2010-10330

FR Doc 2010-10330[Federal Register: May 5, 2010 (Volume 75, Number 86)]

[Notices]

[Page 24626-24633]

From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

[DOCID:fr05my10-57]

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COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION

Order Finding That the TETCO-M3 Financial Basis Contract Traded

on the IntercontinentalExchange, Inc., Does Not Perform a Significant

Price Discovery Function

AGENCY: Commodity Futures Trading Commission.

ACTION: Final order.

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SUMMARY: On October 9, 2009, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission

(``CFTC'' or ``Commission'') published for comment in the Federal

Register \1\ a notice of its intent to undertake a determination

whether the TETCO-M3 Financial Basis (``TMT'') contract traded on the

IntercontinentalExchange, Inc. (``ICE''), an exempt commercial market

(``ECM'') under sections 2(h)(3)-(5) of the Commodity Exchange Act

(``CEA'' or the ``Act''), performs a significant price discovery

function pursuant to section 2(h)(7) of the CEA. The Commission

undertook this review based upon an initial evaluation of information

and data provided by ICE as well as other available information. The

Commission has reviewed the entire record in this matter, including all

comments received, and has determined to issue an order finding that

the TMT contract does not perform a significant price discovery

function. Authority for this action is found in section 2(h)(7) of the

CEA and Commission rule 36.3(c) promulgated thereunder.

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\1\ 74 FR 52186 (October 9, 2009).

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DATES: Effective date: April 28, 2010.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Gregory K. Price, Industry Economist,

Division of Market Oversight, Commodity Futures Trading Commission,

Three Lafayette Centre, 1155 21st Street, NW., Washington, DC 20581.

Telephone: (202) 418-5515. E-mail: [email protected]; or Susan Nathan,

Senior Special Counsel, Division of Market Oversight, same address.

Telephone: (202) 418-5133. E-mail: [email protected]

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Introduction

The CFTC Reauthorization Act of 2008 (``Reauthorization Act'') \2\

significantly broadened the CFTC's regulatory authority with respect to

ECMs by creating, in section 2(h)(7) of the CEA, a new regulatory

category--ECMs on which significant price discovery contracts

(``SPDCs'') are traded--and treating ECMs in that category as

registered entities under the CEA.\3\ The legislation authorizes the

CFTC to designate an agreement, contract or transaction as a SPDC if

the Commission determines, under criteria established in section

2(h)(7), that it performs a significant price discovery function. When

the Commission makes such a determination, the ECM on which the SPDC is

traded must assume, with respect to that contract, all the

responsibilities and obligations of a registered entity under the Act

and Commission regulations, and must comply with nine core principles

established by new section 2(h)(7)(C).

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\2\ Incorporated as Title XIII of the Food, Conservation and

Energy Act of 2008, Public Law 110-246, 122 Stat. 1624 (June 18,

2008).

\3\ 7 U.S.C. 1a(29).

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On March 16, 2009, the CFTC promulgated final rules implementing

the provisions of the Reauthorization Act.\4\ As relevant here, rule

36.3 imposes increased information reporting requirements on ECMs to

assist the Commission in making prompt assessments whether particular

ECM contracts may be SPDCs. In addition to filing quarterly reports of

its contracts, an ECM must notify the Commission promptly concerning

any contract traded in reliance on the exemption in section 2(h)(3) of

the CEA that averaged five trades per day or more over the most recent

calendar quarter, and for which the exchange sells its price

information regarding the contract to market participants or industry

publications, or whose daily closing or settlement prices on 95 percent

or more of the days in the most recent quarter were within 2.5 percent

of the contemporaneously determined closing, settlement or other daily

price of another contract.

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\4\ 74 FR 12178 (Mar. 23, 2009); these rules became effective on

April 22, 2009.

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Commission rule 36.3(c)(3) established the procedures by which the

Commission makes and announces its determination whether a particular

ECM contract serves a significant price discovery function. Under those

procedures, the Commission will publish notice in the Federal Register

that it intends to undertake an evaluation whether the specified

agreement, contract or transaction performs a significant price

discovery function and to receive written views, data and arguments

relevant to its determination from the ECM and other interested

persons. Upon the close of the comment period, the Commission will

consider, among other things, all relevant information regarding the

subject contract and issue an order announcing and explaining its

[[Page 24627]]

determination whether or not the contract is a SPDC. The issuance of an

affirmative order signals the effectiveness of the Commission's

regulatory authorities over an ECM with respect to a SPDC; at that time

such an ECM becomes subject to all provisions of the CEA applicable to

registered entities.\5\ The issuance of such an order also triggers the

obligations, requirements and timetables prescribed in Commission rule

36.3(c)(4).\6\

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\5\ Public Law 110-246 at 13203; Joint Explanatory Statement of

the Committee of Conference, H.R. Rep. No. 110-627, 110 Cong., 2d

Sess. 978, 986 (Conference Committee Report). See also 73 FR 75888,

75894 (Dec. 12, 2008).

\6\ For an initial SPDC, ECMs have a grace period of 90 calendar

days from the issuance of a SPDC determination order to submit a

written demonstration of compliance with the applicable core

principles. For subsequent SPDCs, ECMs have a grace period of 30

calendar days to demonstrate core principle compliance.

