UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION

ENERGY POSITION LIMITS AND HEDGE EXEMPTIONS

Washington, D.C.

Wednesday, July 29, 2009

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1	CONTENTS
2	Call to Order and Introduction:
3	CHAIRMAN GARY GENSLER
4	Opening Statements:
5	COMMISSIONER MICHAEL DUNN
6	COMMISSIONER JILL SOMMERS
7	COMMISSIONER BART CHILTON
8	Panel 1:
9	JEFFREY SPRECHER Intercontinental Exchange, Inc.
10	CRAIG DONAHUE
11	CME Group
12	Panel 2:
13	RICHARD "BEN" HIRST Delta Air Lines, Air Transportation
14	Association
15	LAURA CAMPBELL Memphis Light, Gas & Water, American Public
16	Gas Association
17	SEAN COTA Cota & Cota, Petroleum Marketers Association
18	of America
19	TODD PETZEL Offit Capital Advisors, LLC
20	offit capital Advisors, LLC
21	
22	* * * * *

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

PROCEEDINGS 1 2 (9:04 a.m.) 3 CHAIRMAN GENSLER: Good morning. I call to order this meeting of the Commodity Futures 4 5 Trading Commission. This is the second of three hearings of whether federal position limits should 6 7 be set by the CFTC for commodities of finite 8 supply. 9 I would like to start by thanking my 10 fellow Commissioners, Commissioner Sommers, 11 Commissioner Dunn, Commissioner Chilton, and our 12 distinguished witnesses who will be here today. 13 We're going to have two panels. And just to give 14 a little heads up for our second panel, we're going to have -- we'll go through a couple rounds 15 16 of questions using a five minute clock. 17 Yesterday, it seemed that two rounds of questions were enough for the Commissioners, but if we go 18 19 for three, I hope you oblige us, so it may be 20 about an hour before we get to our second panel, 21 judging from yesterday. 22 Yesterday, the CFTC held its first

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 hearing on setting position limits to protect 2 against the undue burdens that may result from 3 excessive speculation in the energy markets. We had a very productive discussion on the 4 5 legislative history of position limits, the current state of federal position limits and 6 exchange-set accountability levels, and who would 7 8 be best at setting position limits in the future. 9 Our first panel included the Chief Executive 10 Officers of the two biggest futures exchanges, 11 Intercontinental Exchange and the Chicago 12 Mercantile Exchange, or NYMEX, their subsidiary. 13 Both exchanges made announcements that showed 14 tangible progress towards regulation to protect 15 the American public from the burdens that may come 16 from excessive speculation. 17 The CME made a very significant announcement, that it supports adoption of a hard 18 19 limit regime, including single month and all 20 month's limits. This is a welcome change. No longer must we debate the issue of whether or not 21 22 to set position limits. But there still remains

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 three very important questions; who should set 2 position limits, who should be exempted from 3 positions limits, if anyone, and at what level should position limits be set and what formula 4 5 might be used for them. I'm certainly going to be thinking about all three questions as I work with 6 7 -- through my questions with each of the 8 panelists.

9 As I stated at yesterday's hearing, I believe the CFTC does have a duty to protect the 10 11 American public from fraud, manipulation, and the 12 burdens that may come from excessive speculation. Thus, I believe it should be the CFTC that sets 13 14 position limits on energy market participants. We 15 have the statutory authority, we are the most able 16 to strike a balance between competing interest and 17 the public interest. I was interested to hear from a number of the panelists and their 18 19 testimonies, from both today's hearing and in 20 reading your testimonies, and also yesterday's hearing, that they believe the CFTC is also in the 21 22 best position to set such aggregate positions.

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 This is also every encouraging.

2 This brings us to the very important 3 question of exemptions. Some panelists have suggested that a class of financial parties be 4 5 exempted. Of course, the swap dealers testifying here today suggested that the swap dealers should 6 7 be exempted from position limits. Index investors 8 -- or an index fund testifying today suggested 9 that index funds should be exempted. An exchange 10 traded fund operator testifying today suggested 11 that exchange traded funds might be exempted. 12 At the core of promoting market integrity is encouraging markets I believe not to 13 become too concentrated or allowing concentrated 14 15 economic power within a market. We do this in 16 other laws at the core of the CFTC statute, this was set out in 1936 to set up position limits. I 17 18 think this is even more relevant because of the 19 developments that we've seen in financial markets 20 since the first exemptions were issued in 1991. The financial markets are much more concentrated 21 22 today than just 18 years ago.

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

The financial crisis also highlighted 1 2 the risk that can come to the markets and the 3 American public brought about by large concentrated actors upon the financial stage. So 4 5 I would like to hear from each of our panelists as to why, if we were to apply position limits, they 6 7 think that they should not apply consistently to 8 all non-commercial players. 9 While I believe that we should maintain exemptions for bona fide commercial hedgers, I'm 10 11 just concerned about granting exemptions for 12 financial risk management that in some way could defeat the effectiveness of position limits. 13 14 On the last question of what level 15 position limits should be set at, I'm certainly interested to hear from our panelists ideas on 16 this, and if we move forward in rule-writing, we 17 look forward to see how to set formulas through a 18 19 rule-writing process. 20 The CFTC's rules and decisions have meaningful implications on the day-to-day lives of 21 22 the American public. It is essential that we

