UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Before the
COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION

In the Matter of:
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.
CFTC Docket No. 15 – 04
Respondent.

ORDER INSTITUTING PROCEEDINGS PURSUANT TO
SECTIONS 6(c)(4)(A) AND 6(d) OF THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT,
MAKING FINDINGS, AND IMPOSING REMEDIAL SANCTIONS

I.

The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“Commission” or “CFTC”) has reason to believe that JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (“Respondent” or “JPMC”) has violated the Commodity Exchange Act (the “Act”) and Commission Regulations (“Regulations”). Therefore, the Commission deems it appropriate and in the public interest that public administrative proceedings be, and hereby are, instituted to determine whether Respondent engaged in the violations set forth herein, and to determine whether any order shall be issued imposing remedial sanctions.

II.

In anticipation of the institution of an administrative proceeding, Respondent has submitted an Offer of Settlement (“Offer”), which the Commission has determined to accept. Without admitting or denying the findings or conclusions herein, Respondent herein consents to the entry and acknowledges service of this Order Instituting Proceedings Pursuant to Sections 6(c)(4)(A) and 6(d) of the Commodity Exchange Act, Making Findings and Imposing Remedial Sanctions (“Order”).¹

¹ Respondent consents to the entry of this Order and to the use of these findings in this proceeding and in any other proceeding brought by the Commission or to which the Commission is a party; provided, however, that Respondent does not consent to the use of the Offer, or the findings or conclusions in this Order, as the sole basis for any other proceeding brought by the Commission, other than in a proceeding in bankruptcy or to enforce the terms of this Order. Nor does Respondent consent to the use of the Offer or this Order, or the findings or conclusions in this Order consented to in the Offer, by any other party in any other proceeding. Neither the Offer nor the Order confers any rights to any party other than the Commission and JPMC.
III.

The Commission finds the following:

A. **Summary**

From 2010 through 2012 (“Relevant Period”), JPMC, by and through certain of its foreign exchange (“FX”) traders, at times, sought to benefit its own trading positions or those of certain FX traders at other banks by attempting to manipulate and aiding and abetting certain traders at other banks in their attempts to manipulate certain FX benchmark rates.

One of the primary FX benchmark rates that the FX traders attempted to manipulate was the World Markets/Reuters Closing Spot Rates (“WM/R Rates”). The WM/R Rates are the most widely referenced FX benchmark rates in the United States and globally. The WM/R Rates are used to establish the relative values of different currencies, and reflect the rates at which one currency is exchanged for another currency. Most of the WM/R Rates at issue here are set or fixed based on trading activity of market participants, including JPMC and other banks, at various times throughout the day. The most widely used WM/R Rate is set or fixed at 4 p.m. London time (“4 p.m. WM/R fix”).

FX benchmark rates, including the WM/R Rates, are used to price a variety of transactions including foreign exchange swaps, cross currency swaps, spot transactions, forwards, options, futures, and other financial derivative instruments. The most actively traded currency pairs are the Euro/U.S. Dollar (EUR/USD), U.S. Dollar/Japanese Yen (USD/JPY), and British Pound Sterling/U.S. Dollar (GBP/USD). Accordingly, the integrity of the WM/R Rates and other FX benchmark rates is critical to the integrity of the markets in the United States and around the world.

At times during the Relevant Period, certain FX traders at JPMC and other banks coordinated their trading to attempt to manipulate certain FX benchmark rates, including the 4 p.m. WM/R fix, to their benefit. These FX traders at JPMC and the other banks used private electronic chat rooms to communicate and plan their attempts to manipulate the FX benchmark rates for certain currency pairs. Certain FX traders at JPMC regularly participated in numerous private chat rooms. At times, in certain chat rooms, FX traders at JPMC and other banks disclosed confidential customer order information and trading positions, altered trading positions to accommodate the interests of the collective group, and agreed on trading strategies as part of an effort by the group to attempt to manipulate certain FX benchmark rates, in some cases downward and in some cases upward.

JPMC traders’ attempts to manipulate certain FX benchmark rates involved multiple currencies, including the United States Dollar (“U.S. Dollar”) and the Euro. The misconduct conduct occurred primarily, but not exclusively, at JPMC’s FX trading desk in London, United Kingdom.

