.104 for general market risk therefore

take into consideration the terms originally contemplated by these

banking agencies in the 1995 proposed

[[Page 27811]]

rules. Proposed Sec. 23.104 requires the calculation of separate

charges for general market risk for positions in equities, debt

instruments, commodities and foreign currency (including options with

underlying instruments in these categories), which are summed to

determine the total general market risk requirement with respect to

such positions.

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\35\ With permission by its federal banking regulator, a bank

also may use internal models for calculating specific risk charges.

See 76 FR 1890, 1893 (January 11, 2011) (discussion of specific risk

requirements currently applicable to banks).

\36\ See 60 FR 38082 (July 25, 1995) (release proposing market

risk capital charges) and 61 FR 47358, 47359 (September 6, 1996)

(release adopting internal models approach).

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Equities

The standardized measure of market risk for equities applies to

direct holdings of equity securities, equity derivatives and off-

balance-sheet positions whose market values are directly affected by

equity prices. The required charge is the sum of the specific risk

charge, calculated as described above, and of the general market risk

charge, which is equal to 8.0 percent of the difference between the sum

of the firm's long and the sum of the firm's short positions. The net

long or short position must be calculated separately for each national

market. Thus, for example, a long position in U.S. companies traded on

the New York Stock Exchange cannot be netted against a short position

in Japanese companies traded on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. Long and

short equity positions (including derivatives) in identical equity

issues or equity indices in the same market may be netted.

Debt Instruments

Applying the ``maturity'' method under the Basel standardized

approach, on and off-balance-sheet debt positions are distributed among

a range of time-bands and zones that are specified by the Basel Accord,

which are designed to take into account differences in price

sensitivities and interest rate volatilities across various maturities.

The time-band into which a position is distributed is determined by its

maturity (fixed rate instruments) or the nearest interest rate reset

date of the instrument (floating rates). Long positions are treated as

positive amounts and short positions are treated as negative amounts.

The net long or short position for each time-band is multiplied by the

risk weight specified in a table set forth in the Basel Accord.\37\ The

resulting risk-weighted position represents the amount by which the

market value of that debt position is expected to change for a

specified movement in interest rates. The sum of all risk-weighted

positions (long or short) across all time-bands is the base capital

charge for general market risk.

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\37\ The risk-weights provided in the table approximate the

price sensitivity of various instruments. The price sensitivity of

zero coupon and low coupon instruments can be materially greater

than that of instruments with higher coupons, and the table

therefore assigns higher risk weights to low coupon instruments.

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The standardized approach also requires a ``time-band

disallowance'' to address the basis risk that exists between

instruments with the same or similar maturities and also the possibly

different price movements that may be experienced by different

instruments within the same time-band due to the range of maturities

(or repricing periods) that may exist within a time-band. To capture

this risk, a disallowance of 10 percent is applied to the smaller of

the offsetting (long or short) positions within a time-band.\38\ This

amount would be added to the SD's or MSP's base capital charge.

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\38\ For example, if the sum of weighted long positions within a

time-band equals $100 million and the sum of weighted short

positions equals $90 million, the disallowance for the time-band

would be 10 percent of $90 million, or $9 million. Also, if the

offsetting amounts (long and short) are equal, the disallowance can

be applied to either figure.

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Additional disallowances address the risk that interest rates along

the yield curve are not perfectly correlated and that the risk-weighted

positions may not be offset fully. The required disallowances, which

apply to the smaller of the offsetting positions, are specified in a

table provided under the Basel Accord, and range from 30 percent to 100

percent. The amount of each disallowance varies in size by zone:

Greater netting is allowed for positions in different time bands but

within the same zone than is allowed for positions that are in

different zones. The firm must first determine ``intra-zone''

disallowance amounts, and then the required ``inter-zone''

disallowances across zones. An SD's or MSP's general market risk

requirement for debt instruments within a given currency would be the

sum of (1) the value of its net risk-weighted position and (2) all of

its time-band, intra-zone and inter-zone disallowances.\39\ The capital

charges would be separately computed for each currency in which an SD

or MSP has significant positions.

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\39\ The Basel standardized approach includes another maturity

ladder approach for interest rate products, the ``duration method,''

which is not included in the proposed Appendix as it requires

computations that are less standardized.

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Certain debt securities would not be included in the charges

described above, but would instead be subject to the capital treatment

under applicable provisions in the SEC's capital regulation at 17 CFR

240. 15c3-1. For example, municipal securities would be subject to

capital requirements in the SEC rule.\40\ All collateralized debt

obligations, asset-backed securities or mortgage-backed securities,

except pass-through mortgage-backed securities issued or guaranteed as

to principal or interest by the United States or any agency thereof,

would also be governed by the SEC rule.\41\

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\40\ This proposed separate treatment is consistent with the

SEC's analysis when considering, in 1997, capital provisions similar

to the Basel standardized approach for debt instruments. Although

the proposed rules were not adopted, the proposing release included

pertinent analysis that the market price of municipal securities

``depends on tax issues to a much greater extent than other debt

instruments,'' and that the price movements of non-investment grade

debt securities ``tend to be based primarily on issuer-specific

factors.'' See 62 FR 67996 (December 30, 1997).

\41\ Id. at 68002.

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Commodities

The market risk capital requirement for commodities risk applies to

holdings or positions taken in commodities, including precious metals,

but excluding gold (which is treated as a foreign currency because of

its market liquidity). The required charge addresses directional risk,

which is the risk that a commodity's spot price will increase or

decrease, as well as other important risks such as basis risk, interest

rate risk, and forward gap risk.

For purposes of determining the charge, the firm is required to

calculate its net position in each commodity on the basis of spot

rates. Long and short positions in the same commodity may be netted,

and different categories of commodities may be netted if deliverable

against each other. Under the ``simple'' approach under the Basel

Accord, the firm's capital charge for directional risk would equal 15

percent of its net position, long or short, in each commodity, and a

supplemental charge of 3.0 percent of the gross position in each

commodity is added to cover basis, interest rate and forward gap

risk.\42\

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\42\ The standardized approach will in certain instances offer

more than one measurement technique, of increasing degrees of

complexity. The ``simplified'' method for calculating general market

risk charges for positions in commodities has been included in the

proposed rules.

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Foreign Exchange

The market risk capital requirement for foreign exchange covers the

risk of holding or taking positions in foreign currencies (including

gold). The charge is determined by the firm's net positions in a given

currency, including its net spot and forward positions; any guarantees

that are certain to be called and likely to be irrecoverable; its net

future income and expenses that are not yet accrued, but that are

already fully hedged; and any other items

[[Page 27812]]

representing a profit or loss in foreign currencies. For purposes of

the calculation, forward and future positions are converted into the

reporting currency at spot market rates.

The standardized approach assumes the same volatility for all

currencies and requires an SD or MSP to take capital charge equal to

8.0 percent of the sum of (a) its net position in gold and (b) the

greater of the sum of the net short positions or the sum of the net

long positions in each foreign currency.

Options

The proposed rule is based on the ``delta-plus method'' under the

Basel standardized approach, which includes capital charges related to

the option's delta (its price sensitivity relative to price changes in

the underlying security, rate, or index); gamma (the change in delta

for a given change in the underlying); and vega (the effect of changes

in the volatility of the underlying).\43\ The three separate capital

charges are computed as follows:

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\43\ Two other methods under the Basel standardized approach for

options are not included in the Appendix, as the ``simplified''

method applies only to purchased options, and the ``scenario''

method incorporates measurements that must meet the same qualitative

requirements applicable to the internal models approach. See 60 FR

at 38091 (discussing restrictions on use of simplified and scenario

methods).

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Delta risk charge--This charge is determined by incorporating

options positions in the calculations (including specific risk if

applicable) that are required elsewhere in the proposed rule for

positions in commodities, foreign currencies, equities, and debt

instruments. Specifically, options are included as positions equal to

the market value of the underlying instrument multiplied by the delta.

To determine the delta, and also gamma and vega, sensitivities of the

options, the firm will use option pricing models that will be subject

to Commission review.

Total gamma risk charge--This charge requires the following steps:

(1) For each option, perform a ``gamma impact'' calculation that is

based on a Taylor series expansion and expressed in the Basel Accord

as: Gamma impact = .05 x Gamma x VU\2\. In this formula, VU refers to

the variation of the underlying of the option and is computed by

multiplying the market value of the underlying by percentages derived

from those specified elsewhere in the proposal for commodities, foreign

currencies, equities and debt instruments.\44\

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\44\ Applying the required percentages, VU would be determined

for a commodity option by multiplying the market value of the

underlying commodity by 15 percent; for a foreign currency by

multiplying the market value of the underlying by 8 percent; for an

equity or index by multiplying the market value of the underlying by

12 percent or 8 percent respectively, and for options on debt

instruments or interest rates, the market value of the underlying

multiplied by the risk weights for the appropriate time band as

derived from Table A. The text of the rules for the gamma risk

charge simplifies the required computation for options with debt

instruments or interest rates as the underlying, by providing a

table of specific risks weights to be used.

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(2) The gamma impact for each option will be positive or negative,

and for options on the same underlying, the individual gamma impacts

will be summed, resulting in a net gamma impact for each underlying

that is either positive or negative.

(3) Net positive gamma impacts amounts are disregarded, and the

capital charge equals the absolute value of the sum of all of the net

negative gamma impact amounts.

Total vega risk charge--This charge requires the following steps:

(1) Sum the vegas for all options on the same underlying, and multiply

by a proportional shift in volatility of 25 percent; \45\

and (2) The total capital charge for vega risk will be the sum of the

absolute value of the individual capital charges computed for options

positions in the same underlying.

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\45\ Vega is quoted to show the theoretical price change for

every 1 percentage point change in implied volatility. Assuming a

European short call option with volatility of 20 percent, for

purposes of the required calculation the volatility has to be

increased by a relative shift of 25 percent (only an increase in

volatility carries a risk of loss for a short call option.) Thus, in

this example, the vega capital charge should be calculated on the

basis of a change in volatility of 5 percentage points from 20

percent to 25 percent. Assuming vega in this example equals 168, a 1

percent increase in volatility increases the value of the option by

1.68. Accordingly, the capital charge for vega risk is calculated as

follows: 5 x 1.68 = 8.4

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3. Calculations by SDs and MSPs That Are Not Using Internal Models and

Are FCMs

The existing capital treatment under Sec. 1.17 for those FCMs that

are not approved to use internal models would remain the same under the

proposed rules. Thus, SDs and MSPs that are also FCMs and not approved

to use internal models for their capital calculations would be required

to deduct 100 percent of the receivables associated with their

uncleared swaps, except the extent of the market value, minus specified

haircuts, of acceptable collateral that secure such receivables. The

margin rules that have been proposed may result in fewer unsecured

receivables for the FCM's uncleared swaps, especially as the Commission

also is proposing to amend Sec. 1.17(c)(2)(ii)(G) to provide that

receivables from third-party custodians that arise from initial and/or

variation margin deposits associated with bilateral swap transactions

pursuant to proposed Sec. 23.158 will be included in the FCM's current

assets.

The Commission also is proposing to provide greater clarity and

transparency to the market risk haircut charges under Sec. 1.17 for

OTC derivatives positions, by adding new paragraphs (iii) and (iv) to

Sec. 1.17(c)(5) that would address proprietary OTC swap transactions

that are not cleared by or through a clearing organization. The

proposal is intended to codify existing guidance provided by the

Commission and SEC regarding the computation of capital charges for OTC

derivative transactions.

As proposed, Sec. 1.17(c)(5)(iii)(A) would require a capital

charge equal to the notional amount of an interest rate swap multiplied

by the applicable percentages of the underlying securities specified in

SEC Rule 15c3-1(c)(2)(vi)(A)(1), as if such notional amount was the

market value of a security issued or guaranteed as to principal or

interest by the United States, if the interest rate swap position was

not hedged with U.S. Treasury securities of corresponding maturities or

matched with offsetting interest rate swap positions with corresponding

terms and maturities.\46\ Proposed Sec. 1.17(c)(5)(iii)(B) would

address uncleared swaps maturing in 10 years or less that are hedged

with U.S. Treasury securities of corresponding maturities, or matched

with offsetting interest rate swap positions with corresponding terms

and maturities, and would require a capital charge of 1 percent of the

notional amount of such interest rate swaps. Proposed Sec.

1.17(c)(5)(iii)(C) would require a capital charge of 3 percent of the

notional amount of the interest rate swap, if the swap was hedged with

U.S. Treasury securities of corresponding maturities or matched with

offsetting interest rate swap positions with corresponding terms and

maturities, and such interest rate swap positions were maturing in more

than10 years.

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\46\ SEC Rule 15c3-1(c)(2)(vi)(A)(1) lists haircut percentages

between 0 percent and 6 percent based upon the time to maturity of

the security.

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Proposed Sec. 1.17(c)(5)(iv) addresses the capital charges on

proprietary OTC swap positions in credit default swaps, equity swaps,

or commodity swaps that are not cleared by or through a clearing

organization. Credit default swaps that are not hedged by the same

securities underlying the swap are subject to a capital charge computed

by multiplying the notional principal amount of the

[[Page 27813]]

swap by the applicable percentages as determined by the underlying

securities under SEC Rule 15c3-1(c)(2)(vi) and taking into account the

remaining maturity of the swap agreement.

Equity swaps would be subject to a capital charge equal to 15

percent of the net notional principal amount of the swap transaction.

Commodity swaps would be subject to a capital charge equal to 20

percent of the net market value of the notional amount of the

commodities underlying the swap transaction.

D. Failure To Meet Minimum Capital Requirements

Regulation 1.17(a)(4) currently provides that any FCM that fails to

meet, or is unable to demonstrate compliance with, the minimum capital

requirement must transfer all customer accounts and immediately cease

doing business as an FCM until it is capable of demonstrating

compliance with the capital requirements. The FCM may continue to trade

for liquidation purposes only unless the Commission or the FCM's

designated self-regulatory organization (DSRO) provides otherwise.\47\

The Commission and the FCM's DSRO also have the authority to grant the

FCM up to a maximum of 10 business days to come back into compliance

with the capital regulations without having to transfer customer

accounts if the FCM can immediately demonstrate the capability of

achieving capital compliance.

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\47\ The term ``designated self-regulatory organization'' is

defined at Sec. 1.3(ff) as the self-regulatory organization of an

FCM that has been delegated the responsibility of reviewing such

FCM's compliance with minimum financial requirements and financial

reports under a plan approved by the Commission pursuant to Sec.

1.52.

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The Commission is not proposing to amend Sec. 1.17(a)(4).

Accordingly, if an FCM that also is registered as an SD or MSP fails to

maintain the minimum level of capital, it would have to cease operating

as an FCM and transfer the customer futures and cleared swap accounts

that it carries to another FCM. The FCM also could request that the

Commission or DSRO grant the firm up to 10 business days to come back

into compliance with the minimum capital requirements if the FCM could

demonstrate an immediate plan to achieve compliance.

The Commission recognizes that an FCM that is an SD or MSP and has

open uncleared bilateral swap transactions cannot transfer the

uncleared bilateral swap transactions in a manner similar to customer

futures and cleared swap transactions. In such situations, the

agreements between the SD or MSP and its counterparties should dictate

the process. As previously proposed by the Commission, each SD or MSP

would be required to establish written policies and procedures

reasonably designed to ensure that each SD or MSP and its

counterparties have agreed in writing to all of the terms governing

their swap trading relationship. The Commission further has proposed

that the swap trading relationship documentation include a written

agreement by the parties on terms relating to events of default or

other termination events, and dispute resolution procedures. Therefore,

the SD's or MSP's written agreements with its counterparties should

address the possible undercapitalization of the SD or MSP and the

parties' rights in such a situation.\48\

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\48\ See 76 FR 6715 (Feb. 8, 2011). Proposed Sec. 23.504 would

require each SD or MSP to execute with its counterparties swap

trading relationship documentation that address, among other things,

the events of default or other termination events.

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Proposed Sec. 23.105(a) requires an SD or MSP to provide the

Commission with immediate notice if the SD or MSP fails to maintain

compliance with the minimum capital requirements. FCMs also are

required to provide the Commission with immediate notice under Sec.

1.12(a). Upon receipt of an undercapitalization notice, the Commission

would engage the SD or MSP to assess the situation and to determine

whether the SD or MSP would be able to take reasonable actions to bring

itself back into compliance with the minimum capital requirements. The

Commission would further assess what other actions were necessary

depending on the facts and circumstance of each situation, including

the need for providing immediate notice to the SD's or MSP's swap

counterparties.

E. SD and MSP Financial Reporting Requirements

1. SD and MSP Financial Statement Requirements

Section 4s(f)(1)(A) of the CEA, as amended by section 731 of the

Dodd-Frank Act, expressly requires each registered SD and MSP to make

such reports as are required by Commission rule or regulation regarding

the SD's or MSP's financial condition. The Commission is proposing new

Sec. 23.106, which would require certain SDs and MSPs to file monthly

unaudited financial statements and annual audited financial statements

with the Commission and with any registered futures association of

which they are members.

Proposed Sec. 23.106 would apply to SDs and MSPs, except any SDs

or MSPs that are subject to the capital requirements of a prudential

regulator, or designated by the Financial Stability Oversight Council

as a SIFI. SDs and MSPs that are subject to regulation by a prudential

regulator would comply with the applicable financial reporting

obligations imposed by such prudential regulator. SDs and MSPs that are

designated as SIFIs would comply with any financial reporting

obligations imposed by the Federal Reserve Board. Registered SDs or

MSPs that are subject to prudential regulation or designated as SIFIs,

however, would be required pursuant to proposed Sec. 23.105(d) to

provide the Commission with copies of their capital computations and

supporting documentation upon the Commission's request. In addition,

SDs and MSPs that are required to register with the Commission as FCMs

would not be required to file financial reports under Sec. 23.106, and

would continue to comply with the FCM financial reporting obligations

set forth in Sec. 1.10 of the Commission's regulations.

The proposed financial statements under part 23 would include a

statement of financial condition; a statement of income or loss; a

statement of cash flows; and a statement of changes in stockholders',

members', partners', or sole proprietor's equity. The financial

statements also would include a schedule reconciling the firm's equity,

as set forth in the statement of financial condition, to the firm's

regulatory capital by detailing any goodwill or other intangible assets

that are required to be deducted from the SD's or MSP's equity in order

to compute its net tangible equity as required under proposed Sec.

23.101. The schedule would further disclose the firm's minimum required

capital under Sec. 23.101 as of the end of the month or end of its

fiscal year, as applicable, and the amount of regulatory capital it

held at such date.

The proposed financial statements would be required to be prepared

in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles as

established in the United States, using the English language, and in

U.S dollars. The unaudited financial statements would be required to be

filed within 17 business days of the end of each month and the annual

audited financial statements would be required to be filed within 90

days of the end of the SD's or MSP's fiscal year.

Proposed Sec. 23.106 also would authorize the Commission to

require a SD or MSP that was not subject to regulation by a prudential

regulator to

[[Page 27814]]

file with the Commission additional financial or operational

information, and to prepare and to keep current ledgers or other

similar records which show or summarize each transaction affecting the

SD's or MSP's asset, liability, income, expense and capital accounts.

These accounts would be required to be classified in accordance with

United States generally accepted accounting principles. Proposed Sec.

23.106 also would provide that the comprehensive data records

supporting the information contained in the SD's or MSP's unaudited and

annual audited financial reports must be maintained and retained for a

period of five years pursuant to Sec. 1.31 of the Commission's

regulations.

2. SD and MSP Notice Filing Requirements

Proposed Sec. 23.105 would require SDs and MSPs to provide the

Commission, and the registered futures association of which the SDs or

MSPs are members, with written notice in the event of certain

enumerated financial or operational issues. The proposal is intended to

provide the Commission and the appropriate registered futures

association with timely notice of potentially adverse financial or

operational issues that may warrant immediate attention and ongoing

surveillance. The proposed notice requirements are comparable to the

notice requirements currently existing for FCMs under Sec. 1.12 of the

Commission's regulations. Proposed Sec. 23.105 would not be applicable

to SDs and MSPs that are registered as FCMs. Such SDs and MSPs would be

subject to the FCM notice requirements set forth in Sec. 1.12 and, as

noted above, such requirements are comparable to the proposed SD and

MSP notice requirements set forth in Sec. 23.105.

Proposed Sec. 23.105 also would not be applicable to SDs or MSPs

that are subject to the capital requirements of a prudential regulator,

with the exception of two provisions that are discussed below. SDs and

MSPs that are subject to capital requirements imposed by a prudential

regulator would be subject to the applicable financial surveillance

program of its prudential regulator. The first exception is the

proposed requirement in Sec. 23.105(c) that a SD or MSP that is

subject to the capital rules of a prudential regulator file notice with

the Commission and with a registered futures association if the SD or

MSP fails to maintain compliance with the minimum capital requirements

established by its prudential regulator. The second exception is set

forth in proposed Sec. 23.105(e) which requires an SD or MSP to

provide the Commission with notice if it fails to maintain current

books and records.