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

utilize all of our existing authorities to ensure 1 2 fair and orderly markets and protect the American 3 public. To do this, I believe we must also work urgently with Congress to secure additional 4 5 resources to effectively police our markets. And to the extent that we might be in the business of 6 setting aggregate position limits, or as some, the 7 8 panelists have suggested to look through swap 9 dealers to the end users, we will need to work 10 with Congress on additional resources. 11 I also believe that we need to work 12 urgently with Congress to establish new authorities to police the over- the-counter 13 14 markets, and particularly as it relates to the 15 possibility of setting aggregate position limits. 16 I look forward to hearing from today's 17 witnesses. On top of yesterday's very productive discussion, I believe today's hearings will add to 18 the diversity of points of views on the very 19 20 important subject. For the record, I also want to say that written comments on this topic, a record 21 22 will be held open until August 12 for comments

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

from the public or for additional follow-up with 1 2 panelists. And with that, I'd like to turn to 3 Commissioner Dunn for any opening remarks he might have. 4 5 COMMISSIONER DUNN: I have no opening remarks. I'm here to listen to the panel. 6 CHAIRMAN GENSLER: Commissioner Sommers. 7 8 COMMISSIONER SOMMERS: Thank you, Mr. 9 Chairman. I just want to echo a couple of points 10 that you made and to thank the panelists for being 11 here. I think that these hearings are extremely 12 important as we consider these issues. 13 This is a very challenging time, as I pointed out yesterday, and I think some of the 14 15 questions that the Chairman pointed out in his opening remarks today still remain, but it's 16 17 important for us to listen to the variety of market participants that we have testifying 18 19 throughout the three days of these hearings, and 20 to help us answer these challenging questions, because our mission here is to protect the U.S. 21 22 futures markets, and we have an obligation to do

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 that, it's in our mission, and we need to make 2 sure that if we're moving down this path, that we 3 carefully make these changes to make these markets useful for all of the participants, and I'm very 4 5 glad to have you here today and participating in the dialogue, because it's important for us to 6 7 consider. Thank you. 8 CHAIRMAN GENSLER: Commissioner Chilton. 9 COMMISSIONER CHILTON: Thanks, Mr. Chairman. The only thing I wanted to say is, I 10 11 wanted to associate my remarks -- your remarks 12 rather from yesterday on this press report about 13 our swaps report. As I said, the last thing I 14 said at the end of our hearing yesterday was that 15 I commended the Chairman for the greater detail he 16 is trying to put, the greater transparency both on 17 our Commitment of Trader's Report and in our swaps 18 report. 19 A lot of people know I disagreed with 20 the data because I thought it wasn't good enough 21 last year, and it wasn't good enough, in part, 22 because we were asked to meet a timeline and

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

didn't have the staff to do it, and I just thought it was faulty data, and I thought people, therefore, still made conclusions based upon that data.

5 I'm competent that this year, that we won't make conclusions based upon inaccurate data. 6 And so I associate myself with your remarks, and 7 8 don't want to pre-judge what the report is going 9 to say until the report comes out, and it'll speak 10 for itself, and I have a lot of confidence that 11 it's going to be a much better report, our staff 12 has done a great job, and I look forward to 13 sharing it with you all at the appropriate time. 14 CHAIRMAN GENSLER: Thank you, 15 Commissioners. Thank you, Bart, for those comments, too. And if we can turn to our 16 17 panelists, I'm going to start with Ms. Masters, and we'll then go to Doctor Jarecki, and then 18 around to Mr. Slocum, and Mr. -- is it Casturo? 19 20 MR. CASTURO: Casturo. 21 CHAIRMAN GENSLER: Thank you. 22 MS. MASTERS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman,

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

Commissioners, the staff at the CFTC. My name is 1 2 Blythe Masters, I am a Managing Director at J.P. 3 Morgan, and I'm responsible for our global commodities business. I'm also the Chair of 4 5 SIFMA. And I thank you for the opportunity to provide testimony today. 6 J.P. Morgan's commodity business 7 8 provides thousands of customers with risk

9 management and transactional services around the 10 globe, in both physical and financial commodities. 11 We wholeheartedly support your efforts to prevent 12 excessive speculation, as well as to improve the 13 overall framework for regulation of OTC or over-the-counter derivatives. We also believe 14 15 that those efforts must be undertaken in the context of a broader understanding that 16 17 speculation, per se, plays an essential role in 18 all markets and commodity markets. If investors 19 were discouraged or prevented from assuming price 20 risks, hedges would have much more difficulty entering into transactions, markets would be more 21 22 volatile, and the CFTC's mission of protecting

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

risk management and price discovery would be
 compromised.

3 Thus, in discussing position limits and exemptions, it's critical to consider the role 4 5 they play in facilitating risk management in the OTC derivatives market. The vast majority of 6 American corporations enter into OTC derivative 7 8 transactions to hedge risks that arise out of 9 their core day-to-day activities. Financial 10 intermediaries such as J.P. Morgan stand between 11 those entities that want to offload risk, 12 typically in the over-the-counter markets, and 13 those entities who wish to assume risk. 14 Intermediaries like us aggregate risks 15 and manage the net resulting positions on a portfolio basis. And typically we flatten out our 16 17 net resulting positions on exchanges. Thus, for risk management purposes, exchange and OTC markets 18 are used interchangeably, and the ability of a 19 20 financial intermediary to use exemptions to position limits to effectuate the OTC transactions 21 22 is key to being able to provide risk management

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 tools to end customers. The most active commodity 2 hedges are companies like producers, 3 manufacturers, utilities, airlines and the like that face material risks to their financial 4 5 performance arising from commodity price 6 fluctuations and the effect of that on day-to-day 7 operations. 8 Hedging for these companies often 9 represents the only meaningful way for them to 10 protect against adverse price movements and to 11 lock in their margins. For example, airlines 12 frequently hedge their jet fuel costs using OTC 13 jet fuel swaps. Many of these activities can't be done on exchange because the exchanges don't offer 14 15 the customized contracts that are needed. For example, there is no jet fuel contract on a 16 17 futures exchange. 18 Firms with good hedge risk management practices can reduce the cost of and increase the 19 20 availability of funding to run their day-to-day operations, and/or they can lower their ultimate 21 22 prices to their own customers. And time and