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2 Some FX traders involved in certain chat rooms at issue herein were responsible for managing their respective banks’ FX desks.
This conduct occurred at various times over the course of the Relevant Period without detection by JPMC in part because of internal controls and supervisory failures at JPMC. JPMC failed to adequately assess the risks associated with its participation in the fixing of certain FX benchmark rates, including the 4 p.m. WM/R benchmark rates. JPMC also lacked adequate internal controls or procedures to detect and deter possible misconduct involving certain FX benchmark rates and failed to adequately supervise its FX traders by, among other shortcomings, failing to have adequate controls and monitoring over the use of electronic chat rooms.

The Commission notes that some of this conduct occurred during the same period that JPMC was on notice that the CFTC and other regulators were investigating attempts by certain banks to manipulate the London Interbank Offered Rate (“LIBOR”) and other interest rate benchmarks.

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In accepting JPMC’s Offer, the Commission recognizes the Respondent’s significant cooperation during the CFTC’s Division of Enforcement’s (“Division”) investigation of this matter, which included providing important information and analysis to the Division that helped the Division efficiently and effectively undertake its investigation. In addition, the Commission acknowledges that JPMC initiated its own internal investigation into FX trading prior to the Division’s investigation. The Commission also recognizes that JPMC has commenced significant remedial action to strengthen the internal controls and policies relating to foreign exchange benchmarks and internal and external communications by traders.

B. Respondent

JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. is a global bank with headquarters in New York, New York.

C. Facts

1. The FX Market

The FX market, in which traders are able to buy, sell, exchange and speculate on currencies, is one of the world’s largest and most actively traded financial markets. According to the Bank of International Settlements (“BIS”), trading in global foreign exchange markets averaged $5.3 trillion per day in April 2013. Currencies are traded in pairs and the transacted rate represents the rate to exchange one currency for another currency. The U.S. Dollar is the dominant currency in the foreign exchange market. The exchange of the U.S. Dollar for another currency accounts for an estimated 87% of global foreign exchange market activity. The most actively traded currency pairs are the Euro/U.S. Dollar (EUR/USD), U.S. Dollar/Japanese Yen (USD/JPY), and British Pound Sterling/U.S. Dollar (GBP/USD). Participants in the FX market include banks, investment firms, commercial companies, central banks, hedge funds and retail customers.
The foreign exchange market is comprised of many instruments including spot, forwards, swaps, futures and option contracts.

2. WM/R Rates Overview

The WM/R Rates, one of the leading and most widely referenced foreign exchange benchmark rates, are calculated multiple times daily, including at 4 p.m. London time, which is commonly referred to as the “WM/R 4 p.m. London fix” or the “4 p.m. fix.”

For twenty-one of the most liquid currencies (the “trade currencies”), the 4 p.m. fix is based on actual trades, using bids and offers extracted from a certain electronic trading system during a one-minute window (“fix period”). WM/Reuters determines the bid and offer rates based on the captured transacted rate and the bid-offer spread. WM/Reuters then calculates the median of these bid and offer rates and from these medians determines a “mid trade rate.” If there are not enough trades, WM/Reuters calculates a “mid order rate.” All orders and transactions are weighted equally, regardless of their notional sizes.

The WM/R Rates for the other 139 less liquid currencies (the “non-trade currencies”) are set by similar methodology. Because these currencies are less liquid, WM/Reuters relies on indicative quotes (submissions) derived from a Reuters computer feed that solicits “indications of interest” from market participants as part of its fixing methodology. WM/Reuters captures independent snapshots of indicative quotes for bids and offers, and selects the median rate from these quotes as the “WM/R 4 p.m. London fix.”

WM/Reuters also provides fix rates for forward and non-deliverable forward contracts using methodology similar to that used for non-trade currencies. Fix rates for forward and non-deliverable forward contracts are published using a premium or discount to the spot rate for the relevant currency pair.

Other FX benchmark rates are also priced through the use of indicative rates. For instance, the Russian Ruble/U.S. Dollar Emerging Markets Trade Association (“EMTA”) benchmark rates are based on indicative rates submitted by market participants to the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (“CME”), which takes the midpoint of submitted bid-offer pairs that it randomly selects, discards the highest and lowest midpoints, and calculates the final benchmark rate using the mean of the remaining midpoints.