While the prudential regulator will be assessing such an SD's or

MSP's financial condition, the Commission believes that notice of a

CFTC registrant's failure to maintain compliance with applicable

minimum capital requirements is critical information that may impact

the Commission's assessment and monitoring of the SD's or MSP's ongoing

compliance with applicable non-capital CFTC regulations and the SD's or

MSP's potential adverse impact on counterparties, including other

Commission registered SDs and MSPs.

The proposed notice provisions would require a SD or MSP to give

telephonic notice to the Commission, followed by a written notice,

whenever it knows or should know that the firm does not maintain

tangible net equity in excess of its minimum requirement under Sec.

23.101. The SD or MSP also would be required to file documentation

containing a calculation of its current tangible net equity with its

notice of undercapitalization.

Proposed Sec. 23.105 also would require a SD or MSP to file a

written notice with the Commission whenever its tangible net equity

fails to exceed 110 percent of its minimum tangible net equity

requirement as computed under Sec. 23.101. The SD or MSP would be

required to file the notice within 24 hours of failing to maintain

tangible net equity at a level that is 110 percent or more above its

minimum tangible net equity requirement. Proposed Sec. 23.105 also

would require a registered SD or MSP to provide written notice of its

failure to maintain current books and records, or of a substantial

reduction in capital as previously reported to the Commission.

E. Proposed Financial Reporting and Other Amendments to FCM Regulations

Relating to Customer Cleared Swap Transactions

The Commission issued in December 2010 an advanced notice of

proposed rulemaking seeking comment on possible models to implement

section 4d(f)(2) of the CEA, as added by section 724 of the Dodd-Frank

Act, which provides that funds deposited by customers to margin a

cleared swap transaction shall not be commingled with the funds of the

FCM or used to margin, guarantee or secure the positions of any other

customer other than the customer that deposited the funds.\49\ The

Commission is proposing in this release amendments to certain FCM

financial reporting requirements in Sec. Sec. 1.10, 1.12, and 1.16 of

the Commission's regulations to address the segregation of swap

customers' funds. The proposed financial reporting requirements are

similar to the current financial reporting requirements that FCMs must

meet with respect to the segregation of customer funds deposited under

section 4d(a)(2) of the CEA as margin for futures contracts and options

on futures contracts executed on a designated contract market. The

Commission is further proposing to amend Sec. 1.17 to provide that

certain capital charges relating to undermargined customer and

noncustomer accounts extends to undermargined customer and noncustomer

accounts that carry cleared swap transactions.

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\49\ 75 FR 75162 (Dec. 2, 2010).

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1. Financial Reporting Requirements in Sec. 1.10

Regulation 1.10 currently requires each FCM to prepare and to file

unaudited financial condition reports, Form 1-FR-FCM, within 17

business days of the close of business each month. The Form 1-FR-FCM is

required to be filed with the Commission and with the FCM's DSRO. An

FCM also is required to file a Form 1-FR-FCM audited by an independent

public accountant as of the end of the FCM's fiscal year. The audited

financial Form 1-FR-FCM is required to be filed with the Commission and

with the FCM's DSRO organization within 90 calendar days of the date of

the FCM's fiscal year end.

Regulation 1.10(d) provides that each unaudited and audited Form 1-

FR-FCM must include: a Statement of Financial Condition; a Statement of

the Computation of Minimum Capital Requirements; a Statement of Income

(Loss); a Statement of Changes in Ownership Equity; a Statement of

Changes in Liabilities Subordinated to Claims of General Creditors

Pursuant to a Satisfactory Subordination Agreement; a Statement of

Segregation Requirements and Funds in Segregation for Customers Trading

on U.S. Commodity Exchanges; and a Statement of Secured Amounts and

Funds Held in Separate Accounts for Foreign Futures and Options

Customers Pursuant to Sec. 30.7.

The Commission is proposing to amend Sec. Sec. 1.10(d)(1) and (2)

to include a new Statement of Cleared Swap Customer Segregation

Requirements and Funds in Cleared Swap Customer Accounts Under 4d(f) of

the CEA in both the unaudited monthly Form 1-FR-FCM and the audited

annual Form

[[Page 27815]]

1-FR-FCM, respectively. This Statement is comparable to the statement

required for the segregation of customer funds for trading on

designated contract markets, the Statement of Segregation Requirements

and Funds in Segregation for Customers Trading on U.S. Commodity

Exchanges. The proposed swap segregation statement is intended to

provide an FCM that carries accounts for customers that maintain

cleared swap positions with a schedule to document and to demonstrate

its compliance with its obligation to treat, and deal with all money,

securities, and property of any swap customer received to margin,

guarantee, or secure a swap cleared by or through a derivates clearing

organization (including money, securities, or property accruing to swap

customers as the result of such a swap) as belonging to the FCM's swap

customers as required by section 4d of the CEA as amended by section

724 of the Dodd-Frank Act.

Pursuant to the proposal, each FCM would be required to include the

Statement of Cleared Swap Customer Segregation Requirements and Funds

in Cleared Swap Customer Accounts Under 4d(f) of the CEA in both its

unaudited monthly financial Form 1-FR-FCM filings and its annual

audited Form 1-FR-FCM filings. In addition, each FCM would be required

to include a reconciliation of any material reconciling items between

the Statement of Cleared Swap Customer Segregation Requirements and

Funds in Cleared Swap Customer Accounts Under 4d(f) of the CEA

contained in the audited annual Form 1-FR-FCM and the corresponding

unaudited monthly financial Form 1-FR-FCM filed as of the FCM's year

end date, or include a statement that there were no material

reconciling items.

The Commission also is proposing to amend Sec. 1.10(g)(2)(ii) to

provide that an FCM's Statement of Cleared Swap Customer Segregation

Requirements and Funds in Cleared Swap Customer Accounts Under 4d(f) of

the CEA will not be treated as exempt from mandatory public disclosure

under the Freedom of Information Act and the Government in the Sunshine

Act and Parts 145 and 147 of Chapter I of the Commission's regulations.

This proposed amendment would treat the public disclosure of an FCM's

financial information regarding the holding of funds for customers'

cleared swap transactions in a manner that is consistent with the

public disclosure of information regarding the segregation of customer

funds for trading on U.S. commodity exchanges, and regarding the

securing of customer funds for trading on foreign boards of trade

pursuant to Sec. 30.7 of the Commission's regulations.

The Commission is further proposing a technical amendment to Sec.

1.10(c)(1), which directs an FCM, and other registrants, to file the

reports and other information required by Sec. 1.10 with Commission's

Regional Office with jurisdiction over the registrant's principal place

of business. Commission Sec. 140.02 establishes the jurisdiction of

each Regional Office over filing requirements of registrants based upon

the geographic location of the principal business office of the

registrants. In order to clarify where a registrant should file

required financial information with the Commission, the Commission

proposes to amend Sec. 1.10(c) to include a reference to the

geographic listing in Sec. 140.02 of the Commission's regulations.

Except for the technical amendment described above, the other

proposed amendments implementing reporting requirements for funds of

cleared swap customers would not be adopted or effective unless the

Commission adopts, after issuing proposed rules for comment,

regulations establishing requirements for collateral posted by cleared

swap customers under section 4d(f) of the CEA.

2. Audited Financial Statement Requirements in Sec. 1.16

The Commission is proposing to amend Sec. 1.16 of the Commission's

regulations. Regulation 1.16 sets forth the qualifications that an

independent public accountant must meet to be qualified to conduct the

annual examinations of an FCM as required by Sec. 1.10(b)(1)(ii), and

establishes the minimum audit objectives of the independent

accountant's examination of an FCM.

Regulation 1.16(c)(2) provides that the accountant's report on the

audit of an FCM must state whether the audit was made in accordance

with generally accepted auditing standards and must designate any

auditing procedures deemed necessary by the accountant under the

circumstances of the particular case which have been omitted and the

reason for the omission of such procedures. Regulation 1.16(c)(3)

further provides that the accountant's report must clearly state the

opinion of the accountant with respect to the financial statements and

schedules covered by the report and the accounting principles and

practices reflected therein.

Regulation 1.16(d) sets forth the required audit objective of the

accountant's examination of the financial statements of an FCM and

provides, in relevant part, that the audit must be made in accordance

with generally accepted auditing standards and must include a review

and appropriate tests of the accounting systems, the internal

accounting controls, and the procedures for safeguarding customer and

firm assets in accordance with the CEA and Commission regulations,

since the last examination date. The scope of the audit and review of

the FCM's accounting systems, the internal accounting controls, and

procedures for safeguarding customer and firm assets must be sufficient

to provide reasonable assurance that any material inadequacies existing

at the dates of the examination in (1) The accounting systems, (2) the

internal accounting controls, and (3) the procedures for safeguarding

customer and firm assets (including the segregation requirements of

section 4d(a)(2) of the CEA and Commission regulations, and the secured

amount requirements of the CEA and part 30 of the Commission's

regulations) will be discovered. Regulation 1.16(d) further provides

that as specified objectives the audit must include reviews of the

practices and procedures followed by the FCM in making daily

computations of the segregation requirements of section 4d(a)(2) of the

CEA and the secured amount requirements of part 30 of the Commission's

regulations.

The proposed amendments would revise Sec. 1.16 to include the

proposed new Statement of Cleared Swap Customer Segregation

Requirements and Funds in Cleared Swap Customer Accounts Under 4d(f) of

the CEA within the explicit audit scope of the examination of an FCM.

Specifically, the Commission is proposing to amend the term

``customer'' as defined in Sec. 1.16(a)(4) to include an FCM's swap

customers that engage in cleared swap transactions. The proposed

amendment would bring cleared swap positions carried in swap customers'

accounts explicitly within the scope of the accountant's audit

objectives, as set forth in Sec. 1.16(d), which includes the review

and appropriate testing of the accounting systems, the internal

accounting control, and the procedures for safeguarding customer and

firm assets.

The Commission also proposes to amend Sec. 1.16(d)(1) to

explicitly provide that the scope of the independent accountant's

review of the accounting systems, internal accounting controls, and

procedures for safeguarding customer assets must be sufficient to

provide reasonable assurance that any

[[Page 27816]]

material inadequacy existing as of the date of the examination in (1)

the accounting system, (2) the internal accounting controls, and (3)

the procedures for safeguarding customer and firms assets will be

discovered includes the cleared swap segregation requirements as set

forth in section 4d(f) of the CEA. The Commission further proposes to

amend Sec. 1.16(d)(2) to include as a material inadequacy in the

accounting systems, internal accounting controls, and the procedures

for the safeguarding customer and firm assets that are required to be

reported to the Commission any conditions which contribute

substantially to or, if appropriate corrective action is not taken,

could reasonably be expected to result in a violation of the

requirement to segregate swap customers' funds.

The proposed amendments to Sec. 1.16 would not be adopted or

effective unless the Commission adopts, after issuing proposed rules

for comment, regulations establishing segregation requirements for

collateral posted by cleared swap customers under section 4d(f) of the

CEA. As previously noted, the Commission published an advanced notice

of proposed rulemaking on this topic on December 2, 2010.

3. Early Warning Requirements in Sec. 1.12

Regulation 1.12 requires an FCM to provide notice to the Commission

and to the FCM's DSRO of certain material financial or operational

events. The self-reporting of these financial and operational events by

an FCM is a key to the Commission's and self-regulatory organizations'

financial surveillance oversight programs as such notices may lead to

the discovery of accounting, recordkeeping, risk management, or other

regulatory failures that require prompt attention to safeguard customer

funds and to protect the clearing system.

Regulation 1.12(b) is referred to as the ``early warning capital

provisions'' and currently requires an FCM to file written notice with

the Commission and with its DSRO whenever its adjusted net capital is

less than: (1) 150 percent of the minimum dollar amount of adjusted net

capital required by Sec. 1.17(a)(1)(i)(A); (2) 150 percent of the

amount of adjusted net capital required by a registered futures

association of which the FCM is a member (except if the registered

futures association has adopted a margin-based capital rule, then the

FCM is required to file a written notice if its adjusted net capital is

less than 110 percent of its minimum adjusted net capital requirement

as computed under the registered futures association's margin-based

capital requirement); or (3) 110 percent of the FCM's margin-based

capital requirement as computed under Sec. 1.17(a)(1)(i)(B). An FCM

that also is registered with the SEC as a broker or dealer is required

to provide the Commission with written notice whenever it fails to

maintain net capital (as defined in SEC Rule 15c3-1) in an amount that

exceeds the ``early warning level'' set forth in SEC Rule 17a-11(c).

The early warning capital provisions are intended to provide the

Commission and the FCM's DSRO with prompt notice of potential adverse

financial or operational issues that may impact the FCM's ability to

meet its obligations to its customers and the clearing system, and

provide an opportunity for Commission and DSRO staff to review the

financial condition of an FCM that does not maintain a significant

amount of excess adjusted net capital prior to the firm falling under

the minimum net capital requirement.

The Commission is proposing to amend Sec. 1.12(b) by adding a new

paragraph (b)(5) to require any FCM that also is registered with the

SEC as a SSD or a MSSP to file a notice with the Commission if the SSD

or MSSP fails to maintain net capital above the minimum ``early warning

level'' established by rules or regulations of the SEC. The proposed

new paragraph (b)(5) would provide the Commission and the FCM's DSRO

with an opportunity to review the financial condition of an FCM and, if

necessary, to assess possible courses of regulatory action to protect

customer funds and to review potential financial risk presented by the

FCM to the clearing system.

The Commission also is proposing to amend Sec. 1.12(f)(4).

Regulation 1.12(f)(4) requires an FCM to provide immediate notice by

telephone communication, followed by immediate written confirmation,

whenever any commodity futures, options, cleared swaps, or other

Commission regulated account that the FCM carries is subject to a

margin call, or a call for other deposits required by the FCM, that

exceeds the FCM's excess adjusted net capital determined under Sec.

1.17, and the call for additional deposits has not been answered by the

close of business on the day following the issuance of the call.

The Commission intends for all of the notice provisions of Sec.

1.12 to apply, as applicable, to FCMs that carry swap customer

accounts. The Commission, however, believes it is necessary to amend

Sec. 1.12(f)(4) due to the reference in the regulation to ``commodity

interest'' accounts. The term ``commodity interest'' is defined in

Sec. 1.3(yy) as any contract for the purchase or sale of a commodity

for future delivery and any contract, agreement, or transaction

submitted under section 4c of the CEA. To avoid any confusion and to

ensure that an FCM provides the Commission and its self-regulatory

organizations with appropriate early warning notice, the Commission is

proposing to amend Sec. 1.12(f)(4) to require notice of a failure of

the owner of any commodity futures, option, swap, or other Commission

regulated account carried by the FCM to meet a margin call that exceeds

the FCM's excess adjusted net capital. The proposed amendment is

intended to ensure that an FCM is required to file a written notice if

a customer account containing cleared swap transactions fails to meet a

margin call that exceeds the FCM's excess adjusted net capital.

The Commission also is proposing to amend Sec. 1.12(h) to require

an FCM to provide the Commission and its DSRO with immediate notice by

telephone, confirmed immediately in writing, if the amount of funds on

deposit in accounts segregated for the benefit of the FCM's swap

customers is less than the amount that the FCM is required to hold in

such accounts. The proposed amendment to Sec. 1.12(h) would impose an

obligation upon the FCM that is consistent with an FCM's current

obligation to provide immediate telephone notice, confirmed by writing,

whenever the FCM fails to maintain the amount of funds in customer

segregated or secured accounts as required by Sec. 1.20 and Sec.

30.7, respectively.

4. Amendments to 1.17 for FCMs With Cleared Swaps Customers

The Commission proposes to amend Commission regulation

1.17(c)(2)(i) by adding references to cleared swap customers to this

regulation, which currently provides that FCMs must exclude from

current assets any unsecured commodity futures and options account (as

amended, this would include cleared swaps customers and other

Commission regulated accounts) containing a ledger balance and open

trades, the combination of which liquidates to a deficit or containing

a debit ledger balance only: Provided, however, Deficits or debit

ledger balances in unsecured customers', non-customers', and

proprietary accounts, which are the subject of calls for margin or

other required deposits may be included in current assets until the

close of business on the business day following the date on which such

deficit or debit ledger balance originated providing that the account

had timely satisfied, through the deposit of new funds, the previous

day's debit or deficits, if any, in its

[[Page 27817]]

entirety. The Commission is also proposing to add similar references to

cleared swap accounts of customers in Sec. Sec. 1.17(c)(5)(viii) and

(ix), which requires certain capital charges when the accounts of

customer or noncustomers are undermargined.

The Commission also is proposing to amend provisions in Sec.

1.17(c)(5)(v) that require an FCM to incur a capital charge not only on

its proprietary securities included in the FCM's calculation of

adjusted net capital, but also for securities held in customer

segregated accounts when such securities were not deposited in

segregation by a specific customer (i.e., the securities were purchased

with cash held in the customer segregated accounts). The purpose of

both of these capital requirements is to ensure that the FCM maintains

a capital cushion in order to cover potential decreases in the value of

the securities. The proposed rule would further require the FCM to

incur a capital charge for any securities purchased by the FCM using

funds belonging to the FCM's customers and held in the secured accounts

for customers trading on foreign markets pursuant to Sec. 30.7 or in

segregated accounts for cleared swap customers pursuant to section

4d(f) of the CEA.

C. Request for Comment

The Commission requests comment on all aspects of the proposed

capital and financial reporting regulations. In particular, the

Commission request comment on the following:

(1) The Commission's capital proposal for SDs and MSPs includes a

minimum dollar level of $20 million. A non-bank SD or MSP that is part

of a U.S. bank holding company would be required to maintain a minimum

of $20 million of Tier 1 capital as measured under the capital rules of

the Federal Reserve Board. An SD or MSP that also is registered as an

FCM would be required to maintain a minimum of $20 million of adjusted

net capital as defined under Sec. 1.17. In addition, an SD or MSP that

is not part of a U.S. bank holding company or registered as an FCM

would be required to maintain a minimum of $20 million of tangible net

equity, plus the amount of the SD's or MSP's market risk exposure and

OTC counterparty credit risk exposure.

The Commission requests comment on the amount of the proposed

minimum dollar amount of regulatory capital. Should the minimum dollar

amount of capital be set at a higher or lower level? Is a consistent

$20 million of minimum regulatory capital appropriate for all SDs and

MSPs?

(2) The Commission is proposing in Sec. 23.101 to incorporate bank

capital requirements into the CFTC capital requirements by requiring

non-bank SDs and MSPs that are part of a U.S. bank holding company to

meet bank capital requirements. The Commission requests comment on the

appropriateness of the proposed incorporation of banking capital

regulations in the terms of Sec. 23.101 for such SDs or MSPs.

(3) The Commission is proposing in Sec. 23.101 to establish a

regulatory capital requirement that is based upon tangible net equity

if the SD or MSP is not: (1) An FCM; (2) part of a U.S. bank holding

company; or (3) designated a SIFI. Proposed Sec. 23.102 provides that

tangible net equity shall be determined under generally accepted

accounting principles and shall exclude goodwill and other intangible

assets. The Commission requests comment on the proposed definition of

tangible net equity. Should all intangible assets be excluded?

(4) The Commission requests comment on the appropriateness of

establishing a minimum regulatory capital requirement based upon

tangible net equity for all SDs and MSPs that are not also registered

as FCMs, part of U.S. bank holding companies, or designated as SIFIs.

Specifically, is the tangible net equity method appropriate for SDs and

MSPs that are primarily engaged in non-financial operations? Is the

tangible net equity method appropriate for SDs and MSPs that are

primarily engaged in financial operations? Should minimum regulatory

capital requirements be established under a different method for SDs

and MSPs that are primarily financial or trading entities, such as

funds or trading firms? Should the Commission impose additional capital

or alternative capital requirements on financial firms that qualify to

use the tangible net equity approach? What additional or alternative

capital requirements would be appropriate for such firms?

(5) The proposed tangible net equity capital computation does not

require an SD or MSP to maintain the same level of highly liquid assets

as the Commission's current capital requirement for FCMs. Specifically,

the tangible net equity capital requirement would allow an SD or MSP to

include fixed assets and other illiquid assets in meeting its

regulatory capital requirement. Should the capital requirement for the

tangible net equity method include a liquidity component that would

effectively require an SD or MSP to hold a defined amount of highly

liquid assets? What factors should the Commission consider in adopting

a liquidity requirement?

(6) One possible approach to a minimum liquidity requirement is to

require an SD or MSP to hold unencumbered liquid assets equal to the

sum of the total amount of initial margin that the SD or MSP would have

to post with a counterparty for all uncleared swap transactions and the

total amount of any unpaid variation margin that the SD or MSP owes to

any counterparty. Liquid assets that could qualify for purposes of the

liquidity requirement could be limited to cash, obligations guaranteed

by the U.S., and obligations of government sponsored entities. Such

assets could be part of the general operating assets of the SD or MSP

and would not have to be held or ``segregated'' in any special account

by the SD or MSP. Assets posted by the SD or MSP with custodians as

margin on uncleared swap transactions could be included in meeting the

liquidity requirement. The qualifying liquid assets also could be

subject to market value haircuts set forth in the proposed margin rule

Sec. 23.157(c). The Commission request comment on this approach to the

computation of a liquidity requirement. If the Commission were to adopt

such a liquidity requirement, would it be appropriate to incorporate

minimum margin thresholds that would have to be exceeded before the SD

or MSP was subject to the liquidity requirement? For example, should

the Commission consider a rule that would impose a liquidity

requirement only if the SD's or MSP's initial and variation margin

obligations on uncleared swaps exceeded a minimum threshold? How would

such thresholds be determined? What are the appropriate market value

haircuts that should be imposed?