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

again, we see that the difference between hedging 1 2 or not hedging has been the determining factor in 3 the viability of plans to develop major new investment projects. On the other side of such 4 5 transactions is often an investor who enters into OTC transactions to obtain exposure to price 6 7 movements of commodities. Commodities offer 8 diversification to investors, and with respect to 9 inflation, a more correlated hedge than most other 10 investments available in financial markets. 11 In a recent survey of inflationary 12 expectations among J.P. Morgan's institutional client base, some 20 percent of 1800 respondents 13 14 confirmed that they had used commodities to hedge 15 against future inflation. 16 Investors are an important part of 17 commodity markets and their participation has been beneficial because often more producers of 18 19 commodities are interested in hedging than 20 purchasers. Investors fill these gaps, and so they facilitate the efficient and smooth price 21 22 discovery process.

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 Importantly, these investors do not take 2 physical delivery of the underlying commodities 3 and they have no mechanism for withholding or 4 hoarding supplies from the end consumer. For 5 every buyer of a futures contract, there is, by 6 definition, a seller.

Furthermore, once an investor's initial 7 8 investment allocation has been made, positions are typically rolled forward each month with each 9 10 contract being sold prior to expiration and rolled 11 to the next month. For sustained upward price 12 pressure on prices to occur, investors would have to continuously add to their allocations through 13 14 time. In fact, our experience shows that more typical behavior is for investors to sell 15 16 following price appreciation and vice versa in order to maintain a constant dollar amount of 17 funds invested. This tends to stabilize price 18 19 action rather than driving it.

20 We are aware of no credible academic 21 study or analysis that demonstrates the presence 22 of non-commercial interests in commodity markets

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

to have been detrimental and many that, in fact,
 reach the reverse conclusion.

3 Over-the-counter markets and exchanges 4 work in tandem and facilitate the efficient risk 5 transfer within our economy. Swap dealers use 6 exchanges to hedge their net economic positions 7 arising from both physical and financial 8 activities.

9 Importantly, managing risk on a portfolio basis in this way requires the 10 11 intermediary to assume basis risk. Basis risk 12 occurs when a position is hedged with offsetting 13 position that is expected to approximately, but 14 not exactly, offset the risk of the underlying. 15 For example, it's common to hedge power prices 16 with natural gas.

17 CHAIRMAN GENSLER: Okay. If you want to 18 try to summarize up, because -- and I just want to 19 say for all the panelists, your full written 20 reports will be in the record.

21 MS. MASTERS: Understood, sir. So it's 22 common for dealers to hedge power prices with gas

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

or fuel prices with WTI and the like. As entities 1 2 transacting on the exchange, dealers are subject 3 to position limits. And hedge exemptions are critical because they facilitate over- the-counter 4 5 activity for customers. These hedge exemptions are granted for specific purposes, limited size, 6 7 limited application, and a dealer is held to those 8 standards. A dealer acting in its own speculative 9 capacity has no ability to avoid any such limits. 10 We have three specific recommendations 11 that derive from work already commenced last year 12 by the CFTC in conjunction with its special call 13 for data relating to futures and over-the-counter 14 markets. That data requires us and other dealers 15 to disclose for both index and non- index 16 activity, gross long and short positions by 17 activity type, by counterparty type, by counterparty name, for large positions, by futures 18 19 equivalent contract. In short, everything about 20 our over-the-counter business is disclosed. Though setting up that information was expensive 21 22 and time consuming, we have found it useful above

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

and beyond the regular application. And we 1 2 believe it sets the CFTC up to use that 3 information to impose more useful and informative and effective limits going forward. 4 5 CHAIRMAN GENSLER: I'm fearful; to be consistent, I need to apply consistent limits, so 6 why don't we make it one more minute, if we can? 7 8 MS. MASTERS: Okay. So three specific

9 recommendations; first, imposing a large trader 10 reporting system for over-the-counter positions, 11 just as you do for exchange base positions. The 12 information in the special call would allow you to 13 do that and make that information at an aggregated 14 level public. That would be valuable extra 15 transparency across all OTC activities.

Secondly, we believe it would make sense to impose position limits across all markets, both OTC and exchange base markets, and looking through to the end market participant as you evaluate whether that participant's position is over or under a particular threshold or position limit level. I'm not a lawyer, but my layman's read, if

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 your existing authorities would suggest, you have 2 the power to do this, and if not, we would be 3 supportive of legislation needed to achieve that. Finally, we do believe that it's vital that 4 5 exemptions from position limits are maintained for those who act as aggregators, and that you look 6 7 through those aggregators activities to the end 8 position held by the underlying customer in order 9 not to prevent those customers from conducting 10 their necessary investment and risk management activities in over-the-counter markets. Thank 11 12 you. 13 CHAIRMAN GENSLER: Doctor Jarecki; thank 14 you. 15 DOCTOR JARECKI: Thank you, Chairman and 16 Commissioners. 17 CHAIRMAN GENSLER: Just to help a little bit, I'm told that when that light starts 18 19 flashing, I mean you don't have to think like it's 20 politics or anything like a debate, but when that light starts flashing, you're getting close to the 21 22 two minute warning.

