The Lifecycle of Exchange-traded Derivatives

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Abstract

This article provides a statistical description of the lifecycle of exchange-traded derivatives in the United States. Using annual volumes for most derivatives reported to US exchanges since 1954, we present distributional estimates of the rate at which derivative trading volumes rise.
and fall. Our results suggest that the lifecycle of cleared derivatives changed fundamentally in the 2000’s. In that decade, derivatives with low trading volumes moved to modest volumes with increased probability. Prior to the 2000’s, low volume contracts were more likely to remain stuck at low volumes or be delisted altogether. This additional resilience from low levels of trading meant that the expected trading volume for a new cleared derivative after ten years of trading actually grew between the 1990s and 2000’s. This is surprising given that many new contracts were launched in the last decade and a historically large percentage of contracts traded at low volume in any year. The results suggest that trading volumes varied more decade to decade than from exchange to exchange or product type to product type.

*JEL classification*: G12, N22, G17.

*Keywords*: Derivatives; Innovation; Financial History.
1. Introduction

Every year, financial innovators launch new derivatives markets in the hope of serving unmet risk management needs stemming from ongoing economic activity. Many of those new markets fail to attract the liquid trading that is necessary both to generate profits for derivatives exchanges and to drive down transaction costs for their customers. A handful of new markets will host large volumes of trading, enjoying network effects that will sustain further trading in the future.

This article is intended to answer the fundamental question facing financial innovators as they consider whether or not to offer a new derivative contract for trading on their platform: what are the chances that a new derivative will reach a sustainable level of liquidity?

Silber (1981) and Carlton (1984) provided the first summary statistics on the survival of new futures contracts and they suggested that most new derivatives fail, usually soon after their launch. However, since their publication, technological innovation and organizational changes at derivatives exchanges altered the economics of derivatives trading in ways that may have upended long standing patterns in product lifecycles (Gorham and Singh, 2009).

Recently, Gorham and Kundu (2012) used a large dataset from the Futures Industry Association (FIA) to demonstrate a steep increase in the rate at which new futures contracts are launched. They also provide point estimates of multiple metrics for the success of new futures contracts.

Here we extend the more recent work in Gorham and Kundu (2012), providing distributional estimates of exchange-traded derivatives contracts’ movement between states of annual trading volume using a dataset that includes cleared derivatives and options as well as many historic futures contracts absent from most electronic databases. The analysis presented is comprehensive, covering all US exchange-traded derivatives contracts launched since the mid-1950’s. The analysis is also presented in a simple and novel
form, as a non-stationary Markov model estimated using Bayesian methods.

1.1. Derivatives reform and lifecycle statistics

Basic statistics on the lifecycle of derivatives are particularly valuable now because ongoing policy debates on derivatives regulation in the US and Europe have hinged on projections of how new regulations will impact liquidity and trading patterns. Better baseline statistics of the lifecycle of derivatives, particularly statistics that take into account recent shifts in the dynamics of exchange reported derivatives trading, can inform that debate.

Title VII of the Dodd-Frank reforms focuses on swaps markets\(^1\) the hitherto unregulated derivatives markets that, since the first publicly disclosed swaps trade in 1981, had grown to a notional outstanding value of USD 639 trillion by June 2012. (By contrast, options and futures had a combined notional outstanding value of USD 60 trillion (Bank of International Settlements, 2012).) Title VII mandates that swaps markets adopt practices related to many critical market functions, including information dissemination, counter-party risk, and margining, that are comparable to those of exchange-traded futures and options.

This regulatory change suggests that the coming years will see convergence between previously unregulated swaps markets and standard exchange-traded derivatives markets. This convergence, in turn, raises both normative

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1Swap trades have generally been negotiated bilaterally, often over the phone through or with large swap dealers, rather than via the central limit order book system used by exchange-traded derivatives. In theory, markets using bilateral negotiation and central order books trade contracts that imply equivalent cash flows (Mello and Reilly, 2012). However, Duffie (2012) presents evidence that informational asymmetries persist in even highly liquid bilateral markets.

2In practice, the distinction between swaps and futures is often murky. For example, some swaps trades are negotiated bilaterally and then converted into futures trades on markets such as the CME Group’s ClearPort. Those trades are reported to exchanges and are consequently included in the dataset used in this article. The CME and ICE, the two largest US futures exchanges, have recently announced plans to convert many of their most popular swaps markets into futures markets with physical delivery of swaps contracts at settlement (i.e. futures trades that become swaps), providing yet another hybrid model.
questions (How desirable is the move toward increased clearing, public disclosure of pricing information, and greater standardization of margins?) and positive questions (What will the likely costs or regulation be in terms of trading volume?) that would benefit from reliable statistical descriptions of the lifecycle of derivatives.

The relative scarcity of basic statistics on the lifecycle of derivatives has already introduced confusion into the policy debate surrounding Title VII. In one prominent example, the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) released a position paper on regulations mandating price transparency and clearing in swaps markets comparable to that in exchange-traded derivatives markets in late 2011 [ISDA Research Staff and NERA Economic Consulting, 2011]. The paper highlights previous research showing high rates of failure among exchange-traded derivatives. Assuming a connection between those failure rates and exchanges’ price transparency and clearing, the paper goes on to argue that swaps contracts subject to proposed regulations would subsequently lose their liquidity and begin to fail. That suggestion is misleading. First, it ignore the comparable failure rates for bilateral swaps, which are difficult to quantify. Second, it relies on the assumption tested here - that derivatives continue to fail at the rates documented decades ago. Our results suggest that assumption is not robust to recent changes in the underlying structure of cleared derivatives markets.