(7) The Commission is proposing to amend Sec. 1.17 to specify

capital charges for uncleared swap transactions held by an FCM. The

Commission request comment on the appropriateness of the proposed

calculations. Furthermore, the Commission request comment on viable

alternative methods to compute capital charges for uncleared swap

positions. Specifically, the Commission requests comment on whether

capital charges should be based upon the margin calculations that would

be required to be conducted under Part 23 of the proposed regulations.

(8) SDs and MSPs that also are registered as FCMs are required

under Sec. 1.17(c)(2)(ii) to exclude unsecured receivables from

counterparties to OTC transactions in determining their adjusted net

capital under Sec. 1.17. Certain SDs or MSPs that also are

[[Page 27818]]

registered as FCMs, however, may elect to use internal models to

compute credit risk charges under Sec. 1.17(c)(6) if they comply with

the Commission's requirements set forth in Sec. 1.17(c)(6) and have

previously obtained an order from the SEC approving the use of such

models for purpose of computing regulatory capital. In addition,

proposed Sec. 1.17(c)(7) would permit SDs and MSPs that also are

registered FCMs to seek Commission approval under Sec. 23.103 to use

internal models to compute credit risk charges for OTC derivatives

transactions in lieu of the current 100 percent capital charge for

unsecured receivables.

The Commission seeks comment on the appropriateness of allowing SDs

and MSPs that also are registered as FCMs and have received approval to

use internal models to compute their capital requirements to use such

models to reduce the 100 percent capital charge for unsecured

receivables arising from uncleared OTC swap transactions. The

Commission requests comment on this issue as it is concerned that SDs

and MSPs may have significant unsecured receivables for uncleared swap

transactions that are not subject to variation margin requirements

(e.g., bilateral swap positions entered into prior to the effective

date of the Dodd-Frank Act). If such SDs and MSPs also were to register

as FCMs, the unsecured receivables could have a significant impact on

the financial condition of the FCMs and adversely impact the FCMs'

customers if the debtor were to default.

(9) The Commission solicits comment on all of the proposed rules

related to the use of internal models for computing market risk and

counterparty credit risk for capital purposes. Specifically, comment is

requested regarding what resources, expertise, and capacity SDs and

MSPs ought to have in order to be approved to use internal models.

(10) The Commission solicits comment regarding whether it is

appropriate to permit SDs and MSPs to use internal models for computing

market risk and counterparty credit risk charges for capital purposes

if such models have been approved by a foreign regulatory authority and

are subject to periodic assessment by such foreign regulatory

authority. What criteria should the Commission consider in assessing

whether to approve or to accept a model approved by a foreign

regulatory authority?

(11) The Commission previously has proposed regulations that

require each SD and MSP to promptly report to the Commission any swap

valuation dispute not resolved within one business day if the

counterparty is SD or MSP, or five business days if the counterparty is

not an SD or MSP.\50\ The Commission requests comment on whether it is

appropriate to require an SD or MSP to take a capital charge for the

amount of any valuation dispute. Should the SD or MSP take a capital

charge immediately upon learning of a valuation dispute, or should the

capital charge be taken after one business day or five business days

depending on whether the counterparty is an SD/MSP or a non-SD/MSP,

respectively? What role should margin deposits have on the calculation

of the capital charge? Are there any other issues that the Commission

should consider?

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\50\ See, proposed Sec. 23.504(e) at 76 FR 6715 (Feb. 8, 2011).

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(12) What are the costs to counterparties resulting from the

capital requirements being proposed by the Commission?

(13) FCMs currently file monthly unaudited financial statements

with the Commission, and the Commission is proposing to extend this

monthly filing requirement to SDs and MSPs. The Commission seeks

comment regarding the frequency of the filing of SD and MSP unaudited

financial statements. Specifically, what challenges and costs are

associated with monthly financial statement filings? Would the

Commission receive adequate financial information from SDs and MSPs if

they filed on a quarterly basis? Are there other financial statements

or schedules other than, or in addition to, the proposed statements and

schedules that the Commission should require from SDs and MSPs?

(14) The Commission is proposing in Sec. 23.106(i) to make

available to the public regulatory capital information provided by each

SD and MSP in their financial statement filings with the Commission.

Specifically, the Commission would make publicly available for each SD

or MSP its minimum regulatory capital requirement, the amount of its

regulatory capital, and any excess or deficiency in its regulatory

capital. The disclosure of the regulatory capital information of SDs

and MSPs is consistent with the disclosure of FCM financial

information.

III. Conforming Amendments to Delegated Authority Provisions

Commission Sec. Sec. 1.10, 1.12, and 1.17 reserve certain

functions to the Commission, the greater part of which the Commission

has delegated to the Director of the Division of Clearing and

Intermediary Oversight through the provisions of Sec. 140.91 of the

Commission's regulations. The Commission proposes to amend Sec. 140.91

to provide similar delegations with respect to functions reserved to

the Commission in Part 23.

Proposed Sec. 23.101(c) would require an SD or MSP to be in

compliance with the minimum regulatory capital requirements at all

times and to be able to demonstrate such compliance to the Commission

at any time. Proposed Sec. 23.103(d) would require an SD or MSP, upon

the request of the Commission, to provide the Commission with

additional information regarding its internal models used to compute

its market risk exposure requirement and OTC derivatives credit risk

requirement. Proposed Sec. 23.105(a)(2) would require an SD or MSP to

provide the Commission with immediate notification if the SD or MSP

failed to maintain compliance with the minimum regulatory capital

requirements, and further authorizes the Commission to request

financial condition reporting and other financial information from the

SD or MSP. Proposed Sec. 23.105(d) authorizes the Commission to direct

an SD or MSP that is subject to capital rules established by a

prudential regulator, or has been designated a systemically important

financial institution by the Financial Stability Oversight Council and

is subject to capital requirements imposed by the Board of Governors of

the Federal Reserve System to file with the Commission copies of its

capital computations for any periods of time specified by the

Commission.

The Commission is proposing to amend Sec. 140.91 to delegate to

the Director of the Division of Clearing and Intermediary Oversight, or

the Director's designee, the authority reserved to the Commission under

proposed Sec. Sec. 23.101(c), 23.103(d), and 23.105(a)(2) and (d). The

delegation of such functions to staff of the Division of Clearing and

Intermediary Oversight is necessary for the effective oversight of SDs

and MSPs compliance with minimum financial and related reporting

requirements. The delegation of authority also is comparable to the

authorities currently delegated to staff of Division of Clearing and

Intermediary Oversight under Sec. 140.91 regarding the supervision of

FCMs compliance with minimum financial requirements.

The following provisions relating to margin requirements are also

proposed to be included in Part 140, in order to provide within Part

140 a complete listing of the functions reserved to the Commission

under Subpart E that are

[[Page 27819]]

proposed to be delegated to the Director of the Division of Clearing

and Intermediary Oversight. As proposed in this release, Part 140 would

include delegations for the Commission's ability under proposed Sec.

23.155(b)(4)(ii) and (iii), with respect to initial margin, and under

Sec. 23.155(c)(1) and (2) with respect to variation margin, to require

at any time that a covered swap entity (``CSE'') provide further data

or analysis concerning a model or methodology used to calculate margin,

or to modify a model or methodology to address potential

vulnerabilities. A similar delegation is provided for the Commission's

ability under Sec. 23.155(c)(4) to require at any time that the CSE

post or collect additional margin because of additional risk posed by a

particular product, or because of additional risk posed by a particular

party to the swap.

The Commission also is proposing in this release to delegate

authority with respect to the Commission's recently proposed Sec.

23.157(d), which would authorize the Commission to take the following

actions regarding margin assets: (i) Require a CSE to provide further

data or analysis concerning any margin asset posted or received; (ii)

require a CSE to replace a margin asset posted to a counterparty with a

different margin asset to address potential risks posed by the asset;

(iii) require a CSE to require a counterparty that is an SD, MSP, or a

financial entity to replace a margin asset posted with the CSE with a

different margin asset to address potential risks posed by the asset;

(iv) require a CSE to provide further data or analysis concerning

margin haircuts; or (v) require a CSE to modify a margin haircut

applied to an asset received from an SD, MSP, or a financial entity to

address potential risks posed by the asset.

Finally, under proposed Sec. 23.158(c), the Commission may at any

time require a CSE to provide further data or analysis concerning any

custodian holding collateral collected by the CSE. Further, the

Commission may at any time require a CSE participant to move assets

held on behalf of a counterparty to another custodian to address risks

posed by the original custodian. The Commission is proposing also to

include delegations in Part 140 with respect to these functions

reserved to the Commission under Sec. 23.158(c). Each of the proposed

delegations would be to the Director of the Division of Clearing and

Intermediary Oversight, with the concurrence of General Counsel. The

Commission requests comment on each of the proposed amendments to Sec.

140.91 described in this release.

IV. Related Matters

A. Regulatory Flexibility Act

The Regulatory Flexibility Act (``RFA'') \51\ requires that

agencies consider whether the rules they propose will have a

significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities

and if so, provide a regulatory flexibility analysis respecting the

impact. The Commission has already established certain definitions of

``small entities'' to be used in evaluating the impact of its rules on

such small entities in accordance with the RFA.\52\ SDs and MSPs are

new categories of registrant. Accordingly, the Commission has not

previously addressed the question of whether such persons are, in fact,

small entities for purposes of the RFA.

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\51\ 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.

\52\ 47 FR 18618 (Apr. 30, 1982).

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The Commission previously has determined that FCMs should not be

considered to be small entities for purposes of the RFA. The

Commission's determination was based in part upon their obligation to

meet the minimum financial requirements established by the Commission

to enhance the protection of customers' segregated funds and protect

the financial condition of FCMs generally.\53\ Like FCMs, SDs will be

subject to minimum capital and margin requirements, and are expected to

comprise the largest global financial firms. The Commission is required

to exempt from designation entities that engage in a de minimis level

of swap dealing in connection with transactions with or on behalf of

customers. Accordingly, for purposes of the RFA for this and future

rulemakings, the Commission is hereby proposing that SDs not be

considered ``small entities'' for essentially the same reasons that

FCMs have previously been determined not to be small entities.

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\53\ Id. at 18619.

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The Commission also has previously determined that large traders

are not ``small entities'' for RFA purposes.\54\ The Commission

considered the size of a trader's position to be the only appropriate

test for purposes of large trader reporting.\55\ MSPs maintain

substantial positions in swaps, creating substantial counterparty

exposure that could have serious adverse effects on the financial

stability of the United States banking system or financial markets.

Accordingly, for purposes of the RFA for this and future rulemakings,

the Commission is hereby proposing that MSPs not be considered ``small

entities'' for essentially the same reasons that large traders have

previously been determined not to be small entities.

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\54\ 47 FR at 18620.

\55\ Id.

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The Commission is carrying out Congressional mandates by proposing

these rules. The Commission is incorporating capital requirements of

SDs and MSPs into the existing regulatory capital frameworks. In so

doing, the Commission has attempted to formulate requirements in the

manner that is consistent with the public interest and existing

regulatory requirements. Accordingly, the Chairman, on behalf of the

Commission, hereby certifies pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 605(b) that the

proposed rules will not have a significant economic impact on a

substantial number of small entities.

B. Paperwork Reduction Act

The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA) \56\ imposes certain

requirements on Federal agencies (including the Commission) in

connection with their conducting or sponsoring any collection of

information as defined by the PRA. This proposed rulemaking, as well as

the proposed rulemaking on margin requirements for uncleared swaps,

which was first published in the Federal Register on April 28, 2011,

and is subject to a comment period that is being extended to correspond

with the comment period for these proposed capital requirements,

contain collections of information for which the Commission has

previously sought or received control number from the Office of

Management and Budget (``OMB''). This proposed rulemaking, as well as

the proposed rulemaking on margin requirements for uncleared swaps,

also would result in new mandatory collections of information within

the meaning of the PRA. Therefore, pursuant to the PRA, the Commission

is submitting a PRA proposal for both the capital and the margin rules,

in the form of an amendment to the Commission's existing collection

under OMB Control Number 3038-0024, to OMB for its review and approval

in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 3507(d) and 5 CFR 1320.11.

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\56\ 44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.

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1. Collections of Information

a. Schedule to Form 1-FR-FCM

The Commission has included as an exhibit to this proposed

rulemaking the additional schedule that the proposed amendments to

Sec. 1.10 would require FCMs to file with respect to the cleared swaps

of their customers. The collection of information required by the

amended Sec. 1.10 are necessary for the Commission's oversight of the

FCM's compliance with its minimum financial requirements under the CEA

and

[[Page 27820]]

implementing regulations of the Commission. The increase in the annual

reporting burden associated with OMB Collection of Information Control

No. 3038-004 would not be significant, as the Commission estimates that

a small percentage of FCMs (approximately 21 FCMs) would be required to

file the schedule, and the schedule will be included in the Form 1-FR-

FCM that they must already file with the Commission. The requirements

in part 23 also require monthly and annual financial reports to be

filed with the Commission. The Commission estimates that no more than

250 SDs and 50 MSPs would be required to file such reports. The

estimated burden of the proposed part 23 financial reporting

requirements was calculated as follows:

Estimated number of respondents: 300.

Reports annually by each respondent: 13.

Total annual responses: 3,900.

Estimated average number of hours per response: 2.75.

Annual reporting burden: 10,725.

b. Approval of Margin Models

In the rulemaking proposing margin requirements for uncleared

swaps, the Commission would require any SD or MSP to file its margin

model with the Commission for approval. Each filing must include an

explanation of the manner in which the model meets the requirements of

the margin rules; the mechanics of, theoretical basis of, and empirical

support for the model; and independent third party validation of the

model. The Commission would process filings for models that comply with

the minimum requirements established in the margin rules, or that are

currently used by a derivatives clearing organization for margining

cleared swaps, that are currently used by an entity subject to regular

assessment by a prudential regulator for margining uncleared swaps, or

that are made available for licensing by a vendor. At a later date, at

which point the Commission may have sufficient resources to evaluate

such models, the Commission may begin processing filings of proprietary

models to be used by SDs and MSPs.

The Commission cannot estimate with precision the frequency with

which margin model filings will be made by SDs and MSPs annually, as an

SD or MSP may be expected to make one initial filing and then to change

or supplement its margin model occasionally. In an attempt to provide

conservative estimates, the calculations below have been developed in

accordance with the Commission's estimate that there will be 250 SDs

and 50 MSPs that will register with it, and with the assumption that

40% of registrants will make 3 model filings per year with respect to

the margining of various swap instruments. The estimated average number

of hours per filing includes not only preparation of the filing, but

also the time associated with third party evaluation of the model.

Estimated number of respondents: 300.

Frequency of filings: One initial response, and then occasional

filings.

Filings annually by each respondent: One initial filing, and 1 to 3

occasional filings annually.

Total annual filings: 300 initial filings, and 360 occasional

filings annually.

Estimated average number of hours per filing: 60 hours.

Annual filing burden: 21,600.

c. Approval of Capital Models

In this rulemaking proposing capital requirements for SDs and MSPs,

the Commission would permit SDs and MSPs to use internal models to

calculate minimum capital requirements, subject to the submission of an

application to the Commission for approval of the internal model. The

application must address several factors, including: (1) Identifying

the categories of positions that the SD or MSP holds in its proprietary

accounts; (2) describing the methods that the SD or MSP will use to

calculate its market risk and credit risk capital requirements; (3)

describing the internal models; and (4) describing how the SD or MSP

will calculate current exposure and potential future exposure. The SD

or MSP also must explain the extent to which the models have been

reviewed and approved by the Federal Reserve Board or, as applicable,

the SEC.

The Commission cannot estimate with precision the frequency with

which SDs and MSPs will file applications with the Commission for the

use of internal capital models. At present, only those SDs or MSPs that

are subject to prudential regulation or regulation by the SEC will be

permitted to use internal models. The Commission cannot presently

determine which SDs and MSPs will be subject either to prudential

regulation or regulation by the SEC, how many of those SDs or MSPs will

file applications with the Commission, or how frequently those SDs and

MSPs may submit applications with respect to revised or new models. The

Commission additionally cannot presently determine at what time it may

be able to consider applications by SDs and MSPs that will be subject

solely to Commission regulation, or how many of those SDs and MSPs may

eventually file applications with the Commission.

In an attempt to provide conservative estimates, the calculations

below have been developed in accordance with the Commission's estimate

that there will be 250 SDs and 50 MSPs that will register with it, and

that 70% of those SDs and MSPs will file initial applications with the

Commission for the use of an internal model. The Commission

additionally estimates that in subsequent years, it will be asked to

review 30 capital models annually.

Estimated number of respondents: 300.

Frequency of responses: One initial response and then

occasional filings.

Reports by each respondent: 1 filing occasionally.

Total responses: 210 initial applications and 30

applications annually.

Estimated average number of hours per response: 30 for

applicants presently using internal capital models, 60 for each

application not subject to approval by a prudential regulator or the

SEC.

Reporting burden: 630 hours initial applications, and up

to 1,800 hours annually.

d. Approval of Counterparty Credit Ratings

This proposed capital rulemaking permits an SD or MSP, which is

required to apply a credit risk factor to its counterparties, to apply

to the Commission for approval to assign internal individual ratings to

each of its counterparties, or for an affiliated bank or affiliated

broker-dealer to do so. The Commission does not have experience with

such an application process, and therefore cannot estimate with

precision the burden hours associated with this regulatory provision.

In an attempt to provide conservative estimate, the Commission

estimates that it may receive up to 4 applications per year from 70% of

the 300 anticipated SDs and MSPs that may use internal application

models, and that the preparation and submission of these applications

would consume up to 8 hours per application. At such time as the

Commission is able to approve internal models of SDs and MSPs that are

not subject to prudential regulation, the Commission estimates that it

will receive up to 4 applications per year from an additional 20% of

SDs and MSPs.

Estimated Number of Respondents: 270.

Frequency of Responses: Up to 4 applications annually.

[[Page 27821]]

Total Annual Responses: 840 applications initially, and an

additional 240 applications eventually.

Estimated average number of hours per response: 8.

Annual Reporting burden: 6,720 initially, plus an

additional 1,920 eventually.

e. Recordkeeping and Occasional Reporting Obligations

In this proposed capital rulemaking, the Commission would require

SDs and MSPs to present certain information to the Commission on

request. Proposed Sec. 23.104 would authorize the Commission to

require an SD or MSP that is not subject to prudential regulation to

file with the Commission additional financial or operational

information, and to prepare and to keep current ledgers or other

similar records which show or summarize each transaction affecting the

SD's or MSP's asset, liability, income, expense and capital accounts.

Under proposed Sec. 23.105, the Commission would require each

registered SD or MSP subject to prudential supervision, or each SD or

MSP designated as a SIFI, to provide to the Commission, on request,

copies of its capital computations and accompanying schedules and other

supporting documentation demonstrating compliance with the applicable

prudential regulator with jurisdiction over the SD or MSP.

SDs and MSPs additionally will be required to keep comprehensive

data records supporting the information contained in the SD's or MSP's

unaudited and annual audited financial reports for a period of five

years. SDs and MSPs using internal capital models also would be

obligated to make and keep current a record of the basis for the credit

rating it applies to each of its counterparties for a period of five

years.

The Commission is unable to estimate with precision how many

requests it will make of SDs and MSPs under proposed Sec. Sec. 23.104

and 23.105 annually. Additionally, it is unable to estimate with

precision the number of records an SD or MSP will be obligated to keep

related to the credit rating it applies to its counterparties. In an

attempt to provide conservative estimates, the Commission anticipates

that it will make 200 requests under Sec. Sec. 23.104 and 23.105 in

the aggregate annually, and that responding to those requests would

consume 5 burden hours. It is estimated that recordkeeping of monthly

and annual reports, estimated at 3,900 records, would consume .4 burden

hours. And, it is estimated that .7 burden hours would be consumed by

210 SDs and MSPs initially and 270 SDs and MSPs eventually to keep

credit rating bases for up to an average of 75 counterparties annually.

i. Occasional Reporting Obligations

Estimated Number of Respondents: 200.

Frequency of Responses: Occasional.

Total Annual Responses: 200.

Estimated average number of hours per response: 5 hours.

Annual Reporting burden: 1,000.

ii. Recordkeeping Obligations

Estimated Number of Recordkeepers: 300.

Estimated Number of Records per Recordkeeper: Average 94

initially and 89 eventually.

Total Annual Recordkeeping: 19,650 initially and 24,150

eventually.