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 DOCTOR JARECKI: Thank you, Chairman and 2 Commissioners. My name is Henry Jarecki, I'm the 3 Chairman of Gresham Investment Management, a company I formed to implement TAP, a conservative 4 5 long-only tangible asset portfolio which we developed more than 20 years ago. We presented 6 7 you with a number of charts, and this shows the 8 portfolio composition. We've been managing this 9 strategy for ourselves and others since 1987, and 10 we've, over that time, provided better returns 11 than the S&P 500, with less volatility, and we've 12 improved the performance of the stock and bond portfolios into which it's been introduced. We do 13 14 these diversified commodity investments by buying 15 futures for our customers, not by engaging in commodity swaps, and not by netting other 16 positions. We've applied for the appropriate 17 regulatory permissions when appropriate. 18 19 I, myself, have been in the futures 20 industry for over 40 years, and during that time I've seen one market drama after the next. As a 21

matter of fact, I was on the Board of the

22

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

Commodity Exchange when it had to address one of our market's greatest manipulations, that of the Hunt Brothers, who bought large quantities of physical silver which they hoped, after moving the market upwards, to sell.

6 What folks like us do is not only good for diminishing an investor's global portfolio 7 volatility, but also, as said, for protecting him 8 9 or her against the ravages of inflation, which is of increasing importance to people who want their 10 11 pensions to keep pace with the cost of living. 12 Our clients include numerous state and Fortune 100 13 and union pension plans, insurance companies, and 14 a host of foreign enterprises. The customers are stable, well financed entities that decide to take 15 16 part only after they study the idea for a year or 17 two, not because they think there's some special goody in the markets. They do not, any of them, 18 19 use leverage, any of them speculate or take 20 delivery of physical commodities. They maintain 21 their core positions even when the markets fall, 22 and they provide stability and trading liquidity

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 to the market in general. What better market 2 participants can there possibly be? 3 Our activities are tiny compared to the size of our two big competitors, the Goldman Sachs 4 5 and the UBS indexes. We undertake trading in accord with simple rules we established over 20 6 years ago, in which we articulate afresh to our 7 8 clients annually. And I'm here because I'm 9 naturally fearful that our business will be 10 throttled in the false understanding that 11 commodity futures index purchases can cause prices 12 to rise. 13 Because of my 40 years of experience in

14 these markets, I'm surprised to think that high prices can be attributed to commodity futures 15 acquisitions. Prices are made on the factory 16 17 floors, and at the gas pumps, and the level of the farmers who grow wheat, and the consumers who eat 18 19 bread, and the oil companies that take oil out of 20 the ground, and the car owners who buy it at their gas stations. Futures markets are proud of 21 22 themselves and have a lot to be proud of, but the

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

idea that they make the prices rather than reflect them I think is absurd. The amount of buying and selling that's done in the real physical markets is typically ten or 20 times as much annually as the open interest is.

6 Now, this hearing has been called on the 7 topic of position limits in the energy markets. 8 That seems, to me, to be a euphemism for what can 9 we do to make sure that Crude doesn't trade over 10 \$140 again. And oil prices were very high last 11 year, but the high prices were also found, and I 12 show this in this chart, which I think is quite significant, in steel, in coal, in cobalt, and 13 they don't trade on futures markets at all. 14 15 Also, if it was clear that the prices

were so high, why didn't the folks who know the most about oil, who have the best oil economists in the world, the Middle Eastern oil companies, show many years worth of production when the price hit 147, or the U.S. government did believe the oil prices are too high, why doesn't it just sell some to lower the prices for the benefit of

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 consumers? Or if it's so easy to manipulate the 2 prices by acting on the futures markets, why 3 doesn't OPEC simply go in there whenever they think the prices have gone too low? One important 4 5 question which I recommend to you is to be found in chart 12, which is the showing that the flows 6 7 into index funds do not correlate with oil price rises. In some periods, as these charts show, the 8 correlations are, indeed, negative. That is to 9 10 say this is relevant because the Commodity 11 Exchange Act talks about actions that the 12 Commission ought take to prevent things that cause fluctuations in the price of a commodity. And the 13 14 flow data that we are showing here shows that this 15 causative element does not exist. So for all of these reasons, I think 16 17 it's inaccurate to believe that index providers are the cause of high oil prices. Money-printing 18 19 and money-spending is one cause; fears of

20 shortages and of inflation are others. Special 21 circumstances, like public subsidies of the 22 petroleum in China and India, the high cost of new

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 production are further elements.

2 I appreciate, however, that the idea 3 that commodity futures purchasers cause high 4 physical market prices is superficially appealing. 5 And I accept that the Commission may, in response to public concern, decide that something should be 6 7 done. Ut aliquid fiat, we used to say when I 8 practiced medicine, in order that something be 9 done. When the relatives were --10 CHAIRMAN GENSLER: Doctor, you might 11 want to try to summarize or finish up. 12 DOCTOR JARECKI: When the relatives were 13 pushy and asked us to do more, we gave very large and very colorful pills. Ut aliquid fiat 14 15 videatur, we said, in order that it be seen that something is being done. The position limits 16 17 something that the Commission may well do should, however, be directed at those who actually engage 18 19 in excessive speculation or undertake large 20 purchases. It's illogical to apply position limits at the level of firms like ours that 21 22 passively implement the investor's decisions, and

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 it's actually counterproductive --

2 CHAIRMAN GENSLER: I'm going to give you 3 one minute, and I'm actually going to do this for 4 all of you. I'm going to cut you off, and I 5 apologize, but I really mean we're going to move 6 on. Thank you.

