COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION

Comparability Determination for Switzerland: Certain Entity-Level Requirements

AGENCY: Commodity Futures Trading Commission.

ACTION: Notice of Comparability Determination for Certain Requirements under Swiss Financial Market Regulation.

SUMMARY: The following is the analysis and determination of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“Commission”) regarding certain parts of a request by UBS AG (“UBS”) that the Commission determine that laws and regulations applicable in Switzerland provide a sufficient basis for an affirmative finding of comparability with respect to the following regulatory obligations applicable to swap dealers (“SDs”) and major swap participants (“MSPs”) registered with the Commission: (i) Chief compliance officer; (ii) risk management; and (iii) swap data recordkeeping (collectively, the “Internal Business Conduct Requirements”).

DATES: Effective Date: This determination will become effective immediately upon publication in the Federal Register.

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SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Introduction

On July 26, 2013, the Commission published in the Federal Register its “Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance with Certain Swap Regulations” (the “Guidance”). In the Guidance, the Commission set forth its interpretation of the manner in which it believes that section 2(i) of the Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”) applies Title VII’s swap provisions to activities outside the U.S. and informed the public of some of the policies that it expects to follow, generally speaking, in applying Title VII and certain Commission regulations in contexts covered by section 2(i). Among other matters, the Guidance generally described the policy and procedural framework under which the Commission would consider a substituted compliance program with respect to Commission regulations applicable to entities located outside the U.S. Specifically, the Commission addressed the Exemption Program where compliance with a comparable regulatory requirement of a foreign jurisdiction would serve as a reasonable substitute for compliance with the attendant requirements of the CEA and the Commission’s regulations promulgated thereunder.

In addition to the Guidance, on July 22, 2013, the Commission issued the Exemptive Order Regarding Compliance with Certain Swap Regulations (the “Exemptive Order”). Among other things, the Exemptive Order provided time for the Commission to consider substituted compliance with respect to six jurisdictions where non-U.S. SDs are currently organized. In this regard, the Exemptive Order generally provided non-U.S. SDs and MSPs in the six jurisdictions with conditional relief from certain requirements of Commission regulations (those referred to as “Entity-Level Requirements” in the Guidance) until the earlier of December 21, 2013, or 30 days following the issuance of a substituted compliance determination.

On July 11, 2013, UBS (“applicant”) submitted a request that the Commission determine that laws and regulations applicable in Switzerland provide a sufficient basis for an affirmative finding of comparability with respect to certain Entity-Level Requirements, including the Internal Business Conduct Requirements. On November 13, 2013, the application was supplemented with corrections and additional materials. The following is the Commission’s analysis and determination regarding the Internal Business Conduct Requirements, as detailed below.

II. Background

On July 21, 2010, President Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act” or “Dodd-Frank”), which, in Title VII, established a new regulatory framework for swaps. Section 722(d) of the Dodd-Frank Act amended the CEA by adding section 2(i), which provides that the swap provisions of the CEA (including any CEA rules or regulations) apply to cross-border activities when certain conditions are met, namely, when such activities have a “direct and significant connection with activities in, or effect on, commerce of the United States” or when they contravene Commission rules or regulations as are necessary or appropriate to prevent evasion of the swap provisions of the CEA enacted under Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act.

In the three years since its enactment, the Commission has finalized 68 rules and orders to implement Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act. The finalized rules include those promulgated under section 4s of the CEA, which address registration of SDs and MSPs and other substantive requirements applicable to SDs and MSPs. With few exceptions, the delayed compliance dates for the Commission’s regulations implementing such section 4s requirements applicable to SDs and MSPs have passed and new SDs and MSPs are now required to be in full compliance with such regulations upon registration with the Commission. Notably, the requirements under Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act related to SDs and MSPs by their terms apply to all registered SDs and MSPs, irrespective of where they are located, albeit subject to the limitations of CEA section 210.

To provide guidance as to the Commission’s views regarding the scope of the cross-border application of Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act, the Commission set forth in the Guidance its interpretation of the manner in which it believes that Title VII’s swap provisions apply to activities outside the U.S. pursuant to section 2(i) of the CEA. Among other matters, the Guidance generally described the policy and procedural framework under which the Commission would consider a substituted compliance program with respect to Commission regulations.


3 The Entity-Level Requirements under the Exemptive Order consist of 7 CFR 1.31, 3.3, 23.201, 23.203, 23.600, 23.601, 23.602, 23.603, 23.605, 23.606, 23.608, 23.609, and parts 45 and 46 of the Commission’s regulations.

5 For purposes of this notice, the Internal Business Conduct Requirements consist of 17 CFR 3.3, 23.201, 23.203, 23.600, 23.601, 23.602, 23.603, 23.605, and 23.606.


applicable to entities located outside the U.S. Specifically, the Commission addressed a recognition program where compliance with a comparable regulatory requirement of a foreign jurisdiction would serve as a reasonable substitute for compliance with the attendant requirements of the CEA and the Commission’s regulations. With respect to the standards forming the basis for any determination of comparability (“comparability determination” or “comparability finding”), the Commission stated:

In evaluating whether a particular category of foreign regulatory requirement(s) is comparable and comprehensive to the applicable requirement(s) under the CEA and Commission regulations, the Commission will take into consideration all relevant factors, including but not limited to, the comprehensiveness of those requirement(s), the scope and objectives of the relevant regulatory requirement(s), the comprehensiveness of the foreign regulator’s supervisory compliance program, as well as the home jurisdiction’s authority to support and enforce its oversight of the registrant. In this context, comparable does not necessarily mean identical. Rather, the Commission would evaluate whether the home jurisdiction’s regulatory requirement is comparable to and as comprehensive as the corresponding U.S. regulatory requirement(s).

Upon a comparability finding, consistent with CEA section 2(f) and comity principles, the Commission’s policy generally is that eligible entities may comply with a substituted compliance regime, subject to any conditions the Commission places on its finding, and subject to the Commission’s retention of its examination authority and its enforcement authority.

In this regard, the Commission notes that a comparability determination cannot be premised on whether an SD or MSP must disclose comprehensive information to its regulator in its home jurisdiction, but rather on whether information relevant to the Commission’s oversight of an SD or MSP must be directly available to the Commission and any U.S. prudential regulator of the SD or MSP.

The Commission’s direct access to the books and records required to be maintained by an SD or MSP registered with the Commission is a core requirement of the CEA and the Commission’s regulations, and is a condition to registration.

III. Regulation of SDs and MSPs in Switzerland

On July 11, 2013, UBS submitted a request that the Commission assess the comparability of laws and regulations applicable in Switzerland with the CEA and the Commission’s regulations promulgated thereunder. On November 13, 2013, the application was supplemented with corrections and additional materials.

As represented to the Commission by the applicant, SDs in Switzerland are primarily regulated by the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (“FINMA”). FINMA protects creditors, investors, and policyholders, ensuring the smooth functioning of the financial markets and preserving the reputation of Swiss financial institutions. In its role as state supervisory authority, FINMA acts as an oversight authority of banks, insurance companies, exchanges, securities dealers, collective investment schemes, distributors, and insurance intermediaries. It issues operating licenses for companies in the supervised sectors. Through its supervisory activities, FINMA’s role is to ensure that supervised institutions comply with the requisite laws, ordinances, directives and regulations, and continue at all times to fulfill the licensing requirements.

The home jurisdiction’s authority to support and enforce its oversight of the registrant.