Estimated average number of hours for recordkeeping: .4

burden hours for 3,900 records, .7 burden hours for 15,750 records

initially, and .7 burden hours for 16,905 records eventually.

Annual recordkeeping burden: 12,585 initially and 13,393

eventually.

f. Occasional Notice Filings

Finally, the proposed capital rulemaking contains provisions that

would require registered SDs and MSPs to provide notice to the

Commission in the event that certain material financial or operational

events occur. These include the notice filing obligations contained in

Sec. 1.12 and in proposed Sec. Sec. 23.104 and 23.105. In an attempt

to provide conservative estimates, the Commission anticipates receiving

up to 90 occasional notices annually and that the burden of providing

those notices will consume up to .7 burden hours.

Estimated Number of Respondents: 90.

Frequency of Responses: Occasional.

Total Annual Responses: 90.

Estimated average number of hours per response: .7.

Annual Reporting burden: 63.

2. Information Collection Comments

The Commission invites the public and other Federal agencies to

comment on any aspect of the proposed information collection

requirements discussed above. Pursuant to 44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(2)(B), the

Commission will consider public comments on such proposed requirements

in:

Evaluating whether the proposed collections of information

are necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the

Commission, including whether the information will have a practical

use;

Evaluating the accuracy of the estimated burden of the

proposed information collection requirements, including the degree to

which the methodology and the assumptions that the Commission employed

were valid;

Enhancing the quality, utility, and clarity of the

information proposed to be collected; and

Minimizing the burden of the proposed information

collection requirements on FCMs, SDs, and MSPs, including through the

use of appropriate automated, electronic, mechanical, or other

technological information collection techniques, e.g., permitting

electronic submission of responses.

Copies of the submission from the Commission to OMB are available

from the CFTC Clearance Officer, 1155 21st Street, NW., Washington, DC

20581, (202) 418-5160 or from http://RegInfo.gov. Organizations and

individuals desiring to submit comments on the proposed information

collection requirements should send those comments to the OMB Office of

Information and Regulatory Affairs at:

The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office

of Management and Budget, Room 10235, New Executive Office Building,

Washington, DC 20503, Attn: Desk Officer of the Commodity Futures

Trading Commission;

(202) 395-6566 (fax); or

[email protected] (e-mail).

Please provide the Commission with a copy of submitted comments so

that all comments can be summarized and addressed in the final rule

preamble. Please refer to the ADDRESSES section of this rulemaking and

the margin rulemaking for instructions on submitting comments to the

Commission. OMB is required to make a decision concerning the proposed

information collection requirements between thirty (30) and sixty (60)

days after publication of the NPRM in the Federal Register. Therefore,

a comment to OMB is best assured of receiving full consideration if OMB

(as well as the Commission) receives it within thirty (30) days of

publication of this NPRM.

C. Cost-Benefit Analysis

Section 15(a) of the CEA \57\ requires the Commission to consider

the costs and benefits of its action before issuing a rulemaking under

the CEA. By its terms, Section 15(a) does not require the Commission to

quantify the costs and benefits of a rule or to determine whether the

benefits of the rulemaking outweigh its costs; rather, it simply

[[Page 27822]]

requires that the Commission ``consider'' the costs and benefits of its

actions. Section 15(a) further specifies that the costs and benefits

shall be evaluated in light of five broad areas of market and public

concern: (1) Protection of market participants and the public; (2)

efficiency, competitiveness and financial integrity of futures markets;

(3) price discovery; (4) sound risk management practices; and (5) other

public interest considerations. The Commission may in its discretion

give greater weight to any one of the five enumerated areas and could

in its discretion determine that, notwithstanding its costs, a

particular rule is necessary or appropriate to protect the public

interest or to effectuate any of the provisions or accomplish any of

the purposes of the CEA.

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\57\ 7 U.S.C. 19(a).

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Summary of proposed requirements. The proposed regulations would

implement provisions in Sections 4s(e), (d), and (f) of the Act, which

were added by Section 731 of the Dodd-Frank Act. Sections 4s(e), (d),

and (f) authorize the Commission to adopt regulations imposing capital

requirements and financial condition reporting requirements on SDs and

MSPs. The proposed capital requirements would only apply to SDs and

MSPs that are not subject to regulation by a prudential regulator. The

financial condition reporting requirements primarily apply to SDs and

MSPs that are not subject to regulation by a prudential regulator.

The proposed regulations also amend existing requirements for FCMs.

Section 724 of the Dodd-Frank Act adds a new Section 4d(f) of the Act,

which requires an FCM to segregate from its own assets any money,

securities, and property deposited by swap customers to margin,

guarantee, or secure swap transactions cleared by or through a

derivatives clearing organization. The proposed regulations would

require each FCM holding customer funds for cleared swap customers to

prepare a monthly Statement of Cleared Swap Customer Segregation

Requirements and Funds in Cleared Swap Customer Accounts under 4d(f) of

the CEA (Cleared Swap Segregation Statement). The Cleared Swap

Segregation Statement would be filed as part of the FCMs Form 1-FR-FCM.

The proposal also would amend the notice filing requirements and

capital requirements for FCMs.

Structure of the Analysis

The Commission has decided to propose capital rules for SDs and

MSPs falling under four separate categories: (C1) Those that are

affiliates of U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs) and are not registered

as FCMs; (C2) those that are not affiliated with a BHC and are not

registered as FCMs; (C3) those that are affiliates of a BHC and are

registered as FCMs; (C4) those that are not affiliated with a BHC and

are registered as FCMs. Costs and benefits for each of these four

categories is discussed relative to one of two approaches: (D1) What

constitutes capital follows the current practice for the given

category, and the method for determining the amount of required capital

follows an internal models based approach approved by a prudential

regulator; (D2) what constitutes capital is tangible net equity, and

the method for determining the amount of required capital follows an

internal models based approach approved by a prudential regulator. The

first approach, D1, which defines capital as bank capital per the Basel

Accords, applies to C1 (affiliates of BHCs that are not FCMs). D1 also

applies to C3 (affiliates of BHCs that are FCMs) and C4 (non-affiliates

of BHCs that are FCMs); in which cases, the definition of capital is

adjusted net capital per Regulation 1.17.\58\ The second approach, D2,

which defines capital as tangible net equity, applies to C2 (non-

affiliates of BHCs that are not FCMs).

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\58\ Strictly speaking, for D1 to apply to C1, the method for

determining capital needs to be Basel III, whereas for D1 to apply

to C3 and C4, the method for determining capital needs to be

Regulation 1.17 coupled with an allowance for calculating market

risk and credit risk capital using internal models. The common

feature here is the allowed used of approved internal models. The

subsequent analysis abstracts away from any potential differences.

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1. Costs and Benefits of the Proposed Rule to C1 (Affiliates of BHCs

That Are Not FCMs) and C3 (Affiliates of BHCs That Are FCMs)

The rules proposed by the Commission for non-bank subsidiaries of

BHCs would be the capital rules of the prudential regulator unless the

SD or MSP was an FCM, in which case the capital rules would be the

Commission's current FCM capital rules.

The Commission notes that the five prudential regulators have

recently issued proposed rules that would not impose new capital

requirements on the swap entities subject to their prudential

supervision. Instead, the swap entities are required to comply with the

regulatory capital rules already made applicable to them by their

prudential regulators. As noted by the prudential regulators:

The Agencies have preliminarily determined that compliance with

these regulatory capital requirements is sufficient to offset the

greater risk to the swap entity and the financial system arising

from the use of non-cleared swaps, helps ensure the safety and

soundness of the covered swap entity, and is appropriate for the

greater risk associated with the non-cleared swaps and non-cleared

security-based swaps held as a [swap entity]. In particular, the

Agencies note that the capital rules incorporated by reference into

the proposed rule already address, in a risk-sensitive and

comprehensive manner, the safety and soundness risks posed by a

[swap entity's] derivatives positions. In addition, the Agencies

preliminarily believe that these capital rules sufficiently take

into account and address the risks associated with the derivatives

positions that a covered swap entity holds and the other activities

conducted by a covered swap entity. (internal footnotes

omitted).\59\

\59\ See joint proposed rulemaking issued by the prudential

regulators on April 12, 2011, titled ``Margin and Capital

Requirements for Covered Swap Entities.''

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The Commission is anticipating that some number of nonbank

subsidiaries of BHCs will register with the Commission in order to hold

positions that Section 716 of the Dodd-Frank Act may require federally

insured bank subsidiaries to ``push out'' into affiliates within the

same bank holding company structure. The number of such potential

registrants is not known, but the Commission has proposed rules that

would result in the same capital requirements regardless of which non-

FCM subsidiary within the bank holding company organization holds the

positions. This approach produces neither any material costs nor

benefits relative to D1, defined as bank capital per the Basel

Accords.\60\ The only difference between the proposed rule affecting C1

(affiliate of a BHC that is not an FCM) and the current banking

regulatory requirements is the proposed minimum regulatory capital

requirement of $20 million. The Commission has requested comment on

whether this minimum would result in undue burdens on potential ``push

out'' registrants.

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\60\ This is not to say that the proposed rules for bank capital

requirements are without costs and benefits measured with respect to

some to-be-specified alternative. It is only to say that a

discussion of such costs and benefits is beyond the scope of this

analysis.

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To further promote consistent treatment where an FCM is also a

subsidiary of a BHC, the Commission has proposed amendments to Sec.

1.17 to allow it to compute its capital using internal models that have

been approved by the Federal Reserve Board, or as applicable, the SEC.

Following parallel logic as stated above, the effect of the proposed

rule on C3 (affiliate of a BHC that is an FCM), therefore, is to

produce neither any material costs nor benefits with respect to the

alternative.

[[Page 27823]]

2. Costs and Benefits of the Proposed Rule to C2 (Non-Affiliates of

BHCs That Are Not FCMs) and C4 (Non-Affiliates of BHCs That Are FCMs)

For SDs/MSPs that are not affiliated with BHCs and are not FCMs

(C2), the tangible net equity approach would not place undue

restrictions on an affected firm's working capital. This approach takes

into consideration comments received at a public roundtable held

jointly by the CFTC and SEC on December 10, 2010, which included

representatives from each of the five prudential regulators. Industry

commenters noted that some portion of SD and MSP registrants may

include commercial or other entities for whom the costs of compliance

with either FCM or bank regulatory capital requirements could be

substantial, and that such rules may not fully recognize the ability of

such firms to act as financially responsible SDs and MSPs by excluding

some of their valuable assets from being counted towards regulatory

capital.

SDs and MSPs that are not affiliated with BHCs and are not FCMs

(C2) and SDs and MSPs that not affiliates of a BHC and are FCMs (C4)

might not be permitted to use models. Rather they might have to use the

standardized Basel approach. C2 (non-affiliate of BHCs that are not

FCMs) would be required to follow the tangible net equity method with a

standardized Basel approach with respect to credit and market risks. C4

(non-affiliates that are FCMs) would be required to follow Sec. 1.17,

which generally does not include models. Consequently, while C2 and C4

do not share a common capital definition, the costs and benefits of

each relate to the potential for SDS and MSPs potentially being subject

to a less risk-sensitive (i.e., standardized) capital charge than if

they had been permitted to use an internal models based approach to

capital determination.

In this case, the cost of requiring an SD/MSP to take a

standardized capital charge for some period of time (perhaps,

indefinitely) is the opportunity cost on the potentially higher capital

requirement under the standardized approach measured relative to an

internal models based approach. When determining its proposed rules,

the Commission took into consideration commitments by international

regulators to develop risk-sensitive capital requirements for SDs and

MSPs. As noted in an October 2010 of the Financial Stability Board:

Supervisors should apply prudential requirements that

appropriately reflect the risks, including systemic risks, of non-

centrally cleared OTC derivatives products, such as the reforms

proposed by [Basel Committee on Banking Supervision] relating to

higher capital requirements * * *.\61\

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\61\ See ``Implementing OTC Derivatives Market Reforms'', report

of the Financial Stability Board (FSB) dated October 25, 2010, at p.

34. The FSB was formed in 2009 by representatives of the G-20

countries as a successor to the Financial Stability Forum, formed by

the G-7 countries in 1999.

Under the proposed rules, the amount of capital that these SDs and

MSPs must hold would be determined by proposed market risk and OTC

credit risk requirements that are based on internationally recognized

Based Accord ``standardized'' methodologies for assessing market risk

and OTC derivatives credit risk. The requirements would apply only to

uncleared swaps of the SD that are associated with its swap activities,

and also would apply to any related hedge positions. These proposed

requirements would establish risk sensitive capital requirements that

would require SDs and MSPs to hold increasing or decreasing levels of

capital as the risk of proprietary positions that they carry increases

or decreases, although the level of risk sensitivity achieved under

these requirements may prove less than the corresponding level

attributable to a well calibrated internal model.

To the extent that the proposed rules would limit the potential use

of models, they would potentially increase capital requirements. This

potential cost, in turn, needs to be balanced against the operational

cost to the Commission of validating internal capital models, as well

as the potential model risk arising from an internal models based

capital calculation that turns out to be less conservative than the

corresponding standardized calculation. Since both potential increased

capital requirements resulting under the proposed rules as well as

forgone investment opportunities attributable to that increased capital

are difficult to assess, the Commission invites comment.

Finally, if increased capital requirements result under the

proposed rules, such requirements may promote financial integrity by

reducing the aggregate amount of capital at risk, with the cost of this

reduction being paid in terms of reduced return expectations. Depending

on the level of the increased capital required and the effect it has on

the willingness of market participants to engage in swaps transactions,

market efficiency may be negatively impacted through the introduction

of higher costs. Any significant reduction in market participation

would be anticipated to exercise correspondingly negative consequences

on price discovery through reductions in liquidity.

Public Comment. The Commission invites public comment on its cost-

benefit considerations. Commenters also are invited to submit any data

or other information that they may have quantifying or qualifying the

costs and benefits of the Proposal with their comment letters.

List of Subjects

17 CFR Part 1

Brokers, Commodity futures, Reporting and recordkeeping

requirements.

17 CFR Part 23

Swaps, Swap dealers, Major swap participants, Capital and margin

requirements.

17 CFR Part 140

Authority delegations (Government agencies).

For the reasons stated in this release, the Commission proposes to

amend chapter I of title 17 of the Code of Federal Regulations, by

amending in that chapter part 1; part 23, as proposed to be added at 75

FR 71379, published November 23, 2010; and part 140, as follows:

PART 1--GENERAL REGULATIONS UNDER THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT

1. The authority citation for part 1 is revised to read as follows:

Authority: 7 U.S.C. 1a, 2, 6, 6a, 6b, 6b-1, 6c, 6d, 6e, 6f, 6g,

6h, 6i, 6j, 6k, 6l, 6m, 6n, 6o, 6p, 7, 7a, 7b, 8, 9, 9a, 12, 12a,

16, 18, 19, 21, and 23.

2. Amend Sec. 1.10 by revising paragraphs (c), (d)(1)(v),

(d)(2)(iv), (d)(2)(vi), and (g)(2)(ii) to read as follows:

Sec. 1.10 Financial reports of futures commission merchants and

introducing brokers.

* * * * *

(c) Where to file reports. (1) Form 1-FR filed by an introducing

broker pursuant to paragraph (b)(2) of this section need be filed only

with, and will be considered filed when received by, the National

Futures Association. Other reports or information provided for in this

section will be considered filed when received by the regional office

of the Commission with jurisdiction over the state in which the

registrant's principal place of business is located (as set forth in

Sec. 140.02 of this chapter) and by the designated self-regulatory

organization, if any; and reports or other information required to be

filed by this section by an applicant for registration will be

considered filed when received

[[Page 27824]]

by the National Futures Association. Any report or information filed

with the National Futures Association pursuant to this paragraph shall

be deemed for all purposes to be filed with, and to be the official

record of, the Commission.

* * * * *

(d) * * *

(1) * * *

(v) For a futures commission merchant only, the statements of

segregation requirements and funds in segregation for customers trading

on U.S. commodity exchanges and for customers' dealer options accounts,

the statement of secured amounts and funds held in separate accounts

for foreign futures and foreign options customers in accordance with

Sec. 30.7 of this chapter, and the statement of cleared swap customer

segregation requirements and funds in cleared swap customer accounts

under section 4d(f) of the Act as of the date for which the report is

made; and

* * * * *

(2) * * *

(iv) For a futures commission merchant only, the statements of

segregation requirements and funds in segregation for customers trading

on U.S. commodity exchanges and for customers' dealer options accounts,

the statement of secured amounts and funds held in separate accounts

for foreign futures and foreign options customers in accordance with

Sec. 30.7 of this chapter, and the statement of cleared swap customer

segregation requirements and funds in cleared swap customer accounts

under section 4d(f) of the Act as of the date for which the report is

made;

* * * * *

(vi) A reconciliation, including appropriate explanations, of the

statement of the computation of the minimum capital requirements

pursuant to Sec. 1.17 of this part and, for a futures commission

merchant only, the statements of segregation requirements and funds in

segregation for customers trading on U.S. commodity exchanges and for

customers' dealer option accounts, the statement of secured amounts and

funds held in separate accounts for foreign futures and foreign options

customers in accordance with Sec. 30.7 of this chapter, and the

statement of cleared swap customer segregation requirements and funds

in cleared swap customer accounts under section 4d(f) of the Act, in

the certified Form 1-FR with the applicant's or registrant's

corresponding uncertified most recent Form 1-FR filing when material

differences exist or, if no material differences exist, a statement so

indicating; and

* * * * *

(g) * * *

(2) * * *

(ii) The following statements and footnote disclosures thereof: the

Statement of Financial Condition in the certified annual financial

reports of futures commission merchants and introducing brokers; the

Statements (to be filed by a futures commission merchant only) of

Segregation Requirements and Funds in Segregation for customers trading

on U.S. commodity exchanges and for customers' dealer options accounts,

and the Statement (to be filed by a futures commission merchant only)

of Secured Amounts and Funds held in Separate Accounts for foreign

futures and foreign options customers in accordance with Sec. 30.7 of

this chapter, and the Statement (to be filed by futures commission

merchants only) of Cleared Swap Customer Segregation Requirements and

Funds in Cleared Swap Customer Accounts under section 4d(f) of the Act.

3. Amend Sec. 1.12 by:

a. Revising paragraphs (b)(3), (b)(4), (f)(4), and (h); and

b. Adding paragraph (b)(5).

The revisions and addtion read as follows:

Sec. 1.12 Maintenance of minimum financial requirements by futures

commission merchants and introducing brokers.

* * * * *

(b) * * *

(3) 150 percent of the amount of adjusted net capital required by a

registered futures association of which it is a member, unless such

amount has been determined by a margin-based capital computation set

forth in the rules of the registered futures association, and such

amount meets or exceeds the amount of adjusted net capital required

under the margin-based capital computation set forth in Sec.

1.17(a)(1)(i)(B) of this part, in which case the required percentage is

110 percent,

(4) For securities brokers or dealers, the amount of net capital

specified in Rule 17a-11(c) of the Securities and Exchange Commission

(17 CFR 240.17a-11(c)), or

(5) For security-based swap dealers or material security-based swap

participants, the amount of net capital specified in the rules of the

Securities and Exchange Commission that impose comparable reporting

requirements as set forth in this paragraph (b), must file written

notice to that effect as set forth in paragraph (i) of this section

within twenty-four (24) hours of such event.

* * * * *

(f) * * *

(4) A futures commission merchant shall report immediately by

telephone, confirmed immediately in writing by facsimile notice,

whenever any commodity futures, option, swap or other Commission

regulated account it carries is subject to a margin call, or call for

other deposits required by the futures commission merchant, that

exceeds the futures commission merchant's excess adjusted net capital,

determined in accordance with Sec. 1.17 of this part, and such call

has not been answered by the close of business on the day following the

issuance of the call. This applies to all accounts carried by the

futures commission merchant, whether customer, noncustomer, or omnibus,

that are subject to margining, including commodity futures, options on

futures, and swap positions. In addition to actual margin deposits by

an account owner, a futures commission merchant may also take account

of favorable market moves in determining whether the margin call is

required to be reported under this paragraph.

* * * * *

(h) Whenever a person registered as a futures commission merchant

knows or should know that the total amount of its funds on deposit in

segregated accounts on behalf of customers, that the total amount set

aside on behalf of customers trading on non-United States markets, or

that the total amount of its funds in segregated accounts on behalf of

customers for cleared swap transactions is less than the total amount

of such funds required by the Act and the Commission's rules to be on

deposit in segregated futures accounts, secured amount accounts, or

segregated cleared swap accounts, the registrant must report such

deficiency immediately by telephone notice, confirmed immediately in

writing by facsimile notice, to the registrant's designated self-

regulatory organization and the principal office of the Commission in

Washington, DC, to the attentions of the Director and the Chief

Accountant of the Division of Clearing and Intermediary Oversight.

* * * * *

4. Amend Sec. 1.16 by revising paragraphs (a)(4), (d)(1), and

(d)(2)(iv) to read as follows:

Sec. 1.16 Qualifications and reports of accountants.

