UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION

OPEN MEETING OF THE COMMISSION TO CONSIDER A SUPPLEMENTAL PROPOSAL TO AUTOMATED TRADING REGULATION

Washington, D.C.

Friday, November 4, 2016

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2	Commissioners:
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5	COMMISSIONER J. CHRISTOPHER GIANCARLO
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10	Staff Presentation: Supplemental Notice of
11	Proposed Rulemaking - Regulation Automated Trading:
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1 PARTICIPANTS (CONT'D): MICHAEL PENICK Office of the Chief Economist BRIAN ROBINSON Division of Market Oversight * * * * * б

1	PROCEEDINGS
2	(10:00 a.m.)
3	CHAIRMAN MASSAD: Good morning. This
4	meeting will come to order. This is a public
5	meeting of the Commodity Futures Trading
6	Commission. I'd like to welcome members of the
7	public, market participants and members of the
8	media, as well as those taking part on the phone
9	or via webcast. I'm pleased to be joined by my
10	colleagues Commissioner Sharon Bowen and
11	Commissioner Chris Giancarlo. Today we gather to
12	consider a supplemental proposal related to
13	Regulation AT, our proposed rule to address the
14	increased use of automated trading in the markets.
15	As we all know, automated trading now
16	dominates the markets we oversee. More than 70
17	percent of trading in futures is now automated.
18	And this is not just in financial futures. This
19	is in physical commodity futures as well. And our
20	markets have fundamentally changed as a result.
21	We've gone, in just a few years, from the days of
22	open outcry pits where floor traders jostled elbow

1	to elbow to make trades to a machine-dominated
2	market, where today a millisecond is considered
3	slow. In fact, the new measure is a microsecond.
4	In the time it would take a trader, say, to hang
5	up the phone and signal a bid with his hands in
6	the pit, today's machines can probably generate
7	anywhere from 1,600 to 2,000 orders. In fact, in
8	the time it has taken me to read this part of my
9	opening statement, which is about a minute, more
10	than 60 million microseconds have passed, enough
11	time for probably 50,000 orders.
12	But in another respect our markets have
12 13	But in another respect our markets have not changed at all. Farmers, ranchers,
13	not changed at all. Farmers, ranchers,
13 14	not changed at all. Farmers, ranchers, manufacturers, exporters, businesses of all types
13 14 15	not changed at all. Farmers, ranchers, manufacturers, exporters, businesses of all types still depend on these markets to hedge routine
13 14 15 16	not changed at all. Farmers, ranchers, manufacturers, exporters, businesses of all types still depend on these markets to hedge routine risk and engage in price discovery. Whether it is
13 14 15 16 17	not changed at all. Farmers, ranchers, manufacturers, exporters, businesses of all types still depend on these markets to hedge routine risk and engage in price discovery. Whether it is corn or copper, crude oil or cocoa, equities or
13 14 15 16 17 18	not changed at all. Farmers, ranchers, manufacturers, exporters, businesses of all types still depend on these markets to hedge routine risk and engage in price discovery. Whether it is corn or copper, crude oil or cocoa, equities or treasuries, Japanese yen or British pounds,
13 14 15 16 17 18 19	not changed at all. Farmers, ranchers, manufacturers, exporters, businesses of all types still depend on these markets to hedge routine risk and engage in price discovery. Whether it is corn or copper, crude oil or cocoa, equities or treasuries, Japanese yen or British pounds, businesses need these markets. They need them to

greater because businesses operate worldwide.
 Commodity markets are global and products are more
 diverse. Market participants look to us to make
 sure these markets operate with integrity. And so
 while the landscape has changed dramatically, our
 mission has stayed the same.

And let me just say that I meet with 7 8 market participants of all types, and I find that 9 traditional end-users, such as those from the 10 agricultural community in particular, are 11 concerned about the effects of automated trading 12 in these markets today. So it's especially 13 important for us to be able to respond to the 14 concerns of those who are not, let's say the so-called "flash boys," and are only moving at 15 16 human speed.

Today our regulations have not kept up with our modern markets. And today's proposal is a part of what we need to do to keep our regulatory system up to date, just as you need updates periodically for your phone's operating system. б

1 There are other things we need to do to 2 modernize our regulatory oversight, and in 3 particular to engage in adequate surveillance of 4 modern trading methods. We must continue to 5 enhance our ability to receive and analyze message and other types of data. We must have adequate б 7 data on trading and related cash markets. And 8 regulators must cooperate because markets are 9 increasingly linked. So that's why we are here 10 today. Our proposal is designed to minimize the 11 risk of disruption and other problems that can be caused by automated trading, algorithmic trading, 12 13 and to make sure we have the tools to deal with 14 those problems should they occur. 15 It requires reasonable controls, using a 16 principles-based approach that would codify many 17 industry best practices. But it does not prescribe the parameters or limits of such 18 controls because we know how diverse market 19 20 participants can be. And we believe they are the ones who should determine those specifics. 21 22 It requires testing and monitoring of

1 algorithms. It requires the preservation of 2 source code and other records, the equivalent of 3 the records that those trading at human speed have 4 preserved for years. And it ensures that we would 5 have access to such records when necessary, just as for years we have reviewed the records of the б 7 traders who operate at human speed. In the last 8 year we received significant feedback on the 9 proposal that the Commission unanimously approved 10 in November of last year. And today's 11 supplemental proposal makes a number of changes to 12 that initial measure. They reflect the 13 suggestions and comments we have received. 14 The changes we will consider today 15 modify the basic risk control requirements, so 16 that we achieve the proper coverage in an 17 efficient manner. They modify the registration requirement, so that it focuses instead on the 18 19 larger participants. They lessen some of the 20 reporting requirements while still requiring a certification of compliance. And they address the 21 22 concerns raised about access to source code. On

that issue the proposal requires the Commission
 itself to make the decision to seek access to
 source code. No staff member can do so without
 Commission approval.

5 This is a significant departure from our standard practice which allows staff to seek б access to information that registrants are 7 8 required to preserve without a subpoena or 9 specific Commission authorization. Now the 10 Commission could authorize the staff to seek such 11 access either by means of a subpoena or a special 12 call. That is, the process we are proposing will 13 require the same level of Commission review that 14 comes with the issuance of a subpoena, even if it 15 is for surveillance purposes. Our proposal also 16 describes the steps we can take to preserve the 17 confidentiality of source code. Now our staff will highlight these and the other changes in more 18 19 detail in a moment and I want to express my great 20 appreciation to all of them for the hard work on this rule. You'll hear from several in a moment. 21 22 There are many others who have also participated.

1 Let me just conclude by saying we have 2 long engaged in surveillance that involves 3 reviewing information that has significant proprietary value; information on trading 4 5 strategies, including activities of traders in related markets, information that would go to б whether a position truly is a bona fide hedge, 7 8 such as purchase or supply commitments of related 9 cash commodities, inventory levels, production expectations and so forth. 10 11 We should not have a regulatory regime where those who still trade at human speed are 12 13 subject to effective surveillance, but those who 14 use machines are not. Our rules should not favor one method over another. And nobody should be 15 able to hide behind their machines. 16 17 Thank you. Now let me recognize Commissioner Bowen for her opening remarks. 18 19 COMMISSIONER BOWEN: Thank you. Good 20 morning. I'm glad to be here this morning as the Commission considers the supplemental proposal for 21

22 rulemaking in automated trading. I've said

1 several times before that I'm a believer in two 2 things -- the need to enhance our rules to ensure 3 that they are appropriately rigorous and 4 protective and to find a rule that works and that 5 can be effectively implemented. I'm pleased to say that I believe that today's release does both. б 7 So I want to commend our staff for your hard work on this proposal. Following significant 8 9 engagement with a variety of stakeholders, from 10 exchanges, proprietary traders to advocates of 11 financial reform, we're making several important 12 revisions to our proposed rule on automated 13 trading. 14 Of these changes there are two in 15 particular I want to flag. First, we are revising 16 our registration regime to better focus our attention and regulations on the firms responsible 17 for a substantial amount of automated trading in 18 19 our markets. Under this proposal firms that use 20 Direct Electronic Access, or DEA, to connect to

22 register. Instead, only those firms which use DEA

our markets will not automatically have to

21

and also average 20,000 or more trades each day
 over a six-month period will be required to
 register.