Foreign exchange futures contracts are connected to FX benchmark rates. The CME Russian Ruble/U.S. Dollar (RUB/USD) futures contract, for instance, is a cash settled futures contract for which the final settlement rate, a component of the contract’s price, is equal to the reciprocal of the EMTA Russian Ruble/U.S. Dollar benchmark rate. Exchange rates in many actively traded CME foreign exchange futures contracts, including the Euro/U.S. Dollar (EUR/USD) futures, the U.S. Dollar/Japanese Yen (USD/JPY) futures, and British Pound Sterling/U.S. Dollar (GBP/USD) futures, track rates in spot foreign exchange markets at near

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3 Another important benchmark is the European Central Bank (“ECB”) rate set by the ECB at 1:15 p.m. London time. Though less widely referenced than the WM/R Rate, the ECB Rates are also used by a wide range of participants, specifically non-financial corporates and are important for the non-deliverable forwards market. See Financial Stability Board Foreign Exchange Benchmarks Final Report at 1. (September 30, 2014).
parity after adjusting for the forward differential, or adding or subtracting “forward points.” Speculative traders employ strategies that seek to capture short-lived arbitrage opportunities between foreign exchange futures and spot contracts. Since 2012, the CME provides clearing and other services for cash-settled Over the Counter FX Spot, Forward, Swaps, and Non-Deliverable Forward (NDF) contracts. The contracts cover 26 currency pairs, including EUR/USD, USD/JPY, and GBP/USD, and are cash-settled based on the WM/R 4 p.m. London fix.

3. JPMC Traders’ Attempts to Manipulate FX Benchmark Rates

In late 2008, following the financial crisis, liquidity and volume in the FX market increased as many financial institutions and other market participants sought to exchange currencies. The increase in volume and liquidity allowed JPMC FX traders and traders at other banks to take advantage of this trading opportunity, specifically during the FX benchmark rate fixing periods.

At the same time, certain FX traders at JPMC and other banks had and/or developed relationships with certain FX traders at other banks, and they increasingly used private chat rooms to communicate and share information with each other. Certain FX traders at JPMC and other banks routinely participated in the chat rooms. Often, these FX traders had multiple chat rooms open simultaneously on their trading terminals, and within a chat, the traders often focused on a particular currency pair. Being a member of certain chat rooms was sometimes exclusive and by invitation only.

For example, when inviting in a new member, traders in one chat room tried to ensure that a new member agreed to put the interests of the group first. In one chat, the JPMC trader discussed with traders from Banks X and Z whether to invite a trader from Bank W into the chat room:\n
\begin{verbatim}
Bank Z Trader: 7:49:55 are we ok with keeping this as is .. ie the info lvls & risk sharing?
Bank X Trader: 7:50:27 well…
Bank Z Trader: 7:50:30 that is the qu[estion]
Bank X Trader: 7:50:32 you know him best obv…
7:50:39 if you think we need to adjust it
7:50:43 then he shouldn’t be[] in chat
JPMC Trader: 7:50:54 yeah that is key
7:51:00 simple question [Bank Z trader]
7:51:08 I trust you implicitly [Bank Z trader]
7:51:13 and your judgement
7:51:16 you know him
7:51:21 will he tell rest of desk stuff
7:51:26 or god forbin his nyk…
\end{verbatim}

\footnote{The communications quoted in this Order contain shorthand trader language and many typographical errors. The shorthand and errors are explained in brackets within the quotations only when deemed necessary to assist with understanding the discussion.}
Bank X Trader: 7:51:46 yes
7:51:51 that’s really imp[ortant] q[uestion]
7:52:01 dont want other numpty’s in mkt to know
7:52:17 but not only that
7:52:21 is he gonna protect us
7:52:33 like we protect each other against our own branches
7:52:46 ie if you guys are rhs⁵ and my nyk is lhs..ill say
my nyk lhs in few

Bank Z Trader: 7:53:52 what concerns me is that i know he’ll never tell us
when at risk…

After further discussion of whether the fourth trader would “add huge value to this cartell,” the
traders decided to invite the trader into the chat room for a “1 month trial,” with the Bank X
trader warning him, presumably facetiously, “mess this up and sleep with one eye open at night.”

These chat rooms were the vehicles through which certain JPMC FX traders and traders
at other banks coordinated attempts to manipulate certain FX benchmark rates, including the
WM/R 4 p.m. fix. Certain chat room participants used code words to evade detection by their
banks’ compliance monitoring systems.

At times during the Relevant Period, in their attempts to manipulate certain benchmarks
(up or down), JPMC FX traders exchanged the size and direction of the bank’s net orders with
FX traders at other banks and used this information to attempt to coordinate trading strategies.
The traders at times then used this information to enable one or more traders to attempt to
manipulate the FX benchmark rates prior to and during the relevant fixing period.

For example, in one of the chat rooms, if a trader determined that he had fix orders in the
opposite direction to the chat room group’s overall net fixing position approaching the fixing
window, that trader may have transacted before the fix period with traders outside the private
chat room, a practice known by market participants as “netting off,” rather than transact with
other traders within the chat room.⁶ In certain cases, the goal of this trading strategy was to
maintain the volume of orders held by chat room members in the direction favored by the
majority of the private chat room members and limit orders being executed in the opposite
direction during the fix window.