In addition to providing common ground for policy debates, we hope that the following analysis will inform the decisions of derivatives innovators. In general, contracts are showing greater flexibility, moving up from low levels of annual trading. This may have implications for how exchanges allocate their limited budgets for marketing and education. Contracts previously considered too uneven in their year-to-year trading to succeed may indeed have substantial growth potential given proper marketing and educational support.
2. Data

Our analysis is based on annual volume figures for US exchange-traded derivatives (primarily futures, options, and cleared swaps). These figures are/were freely available to the public through trade publications, directly from exchanges, in newspapers, and from the website of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). For ease of access, we used:

- An electronic database maintained by the CFTC aggregating basic, market-level daily trade data (such as volume and open interest) regulated futures and options exchanges, called designated contract markets (DCMs). This dataset covers all recent trading volumes reported to US exchanges of futures, options and swaps, cleared pursuant to DCM rules. Most contracts in that database have volume figures dating back to the early 1980s.
- We supplemented this basic dataset by adding in futures trading figures compiled by hand from historical publications released by derivatives exchanges. The resulting dataset includes many short-lived contracts listed on now-defunct exchanges that are unlikely to appear in most electronic databases of trading statistics.

The merger of these resources may represent the most comprehensive dataset on derivatives trading volume to date.

3. Markov model for the lifecycle of derivatives

We present our primary results in the form of a Markov model. That model begins by imagining that a derivative contract moving between discrete states \((x)\) of trading volume at discrete times \((t)\) according to a discrete-time Markov chain, defined generally as in equation 1.
\[ P(X_t = x_t | X_{t-1} = x_{t-1}, X_{t-2} = x_{t-2}, \ldots, X_0 = x_0) = P(X_t = x_t | X_{t-1} = x_{t-1}) \]

(1)

In the context of derivatives, the left side of equation 1 can be restated as in equation 2.

\[ P(\text{Volume level year } t+1 | \text{Volume level year } t) \]

(2)

Contract are assigned a matrix \( P \) as in equation 3) that describes the probability of moving to any of a set of discrete states (time \( j \)) of annual trading volume in the following year given their state of trading volume today (time \( i \)). This is the transition matrix commonly used to describe a Markov process (Page, 2012).

\[
P = \begin{pmatrix}
p_{1,1} & p_{1,2} & \cdots & p_{1,j} & \cdots \\
p_{2,1} & p_{2,2} & \cdots & p_{2,j} & \cdots \\
\vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots & \ddots \\
p_{i,1} & p_{i,2} & \cdots & p_{i,j} & \cdots \\
\vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots & \ddots \\
\end{pmatrix}
\]

(3)

Volume level for any given contract-year is equivalent to the common logarithm of the annual trading, rounded down to the nearest integer. (For example, annual trading of 10,500 is assigned a volume level that groups it with all contract-years with volume \( \geq 10,000 \) and \( < 100,000 \).) We assigned a special level for annual trading of 0.

For ease of estimation we work with the rows of the transition matrix \( P \) which we denote as \( \theta \). Those rows sum to 1, so, assuming that row entries are randomly distributed, each row can be assigned a Dirichlet distribution, commonly used for the probability of ending in an exhaustive set of categorical states. That assignment is defined in equation 4.
Volume level$_{\text{year } t+1}$|Volume level$_{\text{year } t}$ $\sim$ Categorical($\theta$) \hfill (4) \\
$\theta$ $\sim$ Dirichlet($x_{\text{vol level } 0}$, $x_{\text{vol level } 1}$, ..., $x_{\text{vol level } 10^8}$)

We modeled these transition probabilities via Bayesian Gibbs sampling through R and the Bayesian statistical package JAGS (Plummer, 2003). (We used the “rjags” package (Plummer, 2013).) These methods treat the underlying probabilities of moving between states of trading volume as randomly distributed parameters, as in equation 4.

After estimation, we combine the vectors $\theta$ to reconstruct the transition matrix for a Markov model $P$. As with any Markov model, we can multiply a vector, $\pi_0$ describing the probability that a new derivative will start in any given state (at time 0) by the transition matrix to produce a vector of probabilities that a new market will be in any state over an arbitrary number of periods ($k$) as in equation 5.

$$ \pi_0 P^k = \pi_k. $$ \hfill (5)

We can multiply the vector $\pi_k$ by yet another vector of annual trading volumes corresponding to each possible state to get an approximation of the expected trading volume in that arbitrary year. We present all our expected trading volumes at a ten year horizon (setting $k = 10$), but the Markov model is flexible in this regard.

Note that we do not assume that the transition matrix $P$ is stationary across time. We measure transition matrices for various contract groupings including decades, product categories, and exchanges to test whether they are distinct. Given that we do not assume stationarity our expected value estimates do not describe an equilibrium, only the general direction of the market.
3.1. Prior probabilities on moving between states of annual volume

Our model presumes that the data on the volume level next year \( \text{Volume level}_{\text{year } t+1} \) is segregated by the volume this year \( \text{Volume level}_{\text{year } t} \) and we assigned each of those subsets prior probabilities (corresponding to parameter \( x \) in equation [1]) of moving to any volume level in the next year. Those priors came from an informal survey of economists at the CFTC.