4 It only seems appropriate that firms 5 responsible for a substantial portion of our 6 markets should have heightened trading regulations 7 than small firms who only enter a handful of 8 trades a day.

9 While a one-size-fits-all system may work in some cases, I believe it will be unduly 10 burdensome to small firms to require that anyone 11 who uses DEA automatically has to register. By 12 13 offering a specific threshold for registration, 14 however, it is critical that we pick the right 15 number. I therefore am looking forward to 16 comments from market participants on whether 17 20,000 trades per day is the right level. Is it too high? Is it too low? Given the interest in 18 19 our previous proposal and registration that has 20 engendered in the past, I'm pretty sure that there will be a spirited debate as to what the proper 21 22 threshold should be.

1 While small firms with small volumes would not be required to register, it is not the 2 3 case that their trades will be unregulated. In fact, the second major revision of today's 4 5 proposal will require that all electronic trading, algorithmic as well as non-algorithmic, will have б two separate layers of pre-trade risk controls on 7 it. As a result, under this proposal we will be 8 9 ensuring that every single electronic trade in our 10 markets is subject to two levels of pre-trade risk 11 controls without exception. 12 Given the constant technological

13 innovations and redesigns involving algo trading I 14 believe having two levels of risk controls is not 15 only the most prudent course of action, but it's 16 also a critical protection against market 17 malfunction harming investors in our broader 18 economy.

As I've said before however, I believe this regulation is merely a first cut. Having looked at this issue for nearly a year, I have some doubts as to whether we're doing enough to

1 ensure that all market participants, especially end-users in our markets, are being given a level 2 3 playing field at present, due to the proliferation 4 of algo trading. I therefore believe that we 5 should consider instituting pilot programs in certain small sections of the market that can test б the effects of additional and more substantial 7 restrictions on algo trading. Please note I do 8 9 not believe it is time to place more rigorous 10 restrictions in algo trading in all the markets we 11 regulate. Instead, I only believe that we should see whether there are some markets where a 12 13 significant percentage of end-users are interested 14 in establishing greater monitoring and regulation 15 of algo trading.

16 If one or two such markets exist, then 17 those markets could be candidates for a tailored 18 pilot program to gather data on the effects of 19 algo trading on their markets. We could then gain 20 important insight on the effects of new market 21 dynamics that can change or evolve. If you are an 22 end-user and believe that your market would

benefit from such a tailored pilot program, I
 encourage you to convey that message to the
 Commission.

4 I've had the pleasure of meeting with 5 some members of the National Cattlemen's Beef Association earlier this year and more recently. б They informed me that they believe algo trading is 7 having a substantial impact on livestock markets. 8 9 And they are interested in gaining more data on 10 how algo trading is influencing livestock prices. 11 I share the desire for more information, both as 12 to whether this rule is regarded as being a step 13 in the right direction and about what, if any, 14 effects algo trading is having on our markets. If 15 an observer has any issue with any part of this 16 rule, especially if you feel it's too weak, I sincerely hope that you will lay out your concerns 17 in detail and let us know how we can improve it. 18 19 Finally, I want to thank stakeholders, 20 particularly several industry groups, for their 21 engagement with the Commission since we released 22 our proposal. I was very happy to learn that many

aspects of this proposal, including the idea of 1 2 requiring pre-trade risk controls on all 3 electronic trades were suggested by members of the 4 industry. We have notice-and-comment requirements 5 for many reasons -- increased transparency, an opportunity for public comment, and of course to б 7 set procedural strictures on government. But one 8 of the reasons undergirding our system of 9 notice-and-comment is the idea that regulators do not have all the answers all of the time. And 10 11 there is a role for market participants to play 12 during the regulatory process. The fact that 13 industry participants were able to devise and 14 endorse a broad regulatory requirement on all 15 automated trading is to be commended. Thank you, and I look forward to today's presentation and 16 17 ongoing dialogue. 18 CHAIRMAN MASSAD: Thank you, 19 Commissioner Bowen. Let me now turn to Commissioner Giancarlo. 20 COMMISSIONER GIANCARLO: Thank you, 21 22 Chairman and thank you Commissioner Bowen. Good

morning, everyone. Thank you to the staff for being here. And I look forward very much to your presentation. What I'd like to do is hold back my oral statement until I've had a chance to hear your presentation and ask you a few questions and thereafter I'll give my statement before the vote, thank you.

8 CHAIRMAN MASSAD: Okay, thank you. All 9 right, in a few moments I'll ask the staff to make a presentation to the Commission on the 10 11 supplemental proposal. And after the presentation 12 the floor will be open for questions and comments 13 from each of the Commissioners. Following the 14 close of the Commission's discussion, I expect 15 that we will take a vote on the staff proposal as presented. The final vote conducted in this 16 17 public meeting will be a recorded vote. The result of the vote approving the issuance of the 18 19 supplemental proposal, should that be the outcome, will be included with that document when it is 20 published in the Federal Register. At this point 21 22 I ask for the Commission's unanimous consent to

allow staff to make technical corrections to the
 document that may be approved today, assuming it
 is approved, prior to sending it to the Federal
 Register.

5 Without objection, it is so ordered. Okay, at this time I would like to welcome the б 7 following staff for their presentations on the 8 supplemental proposal to the Commission's 9 automated trading regulation. First, Vince 10 McGonagle, Director of the Division of Market 11 Oversight. And also from the Division of Market 12 Oversight, we have Marilee Dahlman, Sebastian 13 Pujol and Joseph Otchin. Please proceed. 14 MR. PUJOL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and 15 good morning, Commissioners. Staff of the 16 Division of Market Oversight is pleased to present 17 today, a supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking to amend and streamline the 18 19 Commission's rules for Regulation AT. Before 20 beginning, I'd like to thank the divisions and offices of Market Oversight, Enforcement, General 21 22 Counsel and Chief Economist for their hard work in

completing this supplemental. I'd particularly
 like to acknowledge Mike Penick, Richard Haynes,
 John Dunfee, Carlin Metzger, Brian Robinson,
 Andrew Ridenour, Joe Otchin and Marilee Dahlman,
 as members of the rulemaking team.

I'd also like to thank senior staff from б 7 the Division of Market Oversight, including Vince McGonagle and Rachel Berdansky for their continued 8 9 support of our efforts. Staff's presentation 10 today will focus on three areas. First, we'll 11 briefly discuss Regulation AT's development, and its policy objectives. Second, we'll summarize 12 13 the substantive content of the supplemental, 14 focusing on key areas where staff recommends changes to the NPRM to address public comments and 15 concerns. Finally, my colleagues Marilee and Joe 16 will provide greater detail regarding changes to 17 the risk control framework and to the definition 18 19 of AT Person in today's supplemental. 20 Regulation AT is a comprehensive effort

21 to reduce risk in algorithmic order origination22 and electronic trade execution on all U.S. futures

1	exchanges. The proposed rules, both in the NPRM
2	and in today's supplemental, modernize the
3	Commission's regulatory regime, promote the safety
4	and soundness of trading and seek to keep pace
5	with evolving market technologies. To accomplish
6	these aims Regulation AT focuses specifically on
7	registration, pre-trade risk controls, testing,
8	supervision, recordkeeping and transparency in
9	algorithmic and electronic trading.
10	The Commission's consideration of
11	standards in these areas has included numerous
12	opportunities for public comment and input. As
13	early as 2011, the Commission's Technology
14	Advisory Committee developed recommendations for
15	pre-trade risk controls at the trading firm,
16	clearing firm and exchange levels. In 2013, the
17	Commission published its concept release on risk
18	controls and system safeguards, which provided a
19	comprehensive discussion of industry best
20	practices, Commission regulations and work by
21	other U.S. and foreign regulators. In December of
22	2015, the Commission published the NPRM for

Regulation AT. And finally, in June of this year
 Commission staff held a day-long public roundtable
 to discuss important aspects of the proposed rules
 and to provide additional opportunities for public
 comment.