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II. Notice of Intent To Undertake SPDC Determination

On October 9, 2009, the Commission published in the Federal

Register notice of its intent to undertake a determination whether the

TMT contract performs a significant price discovery function and

requested comment from interested parties.\7\ Comments were received

from Industrial Energy Consumers of America (``IECA''), Working Group

of Commercial Energy Firms (``WGCEF''), Platts, ICE, Economists

Incorporated (``EI''), Natural Gas Supply Association (``NGSA''),

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (``FERC'') and Financial

Institutions Energy Group (``FIEG'').\8\ The comment letters from FERC

\9\ and Platts did not directly address the issue of whether or not the

TMT contract is a SPDC; IECA expressed the opinion that the TMT

contract did perform a significant price discovery function; and thus,

should be subject to the requirements of the core principles enumerated

in Section 2(h)(7) of the Act, but did not elaborate on its reasons for

saying so or directly address any of the criteria. The remaining

comment letters raised substantive issues with respect to the

applicability of section 2(h)(7) to the TMT contract and generally

expressed the opinion that the TMT contract is not a SPDC because it

does not meet the price linkage, material price reference and material

liquidity criteria for SPDC determination. These comments are more

extensively discussed below, as applicable.

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\7\ The Commission's Part 36 rules establish, among other

things, procedures by which the Commission makes and announces its

determination whether a specific ECM contract serves a significant

price discovery function. Under those procedures, the Commission

publishes a notice in the Federal Register that it intends to

undertake a determination whether a specified agreement, contract or

transaction performs a significant price discovery function and to

receive written data, views and arguments relevant to its

determination from the ECM and other interested persons.

\8\ IECA describes itself as an ``association of leading

manufacturing companies'' whose membership ``represents a diverse

set of industries including: Plastics, cement, paper, food

processing, brick, chemicals, fertilizer, insulation, steel, glass,

industrial gases, pharmaceutical, aluminum and brewing.'' WGCEF

describes itself as ``a diverse group of commercial firms in the

domestic energy industry whose primary business activity is the

physical delivery of one or more energy commodities to customers,

including industrial, commercial and residential consumers'' and

whose membership consists of ``energy producers, marketers and

utilities.'' McGraw-Hill, through its division Platts, compiles and

calculates monthly natural gas price indices from natural gas trade

data submitted to Platts by energy marketers. Platts includes those

price indices in its monthly Inside FERC's Gas Market Report

(``Inside FERC''). ICE is an exempt commercial market, as noted

above. EI is an economic consulting firm with offices located in

Washington, DC, and San Francisco, CA. NGSA is an industry

association comprised of natural gas producers and marketers. FERC

is an independent federal regulatory agency that, among other

things, regulates the interstate transmission of natural gas, oil

and electricity. FIEG describes itself as an association of

investment and commercial banks who are active participants in

various sectors of the natural gas markets, ``including acting as

marketers, lenders, underwriters of debt and equity securities, and

proprietary investors.'' The comment letters are available on the

Commission's Web site: http://www.cftc.gov/lawandregulation/

federalregister/federalregistercomments/2009/09-014.html.

\9\ FERC stated that the TMT contract is cash settled and does

not contemplate the actual physical delivery of natural gas.

Accordingly, FERC expressed the opinion that a determination by the

Commission that a contract performs a significant price discovery

function ``would not appear to conflict with FERC's exclusive

jurisdiction under the Natural Gas Act (NGA) over certain sales of

natural gas in interstate commerce for resale or with its other

regulatory responsibilities under the NGA'' and further that, ``FERC

staff will continue to monitor for any such conflict * * * [and]

advise the CFTC'' should any such potential conflict arise. CL 07.

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III. Section 2(h)(7) of the CEA

The Commission is directed by section 2(h)(7) of the CEA to

consider the following criteria in determining a contract's significant

price discovery function:

Price Linkage--the extent to which the agreement, contract

or transaction uses or otherwise relies on a daily or final settlement

price, or other major price parameter, of a contract or contracts

listed for trading on or subject to the rules of a designated contract

market (``DCM'') or derivatives transaction execution facility

(``DTEF''), or a SPDC traded on an electronic trading facility, to

value a position, transfer or convert a position, cash or financially

settle a position, or close out a position.

Arbitrage--the extent to which the price for the

agreement, contract or transaction is sufficiently related to the price

of a contract or contracts listed for trading on or subject to the

rules of a designated DCM or DTEF, or a SPDC traded on or subject to

the rules of an electronic trading facility, so as to permit market

participants to effectively arbitrage between the markets by

simultaneously maintaining positions or executing trades in the

contracts on a frequent and recurring basis.

Material price reference--the extent to which, on a

frequent and recurring basis, bids, offers or transactions in a

commodity are directly based on, or are determined by referencing or

consulting, the prices generated by agreements, contracts or

transactions being traded or executed on the electronic trading

facility.

Material liquidity--the extent to which the volume of

agreements, contracts or transactions in a commodity being traded on

the electronic trading facility is sufficient to have a material effect

on other agreements, contracts or transactions listed for trading on or

subject to the rules of a DCM, DTEF or electronic trading facility

operating in reliance on the exemption in section 2(h)(3).

Not all criteria must be present to support a determination that a

particular contract performs a significant price discovery function,

and one or more criteria may be inapplicable to a particular

contract.\10\ Moreover, the statutory language neither prioritizes the

criteria nor specifies the degree to which a SPDC must conform to the

various criteria. In Guidance issued in connection with the Part 36

rules governing ECMs with SPDCs, the Commission observed that these

criteria do not lend themselves to a mechanical checklist or formulaic

analysis. Accordingly, the Commission has indicated that in making its

determinations it will consider the circumstances under which the

presence of a particular criterion, or combination of criteria, would

be sufficient to support a SPDC determination.\11\ For example, for

contracts that are linked to other contracts or that may be arbitraged

with other contracts, the Commission will consider whether the price of

the potential SPDC moves in such harmony with the other contract that

the two markets essentially become

[[Page 24628]]

interchangeable. This co-movement of prices would be an indication that

activity in the contract had reached a level sufficient for the

contract to perform a significant price discovery function. In

evaluating a contract's price discovery role as a price reference, the

Commission will consider the extent to which, on a frequent and

recurring basis, bids, offers or transactions are directly based on, or

are determined by referencing, the prices established for the contract.