If traders in the chat room had net orders in the same direction as what they desired rate
movement at the fix to be, then the traders would at times either (1) match off these orders with
traders outside of the chat room in an attempt to reduce the volume of orders in the opposite
direction transacted during the fix period; (2) transfer their orders to a single trader within the
chat room who could then execute a single order during the fix period; or (3) transact with
traders outside of the chat room to increase the volume traded by chat room members during the

⁵ If an FX trader has orders to sell of the first currency listed in any currency pair, it is often referred to as being on
the left-hand side, or “lhs.” If an FX trader references right hand side, or “rhs,” it indicates that the FX trader is a
buyer of the first currency listed in a currency pair.

⁶ The Commission does not consider that the netting off of orders (or the decision not to net off) ahead of fixes is
inappropriate in all circumstances.
fix window in the direction favored by the private chat room traders. At times, traders also increased the volume traded by them at the fix in the direction favored by the chat room traders in excess of the volume necessary to manage the risk associated with their banks’ net buy or sell orders at the fix. At times, these actions were undertaken in order to attempt to manipulate the benchmark rate set during the fix period.

Some examples of JPMC FX traders’ misconduct include:

In one example, a JPMC FX trader and a Bank W trader coordinated their trading in an attempt to manipulate the 4 p.m. EUR/USD fix. At 3:43:50, the Bank W trader asked the JPMC trader whether he needed to buy Euros in the market in the forthcoming fix. The JPMC trader responded that he had a net buy order for the fix, which he subsequently confirmed as totaling EUR 105 million. At 3:44:04, the JPMC trader offered to transfer that net buy order to the Bank W trader. The Bank W trader replied “maybe” and then stated that he had a net buy order for EUR 150 million.

The traders had the following exchange:

Bank W Trader: 3:46:53 i’d prefer we join forces
JPMC Trader: 3:46:56 perfick
3:46:59 lets do this…
JPMC Trader: 3:47:11 lets double team them
Bank W Trader: 3:47:12 YESssssssssssss

Immediately after the fixing window, the traders congratulated themselves:

Bank W Trader: 4:03:25 sml rumour we haven’t lost it
JPMC Trader: 4:03:45 we
4:03:46 do
4:03:48 dollarrr

Similarly, on another occasion, JPMC trader coordinated with a trader from Bank X in an attempt to manipulate the EUR/USD fix just ahead of the 4 p.m. fix:

JPMC Trader: 3:51:21 ok, i got a lot of euros
Bank X Trader: 3:51:25 ?
3:51:28 you selling?
JPMC Trader: 3:51:30 yes
Bank X Trader: 3:51:33 now
3:51:35 or pickun? 7
JPMC Trader: 3:51:39 pick un
3:51:46 u want it? …

Bank X Trader: 3:52:24 ill take it [JPMC trader]
3:52:26 if u dont want it

7 “Pickun” is a slang term for a fix orders.
JPMC Trader: 3:52:39 tell you what
3:52:42 lets double team it
3:52:45 how much u got

Bank X Trader: 3:52:46 ok
3:52:47 300
3:52:52 u?

JPMC Trader: 3:53:01 ok ill give u 500 more

Bank X Trader: 3:53:05 wow
3:53:06 ok
3:53:08 ha
3:53:09 cool…

JPMC Trader: 3:53:20 so we have 800 each
3:53:21 ok
3:53:31 but we gotta both do some at fix
3:53:36 don’t sell em all and take foot off haha

Bank X Trader: 3:53:40 i promise i will

JPMC Trader: 3:53:47 me too

At 4:00:14, however, the Bank X trader reported that he was “hosed.” The JPMC trader replied with “ditto.” They then proceeded to discuss what went wrong and speculate about which traders outside the chat room might have executed trades that went against them and caused the rate to fix at an unfavorable level.

4. Respondent Lacked Adequate Internal Controls

During the Relevant Period, JPMC failed to adequately assess the risks associated with its FX traders participating in the fixing of certain FX benchmark rates. JPMC also lacked adequate internal controls in order to prevent its FX traders from engaging in improper communications with certain FX traders at other banks. JPMC lacked sufficient policies, procedures and training specifically governing participation in trading around the FX benchmarks rates and had inadequate policies pertaining to, or insufficient oversight of, its FX traders’ use of chat rooms or other electronic messaging.