б As part of this staff process the 7 Commission also reopened the comment period for 8 Regulation AT. I'd like to close this overview by 9 noting that today's supplemental is a continuation 10 of the NPRM procedurally. Therefore, all rules 11 proposed in the NPRM remain under consideration as originally proposed unless specifically amended by 12 13 the supplemental. Accordingly, the remainder of 14 staff's presentation will focus on areas where the 15 supplemental modifies the Commission's original 16 proposal.

17 The supplemental amends proposed 18 Regulation AT in several respects, including four 19 which we will summarize this morning. First, it 20 revises the proposed risk control framework so 21 that controls are required only at two levels, 22 rather than three as originally proposed. Second,

1	the supplemental adds a volume-based test to the
2	criteria for determining who is an AT Person,
3	including who must register as a new floor trader.
4	Third, the supplemental eliminates annual
5	reporting requirements that would have been
6	applicable to AT Persons and FCMs. Fourth, and
7	finally, the supplemental addresses access to
8	algorithmic trading source code by proposing a new
9	and heightened process that requires Commission
10	authorization for any staff access to source code.
11	We'll take each of these changes in
12	turn. First, as a threshold matter, Regulation AT
12 13	turn. First, as a threshold matter, Regulation AT defines a new category of market participants, AT
13	defines a new category of market participants, AT
13 14	defines a new category of market participants, AT Persons, and requires pre-trade risk controls,
13 14 15	defines a new category of market participants, AT Persons, and requires pre-trade risk controls, testing, recordkeeping and other safeguards around
13 14 15 16	defines a new category of market participants, AT Persons, and requires pre-trade risk controls, testing, recordkeeping and other safeguards around their algorithmic trading. The NPRM proposed
13 14 15 16 17	defines a new category of market participants, AT Persons, and requires pre-trade risk controls, testing, recordkeeping and other safeguards around their algorithmic trading. The NPRM proposed requiring risk controls at three levels AT
13 14 15 16 17 18	defines a new category of market participants, AT Persons, and requires pre-trade risk controls, testing, recordkeeping and other safeguards around their algorithmic trading. The NPRM proposed requiring risk controls at three levels AT Person, FCM and DCM. Many commenters however,
13 14 15 16 17 18 19	defines a new category of market participants, AT Persons, and requires pre-trade risk controls, testing, recordkeeping and other safeguards around their algorithmic trading. The NPRM proposed requiring risk controls at three levels AT Person, FCM and DCM. Many commenters however, asserted that a two-level structure would be

structure. Risk controls would be set at the
 level, first, of an AT Person or its FCM and,
 second, at the DCM.

4 The supplemental also provides 5 flexibility by allowing AT Persons who do not wish to operate their own pre-trade risk controls to б delegate that responsibility to their FCM. The 7 8 NPRM also proposed requiring risk controls only 9 with respect to the algorithmic trading of AT 10 Persons. In contrast, the supplemental addresses 11 not only algorithmic trading, but also electronic 12 trading. In this regard, the supplemental is 13 again responsive to public comments indicating 14 that all electronic trading presents potential risks and should pass through appropriate 15 16 pre-trade controls.

17 A second area of focus is that 18 Regulation AT requires registration of certain 19 market participants who are not already registered 20 with the Commission. Such participants would 21 register as floor traders and would also be 22 required to become members of a registered futures

association. Together with existing registrants
 engaged in algorithmic trading, new floor traders
 would be considered AT Persons and be subject to
 the proposed rules. The NPRM specified
 proprietary, algorithmic trading through direct
 access as registration criteria for new floor
 traders.

8 The supplemental adds a trading volume 9 test to these proposed criteria. This amendment 10 responds to concerns that the NPRM would have 11 imposed registration and AT Person status on too 12 large a population of market participants. The 13 supplemental also applies this same trading volume 14 test to existing registrants to determine whether they are also AT Persons. Staff estimates that 15 16 the proposed rules would result in approximately 17 120 AT Persons, including some 70 who are already registered with the Commission in some capacity. 18 19 Third, the NPRM proposed that FCMs and 20 AT Persons must provide DCMs with annual reports 21 regarding their compliance with Regulation AT. 22 The NPRM also required DCMs to establish programs

1 for effective review of such reports. In 2 response, the Commission received comments 3 indicating that the annual reports would be an 4 overly burdensome requirement with little benefit 5 in mitigating risks associated with algorithmic trading. Staff evaluated these comments and б 7 recommends that the Commission replace the NPRM's 8 reporting requirements with a streamlined simpler 9 annual certification process. 10 To help ensure effective implementation 11 of risk controls and other measures required by the proposed rules, staff also recommends that the 12 Commission leverage the DCM's role as front line

13 14 regulators and require that they establish programs for effective periodic review of AT 15 Persons' and FCM's compliance with Regulation AT. 16 17 Finally, source code -- the NPRM's 18 proposal for recordkeeping and access to source 19 code garnered significant attention from 20 commenters, including many who were concerned 21 about the confidentiality and information security 22 of source code if brought on-site to the

Commission. To begin this discussion, staff would 1 2 like to emphasize that the supplemental proposes 3 significant revisions to the Commission's original 4 proposal. These revisions provide for a unique 5 and heightened protections around access to source code, including provisions that would make source б code available to staff only through subpoena or 7 8 special call authorized by the Commission.

9 As background, the NPRM proposed new recordkeeping rules to make clear that AT Persons 10 11 must maintain copies of their source code. The NPRM also required that AT Persons make records 12 13 available in accordance with Commission Regulation 14 1.31, which provides that records must be produced 15 to any representative of the Commission upon 16 request. The rules proposed in the NPRM are consistent with the Commission's traditional 17 statutory and regulatory authority governing 18 19 access to books and records. Staff notes, for 20 example, that the CEA requires registrants and registered entities to maintain books and records 21 22 and to provide for prompt access to such records

by the Commission and its staff in the numerous
 provisions.

These sections include nearly identical language stating that registrants and registered entities must keep books and records in such form and manner and for such period of time as may be required by the Commission and shall keep such books and records open to inspection by any representative of the Commission.