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\10\ In its October 9, 2009, Federal Register release, the

Commission identified material price reference, price linkage and

material liquidity as the possible criteria for SPDC determination

of the TMT contract. Arbitrage was not identified as a possible

criterion. As a result, arbitrage will not be discussed further in

this document and the associated Order.

\11\ 17 CFR part 36, Appendix A.

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IV. Findings and Conclusions

The TETCO-M3 Financial Basis (TMT) Contract and the SPDC Indicia

The TMT contract is cash settled based on the difference between

the bidweek price index for a particular calendar month at the Texas

Eastern Transmission Company's (``TETCO's'') M3 zone, as published in

Platts' Inside FERC's Gas Market Report, and the final settlement price

of the New York Mercantile Exchange's (``NYMEX's'') physically-

delivered Henry Hub natural gas futures contract for the same calendar

month. The Platts bidweek price, which is published monthly, is based

on a survey of cash market traders who voluntarily report to Platts

data on their fixed-price transactions conducted during the last five

business days of the month for physical delivery of natural gas at the

M3 zone; such bidweek transactions specify the delivery of natural gas

on a uniform basis throughout the following calendar month at the

agreed upon rate. The Platts bidweek index is published on the first

business day of the calendar month in which the natural gas is to be

delivered. The size of the TMT contract is 2,500 million British

thermal units (``mmBtu''), and the unit of trading is any multiple of

2,500 mmBtu. The TMT contract is listed for up to 72 consecutive

calendar months.

The Henry Hub,\12\ which is located in Erath, Louisiana, is the

primary cash market trading and distribution center for natural gas in

the United States. It also is the delivery point and pricing basis for

the NYMEX's actively traded, physically-delivered natural gas futures

contract, which is the most important pricing reference for natural gas

in the United States. The Henry Hub, which is operated by Sabine Pipe

Line, LLC, serves as a juncture for 13 different pipelines. These

pipelines bring in natural gas from fields in the Gulf Coast region and

ship it to major consumption centers along the East Coast and Midwest.

The throughput shipping capacity of the Henry Hub is 1.8 trillion mmBtu

per day.

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\12\ The term ``hub'' refers to a juncture where two or more

natural gas pipelines are connected. Hubs also serve as pricing

points for natural gas at the particular locations.

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In addition to the Henry Hub, there are a number of other locations

where natural gas is traded. In 2008, there were 33 natural gas market

centers in North America.\13\ Some of the major trading centers include

Alberta, Northwest Rockies, Southern California border and the Houston

Ship Channel. For locations that are directly connected to the Henry

Hub by one or more pipelines and where there typically is adequate

shipping capacity, the price at the other locations usually directly

tracks the price at the Henry Hub, adjusted for transportation costs.

However, at other locations that are not directly connected to the

Henry Hub or where shipping capacity is limited, the prices at those

locations often diverge from the Henry Hub price. Furthermore, one

local price may be significantly different than the price at another

location even though the two markets' respective distances from the

Henry Hub are the same. The reason for such pricing disparities is that

a given location may experience supply and demand factors that are

specific to that region, such as differences in pipeline shipping

capacity, unusually high or low demand for heating or cooling or supply

disruptions caused by severe weather. As a consequence, local natural

gas prices can differ from the Henry Hub price by more than the cost of

shipping and such price differences can vary in an unpredictable

manner.

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\13\ See http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil_gas/natural_gas/

feature_articles/2009/ngmarketcenter/ngmarketcenter.pdf.

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TETCO transports natural gas from production areas in Texas,

Louisiana, and the Gulf of Mexico to the Mid-Atlantic and Northeast

regions of the United States. The TETCO system, owned and operated by

Spectra Energy Transmission, spans some 9,200 miles and has a capacity

of 6.7 billion cubic feet per day with 75 billion cubic feet of

storage.\14\ The TMT contract prices trading activity at the M3 zone of

TETCO's pipeline. The M3 zone is defined as the portion of the pipeline

traversing the area between eastern Pennsylvania near the New Jersey

border and north central New Jersey. Specifically, the Platts index

includes deliveries at any point between the Delmont compressor station

in Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania, and the Hanover and Linden

stations in Morris County, New Jersey. Included are deals delivered at

interconnections with New York City distributors' citygates and with

Algonquin Gas Transmission at Lambertville in Hunterdon County, New

Jersey, and at the Hanover station.

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\14\ See http://www.spectraenergy.com/what_we_do/businesses/

us/assets/texas_eastern/.

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The Dominion hub, a market center that encompasses the Leidy area

of north central Pennsylvania includes the TETCO M3 natural gas trading

hub. The Dominion market center had an estimated throughput capacity of

2.5 billion cubic feet per day in 2008. Moreover, the number of

pipeline interconnections at the Dominion hub was 17 in 2008, up from

16 in 2003. Lastly, the pipeline interconnection capacity of the

Dominion hub in 2008 was 8.3 billion cubic feet per day, which

constituted a 42 percent increase over the pipeline interconnection

capacity in 2003.\15\ The TMT hub is far removed from the Henry Hub but

is directly connected to the Henry Hub by TETCO's interstate pipeline

system.

