2010-10311

FR Doc 2010-10311[Federal Register: May 4, 2010 (Volume 75, Number 85)]

[Notices]

[Page 23686-23690]

From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

[DOCID:fr04my10-60]

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COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION

Order Finding That the Carbon Financial Instrument Contract

Offered for Trading on the Chicago Climate Exchange, Inc. Does Not

Perform a Significant Price Discovery Function

AGENCY: Commodity Futures Trading Commission.

ACTION: Final order.

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SUMMARY: On August 20, 2009, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission

(``CFTC'' or ``Commission'') published for comment in the Federal

Register \1\ a notice of its intent to undertake a determination

whether the Carbon Financial Instrument (``CFI'') contract offered for

trading on the Chicago Climate Exchange, Inc. (``CCX''), an exempt

commercial market (``ECM'') under Section 2(h)(3)-(5) of the Commodity

Exchange Act (``CEA'' or the ``Act''), performs a significant price

discovery function pursuant to section 2(h)(7) of the CEA. The

Commission undertook this review based upon an initial evaluation of

information and data provided by CCX. The Commission has reviewed

public comments and the entire record in this matter and has determined

to issue an order finding that the CCX CFI contract, at this time, does

not perform a significant price discovery function. Authority for this

action is found in section 2(h)(7) of the CEA and Commission rule

36.3(c) promulgated thereunder.

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\1\ 74 FR 42052 (August 20, 2009).

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DATES: Effective date: April 28, 2010.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Irina Leonova, Financial Economist,

Division of Market Oversight, Commodity Futures Trading Commission,

Three Lafayette Centre, 1155 21st Street, NW., Washington, DC 20581.

Telephone: (202) 418-5646. Email: [email protected], or Gregory K.

Price, Industry Economist, Division of Market Oversight, same address.

Telephone: (202) 418-5515. E-mail: [email protected], or Susan Nathan,

Senior Special Counsel, Division of Market Oversight, same address.

Telephone: (202) 418-5133. E-mail: [email protected]

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Introduction

The CFTC Reauthorization Act of 2008 (``Reauthorization Act'') \2\

significantly broadened the CFTC's regulatory authority with respect to

ECMs by creating, in section 2(h)(7) of the CEA, a new regulatory

category--ECMs on which significant price discovery contracts

(``SPDCs'') are traded--and treating ECMs in that category as

registered entities under the CEA. The legislation authorizes the CFTC

to designate an agreement, contract or transaction traded on an ECM as

a SPDC if the Commission determines, under criteria established in

section 2(h)(7), that it performs a significant price discovery

function. When the Commission makes such a

[[Page 23687]]

determination, the ECM on which the SPDC is traded must assume, with

respect to that contract, all the responsibilities and obligations of a

registered entity under the Act and Commission regulations, and must

comply with nine core principles established by new section 2(h)(7)(C).

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\2\ Incorporated as Title XIII of the Food, Conservation and

Energy Act of 2008, Public Law 110-246, 122 Stat. 1624 (June 18,

2008).

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On March 16, 2009, the CFTC promulgated final rules implementing

the provisions of the Reauthorization Act.\3\ As relevant here, Rule

36.3 imposes increased information reporting requirements on ECMs to

assist the Commission in making prompt assessments whether particular

ECM contracts may be SPDCs. In addition to filing quarterly reports

regarding its contracts, an ECM must notify the Commission promptly

concerning any contract traded in reliance on the exemption in section

2(h)(3) of the CEA that averaged five trades per day or more over the

most recent calendar quarter, and that either: (1) had its price

information sold by the exchange to market participants or industry

publications or (2) had daily closing or settlement prices which were

within 2.5% of the contemporaneously determined closing, settlement or

other daily price of another contract on 95 percent or more of the days

in the most recent quarter.

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\3\ 74 FR 12178 (Mar. 23, 2009); these rules became effective on

April 22, 2009.