10 Some commenters may have misconstrued 11 the NPRM to require more than intended. For 12 example, the NPRM did not require the routine 13 transfer of all source code to the Commission or 14 other party for centralized storage. As noted 15 previously, other commenters raised confidentiality, information security, and process 16 17 concerns regarding source code on Commission 18 premises. 19 Staff has taken these comments seriously

20 and has endeavored to address the Commission's 21 regulatory interest, while at the same time 22 respecting AT Persons' concern for their source

1	code. Most importantly, the supplemental
2	transfers access to source code from the general
3	books and records provisions of Regulation 1.31
4	that I described previously to a new proposed
5	Regulation 1.84. Proposed 1.84 clearly
б	articulates that staff's access to source code is
7	limited to subpoena or special call, a new
8	heightened procedure for source code and related
9	records. Execution of a special call must be
10	authorized by the Commission itself.
11	An execution would be limited to the
12	director of the Division of Market Oversight, once
13	authorized by the Commission. The special call's
14	nexus to market oversight emphasizes proposed
15	regulation 1.84's use in understanding markets and
16	market events, a CFTC function that is distinct
17	from the investigative subpoena process. Proposed
18	1.84 also includes other important provisions,
19	including a requirement that AT Persons keep
20	records of the log files generated in the ordinary
21	course of their algorithmic trading systems.
22	Absent subpoena, access to such log files would

1 also be limited to special call authorized by the 2 Commission. As with other regulatory records, 3 both source code and log files would be required to be maintained for five years. 4 5 Finally, as an additional protection, proposed 1.84 emphasizes in the regulatory text б the protections -- the confidentiality protections 7 -- embedded in the Commodity Exchange Act and 8 9 Commission regulations and emphasizes that section 8(a) of the Act would apply to source code and to 10 log files. 11 12 I'll now turn the presentation over to 13 my colleagues Marilee and Joe for a more detailed 14 description of two items. First, the 15 supplemental's revised risk control framework and 16 second, its new volume threshold test. Thank you. 17 MS. DAHLMAN: As Sebastian indicated, the supplemental revises the overall framework for 18 19 risk controls. The NPRM imposed pre-trade risk 20 control and other requirements at three levels --AT Persons, FCMs and DCMs. The NPRM allowed the 21 22 relevant entity discretion in the design and

1 parameters of the controls and the supplemental 2 continues to provide that discretion. However, 3 the supplemental proposes a risk control framework 4 with controls at two, rather than three, levels. 5 At the first level controls must be implemented by either the AT Person or its FCM. DCMs would б implement risk controls at the second level. 7 8 This revised structure is intended to 9 prevent and mitigate potential market disruptions, 10 while at the same time responding to concerns 11 about the complexity of the risk control framework and overall costs of compliance. By requiring two 12 13 levels of risk controls, failures at one level 14 will have a backstop, thereby reducing the possibility of a trading disruption. 15 At the first level, whether the AT 16 Person or FCM implements the risk controls depends 17 on whether the order is originated by an AT Person 18 19 or a non-AT Person market participant and whether 20 the AT Person has delegated compliance to its FCM. Specifically, Section 1.80 requires AT Persons to 21 22 implement risk control measures on their orders,

but new section 1.80(d) allows an AT Person to
 delegate compliance with risk control requirements
 to its executing FCM.

The supplemental's proposed rules do not 4 5 require the FCM to accept the delegation. If the FCM declines, the AT Person must implement the б 7 risk controls itself. As to orders not 8 originating with AT Persons, FCMs are required to 9 implement risk controls on those non-AT Person 10 customer orders. For trading firms that prefer to 11 implement their own risk controls rather than leave the implementation of such measures to their 12 13 FCM, the supplemental adds to the definition of AT 14 Person a provision that allows a market 15 participant to voluntarily elect to become an AT 16 Person.

Another important revision to the risk control structure is that both levels of risk controls now apply to electronic trading rather than only to algorithmic trading. Specifically, pursuant to new section 1.80(g), AT Persons must apply their risk controls and other measures

1 through electronic trading. In addition, the 2 proposed rules applicable to FCMs and DCMs have 3 been revised to generally apply to electronic 4 trading. Paired with these rule changes, the 5 supplemental proposes a new defined term -electronic trading -- and defined term, electronic б trading order message. As a whole, the revised 7 8 risk control framework addresses concerns 9 regarding market disruptions that could arise from 10 electronic trading, while also preserving a focus 11 on the unique risks of algorithmic trading in 12 modern markets. 13 Finally, the supplemental changes 14 terminology in Regulation AT relating to FCMs. In 15 the NPRM, proposed risk control and reporting 16 rules apply to clearing member FCMs. Now such rules apply to executing FCMs in order to respond 17 to the concern that those firms are better 18 19 positioned to apply risk controls on a pre-trade

20 basis.

21 MR. OTCHIN: The NPRM proposed requiring22 persons to register as new floor traders if they

1 engaged in proprietary algorithmic trading through 2 direct electronic access on a DCM. The 3 supplemental retains these requirements, but also 4 incorporates a volume-based quantitative test for 5 registration as a new floor trader. This proposal responds to commenter concerns that the NPRM б 7 required too large a population of market 8 participants to register with the Commission. In 9 addition to applying to new floor traders, the 10 proposed volume threshold test would also apply to 11 current Commission registrants to help define 12 whether they are AT Persons. The volume threshold test involves 13 14 quantitative metrics based on a market 15 participant's average daily trading volume across all products. Specifically, supplemental proposed 16 17 section 1.3(x)(2) requires potential AT Persons to determine whether they trade at least 20,000 18 19 contracts on average per day over a six-month 20 period. The calculation would include contracts that potential AT Persons trade for their own 21 22 account, the accounts of customers, or both. In

1 addition, AT Persons would be required to 2 calculate their average daily trading volume 3 across all products on the electronic trading 4 facilities of all DCMs on which they trade. 5 Pursuant to supplemental proposed section 1.3(xxxx), a market participant may fall б 7 under the definition of AT Person in one of three 8 ways. 9 First, the category of AT Persons 10 includes market participants currently registered 11 or required to be registered with the Commission 12 that engage in algorithmic trading and satisfy the 13 volume threshold test. 14 Second, AT Persons include new floor 15 traders, i.e., market participants not currently 16 registered with the Commission that engage in 17 algorithmic trading, utilize direct electronic access, and satisfy the volume threshold test. 18 19 Third, a person who does not satisfy 20 either of the other two prongs of the AT Person 21 definition may nevertheless elect to become an AT 22 Person, provided that such person registers as a

1 floor trader and complies with all requirements of 2 AT Persons pursuant to Commission regulations. 3 The volume threshold test is intended to facilitate the identification of AT Persons 4 5 through the use of clear numerical standards that can be easily calculated by market participants б and are verifiable in the Commission's data. 7 8 Staff believes that the volume threshold test is 9 an appropriate vehicle to define the scope of AT Persons. Staff also believes that the proposed 10 11 volume threshold test best matches the goals of AT Person regulation, including risk controls, 12 13 recordkeeping and testing and monitoring 14 requirements that would prevent and reduce the 15 risk of market disruption caused by technological malfunction or other error. Staff estimates that 16 the proposed volume-based criteria would result in 17 approximately 120 AT Persons, including 18 19 approximately 70 market participants who are 20 already registered with the Commission in some 21 capacity and approximately 50 new registrants. 22 MR. PUJOL: Thank you, Joe. Mr.

Chairman, and Commissioners, this concludes
 staff's presentation and summary of the
 supplemental NPRM. We would be happy to answer
 any questions you may have of us, and we thank you
 again for your time and consideration.

б CHAIRMAN MASSAD: Okay. Well thank you 7 Sebastian, Joe and Marilee. Let me also note, in 8 addition to the representatives of the Division of 9 Market Oversight, we have John Dunfee from the 10 Office of General Counsel and Michael Penick from the Office of the Chief Economist available, as 11 well. So to open the Commission's discussion and 12 13 consideration of this rulemaking proposal, I will 14 now entertain a motion to approve and issue the 15 supplemental proposal related to automated trading 16 as presented by the staff.

17 COMMISSIONER BOWEN: So moved.

18 CHAIRMAN MASSAD: Okay. Second?

19 COMMISSIONER GIANCARLO: Second.

20 CHAIRMAN MASSAD: With that I would now 21 like to open the floor to allow the Commissioners 22 to make any statements and ask any questions that

1 they may have. And I will turn first to

2 Commissioner Bowen.

3 COMMISSIONER BOWEN: No questions.
4 CHAIRMAN MASSAD: Okay. Let me turn to
5 Commissioner Giancarlo.

COMMISSIONER GIANCARLO: Let me begin by 6 7 expressing my great respect for the staff that's 8 worked on this. You've all been very responsive 9 to questions from my team and I thank you for 10 that. I do have a few questions. A focus of mine 11 has been the subpoena process. So I do really 12 want to start with that. And I want to make sure 13 first of all, I understand that right now before 14 this rule, if it's passed or not, but as we stand 15 today, if the staff wants to view source code, it 16 can provided it gets a majority of the Commission 17 to agree to the issuance of a subpoena. If this proposal passes, if the staff wants to view source 18 19 code, it will still need to get a vote of a 20 majority of the Commission. So procedurally, am I correct that at least for CFTC procedures that 21 22 step is still the same?