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\15\ See http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil_gas/natural_gas/

feature_articles/2009/ngmarketcenter/ngmarketcenter.pdf.

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The local price at the TMT location typically differs from the

price at the Henry Hub. Thus, the price of the Henry Hub physically-

delivered futures contract is an imperfect proxy for the TMT price.

Moreover, exogenous factors, such as adverse weather, can cause the TMT

gas price to differ from the Henry Hub price by an amount that is more

or less than the cost of shipping, making the NYMEX Henry Hub futures

contract even less precise as a hedging tool than desired by market

participants. Basis contracts \16\ allow traders to more accurately

discover prices at alternative locations and hedge price risk that is

associated with natural gas at such locations. In this regard, a

position at a local price for an alternative location can be

established by adding the appropriate basis swap position to a position

taken in the NYMEX physically-delivered Henry Hub contract (or in the

NYMEX or ICE Henry Hub look-alike contract, which cash settle based on

the NYMEX physically-delivered natural gas contract's final settlement

price).

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\16\ Basis contracts denote the difference in the price of

natural gas at a specified location minus the price of natural gas

at the Henry Hub. The differential can be either a positive or

negative value.

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In its October 9, 2009, Federal Register notice, the Commission

identified material price reference, price linkage and material

liquidity as the potential SPDC criteria applicable to the TMT

contract. Each of these criteria is discussed below.\17\

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\17\ As noted above, the Commission did not find an indication

of arbitrage in connection with this contract; accordingly, that

criterion was not discussed in reference to the TMT contract.

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[[Page 24629]]

1. Material Price Reference Criterion

The Commission's October 9, 2009, Federal Register notice

identified material price reference as a potential basis for a SPDC

determination with respect to this contract. The Commission considered

the fact that ICE sells its price data to market participants in a

number of different packages which vary in terms of the hubs covered,

time periods, and whether the data are daily only or historical. For

example, ICE offers the ``East Gas End of Day'' and ``OTC Gas End of

Day'' \18\ packages with access to all price data or just current

prices plus a selected number of months (i.e., 12, 24, 36 or 48 months)

of historical data. These two packages include price data for the TMT

contract.

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\18\ The OTC Gas End of Day dataset includes daily settlement

prices for natural gas contracts listed for all points in North

America.

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The Commission also noted that its October 2007 Report on the

Oversight of Trading on Regulated Futures Exchanges and Exempt

Commercial Markets (``ECM Study'') \19\ found that in general, market

participants view the ICE as a price discovery market for certain

natural gas contracts. The study did not specify which markets

performed this function; nevertheless, the Commission determined that

the TMT contract, while not mentioned by name in the ECM Study, might

warrant further study. Following the issuance of the Federal Register

release, the Commission further evaluated ICE's data offerings and

their use by industry participants. The TETCO M3 zone is a significant

trading center for natural gas but is not as important as other hubs,

such as the Henry Hub, for pricing natural gas in the eastern half of

the U.S. marketplace.

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\19\ http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@newsroom/documents/

file/pr5403-07_ecmreport.pdf.

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The Commission will rely on one of two sources of evidence--direct

or indirect--to determine that the price of a contract was being used

as a material price reference and therefore, serving a significant

price discovery function.\20\ With respect to direct evidence, the

Commission will consider the extent to which, on a frequent and

recurring basis, cash market bids, offers or transactions are directly

based on or quoted at a differential to, the prices generated on the

ECM in question. Direct evidence may be established when cash market

participants are quoting bid or offer prices or entering into

transactions at prices that are set either explicitly or implicitly at

a differential to prices established for the contract in question. Cash

market prices are set explicitly at a differential to the section

2(h)(3) contract when, for instance, they are quoted in dollars and

cents above or below the reference contract's price. Cash market prices

are set implicitly at a differential to a section 2(h)(3) contract

when, for instance, they are arrived at after adding to, or subtracting

from the section 2(h)(3) contract, but then quoted or reported at a

flat price. With respect to indirect evidence, the Commission will

consider the extent to which the price of the contract in question is

being routinely disseminated in widely distributed industry

publications--or offered by the ECM itself for some form of

remuneration--and consulted on a frequent and recurring basis by

industry participants in pricing cash market transactions.

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\20\ 17 CFR part 36, Appendix A.

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The M3 zone is a major trading center for natural gas in the United

States and, as noted, ICE sells price information for the TMT contract.

Upon further evaluation, however, the Commission has found that the

cash market transactions are not being directly based on or quoted as a

differential to the TMT contract nor is that contract routinely

consulted by industry participants in pricing cash market transactions.

Thus, the contract does not meet the Commission's Guidance for the

material price reference criterion. In this regard, liquidity

constraints caused by severe winter weather on peak days may create

complications for cash market participants. Because the TMT contract is

not consulted on a frequent basis, it does not satisfy the direct price

reference test for the existence of material price reference.

Furthermore, the Commission notes that publication of the TMT

contract's prices is not indirect evidence of material price reference.

The TMT contract's prices are published with those of numerous other

contracts, which are of more interest to market participants. Due to

the lack of importance of the M3 zone, the Commission has concluded

that traders likely do not specifically purchase the ICE data packages

for the TMT contract's prices and do not consult such prices on a

frequent and recurring basis in pricing cash market transactions.

i. Federal Register Comments

As noted above, WGCEF, ICE, EI, NGSA and FIEG addressed the

question of whether the TMT contract met the material price reference

criterion for a SPDC.\21\ The commenters argued that because the TMT

contract is cash-settled, it cannot truly serve as an independent

``reference price'' for transactions in natural gas at this location.