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Commission Rule 36.3(c)(3) established the procedures by which the

Commission makes and announces its determination whether a particular

ECM contract serves a significant price discovery function. Under those

procedures, the Commission publishes notice in the Federal Register

that it intends to undertake a determination whether the specified

agreement, contract or transaction performs a significant price

discovery function and receives written views, data and arguments

relevant to its determination from the ECM and other interested

persons. The Commission, within a reasonable period of time after the

close of the comment period, considers all relevant information and

issues an order announcing and explaining its determination. The

issuance of an affirmative order subjects an ECM with a SPDC to the

full application of the Commission's regulatory authorities; at that

time, such an ECM becomes subject to all provisions of the CEA

applicable to registered entities.\4\ The issuance of such an order

also triggers the obligations, requirements and timetables prescribed

in Commission Rule 36.3(c)(4).\5\

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\4\ Public Law 110-246 at 13203; Joint Explanatory Statement of

the Committee of Conference, H.R. Rep. No. 110-627, 110 Cong., 2d

Sess. 978, 986 (Conference Committee Report). See also 73 FR 75888,

75894 (Dec. 12, 2008).

\5\ For an initial SPDC determination, ECMs have a grace period

of 90 calendar days from the issuance of a SPDC determination order

to submit a written demonstration of compliance with the applicable

core principles. For subsequent SPDC determinations, ECMs have a

grace period of 30 calendar days to demonstrate core principle

compliance.

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II. Notice of Intent To Undertake SPDC Determination

On August 20, 2009, the Commission published in the Federal

Register a notice of its intent to undertake a determination whether

the CCX's CFI contract performs a significant price discovery function,

and requested comment from interested parties.\6\ Comments were

received from the IntercontinentalExchange, Inc. (``ICE''); Jeremy D.

Weinstein, Esq. (``Weinstein''); the California Forestry Association

(``CFA''); and Scott DeMonte (``DeMonte'').\7\ The comments are more

extensively discussed below in the Analysis Section.

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\6\ The Commission's Part 36 Rules establish, among other

things, procedures by which the Commission makes and announces its

determination whether a specific ECM contract serves a significant

price discovery function. Under those procedures, the Commission

publishes a notice in the Federal Register that it intends to

undertake a determination whether a specified agreement, contract or

transaction performs a significant price discovery function and to

receive written data, views and arguments relevant to its

determination from the ECM and other interested persons.

\7\ The comment letters are available on the Commission's Web

site: http://www.cftc.gov/lawandregulation/federalregister/

federalregistercomments/2009/09-010.html.

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III. Section 2(h)(7) of the CEA

The Commission is directed by section 2(h)(7) of the CEA to

consider, as appropriate, the following factors in determining whether

a contract performs a significant price discovery function:

Price Linkage--the extent to which the agreement, contract

or transaction uses or otherwise relies on a daily or final settlement

price, or other major price parameter, of a contract or contracts

listed for trading on or subject to the rules of a designated contract

market (``DCM'') or derivatives transaction execution facility

(``DTEF''), or a SPDC traded on an electronic trading facility, to

value a position, transfer or convert a position, cash or financially

settle a position, or close out a position.

Arbitrage--the extent to which the price for the

agreement, contract or transaction is sufficiently related to the price

of a contract or contracts listed for trading on or subject to the

rules of a DCM or DTEF, or a SPDC traded on or subject to the rules of

an electronic trading facility, so as to permit market participants to

effectively arbitrage between the markets by simultaneously maintaining

positions or executing trades in the contracts on a frequent and

recurring basis.

Material price reference--the extent to which, on a

frequent and recurring basis, bids, offers or transactions in a

commodity are directly based on, or are determined by referencing, the

prices generated by agreements, contracts or transactions being traded

or executed on the electronic trading facility.

Material liquidity--the extent to which the volume of

agreements, contracts or transactions in the commodity being traded on

the electronic trading facility is sufficient to have a material effect

on other agreements, contracts or transactions listed for trading on or

subject to the rules of a DCM, DTEF or electronic trading facility

operating in reliance on the exemption in section 2(h)(3).

Not all factors must be present to support a determination that a

particular contract performs a significant price discovery function.

Moreover, the statutory language neither prioritizes the factors nor

specifies the degrees to which a SPDC must conform to the various

factors. In Guidance issued in connection with the Part 36 rules

governing ECMs with SPDCs, the Commission observed that these factors

do not lend themselves to a mechanical checklist or formulaic

analysis.\8\

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\8\ Appendix A to Part 36, 17 CFR part 36 (2009).