In making a comparability determination, the Commission takes an “outcome-based” approach. An “outcome-based” approach means that when evaluating whether a foreign jurisdiction’s regulatory requirements are comparable to, and as comprehensive as, the corollary areas of the CEA and Commission regulations, the Commission ultimately focuses on regulatory outcomes (i.e., the home jurisdiction’s requirements do not have to be identical). This approach to FINMA supervised institutions, an SD or MSP that is not supervised by FINMA, or is otherwise not subject to the requirements applicable to FINMA supervised institutions upon which the Commission bases its determinations, may not be able to rely on the Commission’s comparability determinations hereunder.

IV. Comparable and Comprehensiveness Standard

The Commission’s comparability analysis will be based on a comparison of specific foreign requirements against the specific related CEA provisions and Commission regulations as categorized and described in the Guidance. As explained in the Guidance, within the framework of CEA section 2(i) and principles of international comity, the Commission may make a comparability determination on a requirement-by-requirement basis, rather than on the basis of the foreign regime as a whole.

In making its comparability determinations, the Commission may include conditions that take into account timing and other issues related to coordinating the implementation of reform efforts across jurisdictions.

In evaluating whether a particular category of foreign regulatory requirement(s) is comparable and comprehensive to the corollary requirement(s) under the CEA and Commission regulations, the Commission will take into consideration all relevant factors, including, but not limited to:

- The comprehensiveness of those requirement(s);
- The scope and objectives of the relevant regulatory requirement(s);
- The comprehensiveness of the foreign regulator’s supervisory compliance program; and
- The home jurisdiction’s authority to support and enforce its oversight of the registrant.

In making a comparability determination, the Commission takes an “outcome-based” approach. An “outcome-based” approach means that when evaluating whether a foreign jurisdiction’s regulatory requirements are comparable to, and as comprehensive as, the corollary areas of the CEA and Commission regulations, the Commission ultimately focuses on regulatory outcomes (i.e., the home jurisdiction’s requirements do not have to be identical). This approach...
recognizes that foreign regulatory systems differ and their approaches vary and may differ from how the Commission chose to address an issue, but that the foreign jurisdiction’s regulatory requirements nonetheless achieve the regulatory outcome sought to be achieved by a certain provision of the CEA or Commission regulation.

In doing its comparability analysis the Commission may determine that no comparable determination can be made and that the non-U.S. SD or non-U.S. MSP, U.S. bank that is an SD or MSP with respect to its foreign branches, or non-registrant, to the extent applicable under the Guidance, may be required to comply with the CEA and Commission regulations.

The starting point in the Commission’s analysis is a consideration of the regulatory objectives of the foreign jurisdiction’s regulation of swaps and swap market participants. As stated in the Guidance, jurisdictions may not have swap specific regulations in some areas, and instead have regulatory or supervisory regimes that achieve comparable and comprehensive regulation to the Dodd-Frank Act requirements, but on a more general, entity-wide, or prudential basis. In addition, portions of a foreign regulatory regime may have similar regulatory objectives, but the means by which these objectives are achieved with respect to swaps market activities may not be clearly defined, or may not expressly include specific regulatory elements that the Commission concludes are critical to achieving the regulatory objectives or outcomes required under the CEA and the Commission’s regulations. In these circumstances, the Commission will work with the regulators and registrants in those jurisdictions to consider alternative approaches that may result in a determination that substituted compliance applies.

Finally, the Commission will generally rely on an applicant’s description of the laws and regulations of the foreign jurisdiction in making its comparability determination. The Commission considers an application to be a representation by the applicant that the laws and regulations submitted are in full force and effect, that the description of such laws and regulations is accurate and complete, and that, unless otherwise noted, the scope of such laws and regulations encompasses the swaps activities of SDs and MSPs in the relevant jurisdictions.

foreign regulators in developing appropriate regulatory changes or new regulations, particularly where changes or new regulations already are being considered or proposed by the foreign regulators or legislative bodies. As another example, the Commission may, after consultation with the appropriate regulators and market participants, include in its substituted compliance determination a description of the means by which certain swaps market participants can achieve substituted compliance within the construct of the foreign regulatory regime. The relevant foreign laws and regulations may not be clearly defined, or may not expressly include specific regulatory elements that the Commission concludes are critical to achieving the regulatory objectives or outcomes required under the CEA and the Commission’s regulations. In these circumstances, the Commission will work with the regulators and registrants in those jurisdictions to consider alternative approaches that may result in a determination that substituted compliance applies.

Further, as stated in the Guidance, the Commission expects that an applicant would notify the Commission of any material changes to information submitted in support of a comparability determination (including, but not limited to, changes in the relevant supervisory or regulatory regime) as, depending on the nature of the change, the Commission’s comparability determination may no longer be valid.

The Guidance provided a detailed discussion of the Commission’s policy regarding the availability of substituted compliance for the Internal Business Conduct Requirements.

V. Supervisory Arrangement

In the Guidance, the Commission stated that, in connection with a determination that substituted compliance is appropriate, it would expect to enter into an appropriate memorandum of understanding (“MOU”) or similar arrangement with the relevant foreign jurisdictions. Although existing arrangements would indicate a foreign regulator’s ability to cooperate and share information, “going forward, the Commission and relevant foreign supervisor(s) would need to establish supervisory MOUs or other arrangements that provide for

relied on the accuracy and completeness of such review and any corrections received in making its comparability determinations. A comparability determination based on an inaccurate description of foreign laws and regulations may not be valid.

The applicant did not request a compatibility determination for § 23.608 (Restrictions on counterparty clearing relationships), therefore, this notice does not address § 23.608. Additionally, this notice does not address § 23.609 (Clearing member risk management). The Commission declines to take the request up for a comparability determination with respect to § 23.609 due to the Commission’s view that there are not laws or regulations applicable in Switzerland to compare with the prohibitions and requirements of § 23.609. The Commission may provide a comparability determination with respect to this regulation at a later date in consequence of further developments in the law and regulations applicable in Switzerland.

This notice also does not address capital adequacy because the Commission has not yet finalized rules for SDs and MSPs in this area, nor SDR Reporting. The Commission may provide a comparability determination with respect to these requirements at a later date or in a separate notice.

An MOU is one type of arrangement between or among regulators. Supervisory arrangements could include, as appropriate, cooperation arrangements that are memorialized and executed as addenda to existing MOUs or as, e.g., independent bilateral arrangements, statements of intent, declarations, or letters.
information sharing and cooperation in the context of supervising SDs and MSPs.”

The Commission is in the process of developing its registration and supervision regime for provisionally-registered SDs and MSPs. This new initiative includes setting forth supervisory arrangements with authorities that have joint jurisdiction over SDs and MSPs that are registered with the Commission and subject to U.S. law. Given the developing nature of the Commission’s regime and the fact that the Commission has not negotiated prior supervisory arrangements with certain authorities, the negotiation of supervisory arrangements presents a unique opportunity to develop close working relationships between and among authorities, as well as highlight any potential issues related to cooperation and information sharing.

Accordingly, the Commission is negotiating such a supervisory arrangement with each applicable foreign regulator of an SD or MSP. The Commission expects that the arrangement will establish expectations for ongoing cooperation, address direct access to information, provide for notification upon the occurrence of specified events, memorialize understandings related to on-site visits, and include protections related to the use and confidentiality of non-public information shared pursuant to the arrangement. These arrangements will establish a roadmap for how authorities will consult, cooperate, and share information. As with any such arrangement, however, nothing in these arrangements will supersede domestic laws or resolve potential conflicts of law, such as the application of domestic secrecy or blocking laws to regulated entities.

VI. Comparability Determination and Analysis

The following section describes the requirements imposed by specific sections of the CEA and the Commission’s regulations for the Internal Business Conduct Requirements that are the subject of this comparability determination, and the Commission’s regulatory objectives with respect to such requirements.