That survey found beliefs corresponding roughly to:

- \( \Pr(\text{Volume level}_{\text{year } t+1} = \text{Volume level}_{\text{year } t-1}) = 0.16 \)
- \( \Pr(\text{Volume level}_{\text{year } t+1} = \text{Volume level}_{\text{year } t}) = 0.63 \)
- \( \Pr(\text{Volume level}_{\text{year } t+1} = \text{Volume level}_{\text{year } t+1}) = 0.14 \)

The probability of a contract jumping more than one order of magnitude up or down was assigned a value of 0.01. In edge cases (\( \text{Volume level}_{\text{year } t} = 0 \) and \( \text{Volume level}_{\text{year } t} = 10^8 \)) where a move up or down would take the contract below annual trading of 0 or to annual trading \( \geq 10^9 \), we combined the probabilities of moving up or down with the probability of remaining in the same state. Table [2] at the end of this article shows the full matrix of transition probability priors.

We chose to assign informative priors on transition probabilities because flat priors (equal weighting to the probability of a transition to any state) unfairly biased the estimation, giving exchanges or product subgroups with few observations a relatively high probability of jumping to extraordinary levels of trading.
Fig. 1. Empirical cumulative distribution function of annual trading volumes by contract

4. Derivatives volumes over time

4.1. Concentration of trading volume over time

Figures 1 and 2 display the empirical cumulative distribution function (ECDF) of annual trading volumes by contract for every year in the sample. In each figure, individual lines represent the ECDFs for a single year, with lines approaching a right angle showing greater concentration of trading volume in a few contracts. Figure 1 clearly shows that most contracts trade at low volumes in any given year, with roughly 80 percent of contracts showing little or no volume in any given year since 1954.
However, figure 1 obscures substantial variation in the concentration of volume over time. Figure 2 zooms in on the same annual ECDFs displayed in figure 1. The ECDF for each year is colored chronologically, with the lines representing the oldest years in the sample in red and the most recent years in purple. Each panel of figure 1 shows the same ECDFs, but the years in a specific decade are highlighted (in black) to give a sense of how concentration has varied from decade to decade.

In this graphic we see clear patterns in concentration over time. Markets grew steadily less concentrated between the 1950s and 1990s (perhaps with some retrenchment between the 1980s and 1990s), shown by flattening ECDFs for each succeeding decade. That trend reversed sharply in the 2000s, with the annual ECDFs approaching a right angle. In the 1980s the range of 15,000 to 30,000 roughly marked the 50th percentile for annual trading volumes, with half of the listed contracts trading above that range and half below. By the 2000s that range had fallen to between 300 and 8,000.

Figure 2 itself highlights one likely cause of this shift - the explosion of innovation during the 2000s. The ECDFs for the 2000s are appreciably smoother than those of previous decades, with 2011 looking almost like a continuous function. This smoothness is due to the inclusion of additional contracts. Figure 3 directly displays the number of contracts with annual reported volume (which is allowed be zero) in the sample by year. It shows the same explosive trend in innovation discussed in Gorham and Kundu (2012), with over 3000 derivatives contracts reporting annual volume in 2011.

4.2. Probability of individual contracts moving to different levels of trading by decade

Figures 4 and 5 give the probabilities of individual contracts moving between volume levels in a given year $t$ (indicated by the row of estimates) and volume levels in year $t+1$ (indicated by the column of estimates). These probabilities, estimated separately for each decade in the sample via equation
Fig. 2. Empirical cumulative distribution function (ECDF) of annual trading volumes by contract with scale adjusted to distinguish between decades. Each line represents the ECDF for a different year. Each of the stacked panels highlights the years in a particular decade in black. Note that an ECDF approaching a right angle represents a year in which volume was concentrated in a few contracts. Hence, with some exceptions in the 1990s the market as a whole becomes less concentrated, until the 2000s when it abruptly becomes highly concentrated.
Fig. 3. Number of contracts in sample by year
combine to form the transition matrix for a Markov model of a contract emerging over time.

The parameter estimates indicate that there is substantial inertia across every decade keeping contracts with a given level of trading volume at that same volume in the following year. In virtually all decades in the sample, contracts trading at or above 1,000 in annual volume were more likely to remain at their trading volume level than to move up or down. This dynamic is particularly strong at higher levels of trading. In most decades where relevant observations were available, contracts with annual volume of one million or above remained in that range the following year with probabilities between $\sim 80$ and $\sim 90$ percent (see lower right-hand corner of figure 5).

We also see substantial historical evidence of inertia at very low levels of trading. From 1970 until 2000, the median probability that a contract with trading volume of zero would remain at zero the next year, ranged between 80 and 95 percent (see upper left-hand corner of figure 4).