7 DOCTOR JARECKI: I'd like to say finally 8 that it is counterproductive and would be 9 manifestly unfair to have long-only diversified 10 commodity funds such as ours who openly identify 11 our intended proportions a year in advance, and 12 openly trade and register our positions on each exchange and its clearinghouse and fully how the 13 14 price of every trade that we do on the long side, 15 the short side, and the hedging side to anyone who looks. If people like us aren't permitted on 16 17 exchanges, and only swap exemption folks were to be called hedgers, it would encourage secrecy, and 18 19 that is not what the exchangers, the regulators, 20 or the public want.

Indeed, before thinking about positionlimits themselves, the regulatory body should

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 revisit the question of swap exemptions, and, if 2 necessary, require all those currently enjoying 3 such benefits to request the exemptions we have asked for and been granted. 4 5 Finally, I would say it would be grossly anti- competitive and would put out of business 6 7 small enterprises like ours if what we do were 8 banned or limited in any way before the same 9 effective constraints are placed on those who assert swap exemptions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; 10 11 thank you, Commissioners. CHAIRMAN GENSLER: Thank you, Doctor 12 Jarecki. Mr. Slocum. 13 MR. SLOCUM: Mr. Chairman, members of 14 15 the Commission, thank you very much for inviting Public Citizen here today and for holding these 16 17 hearings. My name is Tyson Slocum, I direct the Energy Program at Public Citizen. We were founded 18 19 in 1971, we're America's largest consumer advocacy group, and I focus on FERC jurisdictional and CFTC 20 jurisdictional energy market regulations. 21 22 My constituents are the American people.

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

We are directly funded from the contributions by
 over 90,000 dues paying families across the United
 States and from private charitable foundations,
 and so we are advocating policies on behalf of our
 constituents, working families across the United
 States.

And there is no question that the era of 7 8 deregulation has eroded consumer protections and 9 removed effective transparency from energy 10 markets. And our economy and our families in this 11 country have been paying the price for these bad 12 decisions to limit transparency in these markets. 13 Public Citizen's reform proposals are 14 going to sound a lot more in common with Adam 15 Smith than with Hugh Chavez, because we are 16 calling on increasing transparency in these markets because we understand that a market that 17 18 is adequately transparent is a better functioning 19 market and a more competitive market, that when 20 you allow huge over-the-counter derivative markets that are free from effective oversight by the 21 22 federal government, you are encouraging

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

anti-competitive collusive practices that result 1 2 in higher prices to end consumers, my 3 constituents. I have been very encouraged by recent 4 5 pronouncements and actions by the CFTC to address the role that speculation has played in 6 contributing to higher prices and making some 7 8 early concrete steps to begin the long process of 9 re-establishing effective transparency and 10 regulations over these markets.

I am going to address four basic areas where Public Citizen would like to see the CFTC take further action. One of these is absolutely establishing strong effective position limits across all markets and for all products, reaching into swaps dealers and index funds.

We believe that the lack of effective position limits over these entities has allowed the accumulation of too much market power and has limited effective competition in these markets and allowed a hand full of very powerful entities, two of which are seated here at the table today,

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 Goldman Sachs and J.P. Morgan, to take very large 2 positions in under regulated format. We would 3 like to see those trading position limits across all months, and only provide exemptions for bona 4 5 fide commercial interest, only allow those types of hedge exemptions for folks that can demonstrate 6 7 that they have a direct financial interest in 8 hedging their risk. 9 Secondly, I think it's been clear that deregulatory actions by Congress and by the CFTC 10 11 over the years has greatly expanded the reach and 12 the size of the OTC market, and as a result, swaps dealers have been replacing traditional pit 13 14 exchanges as an avenue for entities to get access 15 to hedging their risk. 16 And so I think that the CFTC needs to 17 make adjustments, recognizing the large expansion of these OTC markets, and increase regulations 18 19 accordingly. The CFTC has the authority to

20 declare an emergency in these markets if market 21 prices do not reflect the underlying supply demand 22 fundamentals.

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

And I believe that the CFTC should 1 2 explore whether or not it can use that existing 3 authority, that emergency authority to reach into the OTC market and try to effectively regulate 4 5 that market by going the route that Obama Administration has proposed in terms of requiring 6 7 standardized OTC contracts to be cleared on 8 exchanges regulated by the CFTC. And for those 9 contracts that are non-standardized, the CFTC 10 should impose strong margin requirements to 11 dissuade trying to classify standardized OTC 12 contracts as non-standardized, and that the CFTC 13 should be making the determination. Also, it should be the CFTC making the determination, not 14 15 the exchanges, about the position limits. 16 The third main point is, to the maximum extent possible, the CFTC ought to ensure that 17 exempt commercial markets like electronic 18 19 exchanges such as ICE and swaps dealers are 20 providing data to the CFTC in formats that are compatible with your software that your market 21 22 monitoring staff is using.

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

I know that there might be some gaps in the ability to easily process data and make data more useful for the Commission, and ensuring that entities in these markets are supplying data that is as useful as possible to the Commission ought to be a priority.

And fourth, I know I'm out of time, but 7 8 the CFTC ought to commission several reports, one 9 of which examining any potential market problems 10 associated with the combined role that some 11 entities have in operating simultaneously as swaps 12 dealers, operating as managers of index funds, 13 while also engaging in significant proprietary 14 trading. And also the Commission ought to take a 15 look at the role that some financial firms have in acquiring or controlling access over energy 16 17 infrastructure assets, and how communications with 18 energy infrastructure affiliates facilitate 19 proprietary trading operations. Thank you very 20 much for your time and I look forward to any 21 questions you may have.

22 CHAIRMAN GENSLER: Thank you; our last

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 panelist.