1 MR. PUJOL: Yes, that's right. 2 MR. MCGONAGLE: So for clarification, 3 Commissioner, the staff of the Division of Market 4 Oversight has not sought access to source code to 5 date. And so if the question is whether staff could utilize some process within DMO to access б 7 source code today, the question would first involve whether the code, as defined, or the 8 9 interest of staff fall within either the 10 recordkeeping obligations to the extent it 11 involved a Commission registrant or, separately, are the records of the transactions of the 12 13 individual where the interest is, is that 14 individual a reportable trader that would be subject to a special call? So while the division 15 16 hasn't exercised its authority to get source code, 17 I think there is an open question currently concerning whether staff within the Division of 18 19 Market Oversight might have access to what we've 20 been referring to as source code here, which may 21 also include the log files.

22 CHAIRMAN MASSAD: If I may interject

1 just to clarify. Division of Market Oversight in 2 its surveillance capacity has not accessed source 3 code. Obviously, Enforcement has -- several times 4 -- and that's where the subpoena -- because we 5 issue subpoenas for enforcement and we don't for surveillance. б MR. MCGONAGLE: That's right. 7 8 COMMISSIONER GIANCARLO: So to put it 9 another way, in the past where we've obtained 10 source code, it's been pursuant to a subpoena. 11 MR. MCGONAGLE: Yes. My understanding is that the agency access to date for source code 12 13 has been through the Division of Enforcement. 14 COMMISSIONER GIANCARLO: Through a 15 subpoena and that's been voted on by the 16 Commission and what you are proposing here to 17 obtain source code would require a vote of the Commission. And what I'm seeking to establish is 18 19 that that requirement to obtain a Commission vote 20 would remain the same as it is today or if it, the 21 rule passes in the future.

22 MR. MCGONAGLE: Yes, that's correct.

1 COMMISSIONER GIANCARLO: So from CFTC's 2 point of view, the procedural burden is 3 practically the same, needing to get a vote of the 4 Commission. 5 MR. MCGONAGLE: In the event the Commission were to adopt the proposal today, б that's right. 7 8 COMMISSIONER GIANCARLO: Right. So now 9 let's look at it from the point of view of the 10 American people, automated traders who are asked 11 to turn over their algo source code. Right now 12 they are protected under the Fourth Amendment 13 against unreasonable searches and seizures, which 14 means the right to a pre-decision review before a

15 neutral decision maker. That's the subpoena 16 process. And it allows the owners of property to 17 go to a judge and seek to have the request either limited in scope, in duration, or other controls 18 19 around the data being turned over. Under this 20 proposal, while it may remain the same 21 procedurally for the CFTC, we take away the 22 procedural rights of the property owner. They

just have no choice if this rule is passed, but to hand over their source code and basically shut up. How is that fair?

4 MR. MCGONAGLE: Thanks, Commissioner. 5 So with respect to the records that we are discussing, a point of this proposal is to clarify б 7 that the books and records requirements do extend to source code and the log files. As I mentioned 8 9 before, there may be a question under our current rules whether and how staff have access. However, 10 11 being particularly focused on the question of a 12 taking, the interests that are set forth here 13 relate to CFTC's oversight with respect to trading 14 that occurs on our markets.

15 The proposal that we've set up for 16 source code as a trade secret is the same as we would apply, frankly, to other trade secrets that 17 the Commission has access to -- trading strategies 18 19 by traders. And that is, to the extent that the 20 information is relevant to the inquiry regarding trading on our markets, staff may have access to 21 22 that information.

That access to information doesn't 1 2 necessarily take away from the trader or their 3 ability to use that trade strategy. The trader can continue to use that strategy and the balance 4 5 that gives that trader the ability to continue to use the strategy is, of course, the requirements б 7 that the agency staff have with respect to the 8 confidentiality of that information.

9 So while we can evaluate and review 10 trade information to conform compliance with the 11 Act or to understand trading activity in our 12 markets, the traders continue to use that source 13 code or that trade secret as it were, as otherwise 14 appropriate, of course unless and until some 15 subsequent enforcement action occurs.

16 COMMISSIONER GIANCARLO: Okay. So let's 17 talk about that process with the CFTC review. Am 18 I correct that today's proposal lists various 19 statutes and regulations in it in the preamble and 20 in the rule text that require confidentiality? 21 MR. MCGONAGLE: Yes, we cross-referenced 22 existing confidentiality provisions under the Act

1 in the regs.

2 COMMISSIONER GIANCARLO: Right, so that was my second question. So those confidentiality 3 4 provisions that we're cross-referencing are 5 existing confidentiality requirements, they are not new ones that we're imposing? б 7 MR. MCGONAGLE: Yes, that's right. 8 COMMISSIONER GIANCARLO: Okay. So --MR. MCGONAGLE: Just one clarification, 9 10 the proposal adopts and incorporates within the 11 supplemental, confidentiality requirements. So there'll be an additional confidentiality 12 13 obligation for staff just by virtue of the 14 proposal if accepted. 15 COMMISSIONER GIANCARLO: Okay. But if 16 we're really serious about confidentiality, why 17 wouldn't we have included some new heightened protections? For example, why wouldn't we at 18 19 least agree that when we are done with our review, 20 we would either give back the source code or destroy it and not leave it in our premises. 21 Or 22 why would we not put in other protections, such as

1 who has access or that perhaps it might be kept 2 offline and not accessible in an online basis. 3 Why couldn't we build in some new protections? 4 MR. MCGONAGLE: Certainly the Commission 5 could consider whether additional affirmative protections should be available for this type of б 7 trade secret. I would indicate that for market participants who view their information as 8 9 confidential, there is an expectation that all 10 information that the Commission receives are treated confidentially. But to the extent that 11 12 there are additional restrictions or obligations 13 for the manner in which staff access the 14 information to assure compliance with the 15 confidentiality provisions, that certainly makes 16 sense. 17 COMMISSIONER GIANCARLO: Okay, thank

18 you. And then my last series of questions has to 19 do with more of a broader theme. And that is for 20 the past few years American tech firms have been 21 supported by the U.S. government, the State 22 Department, in fighting a Chinese law that would

1 force them to hand over source code to agencies of 2 the PRC government. Do you think that what we are 3 trying to do here is at odds with our government's efforts against the Chinese effort to obtain 4 5 source code of tech firms? MR. MCGONAGLE: So I wouldn't propose to 6 7 be an expert with respect to global intellectual 8 and privacy requirements. I can say within the 9 context of the jurisdiction that we have in the 10 agency to ensure that our markets operate in an 11 orderly and safe fashion that the requirements 12 that we propose here are consistent with those 13 obligations. 14 COMMISSIONER GIANCARLO: Okay. I have no 15 further questions. I would like to give a 16 statement. 17 CHAIRMAN MASSAD: Please go ahead. COMMISSIONER GIANCARLO: Thank you, 18 Chairman. And I thank the staff for those answers 19 20 to those questions and for your very comprehensive 21 presentation. I've previously said that proposed 22 Reg AT is a reasonable first step in catching up

to the transformation of modern financial markets by algorithmic trading and other new exponential digital technologies. There are practical and useful elements in the proposal that could serve as the basis for an effective rule. And some of the changes to the supplemental are quite sensible, and I commend the staff for that.