The transition matrix begins to depart from the prevailing story in [Silber 1981] and [Carlton 1984] when you look at contracts at lower levels of trading in the 2000s. (See the top rows of figure 4.) The inertia for those contracts is lower than in previous decades, with the median probability of a contract at an annual volume of zero remaining at zero falling to 70 percent (figure 7). While zero volume contracts remained unlikely in absolute terms to rise to higher volume levels, the 95 percent probability interval for the transition probability for the 2000s does not overlap with those for recent decades, meaning that the difference holds with high probability.

During the decade of the 2000s, contracts were substantially more likely to jump from an annual trading volume of 0 to trading volumes between 10 and 1000 than in previous decades. (See top row of figure 4 and 8.) Combined with the apparent trend toward maintaining rather than delisting contracts, this suggests that there was less path-dependence for trading volumes in the 2000s. While more contracts traded at a volume of 0 in any given year (see
Fig. 4. Transition matrix for Markov model of derivatives contract moving between states of annual trading volume by decade - row represents state in year $t$, column represents state in year $t+1$, median estimate indicated by dot, 95 percent probability interval indicated by line - part 1: transitions given annual volumes $\geq 0$ and $< 10,000$
Fig. 5. Transition matrix for Markov model of derivatives contract moving between states of annual trading volume by decade - row represents state in year t, column represents state in year t + 1, median estimate indicated by dot, 95 percent probability interval indicated by line - part 2: transitions given annual volumes ≥ 10,000
Fig. 6. Probability of remaining at annual volume of zero from year to year by decade
Fig. 7. Probability of remaining at annual volume of zero from year to year by decade

Fig. 8. Probability of transition from annual volume of 0 to annual volume in the single digits (left) and from annual volume in the single digits to annual volume $\geq 10, < 100$ (right)
Fig. 9. Probability of transition from annual volume in the hundreds to annual volume in the thousands (left) and from annual volume in the thousands to annual volume tens of thousands (right).

Contracts were substantially more likely to jump up from such low trading volumes in the 2000s. Having reached annual trading volumes in the 10s or 100s (see figure 2), contracts were substantially more likely to continue increasing their trading volume in the 2000s than in the 1980s or 1990s. Only after reaching trading volumes in the 1000s (figure 10) did the probability of an individual contract progressing to higher levels of annual trading volume fall roughly back within the same range as those from previous decades. In the 2000s, contracts generally moved up to annual trading in the thousands with an ease not seen in previous decades.

Contracts trading in the tens of thousands were 8 percent more likely to fall back to lower levels of annual volumes in the 2000s than in previous decades, a difference that holds with high probability. This indicates that some of the flexibility gained for contracts at lower levels of trading may have come at the expense of contracts at mid to high levels of trading. (However, as we see in figure 13, discussed below, that retrenchment from trading in the tens of thousands was not enough, on balance, to lower the prospects of a new contract over the course of ten years.)

Annual trading in the 10,000s appears to represent an important milestone for contracts across the sample. Having reached this level of trading,
Fig. 10. Probability of transition from annual volume in the tens of thousands to annual volume in the hundreds of thousands
the likelihood of outright collapse (annual trading volume falling to 0 in the next year) fell to very low levels and was largely indistinguishable across the decades (figure 11). Table 1 presents the median estimates of transition probabilities estimated across the full sample (i.e. aggregating across decades). They show clearly that having reached annual trading of in the 10,000s, a full collapse becomes relatively unlikely (4 percent). In fact, for contracts that achieve annual trading in the 10,000s, the probability of falling more than one volume level is below 10 percent. (See the sixth row of table 1.) Note that these full sample estimates are biased toward recent decades because the sample contains more observations from recent decades.

As suggested above, one hypothesis regarding the recent shift in derivatives lifecycles is that the additional flexibility that low volume contracts enjoyed in the 2000s came directly at the expense of mid-range to higher volume contracts. In volatile markets, hedgers might be choosing niche contracts with lower basis risk over more liquid cross-hedges. What would that mean for the overall outlook for lifetime trading of derivatives? We test this

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Table 1: Median estimates of transition matrix between volume states on full sample - with annual trading volume state in year t denoted by row, trading volume state in year t+1 denoted by column.
Fig. 11. Probability of transition from annual volume in the tens of thousands to annual volume of 0.
by looking at the expected trading volume of a new derivative over the course of ten years.

Combining draws from the transition matrix in figures 4 and 5 with draws from a vector representing the probability of a contract starting in each of the available states of annual trading volume (estimated using the same basic model presented in equation 4) we can get the probability that a new contract will be in any given state of volume after ten years of trading. Those values are displayed in figure 12. Figure 12 makes clear the resilience of contracts trading at low levels in the 2000s. Only 32 percent of contracts that debuted with zero volume were still trading at zero volume after ten years in the simulation representing the 2000s. Those probabilities were 46, 48, and 52 percent in the 1990s, 1980s and 1970s respectively (See the first column of boxes in figure 12). Instead of languishing, contracts simulated from the 2000s were more likely to migrate over ten years to moderate levels of trading. (See the columns of boxes in figure 12 corresponding to annual trading volume between 100 and 10,000.) Those same contracts were, however, less likely to reach the highest levels of trading ($\geq 100,000$) than contracts from other decades. The 1980s appears to be the best decade for such blockbuster contracts, as suggested in Gorham and Kundu (2012).