Rather, the commenters argue, the underlying cash price series against

which the ICE TMT contract is settled (in this case, the Platts bidweek

price for natural gas at this location) is the authentic reference

price and not the ICE contract itself. The Commission believes that

this interpretation of price reference is too limiting and believes

that a cash-settled derivatives contract could meet the price reference

criterion if market participants ``consult on a frequent and recurring

basis'' the derivatives contract when pricing forward, fixed-price

commitments or other cash-settled derivatives that seek to ``lock in''

a fixed price for some future point in time to hedge against adverse

price movements. As noted above, the M3 zone is a significant trading

center for natural gas in North America. However, traders do not

consider the M3 zone to be as important as other natural gas trading

points.

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\21\ As noted above, IECA expressed the opinion that the TMT

contract met the criteria for SPDC determination but did not provide

its reasoning.

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ICE also argued that the Commission appeared to base the case that

the TMT contract is potentially a SPDC on a disputable assertion. In

issuing its notice of intent to determine whether the TMT contract is a

SPDC, the CFTC cited a general conclusion in its ECM Study ``that

certain market participants referred to ICE as a price discovery market

for certain natural gas contracts.'' ICE states that CFTC's reason is

``hard to quantify as the ECM report does not mention'' this contract

as a potential SPDC. ``It is unknown which market participants made

this statement in 2007 or the contracts that were referenced.'' In

response to the above comment, the Commission notes that it cited the

ECM Study's general finding that some ICE natural gas contracts appear

to be regarded as price discovery markets merely as an indicia that an

investigation of certain ICE contracts may be warranted. The ECM Study

was not intended to serve as the sole basis for determining whether or

not a particular contract meets the material price reference criterion.

Both EI \22\ and WGCEF \23\ stated that publication of price data

in a package format is a weak justification for material price

reference. These commenters argue that market participants generally do

not purchase

[[Page 24630]]

ICE data sets for one contract's prices, such as those for the TMT

contract. Instead, traders are interested in the settlement prices, so

the fact that ICE sells the TMT prices as part of a broad package is

not conclusive evidence that market participants are buying the ICE

data sets because they find the TMT prices have substantial value to

them. As mentioned above, the Commission notes that publication of the

TMT contract's prices is not indirect evidence of routine

dissemination. The TMT contract's prices are published with those of

numerous other contracts, which are of more interest to market

participants. Due to the lack of importance of the M3 zone, the

Commission has concluded that traders likely do not specifically

purchase the ICE data packages for the TMT contract's prices and do not

consult such prices on a frequent and recurring basis in pricing cash

market transactions.

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\22\ CL 05.

\23\ CL 02.

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ii. Conclusion Regarding Material Price Reference

Based on the above, the Commission finds that the TMT contract does

not meet the material price reference criterion because cash market

transactions are not priced either explicitly or implicitly on a

frequent and recurring basis at a differential to the TMT contract's

price (direct evidence). Moreover, while the ECM sells the TMT

contract's price data to market participants, market participants

likely do not specifically purchase the ICE data packages for the TMT

contract's prices and do not consult such prices on a frequent and

recurring basis in pricing cash market transactions (indirect

evidence).

2. Price Linkage Criterion

In its October 9, 2009, Federal Register notice, the Commission

identified price linkage as a potential basis for a SPDC determination

with respect to the TMT contract. In this regard, the final settlement

of the TMT contract is based, in part, on the final settlement price of

the NYMEX's physically-delivered natural gas futures contract, where

the NYMEX is registered with the Commission as a DCM.

The Commission's Guidance on Significant Price Discovery Contracts

notes that a ``price-linked contract is a contract that relies on a

contract traded on another trading facility to settle, value or

otherwise offset the price-linked contract.'' \24\ Furthermore, the

Guidance notes that, ``[f]or a linked contract, the mere fact that a

contract is linked to another contract will not be sufficient to

support a determination that a contract performs a significant price

discovery function. To assess whether such a determination is

warranted, the Commission will examine the relationship between

transaction prices of the linked contract and the prices of the

referenced contract. The Commission believes that where material

liquidity exists, prices for the linked contract would be observed to

be substantially the same as or move substantially in conjunction with

the prices of the referenced contract.'' \25\ Furthermore, the Guidance

proposes a threshold price relationship such that prices of the ECM

linked contract will fall within a 2.5 percent price range for 95

percent of contemporaneously determined closing, settlement or other

daily prices over the most recent quarter. Finally, in Guidance the

Commission stated that it would consider a linked contract that has a

trading volume equivalent to 5 percent of the volume of trading in the

contract to which it is linked to have sufficient volume to be deemed a

SPDC (``minimum threshold'').\26\

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\24\ Appendix A to the Part 36 rules.

\25\ Id.

\26\ Id.

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To assess whether the TMT contract meets the price linkage

criterion, Commission staff obtained price data from ICE and performed

the statistical tests cited above. Staff found that, while the TMT

contract price is determined, in part, by the final settlement price of

the NYMEX physically-delivered natural gas futures contract (a DCM

contract), the imputed TMT location price (derived by adding the NYMEX

Henry Hub Natural Gas price to the ICE TCO basis price) is not within

2.5 percent of the settlement price of the corresponding NYMEX Henry

Hub natural gas futures contract on 95 percent or more of the days.