(a) * * *

(4) Customer. The term ``customer'' includes a customer as defined

in

[[Page 27825]]

Sec. 1.3(k) of this part; a cleared swaps customer as defined in Sec.

22.2 of this chapter; and a foreign futures or foreign options customer

as defined in Sec. 30.1(c) of this chapter.

* * * * *

(d) Audit objectives. (1) The audit must be made in accordance with

generally accepted auditing standards and must include a review and

appropriate tests of the accounting system, the internal accounting

controls, and the procedures for safeguarding customer and firm assets

in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the regulations

thereunder, since the prior examination date. The audit must include

all procedures necessary under the circumstances to enable the

independent licensed or certified public accountant to express an

opinion on the financial statements and schedules. The scope of the

audit and review of the accounting system, the internal controls, and

procedures for safeguarding customer and firm assets must be sufficient

to provide reasonable assurance that any material inadequacies existing

at the date of the examination in the accounting system, the internal

accounting controls, and the procedures for safeguarding customer and

firm assets (including, in the case of a futures commission merchant,

the segregation requirements of section 4d(a)(2) of the Act and these

regulations, the secured amount requirements of the Act and these

regulations, and the segregation requirements for cleared swap

positions under section 4d(f) of the Act and these regulations) will be

discovered. Additionally, as specified objectives the audit must

include reviews of the practices and procedures followed by the

registrant in making periodic computations of the minimum financial

requirements pursuant to Sec. 1.17 of this chapter and in the case of

a futures commission merchant, daily computations of the segregation

requirements of section 4d(a)(2) of the Act and these regulations, the

secured amount requirements of the Act and these regulations, and the

segregation requirements for cleared swap positions under section 4d(f)

of the Act and these regulations.

(2) * * *

(iv) Result in violations of the Commission's segregation, secured

amount or cleared swaps segregation amount (in the case of a futures

commission merchant), recordkeeping or financial reporting requirements

to the extent that could reasonably be expected to result in the

conditions described in paragraph (d)(2)(i), (ii), or (iii) of this

section

* * * * *

5. Amend Sec. 1.17 by:

a. Revising paragraph (a)(1)(i)(A);

b. Revising paragraph (b)(2);

c. Revising paragraph (b)(9);

d. Revising paragraph (c)(2)(i);

e. Revising paragraphs (c)(2)(ii)(D) and (G);

f. Adding paragraphs (c)(5)(iii) and (iv);

g. Revising paragraphs (c)(5)(v), (viii), and (ix);

h. Revising paragraph (c)(6); and

i. Redesignating paragraphs (c)(7) and (c)(8) as paragraphs (c)(8)

and (c)(9) and add new paragraph (c)(7).

The revisions and additions read as follows:

Sec. 1.17 Minimum financial requirements for futures commission

merchants and introducing brokers.

(a)(1)(i) * * *

(A) $1,000,000, Provided, however, that if the futures commission

merchant also is a registered swap dealer, the minimum amount shall be

$20,000,000;

* * * * *

(b) * * *

(2) Customer. This term means customer as defined in Sec. 1.3(k)

of this chapter; cleared over the counter customer as defined in Sec.

1.17(b)(10) of this chapter, and includes a foreign futures or foreign

options customer as defined in Sec. 30.1(c) of this chapter.

* * * * *

(9) Cleared over the counter derivative positions means over the

counter derivative instruments, including swaps as defined in section

1a(47) of the Act, of any person in accounts that are carried on the

books of the futures commission merchant and cleared by any

organization permitted to clear such instruments under the laws of the

relevant jurisdiction, including cleared swaps as defined in section

1a(7) of the Act.

* * * * *

(c) * * *

(2) * * *

(i) Exclude any unsecured commodity futures, option, cleared swap,

or other Commission regulated account containing a ledger balance and

open trades, the combination of which liquidates to a deficit or

containing a debit ledger balance only: Provided, however, Deficits or

debit ledger balances in unsecured customers', non-customers', and

proprietary accounts, which are the subject of calls for margin or

other required deposits may be included in current assets until the

close of business on the business day following the date on which such

deficit or debit ledger balance originated providing that the account

had timely satisfied, through the deposit of new funds, the previous

day's debit or deficits, if any, in its entirety.

(ii) * * *

(D) Receivables from registered futures commission merchants or

brokers, resulting from commodity futures, options, cleared swaps, or

other Commission regulated transactions, except those specifically

excluded under paragraph (c)(2)(i) of this section;

* * * * *

(G) Receivables from third-party custodians that arise from initial

margin deposits associated with bilateral swap transactions pursuant to

Sec. 23.158 of this chapter.

(5) * * *

(iii) For positions in over-the-counter interest rate swaps that

are not cleared by a clearing organization, the following amounts:

(A) If not hedged with U.S. Treasury securities of corresponding

maturities or matched with offsetting interest rate swap positions with

corresponding terms and maturities, the applicable haircut shall be the

notional amount of the interest rate swaps multiplied by the applicable

percentages for the underlying securities specified in Rule 240.15c3-

1(c)(2)(vi)(A)(i) of the Securities and Exchange Commission (17 CFR

240.15c3-1(c)(2)(vi)(A)(i)), as if such notional amount was the market

value of a security issued or guaranteed as to principal or interest by

the United States;

(B) If hedged with U.S. Treasury securities of corresponding

maturities or matched with offsetting interest rate swap positions with

corresponding terms and maturities, and such interest rate swaps are

maturing in ten years or less, the applicable haircut shall be one

percent of the notional amount of the interest rate swaps; and

(C) If hedged with U.S. Treasury securities of corresponding

maturities or matched with offsetting interest rate swap positions with

corresponding terms and maturities, and such interest rate swaps are

maturing in excess of ten years, the applicable haircut shall be three

percent of the notional amount of the interest rate swaps;

(iv) For the net position in the following:

(A) Over-the-counter credit default swaps that are not cleared by a

clearing organization, the notional principal amount multiplied by the

applicable percentages, as determined by the underlying securities and

the remaining maturity of the swap agreement, that are

[[Page 27826]]

specified in Rule 240.15c3-1(c)(2)(vi) of the Securities and Exchange

Commission (17 CFR 240.15c3-1(c)(2)(vi)) (``securities haircuts'') and

100 percent of the value of ``nonmarketable securities'' as specified

in Rule 240.15c3-1(c)(2)(vii) of the Securities and Exchange Commission

(17 CFR 240.15c3-1(c)(2)(vii));

(B) Over-the-counter equity swaps that are not cleared by a

clearing organization, 15 percent of the notional principal amount;

(C) Over-the-counter foreign currency swap transactions involving

euros, British pounds, Canadian dollars, Japanese yen, or Swiss francs,

6 percent of the notional principal amount of the swap transaction;

(D) Over-the-counter foreign currency swap transactions involving

currencies other than euros, British pounds, Canadian dollars, Japanese

yen, or Swiss francs, 20 percent of the notional principal amount of

the swap transaction;

(E) Over-the-counter commodity swaps, 20 percent of the market

value of the notional amount of the underlying commodities; or

(F) Over-the-counter swap transactions involving an underlying

instrument that is not listed in paragraph (c)(5)(iv)(A), (B), (C),

(D), or (E) of this section, 20 percent of the effective notional

principal amount of the swap transaction.

(v) In the case of securities and obligations used by the applicant

or registrant in computing net capital, and in the case of a futures

commission merchant with securities in segregation pursuant to sections

4d(a)(2) and 4d(f) of the Act and the regulations in this chapter, and

Sec. 30.7 secured accounts as set forth in part 30 of this chapter,

which were not deposited by customers, the percentages specified in

Rule 240.15c3-1(c)(2)(vi) of the Securities and Exchange Commission (17

CFR 240.15c3-1(c)(2)(vi)) (``securities haircuts'') and 100 percent of

the value of ``nonmarketable securities'' as specified in Rule

240.15c3-1(c)(2)(vii) of the Securities and Exchange Commission (17 CFR

240.15c3-1(c)(2)(vii));

* * * * *

(viii) In the case of a futures commission merchant, for

undermargined customer commodity futures, options, cleared swaps or

other Commission regulated accounts the amount of funds required in

each such account to meet maintenance margin requirements of the

applicable board of trade or if there are no such maintenance margin

requirements, clearing organization margin requirements applicable to

such positions, after application of calls for margin or other required

deposits which are outstanding three business days or less. If there

are no such maintenance margin requirements or clearing organization

margin requirements, then the amount of funds required to provide

margin equal to the amount necessary after application of calls for

margin or other required deposits outstanding three business days or

less to restore original margin when the original margin has been

depleted by 50 percent or more: Provided, To the extent a deficit is

excluded from current assets in accordance with paragraph (c)(2)(i) of

this section such amount shall not also be deducted under this

paragraph (c)(5)(viii). In the event that an owner of a customer

account has deposited an asset other than cash to margin, guarantee or

secure his account, the value attributable to such asset for purposes

of this subparagraph shall be the lesser of the value attributable to

the asset pursuant to the margin rules of the applicable board of

trade, or the market value of the asset after application of the

percentage deductions specified in this paragraph (c)(5);

(ix) In the case of a futures commission merchant, for

undermargined commodity futures, options, cleared swaps, or other

Commission regulated noncustomer and omnibus accounts the amount of

funds required in each such account to meet maintenance margin

requirements of the applicable board of trade or if there are no such

maintenance margin requirements, clearing organization margin

requirements applicable to such positions, after application of calls

for margin or other required deposits which are outstanding two

business days or less. If there are no such maintenance margin

requirements or clearing organization margin requirements, then the

amount of funds required to provide margin equal to the amount

necessary after application of calls for margin or other required

deposits outstanding two business days or less to restore original

margin when the original margin has been depleted by 50 percent or

more: Provided, To the extent a deficit is excluded from current assets

in accordance with paragraph (c)(2)(i) of this section such amount

shall not also be deducted under this paragraph (c)(5)(ix). In the

event that an owner of a noncustomer or omnibus account has deposited

an asset other than cash to margin, guarantee or secure his account the

value attributable to such asset for purposes of this subparagraph

shall be the lesser of the value attributable to such asset pursuant to

the margin rules of the applicable board of trade, or the market value

of such asset after application of the percentage deductions specified

in this paragraph (c)(5);

* * * * *

(6) * * *

(i)(A) Any futures commission merchant that is also registered with

the Securities and Exchange Commission as a securities broker or

dealer, and who also satisfies the other requirements of this paragraph

(c)(6), may elect to compute its adjusted net capital using the

alternative capital deductions that the Securities and Exchange

Commission has approved by written order, provided, however, that such

order was dated before May 12, 2011;

(B) If an election under this paragraph (c)(6) was authorized

before the date specified in paragraph (c)(6)(i)(A) of this section,

and the futures commission merchant otherwise remains in compliance

with this paragraph (c)(6), a futures commission merchant that is

permitted by the Securities and Exchange Commission to use alternative

capital deductions for its unsecured receivables from over-the-counter

transactions in derivatives, or for its proprietary positions in

securities, commodities, forward contracts, swap transactions, options,

or futures contracts, may continue to use these same alternative

capital deductions when computing its adjusted net capital in lieu of

the standard deductions otherwise specified in this section.

(C) If a futures commission merchant computing alternative

deductions under paragraph (c)(6)(B) of this section is also registered

with the Commission as swap dealer or major swap participant, or

registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission as a security-

based swap dealer or major security-based swap participant, the

alternative deductions approved under this paragraph (c)(6) shall

remain effective only if the futures commission merchant has filed an

application under Sec. 23.103 of this chapter and the application is

pending approval. A denial or approval of an application made under

Sec. 23.103 shall also terminate approval of alternative deductions

under this paragraph (c)(6). The futures commission merchant's capital

deductions must thereafter be calculated as required under the terms of

the Commission's order issued under Sec. 23.103.

* * * * *

(7) Any futures commission merchant that is also registered as a

swap dealer

[[Page 27827]]

or major swap participant, or is also registered as a security-based

swap dealer or major security-based swap participant, and which has

received approval of its application to the Commission under Sec.

23.103 of this chapter for capital computations using the firm's

internal models, shall calculate its adjusted net capital in accordance

with the terms and conditions of such Commission approval.

* * * * *

PART 23--SWAP DEALERS AND MAJOR SWAP PARTICIPANTS

6. The authority citation for part 23 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 7 U.S.C. 1a, 2, 6, 6a, 6b-1, 6c, 6p, 6r, 6s, 6t, 9,

9a, 12, 12a, 13b, 13c, 16a, 18, 19, 21.

7. Part 23, as proposed to be added at 75 FR 71379, November 213,

2010, is amended by adding Subpart E to read as follows:

Subpart E--Capital and Margin Requirements for Swap Dealers and

Major Swap Participants

Sec.

23.100 Definitions applicable to capital requirements.

23.101 Minimum financial requirements for swap dealers and major

swap participants.

23.102 Tangible net equity.

23.103 Calculation of market risk exposure requirement and over-the-

counter derivatives credit risk requirement using internal models.

23.104 Calculation of market risk exposure requirement and over-the-

counter derivatives credit risk requirement when models are not

approved.

23.105 Maintenance of minimum financial requirements by swap dealers

and major swap participants.

23.106 Financial recordkeeping and reporting requirements for swap

dealers and major swap participants.

23.107-23.149 [Reserved]

Sec. 23.100 Definitions applicable to capital requirements.

For purposes of Sec. Sec. 23.101 through 23.149 of subpart E, the

following terms are defined as follows:

Market risk exposure. This term means the risk of loss resulting

from movements in market prices. Market risk exposure includes

``specific risk'' (referring to those risks that affect the market

value of a specific instrument, such as the credit risk of the issuer

of the particular instrument, but do not materially alter broad market

conditions), and it also includes market risk in general (referring to

the change in the market value of a particular asset that results from

broad market movements, such as a change in market interest rates,

foreign exchange rates, equity prices, and commodity prices).

Market risk exposure requirement. This term refers to the amount

that the registered swap dealer or major swap participant is required

to compute under Sec. 23.104, or to compute using internal models as

approved under Sec. 23.103.

Over-the-counter derivatives credit risk. This term refers to the

risk that the counterparty to an over-the-counter transaction could

default before the final settlement of the transaction's cash flows.

Over-the-counter derivatives credit risk requirement. This term

refers to the amount that the registered swap dealer or major swap

participant is required to compute under Sec. 23.104, or to compute

using internal models approved under Sec. 23.103.

Prudential regulator. This term has the same meaning as set forth

in section 1a(39) of the Act, and includes the Board of Governors of

the Federal Reserve System, the Office of the Comptroller of the

Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Farm Credit

Administration, and the Federal Housing Finance Agency, as applicable

to a swap dealer or major swap participant.

Regulatory capital requirement. This term refers to each of the

capital requirements that Sec. 23.101 of this part applies to a swap

dealer or major swap participant.

Sec. 23.101 Minimum financial requirements for swap dealers and major

swap participants.

(a)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (a)(2), (3), or (4) of this

section, each registered swap dealer must meet or exceed the greatest

of the following regulatory capital requirements:

(i) Tangible net equity (as defined in Sec. 23.102 of this part)

in an amount equal to $20,000,000 plus the amounts calculated under

this part for the swap dealer's market risk exposure requirement and

its over-the-counter derivatives credit risk requirement associated

with swap positions and related hedge positions that are part of the

swap dealer's swap activities; or,

(ii) The amount of capital required by a registered futures

association of which the swap dealer is a member.

(2) Except as provided in paragraph (a)(3) or (4) of this section,

each registered swap dealer that is a subsidiary of a U.S. bank holding

company must meet or exceed the greatest of the following regulatory

capital requirements:

(i) $20 million of Tier 1 capital as defined in 12 CFR part 225,

appendix A, Sec. II.A;

(ii) The swap dealer's minimum risk-based ratio requirements set

forth in 12 CFR part 225, and any appendices thereto, as if the swap

dealer itself were a U.S. bank-holding company; or,

(iii) The amount of capital required by a registered futures

association of which the swap dealer is a member.

(3) A registered swap dealer that is subject to minimum capital

requirements established by rule or regulation of a prudential

regulator, or a registered swap dealer that also is a registered

futures commission merchant subject to the capital requirements of

Sec. 1.17 of this chapter, is not subject to the regulatory capital

requirements set forth in paragraph (a)(1) or (2) of this section.

(4) A registered swap dealer that is a U.S. nonbank financial

company that has been designated a systemically important financial

institution by the Financial Stability Oversight Council and subject to

supervision by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System is

not subject to the regulatory capital requirements set forth in

paragraph (a)(1) or (2) of this section.

(b)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (b)(2), (3), or (4) of this

section, each major swap participant must meet or exceed the greatest

of the following regulatory capital requirements:

(i) Tangible net equity (as defined in Sec. 23.102 of this part)

in an amount equal to $20,000,000 plus the amounts calculated under

this part for the major swap participant's market risk exposure

requirement and its over-the-counter derivatives credit risk

requirement associated with its swap positions and related hedge

positions; or

(ii) The amount of capital required by a registered futures

association of which the major swap participant is a member.

(2) Except as provided in paragraph (b)(3) or (4) of this section,

each registered major swap participant that is a subsidiary of a U.S.

bank-holding company must meet or exceed the greatest of the following

regulatory capital requirements:

(i) $20 million of Tier 1 capital as defined in 12 CFR part 225,

appendix A, section II.A;

(ii) The major swap participant's minimum risk-based ratio

requirements set forth in 12 CFR part 225, and any appendices thereto,

as if the major swap participant itself were a U.S. bank-holding

company; or,

(iii) The amount of capital required by a registered futures

association of which the major swap participant is a member.

[[Page 27828]]

(3) A registered major swap participant that is subject to minimum

capital requirements established by rule or regulation of a prudential

regulator, or a registered major swap participant that also is a

registered futures commission merchant subject to the capital

requirements of Sec. 1.17 of this chapter, is not subject to the

regulatory capital requirements set forth in paragraph (b)(1) or (2) of

this section.

(4) A registered major swap participant that is a U.S. nonbank

financial company that has been designated a systemically important

financial institution by the Financial Stability Oversight Council and

subject to supervision by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve

System is not subject to the regulatory capital requirements set forth

in paragraph (b)(1) or (2) of this section.

(c)(1) Before any applicant may be registered as a swap dealer or

major swap participant, the applicant must demonstrate to the

satisfaction of the National Futures Association one of the following:

(i) Its compliance with the applicable regulatory capital

requirements in paragraphs (a)(1), (2), (b)(1) or (2) of this section;

(ii) that it is a futures commission merchant that complies with

Sec. 1.17 of this chapter;

(iii) that its minimum regulatory capital requirements are

supervised by a prudential regulator in paragraph (a)(3) or (b)(3) of

this section; or

(iv) that it is designated by the Financial Stability Oversight

Council as a systemically important financial institution and subject

to supervision by the Federal Reserve Board under paragraph (a)(4) or

(b)(4) of this section.

(2) Each swap dealer and major swap participant subject to the

minimum capital requirements set forth in paragraphs (a) and (b) of

this section must be in compliance with the Commission's minimum

capital requirements at all times and must be able to demonstrate such

compliance to the satisfaction of the Commission.

Sec. 23.102 Tangible net equity.

(a) Tangible net equity is a swap dealer's or major swap

participant's equity as determined under U.S. generally accepted

accounting principles, and excludes goodwill and other intangible

assets.

(b)(1) Subject to the provisions of paragraph (b)(2) of this

section:

(i) Tangible net equity is computed by consolidating in a single

computation assets and liabilities of any subsidiary or affiliate for

which the swap dealer or major swap participant guarantees, endorses,

or assumes directly or indirectly the obligations or liabilities; or

(ii) If an opinion of outside counsel is obtained as provided for

in paragraph (b)(3) of this section, a swap dealer or major swap

participant may elect to consolidate assets and liabilities of a

subsidiary or affiliate whose liabilities and obligations have not been

guaranteed, endorsed, or assumed directly or indirectly by the swap

dealer or major swap participant, but which is majority owned and

controlled by the swap dealer or major swap participant.

(2) If the consolidation required or permitted under paragraph

(b)(1) of this section results in the increase of the swap dealer's or

major swap participant's tangible net equity or decreases the minimum

regulatory capital requirement, such benefits shall not be recognized

unless an opinion of counsel meeting the requirements of paragraph

(b)(3) of this section has been obtained by the swap dealer or major

swap participant.

(3) For purposes of paragraph (b)(1) or (2) of this section, the

swap dealer or major swap participant shall demonstrate by written

opinion of outside counsel that the net asset values or the portion

thereof related to the parent's ownership interest in the subsidiary or

affiliate, may be caused by the swap dealer or major swap participant

or an appointed trustee, to be distributed to the swap dealer or major

swap participant within 30 calendar days. Such opinion also must set

forth the actions necessary to cause such a distribution to be made,

identify the parties having the authority to take such actions,

identify and describe the rights of other parties or classes of

parties, including but not limited to customers, general creditors,

subordinated lenders, minority shareholders, employees, litigants, and

governmental or regulatory authorities, who may delay or prevent such a

distribution and such other assurances as the Commission by rule or

interpretation may require. Such opinion must be current and

periodically renewed in connection with the swap dealer's or major swap

participant's annual audit pursuant to part 23 of this title or upon

any material change in circumstances.