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Accordingly, the Commission has indicated that in making its

determination it will consider the circumstances under which the

presence of a particular factor, or combination of factors, would be

sufficient to support a SPDC determination.\9\ For example, for

contracts that are linked to other contracts or that may be arbitraged

with other contracts, the Commission will consider whether the price of

the potential SPDC moves in such harmony with the other contract that

the two markets essentially become interchangeable.\10\ This co-

movement of prices would be an indication that activity in the contract

had reached a level sufficient for the contract to perform a

significant price discovery function.

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\9\ 17 CFR part 36, appendix A.

\10\ Appendix A to Part 36, 17 CFR 36 (2009).

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IV. The CCX CFI Contract

CCX, launched in 2003, operates the only North American voluntary,

legally

[[Page 23688]]

binding integrated trading system to reduce emissions of six major

greenhouse gases, with offset projects worldwide. CCX offers a cap and

trade system whose members \11\ make a legally binding emission

reduction commitment. Members are allocated annual emission allowances

in accordance with their emissions baseline and the CCX emission

reduction schedule. Members who reduce beyond their targets have

surplus allowances to sell or bank; those who do not meet the targets

must comply by purchasing CCX CFIs. The CCX CFI contract is a cash

market instrument and not a derivatives contract. The Chicago Climate

Futures Exchange (CCFE), a subsidiary of CCX that operates as a DCM,

lists derivatives (futures and option contracts) on CCX CFIs.

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\11\ CCX membership categories:

Members: Entities with direct greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.

Members make a legally binding commitment to the CCX Emission

Reduction Schedule and are subject to annual emissions verification

by FINRA. Indirect emissions are an opt-in.

Registry Participant Members: Entities with direct GHG emissions

that establish a CCX Registry account of their emissions and undergo

data verification. Standardized independent third-party data

verification is provided by FINRA on an annual or multi-annual

basis.

Associate Members: Office-based businesses or institutions with

negligible direct GHG emissions. Associate Members commit to report

and fully offset 100 percent of indirect emissions associated with

energy purchases and business travel from year of entry through 2010

and emissions data are verified by FINRA.

Offset Providers: Owners of title to qualifying offset projects

that sequester, destroy or reduce GHG emissions. Offset Providers

register and sell offsets directly on the CCX.

Offset Aggregators: Entities that serve as the administrative

representative, on behalf of offset project owners, of multiple

offset-generating projects. Offset projects involving less than

10,000 metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent per year should be

registered and sold through an Offset Aggregator.

Liquidity Providers: Entities or individuals who trade on CCX

for purposes other than complying with the CCX Emission Reduction

Schedule, such as market makers and proprietary trading groups.

Exchange Participants: Entities or individuals who purchase CFI

contracts and retire them to offset emissions associated with

special events or other specified activities.

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The size of the CCX CFI contract is 100 metric tons (MT) of

CO2-equivalent emissions. A CCX CFI contract involves the

immediate delivery of, and payment for, vintage specific CCX carbon

dioxide (CO2) emission allowances called CFIs. Earlier dated

vintages may be delivered against later vintage trades. Transactions

(with exception of bilateral agreements) are cleared on trade day. Full

contract value settlement occurs on the next business day. CCX

substitutes as a counterparty to all transactions and guarantees

performance until settlement is completed.

Based upon a required quarterly notification filed on October 15,

2009, (mandatory under Rule 36.3(c)(2)), the CCX reported that, with

respect to its CFI contract, an average of 8 trades per day occurred in

the third quarter of 2009. During the same period, the CFI had an

average daily trading volume of 1,141 contracts. In the second quarter

of 2009, market participants traded the CFI contract on average 15

times per day with an average daily trading volume of 1,235 contracts.

Because the CCX CFI is a cash market instrument, open interest figures

are not applicable.

V. Analysis

A. The Statutory Criteria

In its notice of intent to undertake a determination whether the

CCX CFI contract performs a significant price discovery function, the

Commission indicated that the CCX CFI contract might satisfy the

material price reference and material liquidity criteria for SPDC

determination.\12\ Further analysis reveals that the CCX CFI contract

does not meet either criterion.

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\12\ 74 FR 42054 (Aug. 20, 2009).The Commission did not identify

either price linkage or arbitrage as the possible criteria for the

CCX CFI contact to be a SPDC. Accordingly, those criteria will not

be discussed further in this Order.