8 But there are also some problematic and 9 inconsistent provisions ranging from prescriptive 10 compliance burdens to a disproportionate impact on 11 small market participants. A number of these 12 concerns are described in my written statement. 13 But more importantly, I've warned that any public 14 good achieved by the rule is, in my mind, undone 15 by this provision that proprietary source code 16 used in trading algorithms be accessible at any 17 time, anywhere to the CFTC and to the Justice Department without a subpoena. And in these 18 19 remarks I want to drill down into that a little bit. 20

21 Let me make clear at the outset the22 CFTC, as Vince said, can today obtain the computer

source code of market participants, pursuant to a
 subpoena. Therefore, the issue raised by the
 proposed rule is not whether the CFTC can examine
 the source code of automated traders where
 appropriate, to investigate market misbehavior.
 The CFTC can and does today.

The issue raised by this proposal is 7 8 whether the owners of source code have any say in 9 the matter. The subpoena process provides 10 property owners with due process of law before the 11 government can seize their property. It protects owners of property. The subpoena protects the 12 13 owners of property. It doesn't protect the 14 government.

15 Its purpose is to provide an opportunity 16 to challenge the scope, the timing and the manner 17 of delivery and whether any legal privileges apply to the process of handing over property. The 18 19 subpoena process therefore, provides a fair 20 compromise between the rights of property owners and the government's rights to seize their 21 22 property. Without the subpoena process, there is

no balance between the civil liberties of the 1 2 governed and the unlimited power of the 3 government. Without it, civil liberties can be 4 abrogated to smooth the way for government 5 searches in the name of state security. As a foundation of civil liberties, the б 7 subpoena process precedes the American Republic going back to English Common Law. As a legal 8 9 principal, it is woven into our Bill of Rights. 10 And as a bulwark of modern civil society, it 11 protects the liberty of the governed from the 12 potential tyranny of the government. 13 The supplemental notice before us today, 14 however, would strip owners of intellectual 15 property of due process of law. This abridgement 16 of rights is justified with the condition that 17 before the CFTC can take source code, it will abide by two procedural hurdles -- a majority vote 18 19 of the Commission and the operation of the special 20 call process by the Division of Market Oversight. Well, that justification entirely misses the 21 22 point. Abrogating the legal rights of property

owners is not assuaged by imposing a few
 additional procedural burdens on the government.
 Owners will still have lost any say in the matter.
 The proposal still gives unchecked power to the
 CFTC to decide if, when, and how property owners
 must turn over their property.

Moreover, utilizing DMO's special call
procedures to seize source code provides an
end-run around the subpoena process. There is
nothing in the supplemental notice that I can see
to limit DMO's sharing of gathered source code
with the staff of the Division of Enforcement.
The proposal would allow Enforcement to

14 view source code without having to bother, as they 15 do today, to get a subpoena.

Now commentators have rightly questioned what level of security the CFTC will deploy to safeguard seized source code. The supplemental notice lists the various statutes and regulations that require confidentiality. The proposed rule text also includes a reference to a specific Commodity Exchange Act provision that prohibits

1 the release of trade secrets and other 2 information. That is all well and good. Yet 3 these are not new protections. They are in place 4 today. Simply citing them in the preamble in the 5 rule text gives little assurance that this information will be safeguarded. б If the agency is determined to protect 7 confidentiality, then it should include specific 8 9 protections in the proposed rule. 10 As I said, it could provide that it will only review source code at the property owner's 11 12 premises or on computers not connected to the 13 internet. The CFTC could also state that it will 14 return all source code to the property owner once its review is finished. Today's proposal doesn't 15 16 provide any of those protections. 17 Absent specific measures, I have to say it's absurd to suggest that source code will be 18 19 kept secure. Just look at the area of government 20 cyber security. In the six months after the CFTC proposed Reg AT, hackers breached the computer 21

22 networks of the FDIC and the Federal Reserve.

Incredibly, the U.S. Office of Personnel
 Management that gave up 21.5 million personnel
 records, including mine, my children and my wife's
 in a yearlong cyber penetration, failed the
 security audit last November, six months after the
 breach was discovered.

7 The CFTC itself, I'm sad to say, has an 8 imperfect record as a guardian of confidential 9 proprietary information. If this rule proposal 10 goes forward, it will make itself a target for a 11 broader group of cyber criminals, including now 12 those engaged in cyber espionage.

13 Last Friday we learned that a former 14 employee of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency downloaded thousands of files from the 15 16 agency servers onto two removable thumb drives 17 prior to retiring from the agency. The OCC said that when it contacted the former employee about 18 those files he was, "Unable to locate or return 19 20 the thumb drives to the Agency." News of that security breach surely sent shivers up the spines 21 22 of automated traders who received notice the same

day of the CFTC's intention to move forward with
 this proposal.

3 And they must have been doubly spooked a few hours later when the CFTC's own servers were 4 5 crashed by a denial of service attack. If the CFTC adopts the source code provisions of the б supplemental notice, the SEC will likely copy it, 7 8 and so will other U.S. and overseas regulators. 9 And not just regulators of financial markets, 10 regulators like the Federal Communications 11 Commission may demand Apple's iPhone source code. 12 The Federal Trade Commission may seek the source 13 code used in the matching engines of Google, 14 Facebook and Snapchat. The National Security 15 Agency may demand to see the source code of Cisco's switches, Lucent's routers and Oracle's 16 17 servers. The Department of Transportation may demand Uber's auction technology and Tesla's 18 19 driverless technology source code. All of this in 20 the name of state security. Where does it end? Well it certainly 21

22 won't end on American shores. Overseas regulators

will also mimic the rule. The German Chancellor
 said last week that she wants her government to
 examine the source code used in the matching
 engines of Google and Facebook because she does
 not like their political coverage of her
 administration.

Now as I mentioned, the Chinese 7 government has already tried to put in place a 8 9 rule to obtain the source code of U.S. technology 10 firms. If the CFTC adopts this rule, I hate to 11 say it, but it will make a mockery of the U.S. 12 government's past attempts to oppose China's 13 desire to view proprietary commercial source code and will confirm that the CFTC is not on the same 14 15 page as its own government counterparts.

Unfortunately, this proposed rule is a
reckless step onto a slippery slope. Today the
Federal government is coming for the source code
of seemingly faceless algo trading firms.
Tomorrow, however, governments worldwide may come
for the source code underlying the storing and
matching of American's most personal information

1 -- their Snapchats, their tweets, their 2 Instagrams, their online purchases, their choice 3 of reading materials and their political and 4 social preferences. Seriously, where does it end? 5 Fortunately, our country's founders protected Americans against such unreasonable б searches and seizures and guaranteed them due 7 process of law in our U.S. Constitution. 8 The 9 Supreme Court has routinely and recently upheld 10 these fundamental civil rights. If the Commission 11 adopts today's proposal, its source code seizure provisions will likely be challenged in Federal 12 13 court. The litigation will consume the agency's 14 precious and very limited resources and will erode 15 its credibility in defending such a dubiously constitutional rule. That will be a sad waste of 16 our resources and of taxpayer money. 17 18 Now it's been my general practice as a 19 CFTC Commissioner to vote to put out proposed 20 rules for public comment, even when I have

21 substantial concerns and issues. That's because 22 on most proposals there are reasonable difference

1 of opinion, and I want to hear a broad range of 2 sensible views before making a final decision. 3 I've taken this approach also because of 4 the enormous respect I have for my two fellow 5 Commissioners. We were sworn in together 28 months ago, and it remains an honor and a б 7 privilege to serve alongside them. So it's a 8 disappointment that on this rule I must depart 9 from my preferred practice of voting in favor of 10 proposed rulemakings. But Reg AT is really unlike 11 any other rule proposal that I've seen in my time on the Commission. 12 13 What should be a step forward by the 14 agency, in its mission to oversee 21st century 15 digital markets, is being squandered by this giant 16 lurch backwards in undoing Americans' legal and 17 civil and constitutional rights. The staff recommends that we adopt Reg AT in order to 18 19 address the growing incidence of algorithmic 20 trading and to determine if algorithms are