Immediately following a description of the requirement(s) and regulatory objective(s) of this section of the Internal Business Conduct Requirements that the requestor submitted for a comparability determination, the Commission provides a description of the foreign jurisdiction’s comparable laws, regulations, or rules and whether such laws, regulations, or rules meet the applicable regulatory objective.

The Commission’s determinations in this regard and the discussion in this section are intended to inform the public of the Commission’s views regarding whether the foreign jurisdiction’s laws, regulations, or rules may be comparable and comprehensive as those requirements in the Dodd-Frank Act (and Commission regulations promulgated thereunder) and therefore, may form the basis of substituted compliance. In turn, the public (in the foreign jurisdiction, in the United States, and elsewhere) retains its ability to present facts and circumstances that would inform the determinations set forth in this notice.

As was stated in the Guidance, the Commission recognizes the complex and dynamic nature of the global swap market and the need to take an adaptable approach to cross-border issues, particularly as it continues to work closely with foreign regulators to address potential conflicts with respect to each country’s respective regulatory regime. In this regard, the Commission may review, modify, or expand the determinations herein in light of comments received and future developments.

A. Chief Compliance Officer (§ 3.3)

Commission Requirement: Implementing section 4s(k) of the CEA, Commission regulation 3.3 generally sets forth the following requirements for SDs and MSPs:

- An SD or MSP must designate an individual as Chief Compliance Officer (“CCO”);
- The CCO must have the responsibility and authority to develop the regulatory compliance policies and procedures of the SD or MSP;
- The CCO must report to the board of directors or the senior officer of the SD or MSP;
- Only the board of directors or a senior officer may remove the CCO;
- The CCO and the board of directors must meet at least once per year;
- The CCO must have the background and skills appropriate for the responsibilities of the position;
- The CCO must not be subject to disqualification from registration under sections 8a(2) or (3) of the CEA;
- Each SD and MSP must include a designation of a CCO in its registration application;
- The CCO must administer the regulatory compliance policies of the SD or MSP;
- The CCO must take reasonable steps to ensure compliance with the CEA and Commission regulations, and resolve conflicts of interest;
- The CCO must establish procedures for detecting and remediating non-compliance issues;
- The CCO must annually prepare and sign an “annual compliance report” containing: (i) A description of policies and procedures reasonably designed to ensure compliance; (ii) an assessment of the effectiveness of such policies and procedures; (iii) a description of material non-compliance issues and the action taken; (iv) recommendations of improvements in compliance policies; and (v) a certification by the CCO or CEO that, to the best of such officer’s knowledge and belief, the annual report is accurate and complete under penalty of law; and
- The annual compliance report must be furnished to the CFTC within 90 days after the end of the fiscal year of the SD or MSP, simultaneously with its annual financial condition report.

Regulatory Objective: The Commission believes that compliance by SDs and MSPs with the CEA and the Commission’s rules greatly contributes to the protection of customers, orderly and fair markets, and the stability and integrity of the market intermediaries registered with the Commission. The Commission expects SDs and MSPs to strictly comply with the CEA and the Commission’s rules and to devote sufficient resources to ensuring such compliance. Thus, through its CCO rule, the Commission expects firms to designate a qualified individual as CCO that reports directly to the board.
of directors or the senior officer of the firm and that has the independence, responsibility, and authority to develop and administer compliance policies and procedures reasonably designed to ensure compliance with the CEA and Commission regulations, resolve conflicts of interest, remediate noncompliance issues, and report annually to the Commission and the board or senior officer on compliance of the firm.

Comparable Swiss Law and Regulations: The applicant has represented to the Commission that the following provisions of law and regulations applicable in Switzerland are in full force and effect in Switzerland, and comparable to and as comprehensive as section 4(s)(k) of the CEA and Commission regulation 3.3.

The applicant represented that Swiss law and FINMA regulations require a regulated entity within FINMA’s jurisdiction to appoint a senior management member to act in the capacity of a CCO, with responsibility for the oversight of all of the entity’s regulated businesses, including its swaps business. The CCO is required by law to report, directly or indirectly, to senior management of the regulated entity with respect to any material compliance issues in any of the banking entity’s businesses.

Under Swiss law, compliance entails the adherence to legal, regulatory and internal policies, as well as the observance of the customary standards and rules of professional conduct within the market. The risk of violations of provisions, standards, or rules of professional conduct and the corresponding legal and regulatory sanctions, financial losses, or damage to one’s reputation are deemed to be compliance risks.

Accordingly, FINMA Circular 2008/24 of November 20, 2008, Supervision and Internal Control of Banks, requires banks to take the necessary operational measures and precautions to ensure compliance. Pursuant to such Circular, banks:
- Must designate one member of senior management to act in the capacity of the CCO with responsibility for oversight of the compliance function;
- Must maintain a compliance function with unrestricted access to information and independence from profit-generating business activities;
- Must allocate adequate resources and authority to the compliance function;
- Must not permit compensation of employees of the compliance function to contain incentives that could lead to conflicts of interest;
- Must conduct an annual assessment (at minimum) of compliance risk and compliance policies, approved by management;
- Must timely report to management regarding material changes to compliance risks, serious violations, and remediation; and
- Must prepare an annual report assessing compliance risks and activities and furnish such report to the board of directors, internal auditors, and outside auditors.

Commission Determination: The Commission finds that the Swiss law and regulations specified above are generally identical in intent to §3.3 by seeking to ensure firms have designated a qualified individual as the compliance officer that reports directly to a sufficiently senior function of the firm and that has the independence, responsibility, and authority to develop and administer compliance policies and procedures reasonably designed to ensure compliance with the CEA and Commission regulations, resolve conflicts of interest, remediate noncompliance issues, and report annually on compliance of the firm.

Based on the foregoing and the representations of the applicant, the Commission hereby determines that the CCO requirements of Swiss law and regulations are comparable to and as comprehensive as §3.3, with the exception of §3.3(f) concerning certifying and furnishing an annual compliance report to the Commission.

Notwithstanding that the Commission has not determined that the requirements of the Swiss standards specified above are comparable to and as comprehensive as §3.3(f), any SD or MSP to which both §3.3 and the Swiss law and regulations specified above are applicable would generally be deemed to be in compliance with §3.3 if that SD or MSP complies with the Swiss law and regulations specified above, subject to certifying and furnishing the Commission with the annual report required under Swiss law and regulations specified above in accordance with §3.3(f). The Commission notes that it generally expects registrants to submit required reports to the Commission in the English language.

B. Risk Management Duties (§§23.600—23.609)

Section 4s(j) of the CEA requires each SD and MSP to establish internal policies and procedures designed to, among other things, address risk management, monitor compliance with position limits, prevent conflicts of interest, and promote diligent supervision, as well as maintain business continuity and disaster recovery programs. The Commission adopted regulations 23.600, 23.601, 23.602, 23.603, 23.605, and 23.606 to implement the statute. The Commission also adopted regulation 23.609, which requires certain risk management procedures for SDs or MSPs that are clearing members of a derivatives clearing organization (“DCO”). These requirements help to establish a robust and comprehensive internal risk management program for SDs and MSPs with respect to their swaps activities, which is critical to effective systemic risk management for the overall swaps market. In making its comparability determination with regard to these risk management duties, the Commission will consider each regulation individually.