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Material Price Reference Criterion

The Commission has concluded that the CCX CFI contract does not

meet the material price reference criterion for SPDC determination. As

noted in the original Federal Register notice, the CFI market is solely

a CCX-created entity.\13\ The CCX designed all of the parameters of

this carbon emission reduction program, and it established the rules

for membership in the ECM, allowance trading, and the creation of

offsets. Based on these attributes, staff considered whether traders

look to the CCX as a source of price information and price discovery

for the CFI or the U.S. carbon market in general that would either be a

direct or an indirect source of evidence of the material price

reference. Staff concluded that it appears that CCX CFI prices are not

used as a price reference to the U.S. carbon market due to the

relatively small market share of the CCX CFI program in the overall

U.S. carbon market, the limited potential for the CFI program to be

folded into a national carbon reduction program, and significant price

volatility of the CCX CFI instrument. As part of its material price

reference analysis, Commission staff considered comments filed pursuant

to the request for comment and all other relevant information.\14\

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\13\ 74 FR 42054 (Aug. 20, 2009).

\14\ The Commission will rely on one of two sources of

evidence--direct or indirect--to determine a SPDC. Direct evidence

can be cash market transactions that are frequently based on or

quoted as a differential to the potential SPDC. Indirect evidence

includes contracts whose price series are routinely disseminated in

industry publications or are sold to market participants by the ECM.

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Material Liquidity Criterion

The Commission's decision to undertake a review to determine

whether the CCX CFI contract performs a significant price discovery

function was based on CCX's required initial quarterly notification

filed on July 1, 2009. At that time, CCX reported that, with respect to

all CFI trades combined (aggregate of vintages 2003-2010), an average

of 15 separate trades per day occurred in the second quarter of 2009.

Subsequent to the publication of the Commission's Federal Register

notice announcing its intent to undertake a SPDC review, however, CCX

amended its filing to show the number of trades per day for each

vintage, and clarified that the exchange lists and trades CFI contract

vintages individually and provides a vintage-specific closing price for

each CFI vintage contract. In these circumstances, the Commission

recognizes that the CCX CFI vintage-specific contracts should not be

aggregated, but rather should be treated individually for the purpose

of a SPDC analysis. Accordingly, the Commission has analyzed each

individual vintage of the CCX CFIs to determine whether any of them are

SPDCs.\15\

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\15\ Because this shift in focus did not alter either the

analysis or conclusion or otherwise suggest the need for further

comment, the Commission did not republish its original notice of

intent to make a SPDC determination with respect to the CCX CFI

contract.

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The Commission's evaluation of the supplemental data indicates that

the CCX CFI vintage specific contracts (2003-2010 vintages) do not meet

the material liquidity criterion for a SPDC; the average number of

trades per day per vintage was only one contract, well below the five

trades per day reporting threshold established by the Commission.

B. Comments Received

The Commission received four responses to its request for comments.

Two of the comment letters addressed issues beyond the scope of the

instant matter;\16\ two raised substantive issues

[[Page 23689]]

with respect to the applicability of section 2(h)(7) to the CFI

contract.\17\

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\16\ See supra note 7. Specifically, the California Forestry

Association offered the opinion that all the over-the-counter

voluntary carbon trading occurring now serves a significant price

discovery function. CL 02. Scott DeMonte advises the Commission to

``fix the manipulation'' in [its] exchanges'' and requests that

firms be required to have collateral in excess of two times their

average end of daily trade value in order to participate in this

market. CL 01.

\17\ See supra note 7. The commenters who raised substantive

issues with respect to the applicability of section 2(h)(7) to the

CFI contract are Jeremy D. Weinstein, Esq., owner of the law offices

of Jeremy D. Weinstein, a professional corporation located in Walnut

Creek, California and IntercontinentalExchange, Inc., operator of

regulated exchanges, trading platforms and clearing houses serving

the global markets for agricultural, credit, currency, emissions,

energy and equity index markets headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia,

U.S.

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Weinstein opines that the CCX offset project protocols ``do not

conform to the stringent additionality \18\ and leakage standards \19\

that are in the carbon offset contracts * * * accepted by the broader

market.'' Consequently, Mr. Weinstein asserts that ``the absence from

the CCX CFI contract of the most essential requirements for commonality

with other carbon offset contract prevents market participants from

using the CFI contracts for material price reference, arbitrage, and

settlement and execution of transactions.'' The environmental

requirements of the CCX offset protocols are beyond the scope of the

Commission authority, and this inquiry was limited to an evaluation

whether the CCX CFI contract might satisfy the material liquidity and

material price reference statutory criterion for a SPDC determination.