After the Relevant Period, in June 2013, JPMC commenced an internal investigation of possible misconduct by its FX traders relating to foreign exchange benchmarks. JPMC has since undertaken certain remedial measures to improve its internal controls and banned persistent multi-bank chat rooms in December 2013.
IV.

LEGAL DISCUSSION

A. Respondent, Through the Acts of Certain Traders, Attempted to Manipulate FX Benchmark Rates

Together, Sections 6(c), 6(d) and 9(a)(2) of the Act prohibit acts of attempted manipulation. 7 U.S.C. §§ 9, 13b and 13(a)(2) (2012). Section 9(a)(2) of the Act makes it unlawful for “[a]ny person to . . . attempt to manipulate the price of any commodity in interstate commerce, or for future delivery on or subject to the rules of any registered entity . . . .” 7 U.S.C. § 13(a)(2) (2012). Sections 6(c) and 6(d) of the Act authorize the Commission to serve a complaint and provide for the imposition of, among other things, civil monetary penalties and cease and desist orders if the Commission “has reason to believe that any person” has attempted to manipulate the market price of any commodity, in interstate commerce, or otherwise is violating or has violated any of the provisions of the Act. 7 U.S.C. §§ 9 and 13b (2012).

With respect to conduct on or after August 15, 2011, in addition to Sections 6(c), 6(d) and 9(a)(2), Section 6(c)(3) of the Act prohibits the attempted manipulation of the price of any commodity in interstate commerce. 7 U.S.C. § 9(3) (2012). Commission Regulation 180.2, 17 C.F.R. §180.2 (2014), which became effective on August 15, 2011, in relevant part, makes it “unlawful …directly or indirectly . . . to attempt to manipulate, the price of…any commodity in interstate commerce”  Regulation 180.2 codifies Section 6(c)(3).

Two elements are required to prove an attempted manipulation: (1) an intent to affect the market price, and (2) an overt act in furtherance of that intent. See In re Hohenberg Bros. Co., [1975-77 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 20,271, at 21,477 (CFTC Feb. 18, 1977); CFTC v. Bradley, 408 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1220 (N.D. Okla. 2005). To prove the intent element of attempted manipulation, it must be shown that JPMC FX traders “acted (or failed to act) with the purpose or conscious object of causing or effecting a price or price trend in the market that did not reflect the legitimate forces of supply and demand.” In re Indiana Farm Bureau Coop. Ass’n, [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 21,796, at 27,283 (CFTC Dec. 17, 1982). “[W]hile knowledge of relevant market conditions is probative of intent, it is not necessary to prove that the accused knew to any particular degree of certainty that his actions would create an artificial price. It is enough to present evidence from which it may reasonably be inferred that the accused ‘consciously desire[d] that result, whatever the likelihood of that result happening from his conduct.’ ” Id. (quoting U.S. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 445 (1978)). A profit motive may also be evidence of intent, although profit motive is not a necessary element of an attempted manipulation. See In re DiPlacido, [2007-2009 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 30,970, at 62,484 (CFTC Nov. 5, 2008) (citing In re Hohenberg Bros. Co., [1975-1977 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) at 21,478), aff’d, 364 Fed. Appx. 657, No. 08-5559-ag, 2009 WL 3326624 (2d Cir. 2009). It is also not necessary that there be an actual effect on price. See CFTC v. Amaranth Advisors, L.L.C., 554 F. Supp.2d 523, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).

8 Section 6(c) was amended effective August 15, 2011. For conduct occurring on or after that date, the relevant provision of the Act is 6(c)(4)(A). 7 U.S.C. § 9(4)(A) (2012).
Here, as evidenced by the foregoing, JPMC engaged in acts of attempted manipulation in violation of Sections 6(c), 6(d) and 9(a)(2), 7 U.S.C. §§ 9, 13b and 13(a)(2) (2012). Additionally, with respect to conduct occurring on or after August 15, 2011, JPMC engaged in acts of attempted manipulation in violation of Section 6(c)(3), 7 U.S.C. § 9(3) (2012), and Regulation 180.2, 17 C.F.R. § 180.2 (2014).