1. Risk Management Program for SDs and MSPs (§23.600)

Commission Requirement: Implementing section 4s(j)(2) of the CEA, Commission regulation 23.600 generally requires that:
- Each SD or MSP must establish and enforce a risk management program consisting of a system of written risk management policies and procedures designed to monitor and manage the risks associated with the swap activities of the firm, including without limitation, market, credit, liquidity, foreign currency, legal, operational, and settlement risks, and furnish a copy of such policies and procedures to the

34 7 U.S.C. 6s(j).
35 See Final Swap Dealer and MSP Recordkeeping Rule, 77 FR 21287 (April 9, 2012) (relating to risk management program, measuring of position limits, business continuity and disaster recovery, conflicts of interest policies and procedures, and general information availability, respectively).
36 See Customer Documentation Rule, 77 FR 21278 (April 9, 2012). Also, SDs must comply with Commission regulation 23.608, which prohibits SDs providing clearing services to customers from entering into agreements that would: (i) Disclose the identity of a customer’s original executing counterparty; (ii) limit the number of counterparties a customer may trade with; (iii) impose counterparty-based position limits; (iv) impair a customer’s access to execution of a trade on terms that have a reasonable relationship to the best terms available; or (v) prevent compliance with specified time frames for acceptance of trades into clearing.
37 See supra note 20.
CFTC upon application for registration and upon request:

- The SD or MSP must establish a risk management unit independent from the business trading unit;
- The risk management policies and procedures of the SD or MSP must be approved by the firm’s governing body;
- Risk tolerance limits and exceptions therefrom must be reviewed and approved quarterly by senior management and annually by the governing body;
- The risk management program must have a system for detecting breaches of risk tolerance limits and alerting supervisors and senior management, as appropriate;
- The risk management program must account for risks posed by affiliates and be integrated at the consolidated entity level;
- The risk management unit must provide senior management and the governing body with quarterly risk exposure reports and upon detection of any material change in the risk exposure of the SD or MSP;
- Risk exposure reports must be furnished to the CFTC within five business days following provision to senior management;
- The risk management program must have a new product policy for assessing the risks of new products prior to engaging in such transactions;
- The risk management program must have policies and procedures providing for trading limits, monitoring of trading, processing of trades, and separation of personnel in the trading unit from personnel in the risk management unit; and
- The risk management program must be reviewed and tested at least annually and upon any material change in the business of the SD or MSP.

Regulatory Objective: Through the required system of risk management, the Commission seeks to ensure that firms are adequately managing the risks of their swaps activities to prevent failure of the SD or MSP, which could result in losses to counterparties doing business with the SD or MSP, and systemic risk more generally. To this end, the Commission believes the risk management that seeks to ensure that firms are adequately managing the risks of their swaps activities to prevent failure of the SD or MSP, which could result in losses to counterparties doing business with the SD or MSP, and systemic risk more generally.

Comparable Swiss Law and Regulations: The applicant has represented to the Commission that the following provisions of law and regulations applicable in Switzerland are in full force and effect in Switzerland, and comparable to and as comprehensive as section 4s(j)(2) of the CEA and Commission regulation 23.600.

Article 9 of the Swiss Banking Ordinance,39 FINMA Circular 2008/24,39 and Bank Liquidity Ordinance of the Swiss Federal Council, address specific forms of risk and detail requirements related to controls and management of those risks including, but not limited to: market risk, liquidity risk, operational and settlement risk, credit risk, reputational risk, and legal risk. Specifically, pursuant to such Swiss law and regulations, Swiss banks:

- Must have an internal audit function that annually assesses the effectiveness of risk management;
- Must segregate the risk management function from trading functions;
- Must make the board of directors responsible to regulate, establish, maintain, monitor, and regularly supervise an appropriate internal control function in conformity with the bank’s risk profile;
- Must have internal documentation of the risk management function sufficient for an outside auditor to form a reliable opinion;
- Must keep internal auditors independent from management;
- Must have internal controls based on systematic risk analysis, and must ensure material risks are recorded, limited, and monitored, including risks posed by affiliates;
- Must establish an internal audit function that reports directly to the board or audit committee;
- Must have the board of directors regularly discuss with management its assessment of the adequacy and effectiveness of internal controls;
- Must maintain and regularly test internal control functions; and
- Must define the bank’s capacity to assume liquidity risk (risk tolerance limits), monitor and manage intra-day liquidity risks, and monitor assets that are used to generate liquidity.

Commission Determination: The Commission finds that the Swiss law and regulations specified above are generally identical in intent to § 23.600 by requiring a system of risk management that seeks to ensure that firms are adequately managing the risks of their swaps activities to prevent failure of the SD or MSP, which could result in losses to counterparties doing business with the SD or MSP, and systemic risk more generally. Specifically, the Commission finds that the Swiss law and regulations specified above comprehensively require SDs and MSPs to establish risk management programs containing the following critical elements:

- Identification of risk categories;
- Establishment of risk tolerance limits for each category of risk and approval of such limits by senior management and the governing body;
- An independent risk management unit to administer a risk management program; and
- Periodic oversight of risk exposures by senior management and the governing body.

2. Monitoring of Position Limits

Commission Requirement:

Implementing section 4s(j)(1) of the CEA, Commission regulation 23.601 requires each SD and MSP to establish and enforce written policies and procedures that are reasonably designed
to monitor for, and prevent violations of, applicable position limits established by the Commission, a designated contract market (“DCM”), or a swap execution facility (“SEF”). The policies and procedures must include an early warning system and provide for escalation of violations to senior management (including the firm’s governing body).

Regulatory Objective: Generally, position limits are implemented to ensure market integrity, fairness, orderliness, and accurate pricing in the commodity markets. Commission regulation 23.601 thus seeks to ensure that SDs and MSPs have established the necessary policies and procedures to monitor the trading of the firm to prevent violations of applicable position limits established by the Commission, a DCM, or a SEF. As part of its Risk Management Program, § 23.601 is intended to ensure that established position limits are not breached by the SD or MSP.

Comparable Swiss Law and Regulations: The applicant has represented to the Commission that the following provisions of law and regulations applicable in Switzerland are in full force and effect in Switzerland, and comparable to and as comprehensive as section 4s(j)(1) of the CEA and Commission regulation 23.601.

The applicant represented that Swiss law and regulations require banking entities under FINMA’s supervision to comply with regulations in the jurisdictions in which they conduct business, which would include compliance with the position limit regimes imposed by the Commission, a DCM, or SEF, as applicable. Specifically, FINMA Circular 2008/24 requires banking entities whose compliance policies and procedures govern activities in multiple jurisdictions must ensure that such policies and procedures ensure compliance in each jurisdiction. Thus, activities of a Swiss banking entity that have an impact on United States territory must be in compliance with the Commission’s position limit regime.

FINMA Newsletter 31 of December 13, 2011, Unauthorized Trading of Banks and Swiss law address specific requirements relating to monitoring for and complying with applicable position limits. Pursuant to Swiss law and regulations, Swiss banks:

- Must manage for unauthorized trading and maintain oversight of trading activities and related risks, including compliance with applicable position limits; and
- Banking entities must devote adequate attention and management resources to identify, measure, and control compliance risks.

Commission Determination: The Commission finds that the Swiss law and regulations specified above are generally identical in intent to § 23.601 by requiring SDs and MSPs to establish necessary policies and procedures to monitor the trading of the firm to prevent violations of applicable position limits established by applicable laws and regulations, including those of the Commission, a DCM, or a SEF. Specifically, the Commission finds that the Swiss law and regulations specified above, comprehensively require SDs and MSPs to monitor for regulatory compliance with position limits set pursuant to applicable law and the responsibility of senior management (including the board of directors) for such compliance.