(4) In preparing a consolidated computation of tangible net equity:

(i) Consolidated tangible net equity shall be reduced by the

estimated amount of any tax reasonably anticipated to be incurred upon

distribution of the assets of the subsidiary or affiliate; and

(ii) Each swap dealer or major swap participant included within the

consolidation shall at all times be in compliance with the regulatory

capital requirements to which it is subject.

(5) No swap dealer or major swap participant shall guarantee,

endorse, or assume directly or indirectly any obligation or liability

of a subsidiary or affiliate unless the obligation or liability is

reflected in the computation of tangible net equity of the swap dealer

or major swap participant, except as provided in paragraph (b)(4)(ii)

of this section.

Sec. 23.103 Calculation of market risk exposure requirement and over-

the-counter derivatives credit risk requirement using internal models

(a) A registered swap dealer or major swap participant may apply to

the Commission for approval to use internal models under terms and

conditions required by the Commission and by these regulations when

calculating:

(1) the amounts that the swap dealer or major swap participant must

add to its tangible net equity for its market risk exposure requirement

and over-the-counter derivatives credit risk requirement to compute its

minimum regulatory capital requirement under Sec. Sec. 23.101(a)(1)(i)

or 23.101(b)(1)(i), respectively, of this part;

(2) Its market risk and over-the-counter derivatives credit risk

requirements under 12 CFR part 225, Appendix E and Appendix G, if the

swap dealer or major swap participant is a subsidiary of a U.S. bank

holding company that must meet regulatory capital requirements set

forth in Sec. 23.101(a)(2)(ii) or Sec. 23.101(b)(2)(ii) of this part;

or

(3) The deductions from its net capital for market risk exposure

and over-the-counter derivatives credit risk, in lieu of deductions

otherwise required under Sec. 1.17(c) of this chapter, if the swap

dealer or major swap participant also is registered as a futures

commission merchant.

(b) The application shall be in writing and filed with the regional

office of the Commission having local jurisdiction over the swap dealer

or major swap participant as set forth in Sec. 140.2 of this chapter.

The application may be filed electronically in accordance with

instructions approved by the Commission and specified on the

Commission's Web site. A petition for confidential treatment of

information within the application may be submitted according to

procedures set forth in Sec. 145.9 of this chapter.

(c) The application must identify the categories of positions for

which the

[[Page 27829]]

swap dealer or major swap participant will use internal models for its

computations for market risk and over-the-counter derivatives credit

risk, and, for each such category, provide a description of the methods

that the swap dealer or major swap participant will use to calculate

its deductions, and also, if calculated separately, deductions for

specific risk; a description of the internal models, and an overview of

the integration of the models into the internal risk management control

system of the swap dealer or major swap participant; a description of

how the swap dealer or major swap participant will calculate current

exposure and potential future exposure for its over-the-counter

derivatives credit risk; a description of how the swap dealer or major

swap participant will determine internal credit ratings of

counterparties and internal credit risk weights of counterparties, if

applicable; and a description of the estimated market risk exposure and

over-the-counter derivatives credit risk exposure amounts to be

reported by the swap dealer or major swap participant.

(d) The swap dealer or major swap participant must promptly, upon

the request of the Commission at any time, provide any other

explanatory information as the Commission may require at its discretion

regarding the swap dealer's or major swap participant's internal models

and the swap dealer's or major swap participant's computation of its

market risk exposure or over-the-counter derivatives credit risk

requirements.

(e) Except as permitted under paragraph (f) of this section, the

swap dealer or major swap participant requesting approval under this

section must be either:

(1) A subsidiary of a U.S. bank holding company whose calculations

of minimum risk-based capital requirements under Sec. 23.101 complies

with the requirements that are set forth in regulations of the Board of

Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve Board) at 12

CFR part 225, appendix E and appendix G for calculating capital

requirements for its market risk exposure and over-the-counter

derivatives credit risk requirements, and whose internal models have

been reviewed and are subject to regular assessment by the Federal

Reserve Board; or

(2) A security-based swap dealer or major security-based swap

participant registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission, and

whose internal models used for calculating capital requirements for its

market risk exposure and its over-the-counter derivatives credit risk

have been reviewed and are subject to regular assessment by the

Securities and Exchange Commission.

(f) At any time after the effective date of this rule, the

Commission may in its sole discretion determine by written order that

swap dealers or major swap participants not described in paragraph (e)

of this section also may apply for approval under this section to

calculate the amount of their market risk exposure requirements or

over-the-counter derivatives credit risk requirements using proprietary

internal models.

(g) The Commission may approve or deny the application, or approve

an amendment to the application, in whole or in part, subject to any

conditions or limitations the Commission may require, if the Commission

finds the approval to be necessary or appropriate in the public

interest or for the protection of customers, after determining, among

other things, whether the applicant has met the requirements of this

section and is in compliance with other applicable rules promulgated

under the Act and by self-regulatory organizations.

(h) A swap dealer or major swap participant may no longer use

internal models to compute its market risk exposure requirement and

over-the-counter counterparty credit risk requirement, upon the

occurrence of any of the following:

(1) Internal models that received Commission approval under

paragraph (e) of this section are no longer periodically reviewed or

assessed by the Federal Reserve Board or the Securities and Exchange

Commission;

(2) The swap dealer or major swap participant has changed

materially a mathematical model described in the application or changed

materially its internal risk management control system without first

submitting amendments identifying such changes and obtaining Commission

approval for such changes;

(3) The Commission determines that the internal models are no

longer sufficient for purposes of the capital calculations of the swap

dealer or major swap participant as a result of changes in the

operations of the swap dealer or major swap participant;

(4) The swap dealer or major swap participant fails to come into

compliance with its requirements under this section, after having

received from the Director of the Division of Clearing and Intermediary

Oversight written notification that the firm is not in compliance with

its requirements, and must come into compliance by a date specified in

the notice; or

(5) The Commission by written order finds that permitting the swap

dealer or major swap participant to continue to use the internal models

is no longer necessary or appropriate for the protection of customers

of the futures commission merchant (if the swap dealer or major swap

participant is also a futures commission merchant) or of the integrity

of Commission-regulated markets.

Sec. 23.104 Calculation of market risk exposure requirement and over-

the-counter derivatives credit risk requirement when models are not

approved.

(a) General requirements for calculations. If internal models have

not been submitted and received approval under Sec. 23.103 of this

part, the market risk exposure requirement shall be calculated as set

forth in paragraphs (b) through (d) of this section, and the over-the-

counter derivatives credit risk requirement shall be calculated as set

forth in paragraphs (e) through (j) of this section.

(b) Market risk exposure requirement. (1) A swap dealer or major

swap participant that must meet the minimum regulatory capital

requirements in Sec. 23.101(a)(1)(i) or 23.101(b)(1)(i), respectively,

shall calculate its market risk exposure requirement as the sum of the

amounts for specific risk in paragraphs (c) of this section and the

amounts for market risk in general in paragraph (d) of this section, as

applied to the swap dealer's or major swap participant's:

(i) Swaps that are not cleared; and

(ii) Debt instruments, equities, commodities or foreign currency,

including derivatives of the same, that hedge such uncleared swaps;

(2) A swap dealer or major swap participant that must meet the

requirements in Sec. 23.101(a)(2)(ii) or Sec. 23.101(b)(2)(ii) of

this part shall calculate the market risk deductions required by 12 CFR

part 225, Appendix E as the sum of the amounts for specific risk in

paragraphs (c) of this section and the amounts for market risk in

general in paragraph (d) of this section, as applied to the swap

dealer's or major swap participant's ``covered positions'', as that

term is defined in 12 CFR part 225, Appendix E. Section 2(a); and

(3) A swap dealer or major swap participant that is also a futures

commission merchant shall calculate its deductions from net capital for

market risk and over-the-counter derivatives credit risk in accordance

with Sec. 1.17(c) of this chapter.

[[Page 27830]]

(4) The following definitions apply for purposes of the calculation

of the market risk exposure requirement:

``Credit derivative'' means a financial contract that allows one

party (the protection purchaser) to transfer the credit risk of one or

more exposures (reference exposure(s)) to another party (the protection

provider).

``Debt positions'' means fixed-rate or floating rate instruments,

and other instruments with values that react primarily to changes in

interest rates, including certain non-convertible preferred stock;

convertible bonds; instruments subject to repurchase and lending

agreements; and any derivatives (including written and purchased

options) for which the underlying instrument is a debt position.

Excluded from this definition are asset-backed securities, mortgage-

backed securities and collateralized debt obligations (except for pass-

through mortgage-backed securities issued or guaranteed as to principal

or interest by the United States or any agency thereof); municipal

securities; and non-investment grade debt securities. Debt instruments

excluded from this definition shall remain subject to applicable

haircuts under Sec. 240.15c3-1 of this title.

``Equity Positions'' means equity instruments and other instruments

with values that react primarily to changes in equity prices, including

voting or non-voting common stock, certain convertible bonds, and

commitments to buy or sell equity instruments. Also included are

derivatives (including written and purchased options) for which the

underlying is an equity position.

(c) Specific risk. (1) The required deduction from capital for

specific risk shall equal the sum of the weighted values for debt

positions held by the swap dealer or major swap participant, as

determined in paragraph (c)(2) of this section, plus the sum of the

weighted values of the equity positions held by the swap dealer or

major swap participant, as determined under paragraph (c)(3) of this

section.

(2) Sum of weighted values for debt positions. The sum of the

required weighted values of debt positions is determined by multiplying

the weighting factor indicated in Table A in paragraph (c)(2)(v) of

this section by the absolute value of the current market value of each

net long or short debt position held by the swap dealer or major swap

participant, and summing all of the calculated weighted values for each

position. For purposes of the calculation:

(i) Interest rate derivatives shall be included as set forth in

paragraph (d)(2) of this section;

(ii) Credit derivatives shall be included as set forth in paragraph

(c)(4) of this section;

(iii) Long and short debt positions (including derivatives) in

identical debt issues or debt indices may be netted; and

(iv) Debt instruments are classified in Table A of this section as

one of the following categories:

(A) ``Government category'' includes all debt instruments of

central governments that are members of the Organization for Economic

Co-operation and Development (``OECD'') including bonds, Treasury

bills, and other short-term instruments, as well as local currency

instruments of non-OECD central governments to the extent of

liabilities booked in that currency;

(B) ``Qualifying category'' includes debt instruments of U.S.

government-sponsored agencies, general obligation debt instruments

issued by states and other political subdivisions of OECD countries,

multilateral development banks, and debt instruments issued by U.S.

depository institutions or OECD-banks that do not qualify as capital of

the issuing institution; or

(C) ``Other category'' includes debt instruments that are not

included in the government or qualifying categories.

(v) Table A is as set forth as follows:

Table A--``Specific Risk'' Weighting Factors for Debt Positions

------------------------------------------------------------------------

Remaining maturity Weighting factor

Category (contractual) (in percent)

------------------------------------------------------------------------

Government................... N/A.................. 0.00

Qualifying................... 6 months or less..... 0.25

Over 6 months to 24 1.00

months.

Over 24 months....... 1.60

Other........................ N/A.................. 8.00

------------------------------------------------------------------------

(3) Sum of the weighted values for equity positions. The sum of

the required weighted values of equity positions is determined by

multiplying a weighting factor of 8 percent by the absolute value of

the current market value of each net long or short equity position, and

summing all of the risk-weighted values. For purposes of the

calculation:

(i) Equity derivatives shall be included as set forth in paragraph

(d)(4) of this section; and

(ii) Long and short equity positions (including derivatives) in

identical equity issues or equity indices in the same market may be

netted.

(4) Credit derivatives. The following requirements apply when

computing specific risk charges for credit derivatives:

(i) For each credit derivative in which the swap dealer or major

swap participant is the protection seller, the credit derivative is

treated as a long notional position in the reference exposure, and

where the swap dealer or major swap participant is the protection

buyer, the credit derivative is treated as a short notional position in

the reference exposure.

(ii) The specific risk charge for an individual debt position that

represents purchased credit protection is capped at the market value of

the protection.

(iii) A set of transactions consisting of a debt position and its

credit derivative hedge has a specific risk charge of zero if the debt

position is fully hedged by a total return swap (or similar instrument

where there is a matching of payments and changes in market value of

the position) and there is an exact match between the reference

obligation of the swap and the debt position, the maturity of the swap

and the debt position, and the currency of the swap and the debt

position.

(iv) The specific risk charge for a set of transactions consisting

of a debt position and its credit derivative hedge that does not meet

the criteria of paragraph (c)(4)(iii) of this section is equal to 20.0

percent of the capital requirement for the side of the transaction with

the higher capital requirement when the credit risk of the position is

fully hedged by a credit default swap or similar instrument and there

is an exact match between the reference obligation of the credit

derivative hedge and the debt position, the maturity of the credit

derivative

[[Page 27831]]

hedge and the debt position, and the currency of the credit derivative

hedge and the debt position.

(v) The specific risk charge for a set of transactions consisting

of a debt position and its credit derivative hedge that does not meet

the criteria of either paragraphs (c)(4)(iii) or (iv) of this section,

but in which all or substantially all of the price risk has been

hedged, is equal to the specific risk charge for the side of the

transaction with the higher specific risk charge.

(vi) The total specific risk charge for a portfolio of nth-to-

default credit derivatives is the sum of the specific risk charges for

individual nth-to-default credit derivatives, as computed under this

paragraph. The specific risk charge for each nth-to-default credit

derivative position applies irrespective of whether a swap dealer or

major swap participant is a net protection buyer or net protection

seller.

(vii) The specific risk charge for a first-to-default credit

derivative is the lesser of:

(A) The sum of the specific risk charges for the individual

reference credit exposures in the group of reference exposures; or

(B) The maximum possible credit event payment under the credit

derivative contract.

(viii) Where a swap dealer or major swap participant has a risk

position in one of the reference credit exposures underlying a first-

to-default credit derivative and this credit derivative hedges the swap

dealer's or major swap participant's risk position, the swap dealer or

major swap participant is allowed to reduce both the specific risk

charge for the reference credit exposure and that part of the specific

risk charge for the credit derivative that relates to this particular

reference credit exposure such that its specific risk charge for the

pair reflects the net position in the reference credit exposure. Where

a swap dealer or major swap participant has multiple risk positions in

reference credit exposures underlying a first-to-default credit

derivative, this offset is allowed only for the underlying reference

credit exposure having the lowest specific risk charge.

(ix) The specific risk charge for a second or-subsequent-to-default

credit derivative is the lesser of:

(A) The sum of the specific risk charges for the individual

reference credit exposures in the group of reference exposures, but

disregarding the (n-1) obligations with the lowest specific risk add-

ons; or

(B) The maximum possible credit event payment under the credit

derivative contract.

(x) For second-or-subsequent-to-default credit derivatives, no

offset of the specific risk charge with an underlying reference credit

exposure is allowed.

(d) Market Risk in General. The required deduction from capital for

the market risk in general of the swap dealer or major swap

participant's proprietary positions shall be computed as set forth in

this paragraph:

(1) Interest rate risk: Time-bands and zones. A swap dealer or

major swap participant shall calculate a general market risk capital

charge for interest rate risk on proprietary positions that equals the

sum of the total time-band disallowances in paragraph (d)(1)(vii) of

this section; the total intra-zone disallowances and the total inter-

zone disallowances in paragraphs (d)(1)(viii)(C) and (F) of this

section, and the amount of the final net risk-weighted long or short

position in paragraph (d)(1)(viii)(G) of this section, in accordance

with the following methodology:

(i) Each long or short interest rate position shall be reported at

its current market value and distributed into the time bands of the

maturity ladder specified in Table B of this section. Interest rate

derivatives shall be included as set forth in paragraph (d)(2) of this

section. For purposes of this distribution into time-bands, fixed-rate

instruments are allocated according to the remaining term to maturity

and floating-rate instruments according to the next repricing date.

(ii) The long interest rate positions in each time-band are summed

and the short interest rate positions in each time-band are summed.

(iii) The summed long interest rate positions in each time-band are

multiplied by the appropriate risk-weight factor set forth in Table B

of this section to determine the risk-weighted long interest rate

position for each time-band. The summed short interest rate positions

in each time-band also are multiplied by the appropriate risk-weight

factor in Table B of this section to determine the risk-weighted short

interest rate position for each time-band.

(iv) Table B is as set forth as follows:

Table B--Time-Bands and Risk Weights for Interest Rate Positions

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Risk weight

Zone Coupon 3% or more Coupon less than 3% (%)

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1.............................. 1 month or less................ 1 month or less............... 0.00

1.............................. 1 to 3 months.................. 1 to 3 months................. 0.20

1.............................. 3 to 6 months.................. 3 to 6 months................. 0.40

1.............................. 6 to 12 months................. 6 to 12 months................ 0.70

2.............................. 1 to 2 years................... 1.0 to 1.9 years.............. 1.25

2.............................. 2 to 3 years................... 1.9 to 2.8 years.............. 1.75

2.............................. 3 to 4 years................... 2.8 to 3.6 years.............. 2.25

3.............................. 4 to 5 years................... 3.6 to 4.3 years.............. 2.75

3.............................. 5 to 7 years................... 4.3 to 5.7 years.............. 3.25

3.............................. 7 to 10 years.................. 5.7 to 7.3 years.............. 3.75

3.............................. 10 to 15 years................. 7.3 to 9.3 years.............. 4.50

3.............................. 15 to 20 years................. 9.3 to 10.6 years............. 5.25

3.............................. Over 20 years.................. 10.6 to 12 years.............. 6.00

3.............................. ............................... 12 to 20 years................ 8.00

Over 20 years................. 12.50

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

(v) If a time-band includes both risk-weighted long interest rate

positions and short interest rate positions, such risk-weighted long

positions and short interest rate positions are netted, resulting in a

single net risk-weighted long or short interest rate position for each

time-band.

(vi) If risk-weighted long interest rate positions and risk-

weighted short interest rate positions in a time-band have been netted,

a ``time-band disallowance'' charge is computed equal to 10 percent of

the smaller of the total risk-weighted long interest rate position

[[Page 27832]]

or the total risk-weighted short interest rate position, or if the

total long risk-weighted interest rate position and the total short

risk-weighted interest rate position are equal, 10 percent of either

long or short position.

(vii) The total time-band disallowance equals the sum of the

absolute values of the individual disallowances for each time-band in

Table B.

(viii) Table C of this section also groups the time-bands into

three ``zones'': Zone 1 consists of the first three time-bands (0 up to

1 month; 1 month up to 3 months, and 3 months up to 6 months); zone 2

consists of the next four time-bands (6 months up to 12 months; 1 year

up to 2 years; 2 years up to 3 years; and 3 years up to 4 years), and

the remaining time-bands in Table C are in zone 3. Table C is as set

forth below:

Table C--Horizontal Disallowance

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Between

Zone Time band Within the adjacent zones Between zones

zone (%) (%) 1 and 3 (%)

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1................................. 1 mth or less............... 40 40 100

1................................. 1 to 3 mths................. .............. .............. ..............

1................................. 3 to 6 mths................. .............. .............. ..............

1................................. 6 to 12 mths................ .............. .............. ..............

2................................. 1 to 2 yrs.................. 30 .............. ..............

2................................. 2 to 3 yrs.................. .............. .............. ..............

2................................. 3 to 4 yrs.................. .............. .............. ..............

3................................. 4 to 5 yrs.................. 30 40 ..............

3................................. 5 to 7 yrs.................. .............. .............. ..............

3................................. 7 to 10 yrs................. .............. .............. ..............

3................................. 10 to 15 yrs................ .............. .............. ..............

3................................. 15 to 20 yrs................ .............. .............. ..............

3................................. Over 20 yrs................. .............. .............. ..............

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

(A) If a zone includes both risk-weighted long positions and risk-

weighted short interest rate positions in different time-bands, the

risk-weighted long positions and risk-weighted short positions in all

of the time-bands within the zone are netted, resulting in a single net

risk-weighted long or short position for each zone.

(B) An ``intra-zone disallowance'' is computed by multiplying the

percent disallowance factors for each zone set out in Table C of this

section by the smaller of the net risk-weighted long or net risk-

weighted short positions within the zone, or if the positions are

equal, a percentage of either position.

(C) The total intra-zone disallowance equals the sum of the

absolute values of the individual intra-zone disallowances.

(D) Risk-weighted long and short positions are then netted between

zone 1 and zone 2, between zone 2 and zone 3, and then zone 3 and zone

1.

(E) An ``inter-zone disallowance'' is calculated by multiplying the

percent disallowance in Table C of this section by the smaller of the

net long or short position eliminated by the inter-zone netting, or if

the positions are equal, a percentage of either position.

(F) The total inter-zone disallowance equals the sum of the

absolute values of the individual inter-zone disallowances.

(G) Lastly, the net risk-weighted long interest rate position or

net risk-weighted short interest rate position remaining in the zones

are summed to reach a single net risk-weighted long or net risk-

weighted short.