B. **Respondent Aided and Abetted the Attempts of Certain Traders at Other Banks to Manipulate FX Benchmark Rates**

Pursuant to Section 13(a) of the Act, liability as an aider and abettor requires proof that: (1) the Act was violated, (2) the aider and abettor had knowledge of the wrongdoing underlying the violation, and (3) the aider and abettor intentionally assisted the primary wrongdoer. 7 U.S.C. § 13c(a) (2012); *In re Sharokh Nikkhah*, [1999-2000 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 28,129, at 49,888 n.28 (CFTC May 12, 2000). Although actual knowledge of the primary wrongdoer’s conduct is required, knowledge of the unlawfulness of such conduct is not necessarily required to be demonstrated. *See In re Lincolnwood Commodities, Inc.*, [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 21,986, at 28,255 (CFTC Jan. 31, 1984). Knowing assistance can be inferred from the surrounding facts and circumstances. *Id. See also In re Buckwalter*, [1990-1992 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 24,995, at 37,686 (CFTC Jan. 25, 1991).

Here, as evidenced by the foregoing, FX traders at other banks attempted to manipulate the WM/R and other FX benchmark rates in violation of Section 6(c), 6(d) and 9(a)(2), 7 U.S.C. §§ 9, 13b and 13(a)(2) (2012). Additionally, with respect to conduct occurring on or after August 15, 2011, FX traders at other banks violated Section 6(c)(3), 7 U.S.C. § 9(3), and Regulation 180.2, 17 C.F.R. § 180.2 (2014). As evidenced above, JPMC, through the acts of certain of its FX traders, aided and abetted the attempts of traders at other banks to manipulate the FX benchmark rates in violation of the Act.

C. **Respondent is Liable for the Acts of its Agents**

Section 2(a)(1)(B) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(B) (2012), and Regulation 1.2, 17 C.F.R. § 1.2 (2014), provide that “[t]he act, omission, or failure of any official, agent or other person acting for any individual, association, partnership, corporation, or trust within the scope of his employment or office shall be deemed the act, omission, or failure of such individual, association, partnership, corporation or trust[.]” Pursuant to Section 2(a)(1)(B) of the Act and Commission Regulation 1.2, strict liability is imposed on principals for the actions of their agents. *See, e.g., Rosenthal & Co. v. CFTC*, 802 F.2d 963, 966 (7th Cir. 1986); *Dohmen-Ramirez & Wellington Advisory, Inc. v. CFTC*, 837 F.2d 847, 857-58 (9th Cir. 1988).

JPMC is liable for the acts, omissions and failures of any traders who acted as its employees and/or agents in relation to the conduct described above. Accordingly, JPMC violated Sections 6(c), 6(d) and 9(a)(2), 7 U.S.C. §§ 9(3), 13b and 13(a)(2) (2012) by engaging in attempted manipulation and aiding and abetting attempted manipulation. Additionally, with respect to conduct occurring on or after August 15, 2011, JPMC is liable for violating Section
V.

FINDINGS OF VIOLATIONS

Based on the foregoing, the Commission finds that Respondent violated Sections 6(c), 6(d) and 9(a)(2) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 9, 13b and 13(a)(2) (2012), and for conduct occurring on or after August 15, 2011, Section 6(c)(3), 7 U.S.C. § 9(3) and Regulation 180.2, 17 C.F.R. § 180.2 (2014).

VI.

OFFER OF SETTLEMENT

Respondent, without admitting or denying the findings or conclusions herein, has submitted the Offer in which it:

A. Acknowledges receipt of service of this Order;

B. Admits the jurisdiction of the Commission with respect to this Order only and for any action or proceeding brought or authorized by the Commission based on violation of or enforcement of this Order;

C. Waives:

1. the filing and service of a complaint and notice of hearing;
2. a hearing;
3. all post-hearing procedures;
4. judicial review by any court;
5. any and all objections to the participation by any member of the Commission’s staff in the Commission’s consideration of the Offer;
any claims of Double Jeopardy based on the institution of this proceeding or the entry in this proceeding of any order imposing a civil monetary penalty or any other relief;

D. Stipulates that the record basis on which this Order is entered shall consist solely of the findings contained in this Order to which Respondent has consented in the Offer; and

E. Consents, solely on the basis of the Offer, to the Commission’s entry of this Order that:

1. makes findings by the Commission that Respondent violated Section 6(c), 6(d) and 9(a)(2) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 9, 13b and 13(a)(2) (2012) and for conduct occurring on or after August 15, 2011, Section 6(c)(3), 7 U.S.C. §9(3) and Regulation 180.2, 17 C.F.R. § 180.2 (2014);

2. orders Respondent to cease and desist from violating Sections 6(c)(3) and 9(a)(2) of the Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 9(3) and 13(a)(2) (2012) and Regulation 180.2, 17 C.F.R. § 180.2 (2014);

3. orders Respondent to pay a civil monetary penalty in the amount of $310,000,000 plus post-judgment interest; and

4. orders Respondent and its successors and assigns to comply with the conditions and undertakings consented to in the Offer and as set forth in Part VII of this Order.