Simply comparing the raw probabilities of reaching various levels of volume after ten years, it is difficult to discern which decade provided a better overall environment for new contracts. To make that comparison, we normalize the probabilities in figure 12 by the lower bound of each trading range (i.e. multiplying the probability of being in the trading state $\geq 100$ and $< 1,000$ by 100). This give an approximation of the expected trading volume of a new contract after ten years, displayed in figure 13. Based on that graph, we can conclude:

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Note these simulated values simply describe the dynamics of the transition matrices when compounded. They ignore delisting. If we accounted for delisting, a practice that was more common in previous decades, the probabilities of failure would likely be higher for those decades.
Fig. 12. Box and whiskers plot of probability of a new contract being at different levels of trading after 10 years by decade - median simulated probability marked in text, upper and lower hinges of the box plot correspond to the first and third quartiles (the 25th and 75th percentiles)
- The expected trading volume after 10 years for a contract has varied substantially from decade to decade;
- There is no clear trend that emerges from these variations over time;
- The expected trading volume at year ten for a contract in the 2000s was firmly in the middle of the historical range - the 2000s were lower than the 1980s, higher than the 1990s, and all three decades showed substantial overlap with the earlier decades in the sample;
- In the 2000s, low volume contracts tended to rise to modest levels of trading, balancing any fall in the probability of reaching the highest trading levels.

![Expected trading volume over ten years by decade](image)

Fig. 13. Expected trading volume over ten years by decade

While a larger percentage of contracts were at low volumes in the 2000s
than in previous decades (figure 1). Individual contracts were considerably more likely to jump up from very low volumes to moderate volumes (figure 8). The net effect of these trends set the expected volume of contracts at year ten well within the historical range of earlier decades (figure 13). This is remarkable given the explosion in the number of contracts launched (figure 3). It suggests that the marginal value of an innovative contract (approximated by its expected trading volume at year ten) did not fall in the 2000s, despite exponentially higher rates of innovation than in past decades.

This shift is consistent with the hypothesis that electronic trading made trading activity more mobile across derivatives markets and substantially cut the costs of launching and sustaining a derivatives contract. But changes went above and beyond the introduction of electronic trading on US and European exchanges in the 2000s, making it difficult to identify the causes of product lifecycle shifts in aggregate statistics. For example, many of the new contracts launched in the 2000s (and included in this sample) are bilaterally-negotiated, but centrally-cleared swaps. In the wake of Enron’s collapse, which threatened energy firms with counter-party defaults on their swaps trades, exchanges launched popular new facilities devoted to these cleared-swaps, including the CME’s ClearPort. While those contracts benefited from a suite of tools associated with electronic trading, they were not subject to electronic trading in the narrow sense of actually having buy and sell orders matched on an electronic platform.

To isolate the influence of electronic trading, we look at contracts trading on the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX), where electronic trading was introduced suddenly. The NYMEX does not offer an ideal natural experiment. Its trading patterns were likely influenced by the shift toward cleared swaps throughout the 2000s. However, the abruptness of the exchange’s switch to electronic trading does offer some scope for teasing out the relative import of electronic trading.
5. Derivatives volumes by exchange

Differences in trading volume patterns over the life of a derivatives contract may be influenced by the exchange offering the contract. Carlton (1984) hypothesized that economies of scale in designing and launching a contract gave those on larger exchanges a relative advantage in terms of trading volumes. Similarly, there may be network effects stemming from an exchange’s ability to cross-margin trades.

Cuny (1993) and Holland and Fremault (1997) suggest that innovative exchanges may enjoy a first-mover advantage, capturing a disproportionate share of trading on those contracts that they launch. Gorham and Kundu (2012) tests this hypothesis and finds little persistent advantage. In the context of a Markov model of trading volumes, if indeed there is a first-mover advantage, then we would expect innovative exchanges to distinguish themselves with higher expected trading in year ten.

Figure 14 presents expected volume in year ten for contracts on all exchanges in the sample. Contracts show greater distinction across decades (as in figure 13) than across exchanges. It is possible to distinguish individual exchanges from one another. For example, contracts on the Chicago Board of Trade have an advantage over those on the NYMEX in expected value terms. But no exchanges clearly distinguish themselves from the general tendency with greater than 95 percent probability. Possible exceptions include:

- the single-stock futures traded on OneChicago which show particularly low expected trading volumes over ten years
- the two registered exchanges in the IntercontinentalExchange group, marked ICE and ICEU in figure 14, which likely have higher expected trading volumes than most other exchanges. It is important to note that these exchanges specialize in OTC markets, only a handful of which have been reported to the CFTC as futures. Consequently, some
of their performance may represent selection bias.

5.1. CME acquisitions test the important of exchange to life-cycles

Recent exchange acquisitions offer the chance to test the effects of particular exchanges on trading volumes. Gorham and Kundu (2012) singled out the CME as the exchange with a persistent advantage over its rivals - leading other major exchanges in mean volume in the 5th year of trading, mean lifetime volume, and their approximations of present value discounted fee generation. In the late 2000s, the CME Group effectively took over both the New York Mercantile Exchange (designated in the database as NYME but commonly referred to as the NYMEX) and the Chicago Board of Trade (CBT). After the acquisitions, the exchanges’ contracts continued to be reported as before (i.e. NYMEX contracts continued to be reported in the dataset as NYMEX contracts).