Based on the foregoing and the representations of the applicant, the Commission hereby determines that the compliance monitoring requirements of Swiss law and regulations, as specified above, are comparable to and as comprehensive as § 23.601. For the avoidance of doubt, the Commission notes that this determination may not be relied on to relieve an SD or MSP from its obligation to strictly comply with any applicable position limit established by the Commission, a DCM, or a SEF.

3. Diligent Supervision (§ 23.602)

Commission Requirement: Commission regulation 23.602 implements section 4s(h)(1)(B) of the CEA and requires each SD and MSP to establish a system to diligently supervise all activities relating to its business performed by its partners, members, officers, employees, and agents. The system must be reasonably designed to achieve compliance with the CEA and CFTC regulations.

Commission regulation 23.602 requires that the supervisory system must specifically designate qualified persons with authority to carry out the supervisory responsibilities of the SD or MSP for all activities relating to its business as an SD or MSP.

Regulatory Objective: The Commission’s diligent supervision rule seeks to ensure that SDs and MSPs strictly comply with the CEA and the Commission’s rules. To this end, through § 23.602, the Commission seeks to ensure that each SD and MSP not only establishes the necessary policies and procedures that would lead to compliance with the CEA and Commission regulations, but also establishes an effective system of internal oversight and enforcement of such policies and procedures to ensure that such policies and procedures are diligently followed.

Comparable Swiss Law and Regulations: The applicant has represented to the Commission that the following provisions of law and regulations applicable in Switzerland are in full force and effect in Switzerland, and comparable to and as comprehensive as section 4s(h)(1)(B) of the CEA and Commission regulation 23.602.

- FINMA Circular 2008/24 requires segregation of duties and control activities. Management is required to ensure an appropriate segregation of duties and avoids assigning responsibilities which could lead to conflicting responsibilities or interests.
- Controlling activities are to be an integral part of all work processes, e.g., process controls; results monitoring; and review of conduct of employees and organizational units where no quantitative results are observable.

As previously stated above, the applicant represents that Swiss law requires banking entities under FINMA’s supervision to comply with regulations in the jurisdictions in which they conduct business, which would include compliance with the CEA and Commission regulations as applicable. Specifically, FINMA Circular 2008/24 requires banking entities whose compliance policies and procedures govern activities in multiple jurisdictions must ensure that such policies and procedures ensure compliance in each jurisdiction. Thus, activities of a Swiss banking entity that have an impact on United States territory must be in compliance with the CEA and Commission regulations.

Commission Determination: The Commission finds that the Swiss law and regulations specified above are generally identical in intent to § 23.602 because such standards seek to ensure that SDs and MSPs strictly comply with applicable law, which would include the CEA and the Commission’s regulations. Through the Swiss laws and regulations specified above, Swiss laws and regulations seek to ensure that each SD and MSP not only establishes the
necessary policies and procedures that would lead to compliance with applicable law, which would include the CEA and Commission regulations, but also establishes an effective system of internal oversight and enforcement of such policies and procedures to ensure that such policies and procedures are diligently followed.

Based on the foregoing and the representations of the applicant, the Commission hereby determines that the internal supervision requirements of Swiss law and regulations, as specified above, are comparable to and as comprehensive as § 23.602.

4. Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery (§ 23.603)

Commission Requirement: To ensure the proper functioning of the swaps markets and the prevention of systemic risk more generally, Commission regulation 23.603 requires each SD and MSP, as part of its risk management program, to establish a business continuity and disaster recovery plan that includes procedures for, and the maintenance of, back-up facilities, systems, infrastructure, personnel, and other resources to achieve the timely recovery of data and documentation and to resume operations generally within the next business day after the disruption.

Regulatory Objective: Commission regulation 23.603 is intended to ensure that any market disruption affecting SDs and MSPs, whether caused by natural disaster or otherwise, is minimized in length and severity. To that end, this requirement seeks to ensure that entities adequately plan for disruptions and devote sufficient resources capable of carrying out an appropriate plan within one business day, if necessary.

Comparable Swiss Law and Regulations: The applicant has represented to the Commission that the following provisions of law and regulations applicable in Switzerland are in full force and effect in Switzerland, and comparable to and as comprehensive as Commission regulation 23.603.

- Annex 1 of FINMA’s Circular on Operational Risk requires banks to have contingency or business continuity plans to ensure their ability to operate under exceptional circumstances and to limit consequences of severe business disruptions.
- FINMA Circular 2008/10 of November 20, 2008, Self-regulation as a minimum standard, and sections 5.4.1 (Business Impact Analysis) and 5.4.2 (Business Continuity Strategy) of the Swiss Bankers’ Association Recommendations for Business Continuity Management, establish minimum business continuity management standards for banks and securities dealers in Switzerland.

Commission Determination: The Commission finds that the Swiss law and regulations specified above are generally identical in intent to § 23.603 because such standards seek to ensure that any market disruption affecting SDs and MSPs, whether caused by natural disaster or otherwise, is minimized in length and severity. To that end, the Commission finds that the Swiss law and regulations specified above seek to ensure that entities adequately plan for disruptions and devote sufficient resources capable of carrying out an appropriate plan in a timely manner.

Based on the foregoing and the representations of the applicant, the Commission hereby determines that the business continuity and disaster recovery requirements of Swiss law and regulations, as specified above, are comparable to and as comprehensive as § 23.603.

5. Conflicts of Interest (§ 23.605)

Commission Requirement: Section 4s(j)(5) of the CEA and Commission regulation 23.605(c) generally require each SD or MSP to establish structural and institutional safeguards to ensure that the activities of any person within the firm relating to research or analysis of the price or market for any commodity or swap are separated by appropriate informational partitions within the firm from the review, pressure, or oversight of persons whose involvement in pricing, trading, or clearing activities might potentially bias their judgment or supervision.

In addition, section 4s(j)(5) of the CEA and Commission regulation 23.605(d)(1) generally prohibits an SD or MSP from directly or indirectly interfering with or attempting to influence the decision of any clearing unit of any affiliated clearing member of a DCO to provide clearing services and activities to a particular customer, including:

- Whether to offer clearing services to a particular customer;
- Whether to accept a particular customer for clearing derivatives;
- Whether to submit a customer’s transaction to a particular DCO; or
- Whether to set or adjust risk tolerance levels for a particular customer;
- Whether to set a customer’s fees based on criteria other than those generally available and applicable to other customers.

Commission regulation 23.605(d)(2) generally requires each SD or MSP to create and maintain an appropriate informational partition between business trading units of the SD or MSP and clearing units of any affiliated clearing member of a DCO to reasonably ensure compliance with the Act and the prohibitions set forth in § 23.605(d)(1) outlined above.

The Commission observes that § 23.605(d) works in tandem with Commission regulation 1.71, which requires futures commission merchants (“FCMs”) that are clearing members of a DCO and affiliated with an SD or MSP to create and maintain an appropriate informational partition between business trading units of the SD or MSP and clearing units of the FCM to reasonably ensure compliance with the Act and the prohibitions set forth in § 1.71(d)(1), which are the same as the prohibitions set forth in § 23.605(d)(1) outlined above.

Finally, § 23.605(e) requires that each SD or MSP have policies and procedures that mandate the disclosure to counterparties of material incentives or conflicts of interest regarding the decision of a counterparty to execute a derivative on a swap execution facility or DCM or to clear a derivative through a DCO.

Regulatory Objective: Commission regulation 23.605(c) seeks to ensure that research provided to the general public by an SD or MSP is unbiased and free from the influence of the interests of an SD or MSP arising from the SD’s or MSP’s trading business.

In addition, the § 23.605(d) (working in tandem with § 1.71) seeks to ensure open access to the clearing of swaps by requiring that access to and the provision of clearing services provided by an affiliate of an SD or MSP are not influenced by the interests of an SD’s or MSP’s trading business.