F. Respondent represents that it has already undertaken certain steps intended to make reasonable efforts to ensure the integrity of the FX markets, including, but not limited to, the following:

1. Restricting FX traders from participating in multi-bank chat rooms (except in limited circumstances);

2. Strengthening transaction monitoring and communications surveillance programs for its FX desks;

3. Revising relevant policies and procedures to provide FX traders more concrete and specific guidance;

4. Implementing conduct and culture initiatives to evaluate business practices across the CIB and to create consistent principles regarding acceptable and unacceptable conduct, particularly in trading and communications flows; and

5. Enhancing annual training for all FX traders and sales personnel involved in market-making activities concerning appropriate trading behavior.
Upon consideration, the Commission has determined to accept the Offer.

VII.

ORDER

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:


B. Respondent shall pay a civil monetary penalty of $310 Million Dollars ($310,000,000), within ten (10) days of the date of entry of this Order (the “CMP Obligation”). If the CMP Obligation is not paid in full within ten (10) days of the date of entry of this Order, then post judgment interest shall accrue on the CMP Obligation beginning on the date of entry of this Order and shall be determined by using the Treasury Bill rate prevailing on the date of entry of this Order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961 (2012). Respondent shall pay the CMP Obligation by electronic funds transfer, U.S. postal money order, certified check, bank cashier’s check, or bank money order. If payment is to be made other than by electronic funds transfer, then the payment shall be made payable to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission and sent to the address below:

Commodity Futures Trading Commission
Division of Enforcement
ATTN: Accounts Receivables --- AMZ 340
E-mail Box: 9-AMC-AMZ-AR-CFTC
DOT/FAA/MMAC
6500 S. MacArthur Blvd.
Oklahoma City, OK 73169
Telephone: (405) 954-7262

If payment is to be made by electronic funds transfer, Respondent shall contact Nikki Gibson or her successor at the above address to receive payment instructions and shall fully comply with those instructions. Respondent shall accompany payment of the CMP Obligation with a cover letter that identifies the Respondent and the name and docket number of this proceeding. The Respondent shall simultaneously transmit copies of the cover letter and the form of payment to the Chief Financial Officer, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Three Lafayette Centre, 1155 21st Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20581.

C. Respondent and its successors and assigns shall comply with the following undertakings set forth in the Offer:

1. REMEDIATION
As set forth above in Section VI, paragraph F, Respondent represents that it has already undertaken and continues to undertake extensive remedial measures to implement and strengthen its internal controls and procedures relating to its participation in the fixing of FX benchmark rates and related supervision of its FX traders. With respect to its remediation efforts to the extent not already undertaken, Respondent undertakes that:

a. Respondent will implement and improve its internal controls and procedures in a manner reasonably designed to ensure the integrity of its participation in the fixing of any FX benchmark rate, including measures to identify and address internal or external conflicts of interest;

b. Its remediation improvements will include internal controls and procedures relating to:

   - measures designed to enhance the detection and deterrence of improper communications concerning FX benchmark rates, including the form and manner in which communications may occur;
   - monitoring systems designed to enhance the detection and deterrence of trading or other conduct potentially intended to manipulate directly or indirectly FX benchmark rates;
   - periodic audits, at least annually, of Respondent’s participation in the fixing of any FX benchmark rate;
   - supervision of trading desks that participate in the fixing of any FX benchmark rate;
   - routine and on-going training of all traders, supervisors and others who are involved in the fixing of any FX benchmark rate;
   - processes for the periodic but routine review of written and oral communications of any traders, supervisors and others who are involved in the fixing of any FX benchmark rate with the review being documented and documentation being maintained for a period of three years; and
   - continuing to implement its system for reporting, handling and investigating any suspected misconduct or questionable, unusual or unlawful activity relating to the fixing of any FX benchmark rate with escalation to compliance and legal and with reporting of material matters to the executive management of JPMC and the Commission, as appropriate; the Respondent shall maintain the record basis of the handling of each such matter for a period of three years.
c. Within 120 days of the entry of this Order, the Respondent shall make a report to the Commission, through the Division, concerning its remediation efforts, prior to and since the entry of this Order. Within 365 days of the entry of this Order, Respondent shall submit a report to the Commission, through the Division, explaining how it has complied with the undertakings set forth herein. The report shall contain a certification from a representative of the Respondent’s Executive Management, after consultation with the Respondent’s chief compliance officer(s), that the Respondent has complied with the undertakings set forth above, and that it has established policies, procedures, and controls to satisfy the undertakings set forth in the Order.