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\18\ There are a number of interpretations of the additionality

concept in application to the environmental offset projects. The

most popular interpretations are ``environmental additionality''

where a project is additional if the emissions from the project are

lower than the baseline, and ``project additionality'' where the

project must not have happened without the Clean Development

Mechanism (CDM).

\19\ Leakage generally refers to the increase in emissions

outside the project boundary that occurs as a consequence of the

project activity's implementation.

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ICE expressed an opinion that ``the CFI does not serve a

significant price discovery function and the Commission may exceed its

jurisdiction if it determines that the CFI serves as a significant

price discovery contract.'' ICE observed that the CCX CFI contract

fails the threshold for material liquidity because ``each [CCX CFI

contract] vintage may trade less than twice a day.'' Consequently, ICE

concluded that ``a trade every couple of hours does not equate to the

``ability to transact immediately'' or ``a more or less continuous

stream of prices.'' As noted above, after a thorough review of

supplemental data provided for the CCX CFI contract, Commission staff

concluded that different CCX CFI vintages should be considered as

separate CCX contracts. When analyzed in this manner, the CCX CFI

contracts do not meet the material liquidity criterion for SPDC

determination.

When analyzing the material price reference factor for a CCX CFI

SPDC determination, ICE commented that ``under the Commission's theory,

any spot contract automatically serves as a material price reference,

simply because the contract references itself'' (emphasis in original).

Additionally, ICE expresses an opinion that ``by making this

determination [the CCX CFI contract is a SPDC], the Commission is

broadly asserting jurisdiction over the spot market if the spot

contract is electronically traded.'' In response, the Commission notes

that Section 2(h)(7), refers to ``any agreement, contract or

transaction conducted in reliance on the exemption'' in Section 2(h)(3)

and does not require that the Commission find that a potential SPDC

contract is a commodity futures or options contract. The determination

to list particular instruments in reliance on the Section 2(h)(3)

exemption is made by the ECM, not the Commission, when the ECM files

notice with the Commission, under Section 2(h)(5), of its reliance on

such exemption. Section 2(i) of the CEA reinforces the view that

instruments traded on 2(h)(3) markets may include non-futures products;

that section states that there is no presumption that an agreement,

contract or transaction exempted under section 2(h)(3) ``is or would

otherwise be subject to this chapter.''

VI. Findings and Conclusion

In consideration of the initial and supplemental information

provided by CCX, the comments received in connection with the Federal

Register notice and all other relevant information, the Commission has

determined that the CCX CFI contract does not, at this time, perform a

significant price discovery function. Accordingly, as set forth in the

Commission's Order, CCX is not required to comply with Commission Rule

36.3(c)(4) applicable to ECMs with SPDCs, or otherwise to assume the

statutory and regulatory responsibilities of a registered entity with

respect to the CFI contract. The Reauthorization Act amended the CEA to

require that the Commission evaluate not less than annually all

agreements, contracts and transactions conducted on an ECM in reliance

on the exemption in section 2(h)(3) to determine whether they serve a

significant price discovery function.\20\ In addition, the Commission

routinely monitors contracts traded or executed in reliance on section

2(h)(3) and reviews all ECM submissions on an ongoing basis for the

presence of SPDCs. Accordingly, like all ECMs, CCX remains responsible

for compliance with the reporting requirements described in Rule

36.3(a) and (b).

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\20\ Section 2(h)(7)(D)(ii), 7 U.S.C. 2(h)(7)(D)(ii).

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VII. Related Matters

A. Paperwork Reduction Act

The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (``PRA'') \21\ imposes certain

requirements on federal agencies, including the Commission, in

connection with their conducting or sponsoring any collection of

information, as defined by the PRA. Certain provisions of final

Commission Rule 36.3 impose new regulatory and reporting requirements

on ECMs, resulting in information collection requirements within the

meaning of the PRA; OMB previously has approved and assigned OMB

control number 3038-0060 to this collection of information.

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\21\ 44 U.S.C. 3507(d).