Specifically, during the third quarter of 2009, none of the TMT natural

gas prices derived from the ICE basis values were within 2.5 percent of

the daily settlement price of the NYMEX Henry Hub futures contract. In

addition, staff found that the TMT contract fails to meet the volume

threshold requirement. In particular, the total trading volume in the

NYMEX Natural Gas contract during the third quarter of 2009 was

14,022,963 contracts, with 5 percent of that number being 701,148

contracts. Trades on the ICE centralized market in the TMT contract

during the same period was 145,681 contracts (equivalent to 36,420

NYMEX contracts, given the size difference).\27\ Thus, centralized-

market trades in the TMT contract amounted to less than the minimum

threshold.\28\

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\27\ The size of the NYMEX Henry Hub physically-delivered

natural gas futures contract is 10,000 mmBtu. The TMT contract has a

trading unit of 2,500 mmBtu, which is one-quarter the size of the

NYMEX Henry Hub contract.

\28\ Supplemental data subsequently submitted by the ICE

indicated that block trades are included in the on-exchange trades;

block trades comprise 63.3 percent of all transactions in the TMT

contract.

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i. Federal Register Comments

As noted above, WGCEF, ICE, EI, NGSA and FIEG addressed the

question of whether the TMT contract met the price linkage criterion

for a SPDC.\29\ Each of the commenters expressed the opinion that the

TMT contract did not appear to meet the above-discussed Commission

guidance regarding the price relationship and/or the minimum volume

threshold relative to the DCM contract to which the TMT is linked.

Based on its analysis discussed above, the Commission agrees with this

assessment.

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\29\ As noted above, IECA expressed the opinion that the TMT

contract met the criteria for SPDC determination but did not provide

its reasoning.

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ii. Conclusion Regarding the Price Linkage Criterion

Based on the above, the Commission finds that the TMT contract does

not meet the price linkage criterion because it fails the price

relationship and volume tests provided for in the Commission's

Guidance.

3. Material Liquidity Criterion

As noted above, in its October 9, 2009, Federal Register notice,

the Commission identified material price reference, price linkage and

material liquidity as potential criteria for SPDC determination of the

TMT contract. To assess whether a contract meets the material liquidity

criterion, the Commission first examines trading activity as a general

measurement of the contract's size and potential importance. If the

Commission finds that the contract in question meets a threshold of

trading activity that would render it of potential importance, the

Commission will then perform a statistical analysis to measure the

effect that the prices of the subject contract potentially may have on

prices for other contracts listed on an ECM or a DCM.

The total number of transactions executed on ICE's electronic

platform in the TMT contract was 1,073 in the second quarter of 2009,

resulting in a daily average of 16.8 trades. During the same period,

the TMT contract had a total trading volume of 145,328 contracts and an

average daily trading

[[Page 24631]]

volume of 2,271 contracts. Moreover, open interest as of June 30, 2009,

was 168,963 contracts, which included trades executed on ICE's

electronic trading platform, as well as trades executed off of ICE's

electronic trading platform and then brought to ICE for clearing. In

this regard, ICE does not differentiate between open interest created

by a transaction executed on its trading platform and that created by a

transaction executed off its trading platform.\30\

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\30\ 74 FR 52186 (October 9, 2009).

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In a subsequent filing dated November 13, 2009, ICE reported that

total trading volume in the third quarter of 2009 was 145,681 contracts

(or 2,207 contracts on a daily basis). In terms of number of

transactions, 1,140 trades occurred in the third quarter of 2009 (17.3

trades per day). As of September 30, 2009, open interest in the TMT

contract was 251,573 contracts, which included trades executed on ICE's

electronic trading platform, as well as trades executed off of ICE's

electronic trading platform and then brought to ICE for clearing.

As indicated above, the average number of trades per day in the

second and third quarters of 2009 was above the minimum reporting level

(5 trades per day). Moreover, trading activity in the TMT contract, as

characterized by total quarterly volume, indicates that the TMT

contract experiences trading activity that is greater than in thinly-

traded contracts.\31\ This level of trading activity would ordinarily

merit a statistical analysis to measure the effect that the prices of

the subject contract potentially may have on prices for other contracts

listed on an ECM or DCM. However, in light of the fact that the

Commission has found that the TETCO-M3 contract does not meet the

material price reference or price linkage criteria, according to the

Commission's guidance it would be unnecessary to evaluate whether the

TETCO-M3 contract meets the material liquidity criterion since it

cannot be used alone for SPDC determination.\32\

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\31\ Staff has advised the Commission that in its experience, a

thinly-traded contract is, generally, one that has a quarterly

trading volume of 100,000 contracts or less. In this regard, in the

third quarter of 2009, physical commodity futures contracts with

trading volume of 100,000 contracts or fewer constituted less than

one percent of total trading volume of all physical commodity

futures contracts.

\32\ In establishing guidance to illustrate how it will evaluate

the various criteria, or combinations of criteria, when determining

whether a contract is a SPDC, the Commission made clear that

``material liquidity itself would not be sufficient to make a

determination that a contract is a [SPDC], * * * but combined with

other factors it can serve as a guidepost indicating which contracts

are functioning as [SPDCs].'' For the reasons discussed above, the

Commission has found that the TMT contract does not meet either the

price linkage or material price reference criterion. In light of

this finding and the Commission's Guidance cited above, there is no

need to evaluate further the material liquidity criteria since it

cannot be used alone as a basis for a SPDC determination.

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i. Federal Register Comments

As noted above, WGCEF, ICE, EI, NGSA and FIEG addressed the

question of whether the TMT contract met the material liquidity

criterion for a SPDC.\33\ These commenters stated that the TMT contract

does not meet the material liquidity criterion for SPDC determination

for a number of reasons.

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\33\ As noted above, IECA expressed the opinion that the TMT

contract met the criteria for SPDC determination but did not provide

its reasoning.