Finally, § 23.605(e) seeks to ensure equal access to trading venues and clearinghouses, as well as orderly and fair markets, by requiring that each SD and MSP disclose to counterparties any material incentives or conflicts of interest regarding the decision of a counterparty to execute a derivative on a SEF or DCM, or to clear a derivative through a DCO.

Comparable Swiss Law and Regulations: The applicant has represented to the Commission that the
following provisions of law and regulations applicable in Switzerland are in full force and effect in Switzerland, and comparable to and as comprehensive as Commission regulation 23.605(c).

The FINMA Circular on market conduct rules47 and the FINMA Circular on Self-regulation recognize the Swiss Bankers’ Association Directives on the Independence of Financial Research48 as minimum standards. These circulars require information partitions where necessary to prevent conflicts of interest. In particular, they require the research unit to be independent from business trading units. Adherence to information partitions is to be monitored and is a designated compliance function, while the ultimate responsibility for handling confidential price-sensitive information and conflicts of interest lies with executive management.

More generally, imposing restrictions on particular customers would contradict access principles outlined in art. 33 of the Swiss National Bank Ordinance. In addition, under Swiss law, a bank must comply with the Swiss competition laws, including the Federal Act on Cartels and other Restraints on Competition. An activity that violates the provision of these laws is a violation of these laws regardless of where the putative activity took place.

The applicant has represented to the Commission that FINMA, in the process of its oversight and enforcement of the foregoing Swiss standards, would require any SD or MSP subject to such standards to resolve or mitigate conflicts of interests in the provision of clearing services by a clearing member of a DCO that is an affiliate of the SD or MSP, or the decision of a counterparty to execute a derivative on a SEF or DCM, or clear a derivative through a DCO, through appropriate information firewalls and disclosures.

**Commission Determination:** The Commission finds that the Swiss law and regulations specified above with respect to conflicts of interest that may arise in producing or distributing research are generally identical in intent to § 23.605(c) because such standards seek to ensure that research provided to the general public by an SD is unbiased and free from the influence of the interests of an SD arising from the SD’s trading business.

With respect to conflicts of interest that may arise in the provision of clearing services by an affiliate of an SD or MSP, the Commission further finds that although the general conflicts of interest prevention requirements under the Swiss standards specified above do not require with specificity that access to and the provision of clearing services provided by an affiliate of an SD or MSP not be improperly influenced by the interests of an SD’s or MSP’s trading business, such general requirements would require prevention and remediation of such improper influence when recognized or discovered. Thus such standards would ensure open access to clearing.

Finally, although not as specific as the requirements of § 23.605(e) (undue influence on counterparties), the Commission finds that the general disclosure requirements of the Swiss standards specified above would ensure equal access to trading venues and clearinghouses by requiring that each SD and MSP disclose to counterparties any material incentives or conflicts of interest regarding the decision of a counterparty to execute a derivative on a SEF or DCM, or to clear a derivative through a DCO.

6. Availability of Information for Disclosure and Inspection (§ 23.606)

**Commission Requirement:** Commission regulation 23.606 implements sections 48(j)(3) and (4) of the CEA, and requires each SD and MSP to disclose to the Commission, and an SD’s or MSP’s U.S. prudential regulator (if any) comprehensive information about its swap activities, and to establish and maintain reliable internal data capture, processing, storage, and other operational systems sufficient to capture, process, record, store, and produce all information necessary to satisfy its duties under the CEA and Commission regulations. Such systems must be designed to provide such information to the Commission and an SD’s or MSP’s U.S. prudential regulator within the time frames set forth in the CEA and Commission regulations and upon request.

**Regulatory Objective:** Commission regulation 23.606 seeks to ensure that each SD and MSP captures and maintains comprehensive information about their swap activities, and is able to retrieve and disclose such information to the Commission and its U.S. prudential regulator, if any, as necessary for compliance with the CEA and the Commission’s regulations and for purposes of Commission oversight, as well as oversight by the SD’s or MSP’s U.S. prudential regulator, if any.

The Commission observes that it would be impossible to meet the regulatory objective of § 23.606 unless the required information is available to the Commission and any U.S. prudential regulator under the foreign legal regime. Thus, a comparability determination with respect to the information access provisions of § 23.606 would be premised on whether the relevant information would be available to the Commission and any U.S. prudential regulator of the SD or MSP, not on whether an SD or MSP must disclose comprehensive information to its regulator in its home jurisdiction.

**Comparable Swiss Law and Regulations:** The applicant has represented to the Commission that the following provisions of law and regulations applicable in Switzerland are in full force and effect in Switzerland, and comparable to and as comprehensive as Commission regulation 23.606.

The Swiss Code of Obligations,49 Ordinance of the Swiss Federal Council on Business Record Keeping,50 Swiss Financial Markets Supervisory Authority Act,51 Swiss National Banking Ordinance,52 National Bank Act,53 and FINMA Circulars impose comprehensive requirements with respect to data retention and storage, and the availability of such data to regulatory authorities. These requirements apply to all of a banking entity’s business, including its swaps business. Collectively, these Swiss laws and regulations require a firm to maintain swaps data and related books and records in a systematic, logical, and chronological format so that the data cannot be damaged, altered, or deleted. Further, a firm is required to maintain account records, accounting records, and business correspondence for ten years. These records must contain all

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47 Text of English translation available at: http://www.finma.ch/e/regulierung/Documents/finma-rs-2008-36-e.pdf (stating that analysis or research departments are to be organized independently and be segregated as separate areas of confidentiality).


necessary information to establish, review, and reconstruct the financial situation of the firm by FINMA, regulatory authorities, audit firms, and persons or companies legally authorized to review such records.

**Commission Determination:** The Commission finds that the Swiss law and regulations specified above are generally identical in intent to § 23.606 because such standards seek to ensure that each SD and MSP captures and stores comprehensive information about their swap activities, and are able to retrieve and disclose such information as necessary for compliance with applicable law and for purposes of regulatory oversight.

Based on the foregoing and the representations of the applicant, the Commission hereby determines that the requirements of Swiss law and regulations with respect to the availability of information for inspection and disclosure, as specified above, are comparable to, and as comprehensive as, § 23.606, with the exception of § 23.606(a)(2) concerning the requirement that an SD or MSP make information required by § 23.606(a)(1) available promptly upon request to Commission staff and the staff of an applicable prudential regulator. The applicant has not submitted any provision of law or regulations applicable in Switzerland, upon which the Commission could make a finding that SDs and MSPs would be required to retrieve and disclose comprehensive information about their swap activities to the Commission or any U.S. prudential regulator as necessary for compliance with the CEA and Commission regulations, and for purposes of Commission oversight and the oversight of any U.S. prudential regulator.

Notwithstanding that the Commission has not determined that the requirements of Swiss law and regulations are comparable to and as comprehensive as § 23.606(a)(2), any SD or MSP to which both § 23.606 and the Swiss standards specified above are applicable would generally be deemed to be in compliance with § 23.606(a)(2) if that SD or MSP complies with the Swiss standards specified above, subject to compliance with the requirement that it produce information to Commission staff and the staff of an applicable U.S. prudential regulator in accordance with § 23.606(a)(2).

C. Swap Data Recordkeeping (§§ 23.201 and 23.203)

**Commission Requirement:** Sections 4s(f)(1)(B) and 4s(g)(1) of the CEA, and Commission regulation 23.201 generally require SDs and MSPs to retain records of each transaction, each position held, general business records (including records related to complaints and sales and marketing materials), records related to governance, financial records, records of data reported to swap data repositories (“SDRs”), and records of real-time reporting data along with a record of the date and time the SD or MSP made such reports. Transaction records must be kept in a form and manner identifiable and searchable by transaction and counterparty.