(2) Interest rate derivative contracts. (i) Derivative contracts

are converted into positions in the relevant underlying instrument and

are included in the calculation of specific and general market risk

capital charges as described in paragraphs (c) and (d) of this section.

The amount to be included is the market value of the principal amount

of the underlying or of the notional underlying. In the case of a

futures contract on a corporate bond index, positions are included at

the market value of the notional underlying portfolio of securities.

(ii) Futures and forward contracts (including forward rate

contracts) are converted into a combination of a long position and

short position in the notional security. The maturity of a futures

contract or a forward rate contract is the period until delivery or

exercise of the contract, plus the life of the underlying instrument.

(iii) Swaps are treated as two notional positions in the relevant

instruments with appropriate maturities. The receiving side is treated

as the long position and the paying side is treated as the short

position. For example, an interest rate swap in which the registrant is

receiving floating-rate interest and paying fixed is treated as a long

position in a floating rate instrument with a maturity equivalent to

the period until the next interest rate reset date and a short position

in a fixed-rate instrument with a maturity equivalent to the remaining

life of the swap.

(iv) For swaps that pay or receive a fixed or floating interest

rate against some other reference price, for example, an equity index,

the interest rate component is slotted into the appropriate repricing

maturity category, with the long or short position attributable to the

equity component being included in the equity framework set out in this

section.

(v) Offsets of long and short positions (both actual and notional)

are permitted in identical derivative instruments with exactly the same

issuer, coupon, currency, and maturity before slotting these positions

into time-bands. A matched position in a futures and its corresponding

underlying may also be fully offset and, thus, excluded from the

calculation, except when the futures comprises a range of deliverable

instruments. No offsetting is allowed between positions in different

currencies.

(vi) Offsetting positions in the same category of instruments can

in certain circumstances be regarded as matched and treated by the swap

dealer or major swap participant as a single net position which should

be entered into the appropriate time-band. To qualify for this

treatment the positions must be based on the same underlying

instrument, be of the same nominal value, and be denominated in the

same currency. The separate sides of different swaps also may be

``matched'' subject to the same conditions. In addition:

(A) For futures, offsetting positions in the notional or underlying

instruments

[[Page 27833]]

to which the futures contract relates must be for identical instruments

and the instruments must mature within seven days of each other;

(B) For swaps and forward rate contracts, the reference rate (for

floating rate positions) must be identical and the coupon closely

matched; and

(C) For swaps, forward rate contracts and forwards, the next

interest reset date, or for fixed coupon positions or forwards the

remaining maturity, must correspond within the following limits:

(1) If the reset (remaining maturity) dates occur within one month,

then the reset (remaining maturity) dates must be on the same day;

(2) If the reset (remaining maturity) dates occur between one month

and one year later, then the reset (remaining maturity) dates must

occur within seven days of each other, or if the reset (remaining

maturity) dates occur over one year later, then the reset (remaining

maturity) dates must occur within thirty days of each other.

(3) Equity Risk. A swap dealer or major swap participant shall

calculate a general market risk charge for equity risk on its

proprietary positions equal to 8 percent of its net position in each

national equity market. For each national equity market, the net

position of the swap dealer or major swap participant equals the

difference between the sum of the long positions and the sum of the

short positions at current market value. Equity derivatives shall be

included in this calculation as set forth in paragraph (d)(4) of this

section.

(4) Equity derivatives. (i) Equity derivatives must be converted

into the notional equity positions in the relevant underlying. For

example, an equity swap in which a swap dealer or major swap

participant is receiving an amount based on the change in value of one

particular equity or equity index and paying a different index will be

treated as a long position in the former and a short position in the

latter.

(ii) Futures and forward contracts relating to individual equities

should be reported as current market prices of the underlying. Futures

relating to equity indices should be reported as the marked-to-market

value of the notional underlying equity portfolio. Equity swaps are

treated as two notional positions, with the receiving side as the long

position and the paying side as the short position. If one of the legs

involves receiving/paying a fixed or floating interest rate, the

exposure should be slotted into the appropriate repricing maturity band

for debt securities. Matched positions in each identical equity in each

national market may be treated as offsetting and excluded from the

capital calculation, with any remaining position included in the

calculations for specific and general market risk. For example, a

future in a given equity may be offset against an opposite cash

position in the same equity.

(5) Foreign Exchange Risk. The swap dealer or major swap

participant shall calculate a market risk charge for foreign exchange

risk on its proprietary positions equal to:

(i) 8.0 percent of the sum of:

(A) The greater of the sum of the net open short positions or the

sum of the net open long positions in each currency; and

(B) The net open position in gold, regardless of sign.

(ii) For purposes of the calculation in paragraph (d)(5)(i) of this

section, the net open position in each currency and gold is the sum of:

(A) The net spot position determined by deducting all liabilities

denominated in a currency (or gold) from all assets denominated in the

same currency (or gold), including accrued interest earned but not yet

received and accrued expenses, and

(B) All foreign exchange derivatives and any other item

representing a profit or loss in foreign currencies. Forward currency

positions should be valued at current spot market exchange rates.

(iii) In order to report the required charge in U.S. currency, the

calculation of the net open position requires the nominal amount (or

net present value) of the net open position in each foreign currency

(and gold) to be converted at spot rates into the reporting currency.

(6) Commodities risk. The swap dealer or major swap participant

shall calculate a market risk charge for the commodities risk of its

proprietary positions. For purposes of this calculation, each long and

short commodity position (spot and forward) is expressed in terms of

the standard unit of measurement (such as barrels, kilos, or grams).

Commodity derivative positions also are converted into notional

positions. The open positions in each category of commodities are then

converted at current spot rates into U.S. currency, with long and short

positions offset to arrive at the net open position in each commodity.

Positions in different categories of commodities may not be offset

unless deliverable against each other. The total capital requirement

for commodities risk is the sum of the following:

(i) 15.0 percent of the net open position, long or short, in each

commodity, and

(ii) 3.0 percent of the swap dealer or major swap participant's

gross positions, long plus short, in the particular commodity. In

valuing gross positions in commodity derivatives for this purpose, a

swap dealer or major swap participant should use the current spot

price.

(7) Option positions. (i) A swap dealer or major swap participant

is not required to deduct a capital charge for market risk if the swap

dealer or major swap participant writes options that are hedged by

perfectly matched long positions in exactly the same options.

(ii) Except for options for which no capital charge is required

under paragraph of (d)(7)(i) of this section, a swap dealer or major

swap participant shall calculate its market risk charges (both specific

and general market) for option activities using the ``delta-plus

method''. Under the delta plus method, a swap dealer or major swap

participant shall include delta-weighted options positions within the

appropriate measurement framework set forth in paragraphs (c) through

(d)(6) of this section.

(iii) The delta-weighted option position is equal to the market

value of the underlying instrument multiplied by the option delta. The

delta represents the expected change in the option's price as a

proportion of a change in the price of the underlying instrument. For

example, an option whose price changes $1 for every $2 change in the

price of the underlying instrument has a delta of 0.50.

(iv) In addition to the capital charges associated with the

option's delta, each option position is subject to additional capital

charges to reflect risks for the gamma (the change of the delta for a

given change in the price of the underlying) and the vega (the

sensitivity of the option price with respect to a change in volatility)

for each such option position (including hedge positions). The option

delta, and gamma and vega sensitivities shall be calculated according

to the swap dealer or major swap participant's option pricing model and

will be subject to Commission review. The capital requirement for delta

risk, plus the additional capital charges for gamma and vega risks, are

calculated as follows:

(A) Options with debt instruments or interest rates as the

underlying instrument. The delta-weighted options positions are

included in the specific risk calculations under paragraph (c) of this

section, and also are slotted into the debt instrument time-bands in

Table B of this section, using a two-legged approach requiring one

entry at the time the underlying contract takes effect and

[[Page 27834]]

one at the time the underlying contract matures; and

(1) Floating rate instruments with caps or floors should be treated

as a combination of floating rate securities and a series of European

style options;

(2) For options such as caps and floors whose underlying instrument

is an interest rate, the delta and gamma should be expressed in terms

of a hypothetical underlying security;

(3) For gamma risk, for each time-band, net gammas that are

negative are multiplied by the risk weights set out in Table D and by

the square of the market value of the underlying instrument (net

positive gammas may be disregarded);

(4) Table D is as set forth as follows:

Table D

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Risk-weight

Assumed for gamma

Time-band Modified interest rate (average

duration change (%) assumed for

time band)

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Under 1 month................................................... 0.00 1.00 0.00000

1 up to 3 months................................................ 0.20 1.00 0.00020

3 up to 6 months................................................ 0.40 1.00 0.00080

6 up to 12 months............................................... 0.70 1.00 0.00245

1 up to 2 years................................................. 1.40 0.90 0.00794

2 up to 3 years................................................. 2.20 0.80 0.01549

3 up to 4 years................................................. 3.00 0.75 0.02531

4 up to 5 years................................................. 3.65 0.75 0.03747

5 up to 7 years................................................. 4.65 0.70 0.05298

7 up to 10 years................................................ 5.80 0.65 0.07106

10 up to 15 years............................................... 7.50 0.60 0.10125

15 up to 20 years............................................... 8.75 0.60 0.13781

Over 20 years................................................... 10.00 0.60 0.18000

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

(5) For volatility risk, the capital requirements for vega are

calculated in each time-band assuming a proportional shift in

volatility of 25.0 percent; and

(6) The additional capital requirement for gamma and vega risk is

the absolute value of the sum of the individual capital requirements

for net negative gammas plus the absolute value of the sum of the

individual capital requirements for vega risk for each time-band.

(B) Options with equities as the underlying. The delta-weighted

option positions are included in the calculation of the specific risk

charge under paragraph (c) of this section, and also are incorporated

in the general market risk charge calculated under paragraph (d)(3) of

this section, with individual equity issues and indices treated as

separate underlyings; and

(1) For gamma risk, the net gammas that are negative for each

underlying are multiplied by 0.72 percent (in the case of an individual

equity) or 0.32 percent (in the case of an index as the underlying) and

by the square of the market value of the underlying;

(2) For volatility risk, the capital requirement for vega is

calculated for each underlying, assuming a proportional shift in

volatility of 25.0 percent; and

(3) The additional capital requirement for gamma and vega risk is

the absolute value of the sum of the individual capital requirements

for net negative gammas plus the absolute value of the individual

capital requirements for vega risk.

(C) Options on foreign exchange and gold positions. The net delta

(or delta-based) equivalent of the total book of foreign currency and

gold options is incorporated into the measurement of the exposure in a

single currency position as set forth in paragraph (d)(5) of this

section; and

(1) For gamma risk, for each underlying exchange rate, net gammas

that are negative are multiplied by 0.32 percent and by the square of

the market value of the positions;

(2) For volatility risk, the capital requirements for vega are

calculated for each currency pair and gold assuming a proportional

shift in volatility of 25.0 percent; and

(3) The additional capital requirement for gamma and vega risk is

the absolute value of the sum of the individual capital requirements

for net negative gammas plus the absolute value of the sum of the

individual capital requirements for vega risk.

(D) Options on commodities. The delta-weighted positions are

incorporated into the measure described in paragraph (d)(6) of this

section; and

(1) For gamma risk, net gammas that are negative for each

underlying are multiplied by 1.125 percent and by the square of the

market value of the commodity;

(2) For volatility risk, a bank calculates the capital requirements

for vega for each commodity assuming a proportional shift in volatility

of 25.0 percent; and

(3) The additional capital requirement for gamma and vega risk is

the absolute value of the sum of the individual capital requirements

for net negative gammas plus the absolute value of the sum of the

individual capital requirements for vega risk.

(e) Credit Risk. The swap dealer or major swap participant shall

compute an additional capital requirement for the credit risk of over-

the-counter derivatives transactions that are not cleared in an amount

equal to the sum of the following:

(1) A counterparty exposure charge in an amount equal to the sum of

the following:

(i) The net replacement value in the account of each counterparty

that is insolvent, or in bankruptcy, or that has senior unsecured long-

term debt in default; and

(ii) For a counterparty not otherwise described in paragraph

(e)(1)(i) of this section, the credit equivalent amount of the swap

dealer or major swap participant's exposure to the counterparty, minus

collateral values as set forth in this section, multiplied by a credit

risk factor of 50 percent or a credit risk factor computed under

paragraph (e)(1)(iii) of this section, multiplied by 8 percent;

(iii) Counterparties may be rated by the swap dealer or major swap

participant, or by an affiliated bank or affiliated broker-dealer of

the swap dealer or major swap participant, upon

[[Page 27835]]

approval by the Commission on application by the swap dealer or major

swap participant. The application will specify which internal ratings

will result in application of a 20 percent risk weight, 50 percent risk

weight, or 150 percent risk weight. Based on the strength of the

applicant's internal credit risk management system, the Commission may

approve the application. The swap dealer or major swap participant must

make and keep current a record of the basis for the credit rating for

each counterparty. The records must be maintained in accordance with

Sec. 1.31 of this chapter.

(2) A concentration charge by counterparty in an amount equal to 50

percent of the amount of the current exposure to the counterparty in

excess of 5 percent of the tangible net equity of the swap dealer or

major swap participant and a portfolio concentration charge of 100

percent of the amount of the swap dealer or major swap participant's

aggregate current exposure for all counterparties in excess of 50

percent of the tangible net equity of the swap dealer or major swap

participant.

(f) Calculation of the credit equivalent amount. The credit

equivalent amount of a swap dealer or major swap participant's exposure

to a counterparty is the sum of the swap dealer or major swap

participant's current exposure to the counterparty, and the swap dealer

or major swap participant's potential future exposure to the

counterparty.

(g) The current exposure of the swap dealer or major swap

participant to a counterparty is calculated as follows:

(1) For a single over-the-counter position, the current exposure is

the greater of the mark-to-market value of the over-the-counter

position or zero.

(2) For multiple over-the-counter positions, the current credit

exposure is the greater of:

(i) The net sum of all positive and negative mark-to-market values

of the individual over-the-counter positions, subject to permitted

netting pursuant to a qualifying master netting agreement; or

(ii) Zero.

(h) The potential future exposure of the swap dealer or major swap

participant is calculated as follows:

(1) For a single over-the counter position, the potential future

exposure, including an over-the-counter position with a negative mark-

to-market value, is calculated by multiplying the notional principal

amount of the position by the appropriate conversion factor in Table E

of this section. For purposes of this calculation, the swap dealer or

major swap participant must use the apparent or stated notional

principal amount multiplied by any multiplier in the over-the-counter

position. For exchange rate contracts and other similar contracts in

which the notional principal amount is equivalent to the cash flows,

notional principal amount is the net receipts to each party falling due

on each value date in each currency. The potential future exposure of

the protection provider of a credit derivative is capped at the net

present value of the amount of unpaid premiums. For an over-the-counter

derivative contract with multiple exchanges of principal, the

conversion factor is multiplied by the number of remaining payments in

the derivative contract. For an over-the-counter derivative contract

that is structured such that on specified dates any outstanding

exposure is settled and the terms are reset so that the market value of

the contract is zero, the remaining maturity equals the time until the

next reset date. For an interest rate derivative contract with a

remaining maturity of greater than one year that meets these criteria,

the minimum conversion factor is 0.005.

Table E

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Foreign exchange Precious metals

Remaining maturity Interest rate rate and gold Credit Equity (except gold) Other

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

One year or less.................................. 0.00 0.01 0.10 0.06 0.07 0.10

Over one to five years............................ 0.005 0.05 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.12

Over five years................................... 0.015 0.075 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.15

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

(2) For multiple over-the-counter positions that are subject to a

qualifying master netting agreement, the swap dealer or major swap

participant shall compute its potential future exposure in accordance

with the following formula: Anet = (0.4 x Agross) + (0.6 x NGR x

Agross), where:

(i) Agross equals the sum of the potential future exposure for each

individual over-the-counter position subject to the qualifying master

netting agreement; and

(ii) NGR equals the ratio of the net current credit exposure to the

gross current credit exposure. In calculating the NGR, the gross

current credit exposure equals the sum of the positive current credit

exposures of all individual over-the-counter derivative contracts

subject to the qualifying master netting agreement.

(i) Netting agreements. In computing its credit equivalent amount

pursuant to paragraph (f) of this section, a swap dealer or major swap

participant may net gross receivables and gross payables to and from a

single counterparty if the swap dealer or major swap participant has

entered into a netting agreement with the counterparty that meets the

following criteria:

(1) The netting agreement is legally enforceable in each relevant

jurisdiction, including in insolvency proceedings;

(2) The gross receivables and gross payables that are subject to

the netting agreement with a counterparty can be determined at any

time; and

(3) For internal risk management purposes, the swap dealer or major

swap participant monitors and controls its exposure to the counterparty

on a net basis.

(j) Collateral. (1) Subject to the haircuts specified in paragraph

(j)(2) of this section, a swap dealer or major swap participant may

reduce its credit risk equivalent computed under paragraph (f) of this

section to the extent of the market value of collateral pledged to and

held by the swap dealer or major swap participant to secure an over-

the-counter position. The collateral is subject to the following

requirements:

(i) The collateral must be in the swap dealer or major swap

participant's physical possession or control; Provided, However,

collateral may include collateral held in independent third party

accounts as provided under part 23 of this chapter;

(ii) The collateral must meet the requirements specified in a

credit support agreement meeting the requirements of Sec. 23.151 of

this part; and

(iii) If the counterparty is a swap dealer, major swap participant

or financial entity as defined in Sec. 23.150 of this part:

(A) The collateral must be financial collateral that is liquid and

transferable; marked-to-market each day, and subject

[[Page 27836]]

to a daily maintenance margin requirement;

(B) The collateral must be capable of being liquidated promptly by

the swap dealer or major swap participant without intervention by any

other party;

(C) The collateral must be subject to an agreement that is legally

enforceable by the swap dealer or major swap participant against the

counterparty and any other parties to the agreement;

(D) The collateral cannot consist of securities issued by the

counterparty or a party related to the swap dealer or major swap

participant or to the counterparty; and

(E) The collateral cannot be used in determining the credit rating

of the counterparty.

(2) A swap dealer or major swap participant must reduce the market

value of the counterparty's collateral used to reduce the swap dealer's

or major swap participant's credit risk equivalent amount computed

under paragraph (f) of this section by:

(i) Applying the market haircuts specified in Sec. 1.17(c)(5) of

this chapter, and a further deduction of 8 percent of the market value

of the collateral when the settlement currency of the interest rate

position and collateral currency are not the same; or

(ii) where the collateral has been received from a counterparty

that is not a swap dealer, major swap participant, or a financial

entity as defined in Sec. 23.150 of this part, applying the haircuts

required pursuant to a credit support agreement meeting the

requirements of Sec. 23.151.

(k) Sample Calculation of General Market Risk for Debt Instruments

Using the Maturity Method. (1) The following positions are slotted into

a maturity ladder as shown below, which uses the risk weights specified

in Table B of this section:

(i) Qualifying bond, $13.33mn market value, remaining maturity 8

years, coupon 8 percent;

(ii) Government bond, $75mn market value, remaining maturity 2

months, coupon 7 percent;

(iii) Interest rate swap, $150 mn, bank receives floating rate

interest and pays fixed, next interest reset after 12 months, remaining

life of swap is 8 years (The position should be reported as the market

value of the notional underlying. Depending on the current interest

rate, the market value of each leg of the swap (i.e. the 8 year bond

and the 9 months floater) can be either higher or lower than the

notional amount. For sake of simplicity the example assumes that the

current interest rate is identical with the one the swap is based on.)

(iv) Long position in interest rate future, $50mn, delivery date

after 6 months, life of underlying government security is 3.5 years

(assumes the current interest rate is identical to the one the futures

is based on).

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Time-band and Risk-weighted Net time-band Net zone

Zone position Risk weight % position positions positions

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1..................... 0-1 mth.......... 0.00

1-3 mth Long 75 0.20 Long 0.15....... Long 0.15....... Long 1.00.

Gov. bond.

3-6 mth Short 50 0.40 Short 0.20...... Short 0.20......

Future.

6-12 mths Long 0.70 Long 1.05....... Long 1.05.......

150 Swap.

2..................... 1-2 yrs.......... 1.25

2-3 yrs.......... 1.75

3-4 yrs Long 50 2.25 Long 1.125...... Long 1.125...... Long 1.125.

Future.

3..................... 4-5 yrs.......... 2.75

5-7 yrs.......... 3.25

7-10 yrs Short 3.75 Short 5.625, Short 5.125..... Short 5.125.

150 Swap, Long Long 0.050.

13.33 Qual Bond.

10-15 yrs........ 4.50

15-20 yrs........ 5.25

Over 20 yrs...... 6.00

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

(2) A vertical disallowance is calculated for time-band 7-10 years,

and equals 10 percent of the matched positions in the time-band--10.0 x

0.5 = 0.05 ($50,000).

(3) A horizontal disallowance is calculated for zone 1, and equals

40 percent of the matched positions in the zone--40.0 x 0.20 = 0.80

($80,000). The remaining net position in Zone 1 equals +1.00.