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WGCEF,\34\ ICE \35\ and EI \36\ noted that the Commission's

Guidance had posited concepts of liquidity that generally assumed a

fairly constant stream of prices throughout the trading day, and noted

that the relatively low number of trades per day in the TMT contract

did not meet this standard of liquidity. The Commission observes that a

continuous stream of prices would indeed be an indication of liquidity

for certain markets but the Guidance also notes that ``quantifying the

levels of immediacy and price concession that would define material

liquidity may differ from one market or commodity to another.'' \37\

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\34\ CL 02.

\35\ CL 04.

\36\ CL 05.

\37\ Guidance, supra.

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WGCEF, FIEG \38\ and NGSA \39\ noted that the TMT contract

represents a differential, which does not affect other contracts,

including the NYMEX Henry Hub contract and physical gas contracts. FIEG

and WGCEF also noted that the TMT contract's trading volume represents

only a fraction of natural gas trading.

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\38\ CL 08.

\39\ CL 06.

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ICE opined that the Commission ``seems to have adopted a five

trade-per-day test to determine whether a contract is materially

liquid. It is worth noting that ICE originally suggested that the CFTC

use a five trades-per-day threshold as the basis for an ECM to report

trade data to the CFTC.'' Furthermore, FIEG cautioned the Commission in

using a reporting threshold as a measure of liquidity. In this regard,

the Commission adopted a five trades-per-day threshold as a reporting

requirement to enable it to ``independently be aware of ECM contracts

that may develop into SPDCs''\40\ rather than solely relying upon an

ECM on its own to identify any such potential SPDCs to the Commission.

Thus, any contract that meets this threshold may be subject to scrutiny

as a potential SPDC but this does not mean that the contract will be

found to be a SPDC merely because it met the reporting threshold.

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\40\ 73 FR 75892 (December 12, 2008).

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ICE and EI proposed that the statistics provided by ICE were

misinterpreted and misapplied by the Commission. In particular, ICE

stated that the volume figures used in the Commission's analysis (cited

above) ``include trades made in all months of each contract'' as well

as in strips of contract months, and a ``more appropriate method of

determining liquidity is to examine the activity in a single traded

month or strip of a given contract.'' \41\ A similar argument was made

by EI, which observed that the five-trades-per-day number ``is highly

misleading * * * because the contracts can be offered for as long as

120 months, [thus] the average per day for an individual contract may

be less than 1 per day.''

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\41\ In addition, both EI and ICE stated that the trades-per-day

statistics that it provided to the Commission in its quarterly

filing and which were cited in the Commission's October 9, 2009,

Federal Register notice includes 2(h)(1) transactions, which were

not completed on the electronic trading platform and should not be

considered in the SPDC determination process. The Commission staff

asked ICE to review the data it sent in its quarterly filings; ICE

confirmed that the volume data it provided and which the Commission

cited includes only transaction data executed on ICE's electronic

trading platform. As noted above, supplemental data supplied by ICE

confirmed that block trades are in addition to the trades that were

conducted on the electronic platform; block trades comprise about 63

percent of all transactions in the TMT contract. Commission

acknowledges that the open interest information it provided in its

October 9, 2009, Federal Register notice includes transactions made

off the ICE platform. However, once open interest is created, there

is no way for ICE to differentiate between ``on-exchange'' versus

``off-exchange'' created positions, and all such positions are

fungible with one another and may be offset in any way agreeable to

the position holder regardless of how the position was initially

created. CL 04.

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It is the Commission's opinion that liquidity, as it pertains to

the TMT contract, is typically a function of trading activity in

particular lead months and, given sufficient liquidity in such months,

the ICE TMT contract itself would be considered liquid. In any event,

in light of the fact that the Commission has found that the TMT

contract does not meet the material price reference or price linkage

criteria, according to the Commission's Guidance, it would be

unnecessary to evaluate whether the TM contract meets the material

liquidity criterion since it cannot be used alone for SPDC

determination.

[[Page 24632]]

ii. Conclusion Regarding Material Liquidity

For the reasons discussed above, the Commission has found that the

TMT contract does not meet either the price linkage or material price

reference criteria. Accordingly, there is no need to evaluate further

the material liquidity criterion since it cannot be used alone as a

basis for a SPDC determination.

4. Overall Conclusion

After considering the entire record in this matter, including the

comments received, the Commission has determined that the TMT contract

does not perform a significant price discovery function under the

criteria established in section 2(h)(7) of the CEA.

Specifically, the Commission has determined that the TMT contract

does not meet the material price reference and price linkage criteria

at this time. In light of the fact that the Commission has found that

the TMT contract does not meet the material price reference or price

linkage criteria, according to the Commission's Guidance, it would be

unnecessary to evaluate whether the TMT contract meets the material

liquidity criterion since it cannot be used alone for SPDC

determination. Accordingly, the Commission is issuing the attached

Order declaring that the TMT contract is not a SPDC.

Issuance of this Order indicates that the Commission does not at

this time regard ICE as a registered entity in connection with its TMT

contract.\42\ Accordingly, with respect to its TMT contract, ICE is not

required to comply with the obligations, requirements and timetables

prescribed in Commission rule 36.3(c)(4) for ECMs with SPDCs. However,

ICE must continue to comply with the applicable reporting requirements

for ECMs.

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\42\ See 73 FR 75888, 75893 (Dec. 12, 2008).

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IV. Related Matters

a. Paperwork Reduction Act

The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (``PRA'') \43\ imposes certain

requirements on Federal agencies, including the Commission, in

connection with their conducting or sponsoring any collection of

information as defined by the PRA. Certain provisions of Commission

rule 36.3 impose new regulatory and reporting requirements on ECMs,

resulting in information collection requirements within the meaning of

the PRA. OMB previously has approved and assigned OMB control number

3038-0060 to this collection of information.