2 MR. CASTURO: Chairman Gensler and 3 fellow Commissioners, my name is Don Casturo and 4 I'm a Managing Director of Goldman Sachs, where I 5 am responsible for the firm's commodities investor 6 trading desk. Thank you for the opportunity to 7 share our views regarding important issues in the 8 energy markets.

9 Increasing in volatility and the outright prices of energy commodities have raised 10 11 concerns at the CFTC and among policymakers about 12 changes in the marketplace. Some have questioned the role of index investors, other financial 13 14 participants, and intermediaries such as my firm 15 that are commonly referred to as swap dealers, 16 hence our participation in these hearings. 17 During my 14 year career, I observed an evolution in the commodities markets which has 18 19 yielded two noteworthy trends. The first is 20 increased participation by financial investors, which has brought new capital to the commodity 21 22 markets. This, in turn, has facilitated efficient

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

hedging by commercial participants. The second is that swap dealers have become the predominate source of liquidity for both commercial and non-commercial entities, and in so doing, have provided more customized forms of risk management products to end users.

7 We believe that both of these trends 8 have been positive for the marketplace. An 9 assertion that was confirmed in the testimony 10 yesterday of two of the commercial participants on 11 yesterday's panel.

12 Futures markets allow commercial entities to mitigate their exposure to commodity 13 14 price fluctuations. For a producer, hedging frees 15 up expensive equity capital and allows it to focus on its core competency of operating its business. 16 Index investors are well suited to bear the 17 18 commodity price risk associated with this producer 19 hedge. They regard this exposure as a source of 20 portfolio diversification and a safeguard against future inflation. 21

There has been much debate recently over

22

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 whether this financial participation has distorted 2 prices away from fair fundamental price. In order 3 to address this concern, I would note that 4 financial participation takes place in the futures 5 market and not on physical markets. Futures, as the name applies, are contracts whose values 6 express the equilibrium price for commodities at 7 8 distinct points in the future. The assessment of 9 fair value for these points is far more 10 complicated than spot fundamentals which are 11 derived from more observable data. Too often recently, however, many market commentators have 12 13 tried to explain futures prices by only applying 14 spot fundamentals. 15 The second trend I would note is the 16 increasingly central role of the swap dealer in 17 commodity markets. Swap dealers have successfully 18 developed risk management products tailored to 19 absorb specific risk with a level of precision beyond that which is practical in the futures 20 21 markets.

22 Additionally, they have established

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

credit lines with end users that recognize the
 relationship between credit exposures and the
 ability of the end user to meet obligations under
 hedging arrangements. Again, the Commission heard
 commercial participants identify both of these
 benefits in their testimony yesterday.

While it might often appear that a swap 7 8 dealer has taken a large position in the futures 9 market, in reality, the swap dealer is using the 10 exchange to manage the risk incurred in their 11 capacity as an important intermediary in the OTC 12 markets. First and foremost, the swap dealer is a market maker that maintains relationships with 13 producers, consumers, and financial participants 14 15 in order to provide more competitive pricing and 16 tailored products to each.

17 In order to perform this role 18 efficiently, the swap dealer may require access to 19 futures markets beyond existing position or 20 accountability limits. This is the rationale for 21 the swap hedge exemption. One concern with this 22 policy, however, is the so called swap loophole or

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 the notion that end users in the OTC markets have 2 the ability to accumulate exposure beyond what we 3 permitted under future position limits.

We acknowledge this as a concern. At 4 5 the same time, we do not believe that eliminating hedge exemptions or limiting them to situations 6 7 where the dealer is only transacting with the 8 commercial hedger will address the core issue. 9 We do, however, believe that such an approach will have unintended and undesirable 10 11 consequences. These would include, one, 12 commercial entities paying a higher price for 13 their customized hedge; two, encouraging more transactions to be executed all futures exchanges 14 15 and away from existing regulatory oversight; three, splintering the market; and four, driving a 16 large number of index and other investors to 17 non-U.S. commodity futures exchanges. From our 18 19 point of view, the swap loophole is better 20 addressed by looking to swap dealers for information regarding counterparty positions, as 21 22 it has done since establishing the special call

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

procedures, and looking through the swap dealers to apply limits at the end user level across derivatives and futures. In this manner, the CFTC would effectively establish aggregate position limits at the end user level across the full spectrum of

7 traded markets.

8 Lastly, I would like to comment on the 9 appropriate size of these position limits. The 10 Commission is focused on establishing limits to 11 prevent and eliminate excessive speculation. 12 Given that Chairman Gensler's previous testimony acknowledges the role of some speculation in the 13 markets, the challenge is to determine what size 14 15 limits should be set to prevent excessive speculation; in other words, at what level, are 16 17 the position limits low enough to prevent excessive speculation while still being high 18 enough so as to not restrict the level of 19 20 speculation that is necessary to balance between producer and consumer hedging interests. While 21 22 this may be a complicated process, we believe that

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 the CFTC is the appropriate authority to engage in 2 the exercise and support the idea that the 3 Commission establish a consistent methodology to set limits across all commodities. 4 5 In sum, we appreciate the focus that the Commission is bringing to important energy issues 6 7 in the energy markets and look forward to 8 continuing to work with the Commission on these 9 issues. 10 CHAIRMAN GENSLER: I want to thank our 11 witnesses. I want to thank you for being within 12 the five minutes, impressive. We're going to try to do the same five minute clock here, and I ask 13 14 for your purveyance, because it may be three rounds, it may be just -- there's a lot of 15 16 substance here and this is a very important set of 17 witnesses, and the next set of witnesses, we might go three rounds, as well. 18 19 I just wanted to first comment on 20 something Doctor Jarecki mentioned. And there was a lot of Latin, and I never took Latin, but I 21 22 think it translated, in lay terms, you were

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

suggesting this is just sort of a political thing 1 2 here, and it's not for this Commissioner, this 3 Chairman. I really think, and Congress laid out in our statute very clearly that we have an 4 5 authority and that we shall use that authority to best promote the fair and orderly functioning of 6 7 markets. We are not a price setter as an agency, 8 and under this chairmanship, I don't see us as a 9 price setting agency, but we are about making sure 10 that markets are fair and orderly and work for the 11 American public.