Commission regulation 23.203, requires SDs and MSPs to maintain records of a swap transaction until the termination, maturity, expiration, transfer, assignment, or novation date of the transaction, and for a period of five years after such date. Records must be “readily accessible” for the first 2 years of the 5 year retention period (consistent with § 1.31).

The Commission notes that the comparability determination below with respect to §§ 23.201 and 23.203 encompasses both swap data recordkeeping generally and swap data recordkeeping relating to complaints and marketing and sales materials in accordance with § 23.201(b)(3) and (4).

**Regulatory Objective:** Through the Commission’s regulations requiring SDs and MSPs to keep comprehensive records of their swap transactions and related data, the Commission seeks to ensure the effectiveness of the internal controls of SDs and MSPs, and transparency in the swaps market for regulators and market participants.

The Commission’s regulations require SDs and MSPs to keep swap data in a level of detail sufficient to enable regulatory authorities to understand an SD’s or MSP’s swaps business and to assess its swaps exposure.

By requiring comprehensive records of swap data, the Commission seeks to ensure that SDs and MSPs employ effective risk management, and strictly comply with Commission regulations. Further, such records facilitate effective regulatory oversight.

The Commission observes that it would be impossible to meet the regulatory objective of §§ 23.201 and 23.203 unless the required information is available to the Commission and any U.S. prudential regulator under the foreign legal regime. Thus, a comparability determination with respect to the information access provisions of § 23.203 would be premised on whether the relevant information would be available to the Commission and any U.S. prudential regulator of the SD or MSP, not on whether an SD or MSP must disclose comprehensive information to its regulator in its home jurisdiction.

**Comparable Swiss Law and Regulations:** The applicant has represented to the Commission that the following provisions of law and regulations applicable in Switzerland are in full force and effect Switzerland, and comparable to and as comprehensive as sections 4s(f)(1)(B) and 4s(g)(1) of the CEA and §§ 23.201 and 23.203.

Under Swiss law and FINMA Circulars, a banking entity is subject to extensive requirements regarding accounting records, which cover records of transactions in all areas of the bank’s business, including its swaps business. Under the Swiss Code of Obligations, for example:

- According to art. 957, a Swiss firm has to properly capture and maintain its books necessary to provide a fair view of its kind and size of business. Accounting records and business correspondence can be maintained in written or electronic format, provided the format ensures that the records adequately reflect business transactions;
- According to art. 962, accounts, accounting records, and business correspondence have to be retained for ten years;
- Pursuant to art. 713, all deliberations and decisions by the supervisory body have to be recorded in a protocol, signed by the Chairman and the secretary; and
- Pursuant to art. 747, the accounting records of a dissolved company are kept for ten years at a location designated by the liquidators or, if the liquidators cannot reach agreement, by the commercial registry.

**Commission Determination:** The Commission finds that the Swiss law and regulations specified above are generally identical in intent to §§ 23.201 and 23.202 because such standards seek to ensure the effectiveness of the internal controls of SDs and MSPs, and transparency in the swaps market for regulators and market participants.

In addition, the Commission finds that the Swiss laws and regulations specified above require SDs and MSPs to keep swap data in a level of detail sufficient to enable regulatory authorities to understand an SD’s or MSP’s swaps business and to assess its swaps exposure.

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54 See the Guidance for a discussion of the availability of substituted compliance with respect to swap data recordkeeping, 78 FR 45332–33.

55 See supra note 51.
Finally, the Commission finds that Swiss laws and regulations specified above, by requiring comprehensive records of swap data, seek to ensure that SDs and MSPs employ effective risk management, seek to ensure that SDs and MSPs strictly comply with applicable regulatory requirements (including the CEA and Commission regulations), and that such records facilitate effective regulatory oversight. Based on the foregoing and the representations of the applicant, the Commission hereby determines that the requirements of Swiss law and regulations with respect to the swap data recordkeeping, as specified above, are comparable to, and as comprehensive as, §§ 23.201 and 23.203, with the exception of § 23.203(b)(2) concerning the requirement that an SD or MSPs make records required by § 23.201 open to inspection by any representative of the Commission, the United States Department of Justice, or any applicable U.S. prudential regulator. The applicant has not submitted any provision of law or regulations applicable in Switzerland, upon which the Commission could make a finding that SDs and MSPs would be required to make records required by § 23.201 open to inspection by any representative of the Commission, the United States Department of Justice, or any applicable U.S. prudential regulator.

Notwithstanding that the Commission has not determined that the requirements of Swiss law and regulations are comparable to and as comprehensive as § 23.203(b)(2), any SD or MSP to which both § 23.203 and the Swiss law and regulations specified above are applicable would generally be deemed to be in compliance with § 23.203(b)(2) if that SD or MSP complies with the Swiss law and regulations specified above, subject to compliance with the requirement that it make records required by § 23.201 open to inspection by any representative of the Commission, the United States Department of Justice, or any applicable U.S. prudential regulator in accordance with § 23.203(b)(2).

Issued in Washington, DC on December 20, 2013, by the Commission.

Christopher J. Kirkpatrick,
Deputy Secretary of the Commission.

Appendices to Comparability Determination for Switzerland: Certain Entity-Level Requirements

Appendix 1—Commission Voting Summary

On this matter, Chairman Gensler and Commissioners Chilton and Wetjen voted in the affirmative. Commissioner O’Malia voted in the negative.

Appendix 2—Joint Statement of Chairman Gary Gensler and Commissioners Bart Chilton and Mark Wetjen

We support the Commission’s approval of broad comparability determinations that will be used for substituted compliance purposes. For each of the six jurisdictions that has registered swap dealers, we carefully reviewed each regulatory provision of the foreign jurisdictions submitted to us and compared the provision’s intended outcome to the Commission’s own regulatory objectives. The resulting comparability determinations for entity-level requirements permit non-U.S. swap dealers to comply with regulations in their home jurisdiction as a substitute for compliance with the relevant Commission regulations.

These determinations reflect the Commission’s commitment to coordinating our efforts to bring transparency to the swaps market and reduce its risks to the public. The comparability findings for the entity-level requirements are a testament to the comparability of these regulatory systems as we work together in building a strong international regulatory framework.

In addition, we are pleased that the Commission was able to find comparability with respect to swap-specific transaction-level requirements in the European Union and Japan.

The Commission attained this benchmark by working cooperatively with authorities in Australia, Canada, the European Union, Hong Kong, Japan, and Switzerland to reach mutual agreement. The Commission looks forward to continuing to collaborate with both foreign authorities and market participants to build on this progress in the months and years ahead.

Appendix 3—Statement of Dissent by Commissioner Scott D. O’Malia

I respectfully dissent from the Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s (“Commission”) approval of the Notices of Comparability Determinations for Certain Requirements under the laws of Australia, Canada, the European Union, Hong Kong, Japan, and Switzerland (collectively, “Notices”). While I support the narrow comparability determinations that the Commission has made, moving forward, the Commission must collaborate with foreign regulators to harmonize our respective regimes consistent with the G-20 reforms. However, I cannot support the Notices because they: (1) Are based on the legally unsound cross-border guidance (“Guidance”);1 (2) are the result of a flawed substituted compliance process; and (3) fail to provide a clear path moving forward. If the Commission’s objective for substituted compliance is to develop a narrow rule-by-rule approach that leaves unanswered major regulatory gaps between our regulatory framework and foreign jurisdictions, then I believe that the Commission has successfully achieved its goal today.