If indeed the CME did enjoy a persistent advantage on multiple volume metrics, then presumably the transition matrices for NYMEX and CBOT contracts, calculated using the Markov models profiled here, would improve following their acquisitions. These acquisitions could also test a weaker form of that same hypothesis. If exchange management is important to contract lifecycles, then the CBOT and NYMEX’s contracts’ transition matrices should converge to the CME’s, regardless of whether the CME has an advantage over other exchanges or not.

Figures 15 and 16 for the NYMEX and ??’s figures ?? and ?? present the transition matrices for each of the merged exchanges in the years before

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4In late 2012, the IntercontinentalExchange announced that many of its most popular OTC contracts will begin trading as futures.

5Technically, the CME and CBOT merged. However, the CME was the dominant firm in the merger, initiating the transaction and retaining most of the key staff positions. Olson (2010) provides an inside account of the fight between the CME and ICE for control of the CBOT.
Fig. 14. Expected trading volume over ten years by exchange
and after the merger.

The CBT’s transition matrices (??’s figures ?? and ??) show no consistent trends in post-merger years relative to the earlier years in the sample. Post-merger years with strong performance (contracts showing a high probability of advancing to a higher level of liquidity - such as 2010, where many of the contracts previously trading with annual volumes in the thousands advanced to the tens of thousands) do not stand out relative to the pre-merger era. To the extent that the CBT shows any post-merger trend, it stems from 2010, an especially volatile year for the CBT, where many contracts advanced to trading in the tens of thousands and a particularly large percentage fell back from annual volumes in the tens of thousands.

Unlike the transition matrix for the CBT, the NYMEX shows a clear trend in its transition probabilities. On the rows in figures ?? and ?? indicating trading volume between \( \leq 10 \) and \(< 1,000,000 \) (rows three through five in figure ?? and rows one and two in figure ??), a gradual pattern in volume level transitions emerges that is strong enough, by the end of the decade, to hold with high probability. Starting roughly in 2006, the 10s, 100s, and 1000s became sinks (rows three through five in figures ??). The probability of staying at these levels year on year increases gradually. The probability of rising out of that range falls. At levels immediately above that sink (rows one and two in figures ??), the probability of falling into the sink rises at the clear expense of the probability of staying put or rising. This trend predates, and is uninterrupted by, the CME merger.

Neither transition matrix support the hypothesis that exchange management is an important factor in lifecycle patterns, much less the hypothesis that CME’s systems and network effects boost trading volumes substantially relative to competing exchanges.

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6We chose to present the full transition matrix for the exchange-year comparisons rather than the expected value figures because we believe that the former provide more robust inference. Expected value calculations are sensitive to the initial trading volumes of the contracts that happened to launch after the merger.
Fig. 15. Transition matrix for Markov model of derivatives contract moving between states of annual trading volume by decade - NYMEX before and after CME merger (announced March 2008, finalized September 2009) and before and after switch to electronic trading.°(September 2006) - part 1: transitions given annual volumes ≥ 0 and < 10,000
Fig. 16. Transition matrix for Markov model of derivatives contract moving between states of annual trading volume by decade - NYMEX before and after CME merger (announced March 2008, finalized September 2009) and before and after switch to electronic trading (September 2006) - part 2: transitions given annual volumes $\geq 10,000$
5.2. Recent trends in NYMEX lifecycles and the importance of electronic trading

While they do not show a strong influence from the CME acquisition, figures 15 and 16 may speak to the influence of electronic trading. Pronounced lifecycle trends on the NYMEX seem to begin in 2006, when the exchange abruptly switched from open-outcry to electronic trading. These trends mirror the more general tendency across derivatives markets over the last decade, with more flexible trading at low volumes, more contracts moving up to modest volumes, and a small decline in the probability of trading at high levels.

As mentioned above, it is difficult to separate out the effects of electronic trading per se from those of the whole suite of new tools that arrived with electronic trading, such as clear swaps platforms. NYMEX, within its specialization in energy contracts threatened by Enron, was a pioneer in cleared swaps transactions. In 2003, it launched ClearPort, the platform now used for all of the CME’s cleared swaps trades. ClearPort was marketed as an electronic trading system because it disseminated information about specialized swaps trades via screens [Reuters News, 2003]. However, most cleared swaps transactions are negotiated bilaterally, over the phone. That means that ClearPort trades are supported by electronic infrastructure, but they are not fully electronic. So, while NYMEX’s abrupt shift from pit-based to electronic trading offers a prime opportunity to isolate the influence of electronic trading on derivatives volumes, the advent of cleared swaps complicates both the analysis of NYMEX data and the definition of electronic trading.

To the extent that we can identify the influence of fully electronic trading on its own, then 2006, the year that NYMEX abruptly closed pit trading, should produce discontinuities in ongoing lifecycle trends. 2006 does indeed show evidence of a discontinuity. That evidence is not overwhelming, but it does support the hypothesis that the large changes in derivatives markets in the 2000s were driven specifically by the switch to electronic trading.
6. Derivatives volumes by product type

Figure 17 shows expected value estimates for trading at year ten for each product type. Derivatives based on US treasuries, and, to a lesser extent, derivatives based on natural gas and stock indexes enjoy higher expected volumes than other product types.