12 As I was rightly quoted, speculators are a very important part of the functioning markets 13 and have been for well over 100 years. Hedgers, 14 15 whether they be a farmer, a grain elevator operator, an oil producer, somebody down the line, 16 17 a purchaser, a miller, or ultimately the American public benefit that risk can be hedged and then 18 19 commercial enterprises and farmers can focus on 20 the risk they want to retain, whether that's employment or within their business, but we are 21 22 trying to protect the markets.

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 And so that leaves me a little bit to my 2 question to, if I can direct it to Ms. Masters and 3 Mr. Casturo. I take it from your testimonies, they're somewhat similar in approach, that you 4 5 both support the CFTC setting position limits, aggregate position limits, but if I may use the 6 7 term, on end users, looking through the swap 8 dealer community; is that correct; do I read the 9 testimony correctly? 10 MS. MASTERS: Yes, sir. 11 MR. CASTURO: Yes. CHAIRMAN GENSLER: And in setting those 12 position limits on the end users, how would that 13 benefit the functioning of the markets? 14 15 MS. MASTERS: I think that the suggestion made by Don Casturo, which is that the 16 17 objective, if to impose position limits is to avoid excessive speculation, then you need to size 18 those limits in a fashion that enables the market 19 20 notwithstanding those limits to balance the imbalances between producer and consumer flows. 21 22 If that is the objective, then the role

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

of the aggregator or intermediary plays no net
 economic effect on that, all it does is facilitate
 buyer aggregation activity, the meeting of the
 buyer and the seller.

5 The benefit of having additional investors or speculators is, you're more likely to 6 be able to have those buyers and sellers met 7 8 through time with less results in volatility. So 9 the logic for exempting an aggregator, only on its 10 net, flat positions, and imposing those limits on 11 the end user is that ultimately it is the end 12 market participant who has a net economic 13 position.

14 CHAIRMAN GENSLER: I'm sorry, I do want 15 to hear from Mr. Casturo, but just so I clarify, 16 my question is, that was helpful, but my question 17 is, what benefit comes to the market from setting 18 the position limits on the end users, not what 19 benefit in exempting the aggregator.

20 MS. MASTERS: Well, I think -- we have 21 -- we see in our data, which is only a portion of 22 the market, obviously, no situations where the end

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 activity of either a producer, a consumer, or an 2 investor is so significant that it is affording 3 that entity the opportunity to manipulate or abuse prices. However, at least in theory, we certainly 4 5 appreciate the potential for that to exist. And so if you were to impose those limits, you would 6 7 have insurance against that eventuality, and, of 8 course, the ability to monitor against those 9 limits. 10 CHAIRMAN GENSLER: Okay. 11 MS. MASTERS: I think, personally, the 12 monitoring is more important than the limits. 13 MR. CASTURO: Yes; I think the primary 14 point to be made is that if you're looking for possibilities of excessive speculation, as you've 15 16 heard in testimony all over the panel, the markets 17 are broader than just the future markets, and to 18 look at the entire spectrum of trade in markets 19 for any single entity that may accumulate an 20 exposure that may be deemed as excessive, and the only way to do that is to go to the end user 21 22 level.

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 One other point that I'd like to make, 2 that, in our discussion of how we think these 3 positions limits should be set up at the end user level, we are not advocating that Goldman Sachs 4 5 have any special treatment, we should be held to the same at risk level of position limits as any 6 7 other end user. We're only taking futures to 8 facilitate end user activity, and that our net 9 exposure, our net at risk exposure would be 10 subject to the same limits. 11 CHAIRMAN GENSLER: I fear I see my 12 yellow light, but I'll make a statement. You can 13 be thinking about it while you answer other 14 questions. I noticed in earlier Mr. Casturo's 15 oral statement, you mentioned about splintering of markets, and someone else, and it may have been 16 17 Doctor Jarecki, used fragmenting, I think was the 18 word maybe, but one person splintering and another 19 person fragmenting might be a -- somebody else's 20 diversity in markets. And so I'd like to come

22 your view on this, because I do think there is a

21

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

back when we get to the next round and understand

logic to avoid concentrated economic power in any
 market. But, of course, if you avoid concentrated
 economic power, you might call that splintering.
 So Commissioner Dunn.

5 COMMISSIONER DUNN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don't with to pick on Mr. Casturo and 6 Ms. Masters, but I will. Your testimony, if I can 7 8 paraphrase it, you, in essence, said that things 9 have changed in the marketplace, and, in fact, 10 over-the-counter has really replaced pit trading 11 to some extent, and that instead of going through 12 a clearinghouse, there should be the residual net worth of those folks that are the counterparties 13 14 and the swaps that protect the sanctity of those 15 trades.