21 disrupting financial markets. And yes, that is an 22 important goal. Automated trading does indeed

1 present a number of critical challenges to our 2 markets. My many meetings with America's farmers 3 and ranchers and other end-users have convinced me 4 that the CFTC must quickly catch up to the digital 5 transformation of our financial markets. Yet jettisoning the subpoena process does not address б the challenge of automated trading. It just 7 strips the firms we regulate of their 8 9 constitutional rights. Other than that it really 10 does nothing to enhance market health, durability 11 and safety. 12 In closing, I note that Benjamin 13 Franklin is said to have warned that a people that 14 are willing to give up their liberty for apparent security deserve neither and will lose both. 15 16 Franklin was right. Reg AT is a threat to our people's liberty and their security. After 12 17 score years of ordered freedom in America, Reg AT 18 19 is a degree turn in the direction of unchecked 20 state authority. If adopted in its present form it will put out of balance century-old rights of 21 22 the governed against the creeping power of central

1 government. Thank you.

2 CHAIRMAN MASSAD: Thank you. Let me 3 just start with a question. We have a surveillance function. We monitor the markets. 4 5 If we see a disruption or abnormal trading, and let's say we, you know, based on the transaction б 7 data we get we think, gee, that abnormal activity 8 was perhaps caused by this particular trader 9 because we have very good insight into who is 10 trading. We know the participants. So let's say that's a trader who, I don't know, it's a floor 11 12 trader. They're registered with us. But it's 13 kind of the traditional old days right? 14 And so let's say they were engaged in a 15 strategy to manipulate the markets. In fact, 16 there are trading logs, there are emails, there 17 are phone calls that evidence that because they kind of communicate -- you do this then, and then 18 19 I'll do this in this other market, and whatever. 20 How would we go about getting that information? And let's say -- actually, let's say 21 22 it's not clear they were engaged in it, right.

1 Let's say there is a question, maybe what they did 2 was fully compliant, maybe it wasn't. So 3 Enforcement is not in the picture yet. We're just 4 engaged in surveillance. How would we go about 5 getting that today? б MR. MCGONAGLE: Yes. Thank you, 7 Chairman. The division staff, Division of Market Oversight, as well as CFTC staff to the extent 8 9 that records are required to be maintained. And 10 so records relating to the transactions executed 11 on designated contract markets, for example, are 12 open to inspection and access by staff and also by 13 the Department of Justice. 14 CHAIRMAN MASSAD: So today you would 15 just call up the participant. You wouldn't even come to the Commission. There wouldn't even be a 16 17 Commission vote? 18 MR. MCGONAGLE: That's correct, 19 Chairman. We would utilize our staff to reach 20 out, to speak to the market participants, to work 21 to get an understanding about what their position 22 in the market is. And what's their intentions

concerning the positions that they have.

1

2 CHAIRMAN MASSAD: And they would have to 3 turn over those records to us. I suppose they 4 could refuse, and you know, then we take them to 5 court. But basically given our jurisdiction, given our responsibilities, they would have to б 7 turn that over to let us inspect it. 8 MR. MCGONAGLE: In most instances market 9 participants are very forthcoming to talk about 10 how and why they are trading in the markets. 11 CHAIRMAN MASSAD: And we've probably done that a few times. 12 13 MR. MCGONAGLE: That's right, Chairman. 14 CHAIRMAN MASSAD: Maybe a few hundred, 15 maybe a few thousand, maybe tens of thousands. Whatever, okay. So instead, let's say the trader 16 17 is an algo-trader. So the strategy, and again it's not clear whether this is a strategy that is 18 19 compliant with the law or not. Strategy is, you 20 know, in an algo. And of course first there might be several things we would do. We might just call 21 22 them up and talk to them. "What were you doing?"

1	We might look at message data. You know, we might
2	address our concerns through any number of ways.
3	But if it came to it, "You know what, you've told
4	us certain things. We're still not so sure. We
5	want to see the source code," then what we're
б	really saying here is because now the strategy
7	isn't in emails. It isn't in phone calls. It
8	isn't in these other old world records, we might
9	even call them today, it's in ones and zeros in a
10	computer code. Sorry, we can't have that.
11	That's where we are. Unless we decide
12	to bring an enforcement action, obviously which,
13	you know, the investigation itself implies
14	making the appearance of wrongdoing. A lot of
15	firms don't like to get subpoenas because, you
16	know, of that. But if we went that route,
17	Enforcement could seek a subpoena. Of course,
18	Enforcement might not even want subpoenas.
19	Sometimes Enforcement calls rather than DMO calls
20	and people say, "Oh gee, I better, you know, give
21	it." So a lot of times Enforcement gets things
22	even without subpoenas. Have I got it basically

1 right?

2 MR. MCGONAGLE: Yes, Chairman. 3 CHAIRMAN MASSAD: Okay. So in other 4 words if you trade in our markets under the old 5 world ways, you are subject to surveillance. But if you trade in our markets under the new world б 7 ways of algos, "Oh no, that's a violation of the 8 Constitution," if we ask to see something that 9 evidenced your trading strategy. 10 MR. MCGONAGLE: So again with the point that I had made with Commissioner Giancarlo 11 12 earlier, to the extent that staff were interested 13 in evaluating currently today under our existing 14 rules, we would issue a special call and whether 15 _ _ 16 CHAIRMAN MASSAD: I get it. 17 MR. MCGONAGLE: We could, yeah, that's right. 18 19 CHAIRMAN MASSAD: In other words, today you haven't done it. DMO hasn't done it. 20 Enforcement has done it. But if you haven't done 21 22 it, that doesn't mean you couldn't --

MR. MCGONAGLE: Right.

1

2 CHAIRMAN MASSAD: -- for what we're 3 seeking today. Let's remember, the first thing we 4 are trying to do today is preserve the source 5 code. Is that right? Because we want to make 6 sure it's preserved, again for a very small group 7 of participants.

8 MR. MCGONAGLE: That's right. The 9 proposal seeks to clarify for recordkeeping 10 purposes for those category registrants which we 11 expect based on the volume measures would capture a small subset of the market. But those market 12 13 participants who have a substantial impact in the 14 market by the volume of their trading that their 15 source code and associated records be maintained 16 in the event of a need by special call or 17 separately for Division of Enforcement under a 18 subpoena.

19 CHAIRMAN MASSAD: Okay, all right. So I 20 guess to my mind what we're trying to do here is, 21 we are not changing our process. We're updating 22 our rules for the fact that the way trading is

1 conducted has changed. All right, so let me maybe 2 make a few more comments in response. And I have 3 great respect for both of my fellow Commissioners. 4 I agree with Commissioner Giancarlo's statements 5 that we have worked very constructively together. And I think including on this rule. I had hoped б 7 that, and I still hope, that what we have proposed today actually was a compromise. There are those 8 9 who didn't even feel we should require a 10 Commission authorization, given that we, again, 11 don't -- to get trading strategy if you write it 12 down. But we thought that this would be a good 13 compromise.

14 So let me address a few points. First, 15 just because, you know, we get into this and there 16 is lots of things mentioned. And I hear talk about, you know, deprivation of property or 17 takings or so forth. I mean, we're talking about 18 19 looking at records. We're not talking about 20 taking property. The notion of a "taking" to me means you can't use that property. The government 21 22 takes it away from you. If we go look at source

1 code, the trader can still trade. We're not telling him to stop. The real concern, I think 2 3 here, and I recognize it as one we should address, 4 is the confidentiality, making sure it's 5 confidential and kept confidential so that the value of that code is not diminished. And we do б take that seriously. But I just want to first get 7 on the table that I don't think we're talking 8 9 about, you know, a taking in a constitutional 10 sense.