The distinction between these strong performers and most of the other product types in the sample is appreciable but does not hold with high probability. The 95 percent probability interval for each of those high expected volume product types sits within the upper tails of the distributions for other product types. The long upper tails that shadow the three top performers are largely a function of uncertainty in estimating the parameter for relatively uncommon product types rather than stellar historical performance. They reflect the fact that we have relatively few observations of derivatives based on wood products, for example, and so our model allows for the possibility that out-of-sample wood products may show high trading volumes in the future.

Major currencies, grains, precious metals, petroleum-related products, and interest rates not derived from US treasuries define the middle of the pack for expected year ten volumes. They are joined by a large group of product types whose expected volumes are subject to great uncertainty, thanks to a scarcity of data.

Among these average performers, plastics and chemicals may be promising niches for innovation. While their estimated expected volumes are subject to considerable uncertainty, the data points we have indicate that they are relatively strong performers.

On the low end of our expected year ten volume estimates are single-stock futures\textsuperscript{7} and weather derivatives. Both are relatively new product

\textsuperscript{7}This is consistent with figure 14 which shows OneChicago, the exchange specializing in single-stock futures as a relative under-performer in expected trading volume at year ten.
Fig. 17. Expected trading volume over ten years by product type.
Fig. 18. Probability of transition from annual volume in the hundreds to annual volume in the thousands (left) and from annual volume in the thousands to annual volume tens of thousands (right) by product type
Fig. 19. Probability of transition from annual volume in the hundreds to annual volume in the thousands (left) and from annual volume in the thousands to annual volume tens of thousands (right) by product type
types with many correlated contracts launched in recent years. Interestingly, these contract types appear to under-perform relative to some product types like yield insurance and emissions in which trading was effectively smothered by external events (the proliferation of subsidized crop insurance in the US in the case of yield insurance and the failure of the US to consistently promote cap-and-trade legislation in the case of emissions).

Interestingly, single-stock futures and weather derivatives were more likely than most other product types to climb up from low levels of trading volume. Figures 18 and 19 present the probability of any contract moving to higher levels of annual trading volume for each product type in the sample. Single-stock futures are particularly likely to recover from years of zero trading volume and weather derivatives are particularly likely to move up to annual trading volumes in the thousands. (See ??’s figures 25 and 26 for additional details.) Insofar as these product types move fluidly up and down from low levels of annual trading volumes they are representative of recent trends across derivatives markets.

7. Conclusions

In this article we have presented a comprehensive analysis of trading volumes for derivatives reported to exchanges in the United States. Looking across decades, exchanges, and product types we see multiple trends that challenge or significantly modify findings of existing studies.

While a larger percentage of contracts had little or no volume in any given year of the 2000s, contracts did not fail at the high rates noted in previous analyses. Instead, they remained at low levels of trading until they were needed, transitioning back into active trading with greater probability than in previous decades. Interestingly, this flexibility from low levels of trading meant that the long term outlook for a new contract did not erode despite remarkable levels of new contract innovation. During the 2000s the expected
volume of a new contract after ten years was above that of the 1990s and within the range of previous decades. On balance, the explosion of innovation catalyzed by electronic trading did not hurt the prospects for the marginal contract.

We find that expected year ten trading volumes varied more decade to decade than from exchange to exchange or product type to product type. In particular, the lifecycle of a derivative on any given exchange was largely indistinguishable from that on any other, with the likely exception of OneChicago, which specializes in single-stock futures.

We find evidence that the decadal changes in derivative lifecycles were driven by the switch to electronic trading rather than the consolidation of exchanges by looking at trends on the New York Mercantile Exchange. The effects of electronic trading are difficult to separate from the the related innovation of cleared swaps. However, trends in NYMEX volumes following the 2006 launch of widespread electronic trading tentatively support the hypothesis that electronic trading is indeed driving recent trends in derivatives lifecycles across all sampled markets.

7.1. The statistical characteristics of derivative volumes

In addition to facilitating quick distributional comparisons across various contract groupings (decade, exchange, and product type), our framework (Markov models) allows us to explore some basic questions about derivative markets in general. For example, based on our Markov models it appears that trading volumes do not follow a normal or log-normal random walk over time. In figures 4 and 5 it is clear that the probability of remaining at a given level of annual volume varies dramatically from one level to the next. These differences hold with greater than 95 percent probability as do variations in the volume dynamics across time (indicating that normal or log-normal models of trading volume would suffer from stationarity problems as well). Furthermore, switches to higher and lower levels of trading are often not
symmetric. In particular, an outright crash to zero trading volume appears more likely than would be predicted by a symmetrically distributed random walk.

However, our analysis does affirm the common observation that it is unusual for a contract to experience initial popularity and to crash subsequently (Johnston and McConnell 1989). After reaching a trading volume in the tens of thousands, the probability that a contract will have annual trading volume of zero in the subsequent year drops appreciably.

7.2. Optimal contract innovation

Much of the literature on derivative innovation focuses on the problem of choosing the optimal derivatives contract to launch next. This analysis does not directly address that question, but it does present some trends relevant to previous theoretical work which could inform further investigation.