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\43\ 44 U.S.C. 3507(d).

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b. Cost-Benefit Analysis

Section 15(a) of the CEA \44\ requires the Commission to consider

the costs and benefits of its actions before issuing an order under the

Act. By its terms, section 15(a) does not require the Commission to

quantify the costs and benefits of an order or to determine whether the

benefits of the order outweigh its costs; rather, it requires that the

Commission ``consider'' the costs and benefits of its actions. Section

15(a) further specifies that the costs and benefits shall be evaluated

in light of five broad areas of market and public concern: (1)

Protection of market participants and the public; (2) efficiency,

competitiveness and financial integrity of futures markets; (3) price

discovery; (4) sound risk management practices; and (5) other public

interest considerations. The Commission may in its discretion give

greater weight to any one of the five enumerated areas and could in its

discretion determine that, notwithstanding its costs, a particular

order is necessary or appropriate to protect the public interest or to

effectuate any of the provisions or accomplish any of the purposes of

the Act. The Commission has considered the costs and benefits in light

of the specific provisions of section 15(a) of the Act and has

concluded that the Order, required by Congress to strengthen federal

oversight of exempt commercial markets and to prevent market

manipulation, is necessary and appropriate to accomplish the purposes

of section 2(h)(7) of the Act.

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\44\ 7 U.S.C. 19(a).

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When a futures contract begins to serve a significant price

discovery function, that contract, and the ECM on which it is traded,

warrants increased oversight to deter and prevent price manipulation or

other disruptions to market integrity, both on the ECM itself and in

any related futures contracts trading on DCMs. An Order fining that a

particular contract is a SPDC triggers this increased oversight and

imposes obligations on the ECM calculated to accomplish this goal. The

increased oversight engendered by the issue of a SPDC Order increases

transparency and helps to ensure fair competition among ECMs and DCMs

trading similar products and competing for the same business. Moreover,

the ECM on which the SPDC is traded must assume, with respect to that

contract, all the responsibilities and obligations of a registered

entity under the CEA and Commission regulations. Additionally, the ECM

must comply with nine core principles established by section 2(h)(7) of

the Act--including the obligation to establish position limits and/or

accountability standards for the SPDC. Amendments to section 4(i) of

the CEA authorize the Commission to require reports for SPDCs listed on

ECMs. These increased responsibilities, along with the CFTC's increased

regulatory authority, subject the ECM's risk management practices to

the Commission's supervision and oversight and generally enhance the

financial integrity of the markets.

The Commission has concluded that ICE's TMT contract, which is the

subject of the attached Order, is not a SPDC; accordingly, the

Commission's Order imposes no additional costs and no additional

statutorily or regulatory mandated responsibilities on the ECM.

c. Regulatory Flexibility Act

The Regulatory Flexibility Act (``RFA'') \45\ requires that

agencies consider the impact of their rules on small businesses. The

requirements of CEA section 2(h)(7) and the Part 36 rules affect exempt

commercial markets. The Commission previously has determined that

exempt commercial markets are not small entities for purposes of the

RFA.\46\ Accordingly, the Chairman, on behalf of the Commission, hereby

certifies pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 605(b) that this Order, taken in

connection with section 2(h)(7) of the Act and the Part 36 rules, will

not have a significant impact on a substantial number of small

entities.

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\45\ 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.

\46\ 66 FR 42256, 42268 (Aug. 10, 2001).

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V. Order

Order Relating to the TETCO-M3 Financial Basis Contract

After considering the complete record in this matter, including the

comment letters received in response to its request for comments, the

Commission has determined to issue the following Order:

The Commission, pursuant to its authority under section 2(h)(7) of

the Act, hereby determines that the TETCO-M3 Financial Basis contract,

traded on the IntercontinentalExchange, Inc., does not at this time

satisfy the material price reference and price linkage criteria for

significant price discovery contracts. In light of the fact that the

Commission has found that the TMT contract does not meet the material

price reference or price linkage criteria, according to the

Commission's Guidance, it would be unnecessary to evaluate whether the

TMT contract meets the material

[[Page 24633]]

liquidity criterion since it cannot be used alone for SPDC

determination.

Consistent with this determination, the IntercontinentalExchange,

Inc., is not considered a registered entity \47\ with respect to the

TETCO-M3 Financial Basis contract and is not subject to the provisions

of the Commodity Exchange Act applicable to registered entities.

Further, the obligations, requirements and timetables prescribed in

Commission rule 36.3(c)(4) governing core principle compliance by the

IntercontinentalExchange, Inc., are not applicable to the TETCO-M3

Financial Basis contract with the issuance of this Order.

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\47\ 7 U.S.C. 1a(29).

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This Order is based on the representations made to the Commission

by the IntercontinentalExchange, Inc., dated July 27, 2009, and

November 13, 2009, and other supporting material. Any material change

or omissions in the facts and circumstances pursuant to which this

order is granted might require the Commission to reconsider its current

determination that the TETCO-M3 Financial Basis contract is not a

significant price discovery contract. Additionally, to the extent that

it continues to rely upon the exemption in Section 2(h)(3) of the Act,

the IntercontinentalExchange, Inc., must continue to comply with all of

the applicable requirements of Section 2(h)(3) and Commission

Regulation 36.3.

Issued in Washington, DC on April 28, 2010, by the Commission.

David A. Stawick,

Secretary of the Commission.

[FR Doc. 2010-10330 Filed 5-4-10; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE P

Last Updated: May 5, 2010