2. COOPERATION WITH THE COMMISSION

In this action, and in any investigation or other action instituted by the Commission, related to the subject matter of this action, Respondent shall cooperate fully and expeditiously with the Commission, including the Division. As part of such cooperation, Respondent agrees to the following for a period of three (3) years from the date of the entry of this Order, or until all related investigations and litigations in which the Commission, including the Division, is a party, are concluded, including through the appellate review process, whichever period is longer:

1. Preserve all records relating to the subject matter of this proceeding, including, but not limited to, audio files, electronic mail, other documented communications, and trading records;

2. Comply fully, promptly, completely, and truthfully with all inquiries and requests for non-privileged information or documents;

3. Provide authentication of documents and other evidentiary material;

4. Provide copies of non-privileged documents within JPMC’s possession, custody or control;

5. Subject to applicable laws and regulations, JPMC will make its best efforts to produce any current (as of the time of the request) officer, director, employee, or agent of JPMC, regardless of the individual’s location, and at such location that minimizes Commission travel expenditures, to provide assistance at any trial, proceeding, or Commission investigation related to the subject matter of this proceeding, including, but not limited to, requests for testimony, depositions, and/or interviews, and to encourage them to testify
6. Subject to applicable laws and regulations, JPMC will make its best efforts to assist in locating and contacting any prior (as of the time of the request) officer, director, employee or agent of JPMC;

Respondent also agrees that it will not undertake any act that would limit its ability to cooperate fully with the Commission. JPMC will designate an agent located in the United States of America to receive all requests for information pursuant to these Undertakings, and shall provide notice regarding the identity of such Agent to the Division upon entry of this Order. Should JPMC seek to change the designated agent to receive such requests, notice of such intention shall be given to the Division fourteen (14) days before it occurs. Any person designated to receive such request shall be located in the United States of America; and

3. PROHIBITED OR CONFLICTING UNDERTAKINGS

Should the Undertakings herein be prohibited by, or be contrary to the provisions of any obligations imposed on Respondent by any presently existing, or hereinafter enacted or promulgated laws, regulations, regulatory mandates, or the rules or definitions issued by a Benchmark Publisher, then Respondent shall promptly transmit notice to the Commission (through the Division) of such prohibition or conflict, and shall meet and confer in good faith with the Commission (through the Division) to reach an agreement regarding possible modifications to the Undertakings herein sufficient to resolve such inconsistent obligations. In the interim, Respondent will abide by the obligations imposed by the law, regulations, regulatory mandates and Benchmark Publishers’ rules and definitions. Nothing in these Undertakings shall limit, restrict or narrow any obligations pursuant to the Act or the Commission’s Regulations promulgated thereunder, including, but not limited to, Regulations 1.31 and 1.35, 17 C.F.R. §§ 1.31 and 1.35 (2014), in effect now or in the future.

4. PUBLIC STATEMENTS

Respondent agrees that neither it nor any of its successors and assigns, agents or employees under its authority or control shall take any action or make any public statement denying, directly or indirectly, any findings or conclusions in this Order or creating, or tending to create, the impression that this Order is without a factual basis; provided, however, that nothing in this provision shall affect Respondent’s (i) testimonial obligations, or (ii) right to take positions in other proceedings to which the Commission is not a party. Respondent and its successors and assigns shall undertake all steps necessary to ensure that all of its agents and/or
employees under its authority or control understand and comply with this agreement.

5. Pursuant to Rule 506(d)(1)(iii)(B), 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(d)(1)(iii)(B), of the Securities & Exchange Commission's Regulation D, this Order constitutes a Commission final order based on a violation of law and regulation that prohibits manipulative conduct. Nevertheless, under the specific and unique facts and circumstances presented here, pursuant to Rule 506(d)(2)(iii), disqualification under Rule 506(d)(1) of the Regulation D exemption should not arise as a consequence of this Order.

6. PARTIAL SATISFACTION

Respondent understands and agrees that any acceptance by the Commission of partial payment of Respondent’s CMP Obligation shall not be deemed a waiver of its obligation to make further payments pursuant to this Order, or a waiver of the Commission’s right to seek to compel payment of any remaining balance.

The provisions of this Order shall be effective as of this date.

By the Commission.

[Signature]
Christopher J. Kirkpatrick
Secretary of the Commission
Commodity Futures Trading Commission

Dated: November 11, 2014

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