One interpretation of Duffie and Jackson (1989) provides that revenue maximizing marginal innovations are uncorrelated with existing contracts. However, recent trends suggest that one of the key assumptions underlying this finding only holds weakly. Historically, correlated contract innovations have not shown diminishing marginal volumes. In general, innovation in derivatives markets has exploded in the last decade seemingly without dragging down expected trading volumes at year ten. Indeed, some of the highest volume product types (in expected volume terms) are highly correlated both to other derivatives of their product category but also to the average returns of the economy as a whole (US treasuries and stock indexes).

Tashjian and Weissman (1995) explains the proliferation of correlated (and often redundant) contracts as a form of price discrimination. They assume, that an exchange can charge higher fees on the transaction for parties with larger and more concentrated exposure to a given underlying index. This framework for understanding product innovation holds up well in light of recent trends. As we have discussed, many recently launched contracts are
cleared swaps, which tend to be more specialized than conventional futures or options. As Tashjian and Weissman (1995) predicted, exchanges charge a substantial premium on these specialized transactions. Fees on CME’s ClearPort platform were more than 350 percent those on conventional electronic futures trades as of late 2012 (CME Group 2012). However, Tashjian and Weissman (1995) suggested that exchanges would charge more for single-asset-based derivatives (such as gold) than for derivatives that represented the holding of multi-product firms (like the crack-spreads used to reproduce petroleum refiners’ returns). In practice, cleared-swaps contracts, with their relatively high fees, appear to be biased toward the latter.

A third explanation of recent patterns in derivative innovation is psychological. Based on Tversky, Kahneman, et al. (1981), Shiller (1994) suggests that a hedge “appears more attractive when it’s presented as the elimination of risk rather than when it is described as the reduction of risk.” This tendency to overvalue hedges tailored to the needs of specific firms may explain the proliferation of correlated contracts (and their relative success) above and beyond the price discrimination suggested in Tashjian and Weissman (1995).

7.3. What kind of economic goods are derivatives?

The present analysis could also suggest new ways of understanding the economic value of derivatives. If indeed derivatives are simply contingent contracts that move cash flows across time and states of nature, then they should derive all their value from the way that they mesh with hedger’s risk preferences. It follows from that idea, that if risk preferences remain stable over time, then derivative trading patterns should also remain stable.

But trading patterns have not been stable over the last decade. Instead, they bear a striking qualitative resemblance to those of information goods, particularly media:

- Each class of economic goods was, until recently, simple to classify: normal goods with elastic demand and network effects.
• Starting a new derivatives market, just like producing a new music album or launching a magazine, was a high risk, high reward proposition.
• In the last decade both saw paradigm shifts in their marginal cost structure (i.e. there were fundamental changes in supply).
• At the same time, new technologies allowed consumers ubiquitous access to goods (i.e. there were also fundamental changes in demand).
• After those twin revolutions, markets:
  - Rewarded specialty products more than in the past;
  - Hosted blockbusters as large as/larger than ever;
  - Did not offer the same opportunities for strong but less-than-blockbuster products.

In media (and informational goods more generally) this transition has upended many long-profitable business models and catalyzed a great deal of innovation. In derivatives it has certainly opened up the door to many new entrants like ICE, which now is one of two large futures exchanges in the US today. But it is not clear whether those new entrants are using fundamentally new business models.

How strong is the parallel? Should economists study derivatives alongside informational goods? What does the possible connection suggest for the future of derivatives? We believe that these questions provide a solid foundation for future research.

References


contracts per day in September 2012, up 16 percent from August 2012. Thanks to Silla Brush of Bloomberg for directing us to this press release.


Table 2: Priors on transition between volume states - with annual trading volume state in year $t$ denoted by row, trading volume state in year $t$ denoted by column

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Fig. 20. Transition matrix for Markov model of derivatives contract moving between states of annual trading volume by exchange - part 1: transitions given annual volumes $\geq 0$ and $< 10$
Fig. 21. Transition matrix for Markov model of derivatives contract moving between states of annual trading volume by exchange - part 2: transitions given annual volumes $\geq 10$ and $< 1,000$
Fig. 22. Transition matrix for Markov model of derivatives contract moving between states of annual trading volume by exchange - part 3: transitions given annual volumes ≥ 1000 and < 10,000
Fig. 23. Transition matrix for Markov model of derivatives contract moving between states of annual trading volume by exchange - part 4: transitions given annual volumes ≥ 10,000 and < 1,000,000
Fig. 24. Transition matrix for Markov model of derivatives contract moving between states of annual trading volume by exchange - part 5: transitions given annual volumes $\geq 1,000,000$
Fig. 25. Transition matrix for Markov model of derivatives contract moving between states of annual trading volume by product type - part 1: transitions given annual volumes ≥ 0 and < 10,000
Fig. 26. Transition matrix for Markov model of derivatives contract moving between states of annual trading volume by product type - part 2: transitions given annual volumes ≥ 10 and < 1,000
Fig. 27. Transition matrix for Markov model of derivatives contract moving between states of annual trading volume by product type - part 3: transitions given annual volumes $\geq 1000$ and $< 10,000$
Fig. 28. Transition matrix for Markov model of derivatives contract moving between states of annual trading volume by product type - part 4: transitions given annual volumes $\geq 10,000$ and $< 1,000,000$
Fig. 29. Transition matrix for Markov model of derivatives contract moving between states of annual trading volume by product type - part 5: transitions given annual volumes ≥ 1,000,000