11 Second, there was a mention of cyber security in the recent DDOS, Distributed Denial of 12 13 Service Attack on our website. Of course, you 14 know, the entire East coast was hit by this --Netflix, Twitter, lots of organizations were hit 15 16 by this. But all we're talking about here is so much traffic that it overwhelms your website for a 17 brief period of time. And in our case that did 18 19 happen for parts of the website. Parts of the 20 website were still fine. People could access it. 21 But let's be clear, no one hacked into our system. 22 There was no breach of confidential information.

And we're not proposing today to put anyone's
 source code on our website.

3 So to suggest that because, you know, 4 our website was overloaded by traffic we shouldn't 5 be allowed to conduct our responsibilities, you know, sort of like saying, "Well, let's all not б 7 subscribe to Netflix or maybe even any other movie service or Twitter or use JP Morgan or Bank of 8 9 America because lots of organizations have had DDOS attacks." It's simply the nature of the 10 11 world today.

12 Again, that's not to say that we don't 13 take confidentiality extremely seriously. And you 14 know, on that point, to Commissioner Giancarlo's 15 point, we've outlined in the preamble a number of 16 the things that we could do, including viewing source code on a computer that is not connected to 17 the internet or any other website. The specifics 18 19 I think are going to depend on the case. 20 And again, first of all, the fact that

21 we would have the ability under the rule to look 22 at it, doesn't mean that we would even need to in

1 a lot of cases. We might just call up the participant and get our questions answered. 2 But 3 if we needed to look at it, you know, perhaps we 4 could go to their office and look at it. Of 5 course, if we went to their office and look at it, we'd have to be concerned about, you know, the б fact that they could probably tell exactly what 7 we're looking at and maybe even reverse engineer 8 9 what we're doing, and that could compromise our 10 ability. So, you know, you have to decide these 11 things on a case by case basis. You can't say, 12 "Oh, in every single case we will look at it at 13 their office." 14 But again, I think as the preamble says, we take the confidentiality thing very seriously. 15 As far as employees -- our employees are subject 16 to statutory prohibitions on the use of 17 information that they gain by working here. It's 18 19 not just statutory, it's criminal, criminal

20 penalties. So you know, unless we're suggesting 21 they should be drawn and quartered, I think the 22 penalties today are pretty severe. So, you know,

1	finally, why not just a subpoena then. I'm sure
2	some would say, if you're going to go to the
3	Commission why not just make it a subpoena? Well
4	again, that's not the way we have operated in the
5	past. The Division of Enforcement uses subpoenas
6	often when the person is not a registrant or when
7	they are concerned that the person won't
8	cooperate, or maybe there is an emergency or
9	something like that. They often get a lot of
10	information without subpoenas. There are a lot of
11	agencies that issue subpoenas without it even
12	going to the Commission.
13	So what we're proposing today, I think,
14	is a level of review that addresses what you get
15	by virtue of the subpoena. It would go to the
16	
	Commission. As far as the rights of the
17	Commission. As far as the rights of the individual, truth is, you know, we have the
17 18	
	individual, truth is, you know, we have the
18	individual, truth is, you know, we have the jurisdiction. That's our job. It's our job to
18 19	individual, truth is, you know, we have the jurisdiction. That's our job. It's our job to survey the markets to enforce the laws. And, you

point out we have gotten the source code and many times through enforcement actions. There haven't been breaches. So I think it might be helpful to think about the track record rather than, you know, what may have happened to OPM.

Finally, let me just say on the slippery б 7 slope point, it strikes me as the wrong metaphor. This is not a slippery slope, this is an uphill 8 9 climb. It's an uphill climb because our markets 10 have evolved much faster than our regulatory 11 framework. And we are trying to climb up a steep 12 hill to catch up, to be able to see what is going 13 on in our markets today and engage in adequate 14 oversight. And this information could be 15 critical. Again, I speak to, and I know both of 16 you have as well, a number of participants in our 17 markets, what I would call the more traditional participants in our markets, who have a lot of 18 19 concerns, who feel these markets have changed 20 dramatically.

21 And so I think we have to recognize that 22 we do need to modernize our markets. Part of that


1 is the ability to update essentially the 2 surveillance function we've been engaged in for 3 decades, where we do look at all sorts of 4 information, confidential proprietary information 5 of great value. And the fact that today, similar information is embodied in ones and zeros in code, б should not make a fundamental difference. You 7 should not be able to hide behind machines, as I 8 9 said earlier. Are there any other comments or Commission business? 10

11 COMMISSIONER GIANCARLO: Chairman, I'd 12 just like to make one point. And I have a lot of 13 respect for your points, but I just do want to say 14 for the record that comparing records of historic 15 trades to the most valuable algorithmic systems 16 that project a firm's business strategy going forward, are comparing apples to oranges. Trades 17 of historic trades, that's books and records. 18 19 Firms' algorithms that show what they will do in the future in the event of certain market factors 20 21 is an entirely different thing.

22 CHAIRMAN MASSAD: Let me just say,

1	requiring the preservation of source code because
2	source code is changed all the time. What we're
3	looking at in any given instance is the past. It
4	is what they did. And it is the same thing as a
5	trade. From the standpoint of our mission, it's
6	the same thing as if you wrote down exactly how
7	you want to trade on a piece of paper.
8	With that I will entertain a motion to
9	vote. Is that right? Is that my next move? I've
10	got my script mixed up.
11	We already have the motion. Okay. I
12	will now ask for a vote all in favor at
13	least I'm sorry. You are going to do it.
14	MR. KIRKPATRICK: Yeah.
15	CHAIRMAN MASSAD: Thank you.
16	MR. KIRKPATRICK: The motion now before
17	the Commission is on the approval and issuance of
18	the regulation automated trading supplemental
19	notice of proposed rulemaking. Commissioner
20	Giancarlo?
21	COMMISSIONER GIANCARLO: No.
22	MR. KIRKPATRICK: Commissioner

1 Giancarlo, no. Commission Bowen? 2 COMMISSIONER BOWEN: Aye. 3 MR. MCGONAGLE: Commissioner Bowen, Aye. 4 Chairman Massad? 5 CHAIRMAN MASSAD: Aye. MR. KIRKPATRICK: Chairman Massad, aye. б 7 Mr. Chairman, on this matter the ayes have two, 8 the nos have one. 9 CHAIRMAN MASSAD: Okay, therefore the motion is adopted. Is there any other Commission 10 11 business? Sorry, thank you, there it is. Okay, there being no further business, I would entertain 12 13 a motion to adjourn the meeting. COMMISSIONER BOWEN: So moved. 14 15 COMMISSIONER GIANCARLO: Second. CHAIRMAN MASSAD: Okay. The ayes have 16 it. Again, I want to thank the staff. There has 17 been a lot of work that has gone into this. And I 18 also want to thank Commissioners Bowen and 19 Giancarlo and their staffs for their 20 consideration. The meeting is adjourned. 21 22 (Whereupon, at 11:48 a.m., the



1	CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC
2	DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
3	I, Carleton J. Anderson, III, notary
4	public in and for the District of Columbia, do
5	hereby certify that the forgoing PROCEEDING was
б	duly recorded and thereafter reduced to print under
7	my direction; that the witnesses were sworn to tell
8	the truth under penalty of perjury; that said
9	transcript is a true record of the testimony given
10	by witnesses; that I am neither counsel for,
11	related to, nor employed by any of the parties to
12	the action in which this proceeding was called;
13	and, furthermore, that I am not a relative or
14	employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the
15	parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise
16	interested in the outcome of this action.
17	
18	
19	(Signature and Seal on File)
20	
21	Notary Public, in and for the District of Columbia
22	My Commission Expires: March 31, 2017