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B. Cost-Benefit Analysis

Section 15(a) of the CEA \22\ requires the Commission to consider

the costs and benefits of its actions before issuing an order under the

Act. By its terms, section 15(a) does not require the Commission to

quantify the costs and benefits of an order or to determine whether the

benefits of the order outweigh its costs; rather, it requires that the

Commission ``consider'' the costs and benefits of its action. Section

15(a) further specifies that the costs and benefits shall be evaluated

in light of five broad areas of market and public concern: (1)

Protection of market participants and the public; (2) efficiency,

competitiveness, and financial integrity of futures markets; (3) price

discovery; (4) sound risk management practices; and (5) other public

interest considerations. The Commission may in its discretion give

greater weight to any of the five enumerated areas and could in its

discretion determine that, notwithstanding its costs, a particular

order is necessary or appropriate to protect the public interest or to

effectuate any provisions or accomplish any of the purposes of the Act.

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\22\ 7 U.S.C.19(a).

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When a futures contract begins to serve a significant price

discovery function, that contract, and the ECM on which it is traded,

warrants increased oversight to deter and prevent price manipulation

and other disruptions to market integrity, both on the ECM itself and

in any related futures contracts trading on DCMs. An Order finding that

a particular contract is a SPDC triggers

[[Page 23690]]

this increased oversight and imposes obligations on the ECM calculated

to accomplish this goal. The increased oversight engendered by the

issuance of a SPDC Order increases transparency and helps to ensure

fair competition among ECMs and DCMs trading similar products and

competing for the same business. Moreover, the ECM on which the SPDC is

traded must assume, with respect to that contract, all the

responsibilities and obligations of a registered entity under the CEA

and Commission regulations. Additionally, the ECM must comply with nine

core principles established by section 2(h)(7) of the Act--including

the obligation to establish position limits and/or accountability

standards for the SPDC. Amendments to section 4(i) of the CEA authorize

the Commission to require large trader reports for SPDCs listed on

ECMs. These increased ECM responsibilities, along with the CFTC's

increased regulatory authority, subject the ECM's risk management

practices to the Commission's supervision and oversight and generally

enhance the financial integrity of the markets.

The Commission has concluded that the Chicago Climate Exchange's

Carbon Financial Instrument contract that is the subject of the

attached Order is not a SPDC; accordingly, the Commission's Order

impose no additional costs and no additional statutorily or regulatory

mandated responsibilities on the ECM.

VIII. Order

Order Relating to the CCX CFI Contract

After considering the complete record in this matter, including the

comment letters received in response to its request for comments, the

Commission has determined to issue the following:

The Commission, pursuant to its authority under section 2(h)(7) of

the Act, hereby determines that the Chicago Climate Exchange's Carbon

Financial Instrument contract that was submitted to the Commission by

the Chicago Climate Exchange for review on July 1, 2009 and October 15,

2009 does not, at this time, satisfy the statutory or regulatory

requirements of a significant price discovery contract. Consistent with

this determination, the Chicago Climate Exchange is not required at

this time to comply with section 2(h)(7)(C) in connection with the

Carbon Financial Instrument contract or the Part 36 regulations

applicable to exempt commercial markets with significant price

discovery contracts, and is not required to assume the statutory or

regulatory responsibilities required of registered entities with

respect to the Carbon Financial Instrument contract.

This order is based upon the representations made to the Commission

by the Chicago Climate Exchange in filings dated July 1, 2009 and

October 15, 2009, and other supporting material. Any material change or

omissions in the facts and circumstances pursuant to which this order

is granted might require the Commission to reconsider its current

determination that the Carbon Financial Instrument contract is not a

significant price discovery contract.

The Commission may, based upon information regarding the Carbon

Financial Instrument contract reviewed under this Order that is

submitted in required reports and filings, issue another notice of

intent to undertake a significant price discovery contract

determination for these contracts. Further, issuance of this Order does

not affect the Chicago Climate Exchange's continuing obligation to

comply with all statutory and regulatory requirements applicable to

2(h)(3) markets, including all reporting requirements found in

Commission Regulation 36.3.

Issued in Washington, DC on April 28, 2010 by the Commission.

David A. Stawick,

Secretary of the Commission.

[FR Doc. 2010-10311 Filed 5-3-10; 8:45 am]

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Last Updated: May 4, 2010