Determinations Based on Legally Unsound Guidance

As I previously stated in my dissent, the Guidance fails to articulate a valid statutory foundation for its overbroad scope and inconsistently applies the statute to different activities.2 Section 2(i) of the Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”) states that the Commission does not have jurisdiction over foreign activities unless “those activities have a direct and significant connection with activities in, or effect on, commerce of the United States.”3 However, the Commission never properly articulated how and when this limiting standard on the Commission’s extraterritorial reach is met, which would trigger the application of Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act4 and any Commission regulations promulgated thereunder to swap activities that are outside of the United States. Given this statutorily unsound interpretation of the Commission’s extraterritorial authority, the Commission often applies CEA section 2(i) inconsistently and arbitrarily to foreign activities.

Accordingly, because the Commission is relying on the legally deficient Guidance to make its substituted compliance determinations, and for the reasons discussed below, I cannot support the Notices. The Commission should have collaborated with foreign regulators to agree on and implement a workable regime of substituted compliance, and then should have made determinations pursuant to that regime.

Flawed Substituted Compliance Process

Substituted compliance should not be a case of picking a set of foreign rules identical to our rules, determining them to be “comparable,” but then making no determination regarding rules that require extensive gap analysis to assess to what extent each jurisdiction is, or is not, comparable based on overall outcomes of the regulatory regimes. While I support the narrow comparability determinations that the Commission has made, I am concerned that in a rush to provide some relief, the Commission has made substituted compliance determinations that only afford narrow relief and fail to address major regulatory gaps between our domestic regulatory framework and foreign jurisdictions. I will address a few examples below.

First, earlier this year, the OTC Derivatives Regulators Group (“ODRG”) agreed to a number of substantive understandings to improve the cross-border implementation of over-the-counter derivatives reforms.5 The ODRG specifically agreed that a flexible, outcomes-based approach, based on a broad

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1 Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance with Certain Swap Regulations, 78 FR 45292 (Jul. 26, 2013).
2 3 CEA section 2(i); 7 U.S.C. 2(i).
4 http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6876-12.
category-by-category basis, should form the basis of comparability determinations.\textsuperscript{6}

However, instead of following this approach, the Commission has made its comparability determinations on a rule-by-rule basis. For example, in Japan’s Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s Certain Swap Regulations,\textsuperscript{7}\textsuperscript{8} the Commission has made a positive comparability determination for some of the detailed requirements under the swap trading relationship documentation provisions, but not for others.\textsuperscript{9} This detailed approach clearly contravenes the ODRG’s understanding.

Second, in several areas, the Commission has declined to consider a request for a comparability determination, and has also failed to provide an analysis regarding the extent to which the other jurisdiction is, or is not, comparable. For example, the Commission has declined to address or provide any clarity regarding the European Union’s reporting regime for small swap activity, even though the European Union’s reporting regime is set to begin on February 12, 2014. Although the Commission has provided some limited relief with respect to regulatory data reporting, the lack of clarity creates unnecessary uncertainty, especially when the European Union’s reporting regime is set to begin in less than two months.

Similarly, Japan receives no consideration for its mandatory clearing requirement, even though the Commission considers Japan’s legal framework to be comparable to the U.S. framework. While the Commission has declined to provide even a partial comparability determination, at least in this instance the Commission has provided a reason: the differences in the scope of entities and products subject to the clearing requirement.\textsuperscript{10} Such treatment creates uncertainty and is contrary to increased global harmonization efforts.

The Commission’s rush to meet the artificial deadline of December 21, 2013, as established in the Exemptive Order Regarding Compliance with Certain Swap Regulations (“Exemptive Order”),\textsuperscript{11} the Commission failed to complete an important piece of the cross-border regime, namely, supervisory memoranda of understanding (“MOUs”) between the Commission and fellow regulators.

I have previously stated that these MOUs, if done right, can be a key part of the global harmonization effort because they provide mutually agreed-upon solutions for differences in regulatory regimes.\textsuperscript{12} Accordingly, I stated that the Commission should be able to review MOUs alongside the respective comparability determinations and vote on them at the same time. Without these MOUs, our fellow regulators are left wondering whether and how any differences, such as direct access to books and records, will be resolved.

Finally, as I have consistently maintained, the substituted compliance process should allow other regulatory bodies to engage with the full Commission.\textsuperscript{13} While I am pleased that the Notices are being voted on by the full Commission, the full Commission only gained access to the comment letters from foreign regulators on the Commission’s comparability determination draft proposals a few days ago. This is hardly a transparent process.

Unclear Path Forward

Looking forward to next steps, the Commission must provide answers to several outstanding questions regarding these comparability determinations. In doing so, the Commission must collaborate with foreign regulators to increase global harmonization.

First, there is uncertainty surrounding the timing and outcome of the MOUs. Critical questions regarding information sharing, cooperation, supervision, and enforcement will remain unanswered until the Commission and our fellow regulators execute these MOUs.

Second, the Commission has issued time-limited no-action relief for the swap data repository reporting requirements. These comparability determinations will be done as separate notices. However, the timing and process for these determinations remain uncertain.

Third, the Commission has failed to provide clarity on the process for addressing the comparability determinations that it declined to undertake at this time. The Notices only state that the Commission may address these requests in a separate notice at a later date given further developments in the law and regulations of other jurisdictions. To promote certainty in the financial markets, the Commission must provide a clear path forward for market participants and foreign regulators.

The following steps would be a better approach: (1) The Commission should extend the Exemptive Order to allow foreign regulators to further implement their regulatory regimes and coordinate with them to implement a harmonized substitute compliance process; (2) the Commission should implement a flexible, outcomes-based approach to the substituted compliance process and apply it similarly to all jurisdictions; and (3) the Commission should work closely with our fellow regulators to expeditiously implement MOUs that resolve regulatory differences and address regulatory oversight issues.

Conclusion

While I support the narrow comparability determinations that the Commission has made, it was my hope that the Commission would work with foreign regulators to implement a substituted compliance process that would increase the global harmonization effort. I am disappointed that the Commission has failed to implement such a process.

I do believe that in the longer term, the swaps regulations of the major jurisdictions will converge. At this time, however, the Commission’s comparability determinations have done little to alleviate the burden of regulatory uncertainty and duplicative compliance with both U.S. and foreign regulations.

The G–20 process delineated and put in place the swaps market reforms in G–20 member nations. It is then no surprise that the Commission must learn to coordinate with foreign regulators to minimize confusion and disruption in bringing much needed clarity to the swaps market. For all these shortcomings, I respectfully dissent from the Commission’s approval of the Notices.

[FR Doc. 2013–30978 Filed 12–26–13; 8:45 am]

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COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION

Comparability Determination for Japan: Certain Entity-Level Requirements

AGENCY: Commodity Futures Trading Commission.

ACTION: Notice of comparability determination for certain requirements under the laws of Japan.

SUMMARY: The following is the analysis and determination of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“Commission”) regarding certain parts of a joint request by the Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ, Ltd (“BTMU”), Goldman Sachs Japan Co., Ltd., Merrill Lynch Japan Securities Co., Ltd., and Morgan Stanley MUFG Securities Co., Ltd. that the Commission determine that laws and regulations applicable in Japan provide a sufficient basis for an affirmative finding of comparability with respect to the following regulatory obligations applicable to swap dealers (“SDs”) and major swap participants (“MSPs”) registered with the Commission: (i) Chief compliance officer; (ii) risk management; and (iii) swap data recordkeeping (collectively, the “Internal Business Conduct Requirements”).

DATES: Effective Date: This determination will become effective immediately upon publication in the Federal Register.