(4) A horizontal disallowance is calculated for adjacent zones 2

and 3. It equals 40 percent of the matched positions between the

zones--40.0 x 1.125 = 0.45 (450,000). The remaining position in zone 3

equals -4.00.

(5) A horizontal disallowance is calculated between zones 1 and 3.

It equals 100 percent of the matched positions between the zones--100 x

1.00 = 1.00 (1,000,000).

(6) The remaining net open position equals 3.00 ($3,000,000). The

total capital requirement for general market risk for this portfolio

equals:

------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------------------------------------------------

The vertical disallowance.................................. $50,000

Horizontal disallowance in zone 1.......................... 80,000

Horizontal disallowance-- zones 2 and 3.................... 450,000

Horizontal disallowance-- zones 1 and 3.................... 1,000,000

Overall net open position.................................. 3,000,000

------------

Total requirement for general market risk.............. 4,580,000

------------------------------------------------------------------------

(l) Sample Calculation for Delta-Plus Method for Options. (1)

Assume the swap dealer or major swap participant has a European short

call option on a commodity with an exercise price of 490 and a market

value of the underlying 12 months from the expiration of the option at

500; a risk-free interest rate at 8 percent per annum, and the

volatility at 20 percent. The current delta for this position is

according to the Black-Scholes formula -0.721 (that is, the price of

the option changes by -0.721 if the price of the underlying moves by

1). The gamma is -0.0034 (that is, the delta changes by -0.0034 from -

0.721 to -0.7244 if the price of the underlying moves by 1). The

current value of the option is 65.48.

(2) The first step under the delta-plus method is to multiply the

market value of the commodity by the absolute value of the delta: 500 x

0.721 = 360.5. The delta-weighted position is then incorporated into

the measure described for general market risk for commodities. If no

other positions in the commodity exist, the delta-weighted position is

multiplied by 0.15 to calculate the capital requirement for delta:

360.5 times 0.15 = 54.075.

(3) The capital requirement for gamma is calculated according to

the Taylor expansion by multiplying the absolute

[[Page 27837]]

value of the assumed gamma of -0.0034 by 1.125 percent and by the

square of the market value of the underlying: 0.0034 x 0.01125 x 500\2\

= 9.5625.

(4) The capital requirement for vega is calculated next. The

assumed current (implied) volatility is 20 percent. Since only an

increase in volatility carries a risk of loss for a short call option,

the volatility has to be increased by a relative shift of 25 percent.

This means that the vega capital requirement has to be calculated on

the basis of a change in volatility of 5 percentage points from 20

percent to 25 percent in this example. According to the Black-Scholes

formula used here, the vega equals 168. Thus, a 1 percent or 0.01

increase in volatility increases the value of the option by 1.68.

Accordingly, a change in volatility of 5 percentage points increases

the value: 5 x 1.68 = 8.4. This is the capital requirement for vega

risk.

(m) Summary of Treatment for Interest Rate Derivatives. (1) The

following chart summarizes the application of specific risk and general

market risk charges for specific types of interest rate derivatives.

------------------------------------------------------------------------

Specific risk General market risk

Instrument charge charge

------------------------------------------------------------------------

Exchange-Traded Future:

Government security....... No............... Yes, as two

positions.

Corporate debt security... Yes.............. Yes, as two

positions.

Index on short-term No............... Yes, as two

interest rates (e.g. positions.

LIBOR).

OTC Forward:

Government security....... No............... Yes, as two

positions.

Corporate debt security... Yes.............. Yes, as two

positions.

Index on short-term No............... Yes, as two

interest rates.. positions.

FRAs, Swaps............... No............... Yes, as two

positions.

Forward foreign exchange.. No............... Yes, as one position

in each currency.

Options:

Government security....... No.

Corporate debt security... Yes.............. General market risk

charge for each type

of transaction,

using the Delta-plus

method (gamma and

vega receive

separate capital

charges).

Index on short-term No.

interest rates.

------------------------------------------------------------------------

(2) The chart provided in paragraph (m)(1) of this section is

provided as a summary only. The requirements for specific risk and

general market risk charges applicable to interest rate derivatives are

set forth in paragraphs (a) through (d) of this section.

Sec. 23.105 Maintenance of minimum financial requirements by swap

dealers and major swap participants.

(a) Each swap dealer or major swap participant who is subject to

the minimum capital requirements under Sec. 23.101 of this part and

who knows or should have known that its capital at any time is less

than the minimum required by Sec. 23.101 of this part, must:

(1) Give telephonic notice, to be confirmed in writing by facsimile

notice, that the swap dealer's or major swap participant's capital is

less than that required by Sec. 23.101 of this part. The notice must

be given immediately after the swap dealer or major swap participant

knows or should know that its capital is less than that required by

Sec. 23.101 of this part; and

(2) Provide together with such notice documentation in such form as

necessary to adequately reflect the swap dealer's or major swap

participant's capital condition as of any date such person's capital is

less than the minimum required. The swap dealer or major swap

participant must provide similar documentation for other days as the

Commission may request.

(b) Each swap dealer or major swap participant who is subject to

the minimum capital requirements under Sec. 23.101 of this part and

who knows or should have known that its capital at any time is less

than 110 percent of its minimum capital requirement as determined under

Sec. 23.101 of this part, must file written notice to that effect

within 24 hours of such event.

(c) Each swap dealer or major swap participant who is subject to

capital rules established by a prudential regulator, or has been

designated a systemically important financial institution by the

Financial Stability Oversight Council and is subject to capital

requirements imposed by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve

System, must provide immediate written notice transmitted by facsimile

if it fails to maintain compliance with the minimum capital

requirements established by the prudential regulator or the Board of

Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

(d) Upon the request of the Commission, each swap dealer or major

swap participant who is subject to capital rules established by a

prudential regulator, or has been designated a systemically important

financial institution by the Financial Stability Oversight Council and

is subject to capital requirements imposed by the Board of Governors of

the Federal Reserve System must provide the Commission with copies of

its capital computations for any periods of time specified by the

Commission. The capital computations must be computed in accordance

with the requirements of the swap dealer's or major swap participant's

prudential regulator, and must include all supporting schedules and

other documentation.

(e) If a swap dealer or major swap participant at any time fails to

make or to keep current the books and records required by these

regulations, such swap dealer or major swap participant must, on the

same day such event occurs, provide facsimile notice of such fact,

specifying the books and records which have not been made or which are

not current, and within 48 hours after giving such notice file a

written report stating what steps have been and are being taken to

correct the situation.

(f) A swap dealer or major swap participant that is subject to the

minimum capital requirements set forth in Sec. 23.101 of this part,

must provide written facsimile notice of a substantial reduction in

capital as compared to that last reported in a financial report filed

with the Commission pursuant to Sec. 23.105 of this part. This notice

shall be provided as follows:

(1) If any event or series of events, including any withdrawal,

advance, loan or loss cause, on a net basis, a reduction in tangible

net equity of

[[Page 27838]]

20 percent or more, notice must be provided within two business days of

the event or series of events causing the reduction; and

(2) If the equity capital of the swap dealer or major swap

participant would be withdrawn by action of a stockholder or a partner

or a limited liability company member or by redemption or repurchase of

shares of stock by any of the consolidated entities or through the

payment of dividends or any similar distribution, or an unsecured

advance or loan would be made to a stockholder, partner, sole

proprietor, limited liability company member, employee or affiliate,

such that the withdrawal, advance or loan would cause, on a net basis,

a reduction in excess net tangible equity of 30 percent or more, notice

must be provided at least two business days prior to the withdrawal,

advance or loan that would cause the reduction: Provided, however, That

the provisions of paragraphs (f)(1) and (2) of this section do not

apply to any futures or swaps transaction in the ordinary course of

business between a swap dealer or major swap participant and any

affiliate where the swap dealer or major swap participant makes payment

to or on behalf of such affiliate for such transaction and then

receives payment from such affiliate for such transaction within two

business days from the date of the transaction.

(3) Upon receipt of such notice from a swap dealer or major swap

participant, the Director of the Division of Clearing and Intermediary

Oversight or the Director's designee may require that the swap dealer

or major swap participant provide, within three business days from the

date of the request or such shorter period as the Director or designee

may specify, such other information as the Director or designee

determines to be necessary based upon market conditions, reports

provided by swap dealer or major swap participant, or other available

information.

(g) Every notice and written report required by this section to be

filed by a swap dealer or major swap participant shall be filed with

the regional office of the Commission with jurisdiction over the state

in which the swap dealer's or major swap participant's principal place

of business is located, as set forth in Sec. 140.02 of this chapter,

and with the registered futures association of which the swap dealer or

major swap participant is a member. In addition, every notice and

written report required to be given by this section must also be filed

with the Chief Accountant of the Division of Clearing and Intermediary

Oversight at the Commission's principal office in Washington, DC.

Sec. 23.106 Financial recordkeeping and reporting requirements for

swap dealers and major swap participants.

(a)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (a)(2) of this section, each

registered swap dealer or major swap participant must comply with the

requirements set forth in paragraphs (b) through (j) of this section.

(2) The requirements in paragraphs (b) through (j) of this section

do not apply to any swap dealer or major swap participant that:

(i) Is subject to the capital requirements of a prudential

regulator;

(ii) Has been designated a systemically important financial

institution by the Financial Stability Oversight Council and is subject

to supervision by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System;

or

(iii) Is registered as a futures commission merchant.

(b) Each swap dealer or major swap participant shall prepare and

keep current ledgers or other similar records which show or summarize,

with appropriate references to supporting documents, each transaction

affecting its asset, liability, income, expense and capital accounts,

and in which (except as otherwise permitted in writing by the

Commission) all its asset, liability and capital accounts are

classified in accord with generally accepted accounting principles as

established in the United States, and as otherwise may be necessary for

the capital calculations required under Sec. 23.101. Such records must

be maintained in accordance with Sec. 1.31 of this chapter.

(c)(1) Each swap dealer and major swap participant shall file

financial reports meeting the requirements in paragraph (c)(2) of this

section as of the close of business each month. Such financial reports

must be filed no later than 17 business days after the date for which

the report is made.

(2) The monthly financial reports must be prepared in the English

language and be denominated in United States dollars. The monthly

financial reports shall include a statement of financial condition, a

statement of income/loss, a statement reconciling the net equity in the

statement of financial condition to the firm's tangible net equity, a

schedule detailing, as applicable under Sec. 23.101, the calculation

of the firm's minimum tangible net equity requirement or its minimum

risk-based capital ratios requirements, and showing the excess or

deficiency in its regulatory capital after subtracting the minimum

tangible net equity requirement from its tangible net equity, or after

comparing its risk-based capital ratios to its minimum risk-based

capital ratios. The monthly report and schedules must be prepared in

accordance with generally accepted accounting principles as established

in the United States.

(d)(1) Each swap dealer and major swap participant shall file

annual audited financial reports certified in accordance with paragraph

(d)(2) of this section, and including the information specified in

paragraph (d)(3) of this section, as of the close of its fiscal year no

later than 90 days after the close of the swap dealer's and major swap

participant's fiscal year.

(2) The annual audited financial report shall be certified in

accordance with the provisions of paragraphs (a) through (e) of Sec.

1.16 of this chapter: Provided, however, that for purposes of

application of the provisions of Sec. 1.16 to swap dealers and major

swap participants, the term ``Sec. 23.101'' shall be substituted for

the term ``Sec. 1.17,'' and the terms ``swap dealer'' or ``major swap

participant'' shall be substituted for the term ``futures commission

merchant,'' as appropriate.

(3) The annual audited financial reports shall be prepared in

accordance with generally accepted accounting principles as established

in the United States, be prepared in the English language, and

denominated in United States dollars. The annual audited financial

reports must include the following:

(i) A statement of financial condition as of the date for which the

report is made;

(ii) Statements of income (loss), cash flows, and changes in

ownership equity for the period between the date of the most recent

certified statement of financial condition filed with the Commission

and the date for which the report is made;

(iii) Appropriate footnote disclosures;

(iv)(A) If the swap dealer or major swap participant must comply

with capital requirements set forth in Sec. 23.101(a)(1) of this part,

a schedule including the swap dealer's or major swap participant's net

equity; its intangible assets; its minimum tangible net equity; its

minimum tangible net equity requirement; and the excess or deficiency

in its regulatory capital after subtracting the minimum tangible net

equity requirement from its tangible net equity; or

(B) If the swap dealer or major swap participant must comply with

capital requirements set forth in Sec. 23.101(a)(2) of this part, a

schedule including the swap dealer's or major swap participant's

minimum risk-based capital ratio requirements as calculated using

requirements set forth in 12 CFR.

[[Page 27839]]

part 225, and appendices thereto, as if the subsidiary itself were a

U.S. bank-holding company; its risk-based capital ratios; and the

excess or deficiency in its regulatory capital after comparing its

risk-based capital ratios to its minimum risk-based capital ratio

requirements.

(v) Such further material information as may be necessary to make

the required statements not misleading.

(e) A registered swap dealer or major swap participant may not

change its fiscal year from that used in its most recent report filed

under paragraph (c) or (d) of this section unless it has requested and

received written approval for the change from a registered futures

association of which it is a member.

(f) Attached to each financial report filed pursuant to this

section must be an oath or affirmation that to the best knowledge and

belief of the individual making such oath or affirmation the

information contained in the financial report is true and correct. The

individual making such oath or affirmation must be: If the swap dealer

or major swap participant is a sole proprietorship, the proprietor; if

a partnership, any general partner; if a corporation, the chief

executive officer or chief financial officer; and, if a limited

liability company or limited liability partnership, the chief executive

officer, the chief financial officer, the manager, the managing member,

or those members vested with the management authority for the limited

liability company or limited liability partnership.

(g) From time to time the Commission may, by written notice,

require any swap dealer or major swap participant to file financial or

operational information on a daily basis or at such other times as may

be specified by the Commission. Such information must be furnished in

accordance with the requirements included in the written Commission

notice.

(h) Procedures for filing with Commission. (1) Unless filed

electronically as permitted under paragraph (h)(2) of this section, all

filings made under this section must be addressed to, and received at,

the location of the regional office of the Commission with jurisdiction

over the state in which the registrant's principal place of business is

located as set forth in Sec. 140.02 of this chapter.

(2) All filings of financial reports made pursuant to this section

may be submitted to the Commission in electronic form using a form of

user authentication assigned in accordance with procedures established

by or approved by the Commission, and otherwise in accordance with

instructions issued by or approved by the Commission, if the swap

dealer or major swap participant has provided the Commission with the

means necessary to read and to process the information contained in

such report. Any such electronic submission must clearly indicate the

swap dealer or major swap participant on whose behalf such filing is

made and the use of such user authentication in submitting such filing

will constitute and become a substitute for the manual signature of the

authorized signer. In the case of a financial report required under

paragraphs (c), (d), or (g) of this section and filed via electronic

transmission in accordance with procedures established by or approved

by the Commission, such transmission must be accompanied by the user

authentication assigned to the authorized signer under such procedures,

and the use of such user authentication will constitute and become a

substitute for the manual signature of the authorized signer for the

purpose of making the oath or affirmation referred to in paragraph (f)

of this section.

(i) Public availability of reports. (1) Financial information

required to be filed pursuant to this section, and not otherwise

publicly available, will be treated as exempt from mandatory public

disclosure for purposes of the Freedom of Information Act and the

Government in the Sunshine Act and parts 145 and 147 of this chapter,

except for the information described in paragraph (i)(2) of this

section.

(2) The following information will be publicly available:

(i) As applicable, the amounts calculated by the swap dealer or

major swap participant as its tangible net equity; its minimum tangible

net equity requirement; its tangible net equity in excess of its

minimum tangible net equity requirement; its risk-based capital ratios;

and the excess or deficiency in its regulatory capital after comparing

its risk-based capital ratios to its minimum risk-based capital ratio

requirements.

(ii) The opinion of the independent public accountant in the

certified annual financial reports.

(3) All information that is exempt from mandatory public disclosure

under paragraph (i)(1) of this section will, however, be available for

official use by any official or employee of the United States or any

State, by the National Futures Association and by any other person to

whom the Commission believes disclosure of such information is in the

public interest.

Sec. Sec. 23.107-23.149 [Reserved]

PART 140--ORGANIZATION, FUNCTIONS, AND PROCEDURES OF THE COMMISSION

7. The authority citation for part 140 continues to read as

follows:

Authority: 7 U.S.C. 2 and 12a.

8. Amend Sec. 140.91 by revising the section heading and adding

paragraphs (a)(9) through (15) to read as follows:

Sec. 140.91 Delegation of authority to the Director of the Division

of Clearing and Intermediary Oversight.

(a) * * *

(9) All functions reserved to the Commission in Sec. 23.101(c)(2)

of this chapter, with the concurrence of the General Counsel or his or

her designee;

(10) All functions reserved to the Commission in Sec. 23.103(d) of

this chapter, with the concurrence of the General Counsel or his or her

designee;

(11) All functions reserved to the Commission in Sec. 23.105(a)(2)

and (d) of this chapter, with the concurrence of the General Counsel or

his or her designee;

(12) All functions reserved to the Commission in Sec.

23.155(b)(4)(ii), (iii) and (c)(4) of this chapter, with the

concurrence of the General Counsel or his or her designee;

(13) All functions reserved to the Commission in Sec. 23.156(c)(1)

and (2) of this chapter, with the concurrence of the General Counsel or

his or her designee;

(14) All functions reserved to the Commission in Sec. 23.157(d) of

this chapter, with the concurrence of the General Counsel or his or her

designee; and

(15) All functions reserved to the Commission in Sec. 23.158(c) of

this chapter, with the concurrence of the General Counsel or his or her

designee.

* * * * *

Issued in Washington, DC, on April 27, 2011, by the Commission.

David A. Stawick,

Secretary of the Commission.

Note: The following appendices will not appear in the Code of

Federal Regulations.

Appendices to Capital Requirements of Swap Dealers and Major Swap

Participants--Commission Voting Summary and Statements of Commissioners

Appendix 1--Commission Voting Summary

On this matter, Chairman Gensler and Commissioners Dunn, Sommers

and Chilton voted in the affirmative; Commissioner O'Malia voted in

the negative.

[[Page 27840]]

Appendix 2--Statement of Chairman Gary Gensler

I support the proposed rulemaking to establish capital

requirements for nonbank swap dealers and major swap participants.

The Dodd-Frank Act requires capital requirements to help ensure the

safety and soundness of swap dealers and major swap participants.

Capital rules help protect commercial end-users and other market

participants by requiring that dealers have sufficient capital to

stand behind their obligations with such end-users and market

participants. The proposal fulfills the Dodd-Frank Act's mandate in

Section 731 to establish capital rules for all registered swap

dealers and major swap participants that are not banks, including

nonbank subsidiaries of bank holding companies.

The proposed rule addresses capital requirements for swap

dealers and major swap participants in three different categories:

(1) If they are an futures commission merchants (FCMs); 2) if they

are subsidiaries of bank holding companies or systemically important

financial institutions; or 3) if they are neither.

With regard to dealers that also are FCMs, generally speaking,

the Commission's existing capital rules for FCMs would apply. This

is to ensure that FCMs have sufficient capital to continue to carry

and clear customer swaps and futures transactions cleared by a DCO.

The proposed rule would require dealers that are subsidiaries of

bank holding companies or that have been designated as systemically

important financial institutions by the Financial Stability

Oversight Council (FSOC) to follow the rules set by the prudential

regulators. For instance, a subsidiary of a U.S. bank holding

company would have to comply with the capital requirements set by

the Federal Reserve Board as if the subsidiary itself were a U.S.

bank holding company. This is intended to prevent regulatory

arbitrage and ensure consistency among capital regimes for those

entities that are regulated by prudential regulators.

For those swap dealers and major swap participants that are not

regulated for capital by a prudential capital and not FCMs, part of

a bank holding company or a systemically important financial

institution, the proposed rule departs from bank capital rules. It

takes into consideration that these dealers are likely to have

different balance sheets from those financial institutions that

traditionally have been subject to prudential supervision. Such

entities would be required to maintain a minimum level of tangible

net equity greater than $20 million plus a measurement for market

risk and a measurement for credit risk. This market risk and credit

risk would be scaled to the dealers' activities and be measured

based upon swaps activity and related hedges. The proposal would

allow such firms to recognize as part of their capital fixed assets

and other assets that traditionally have not been recognized by

prudential regulators.

I also support the proposed rulemaking's financial condition

reporting requirements that relate generally to capital and other

matters. These reporting requirements are comparable to existing

requirements for FCMs and will facilitate ongoing financial

oversight of these entities.

CFTC staff worked very closely with prudential regulators to

establish these capital requirements that are comparable to the

maximum extent practicable. Staff also consulted with the SEC and

with international authorities. The rule benefited from the CFTC and

SEC staff roundtable on capital and margin requirements where we

received significant input from the public.

Note: The following exhibit also will not appear in the Code of

Federal Regulations.

BILLING CODE P

[[Page 27841]]

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[FR Doc. 2011-10881 Filed 5-11-11; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE C

Last Updated: May 12, 2011