16 It occurs to me that that's exactly what 17 got us into the financial meltdown that we have. 18 And, Ms. Masters, you even make the point, in 19 your last paragraph, where you say that 85 percent 20 of those are based upon ratings, and again, the 21 problems you say, of the remaining 133 billion of 22 exposure, 85 percent of the entities that were

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 rated investment grade, and some of this exposure 2 was secured by the kinds of collateral that I 3 mentioned above, property, equipment, reserves, et cetera, all across the line. 4 5 MS. MASTERS: That refers to J.P. Morgan's internal ratings, not rating agency 6 7 ratings. 8 COMMISSIONER DUNN: That's an internal 9 one then and not one of the external ones that we have had concerns about, got you on that. The 10 11 problem I have, going back to what I know, the old 12 agricultural pits and looking at those, is, we had very specific supervisory and compliance 13 14 requirements of those exchange. There were 15 cameras looking over the shoulders of the pit traders as they traded. There was immediate and 16 17 -- calculating who made what trade and reconciling that at the end of that trading period. 18 19 That type of openness with compliance 20 and somebody following up when there was a problem is not there in the over-the-counter. Who will do 21

> ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

the surveillance and compliance?

22

1 MS. MASTERS: In the latter part of my 2 written testimony, I made reference to J.P. 3 Morgan's belief that there is an important role for a systemic risk regulator whose authorities 4 5 would include the oversight of transacting in the over-the-counter derivative markets, as well as 6 7 setting capital requirements, as well as setting 8 collateral requirements and the like. I do agree 9 that over-the-counter derivative activities should 10 be regulated and supervised in some form. I don't 11 agree that the only way to achieve that is by 12 forcing transactions to be conducted on a 13 centralized exchange. MR. CASTURO: I would echo those 14 15 comments and mention that it also agrees with the comments of Mr. Slocum, that we're also 16 17 supportive of additional regulatory oversight into 18 that over-the-counter space because it is as 19 important as we've identified, and not just we've 20 identified, even the commercial participants that have given testimony have identified the benefits 21 22 of transacting in the over-the-counter space.

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 COMMISSIONER DUNN: All of you have 2 indicated that at the end of the day, we ought to 3 know the aggregate position of those participating in the market. Mr. Slocum says, well, we could 4 5 use our existing software, I wish it were true. The amount of effort went into our special call, 6 7 it took up about a third of the time of our 8 surveillance staff.

9 We did get some of that stuff down to the point and we are in the process of trying to 10 11 establish IT programs that will do the type of 12 evaluation and raise the red flag, but, you know, every day there are millions of transactions that 13 14 are taken, and that is going to require, on behalf of all of you in the industry, to respond to the 15 16 needs of giving us information in the format that 17 we are going to require. Is the industry ready to do that? And I really appreciate J.P. Morgan and 18 19 Goldman Sachs offering solutions here.

20 MR. CASTURO: Yes; we recognize that 21 there's a large burden and expense involved in 22 what we're proposing, but we believe this is the

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

right approach and are prepared to meet those burdens and expenses and work with the exchange in getting you the data that you require in the right format. My belief, as I've stated to the

6 Commission before, is that your special call last 7 year was remarkably accurate given the short time 8 frame that you had to enact it in terms of what it 9 was seeking, and we look forward to working with 10 you more and refine that process even further if 11 so needed.

MS. MASTERS: I hate to say it, but I agree.

14 COMMISSIONER DUNN: You indicated that 15 you got some good out of that special call; could 16 you elaborate on that?

17 MR. CASTURO: Yeah; I just think that, 18 in terms of examining our business and what the 19 makeup of our over- the-counter participants is, I 20 mean, broadly I understood, obviously, what they 21 were because that's my role on the desk every day, 22 but to actually look at the data in the format

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 that you requested gave me additional insights as 2 to where these flows came from, none of which did 3 I feel there was any damaging -- was damaging to the markets in any way, but was just useful 4 5 analysis of how our business operates. 6 CHAIRMAN GENSLER: Commissioner Sommers. COMMISSIONER SOMMERS: Thank you, Mr. 7 Chairman. I'm going to follow a line of 8 9 questioning that I had yesterday with some of our 10 market participants and it's regarding the formula 11 that we use to set the position limits and what we 12 look at as the entire marketplace. And as you 13 know, we don't have the current authority over the 14 OTC markets right now, but through our special 15 call, have been getting information. To all of the panelists, do you feel that it's important for 16 17 us to look at the total open interest, including OTC positions, in order to set the position limits 18 19 on these markets, and how difficult is that going 20 to be to achieve accurate numbers? DOCTOR JARECKI: I'd be happy to comment 21 22 briefly on the question. I think you do need the

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 entire quantum, but you also do need the look 2 through to be individual holder. And I want to 3 just respond briefly to your question, to also touch on the Chairman's question of what the 4 5 importance is in identifying the position, the final position holder is, because it's the final 6 7 position holder that is the -- that is the swing 8 element. 9 Index operators and folks like ourselves are simply passive mechanics of implementation. 10 11 It's the customer, not we, who decides to 12 purchase. And I'm speaking here of investors. So 13 one speaks here of disaggregation, that is, not 14 pulling it together in the sense that you mean, 15 but identifying what the position is of each

16 individual long holder.

17 He's got to save his position anywhere 18 near position limits, otherwise, an investor could 19 buy five wheat directed funds, he could own a 20 billion dollars worth of wheat futures and yet not 21 be subject to position limits at all. Making the 22 investor, not the aggregator, responsible closes a

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 giant unintended loophole, and that loophole 2 exists under what is currently foreseen, one 3 doesn't get to the end user, the end long user. So I think it is -- I think the overall position, 4 5 including the derivatives and the over-the-counter trades is important, but the end user's position 6 7 is where the most important activity is, that's where the abuses can occur, our colleagues claim 8 9 they have not occurred, and I have no data on 10 that. 11 COMMISSIONER SOMMERS: Just to clarify 12 before the rest of you answer that question, do 13 you disclose to anyone the positions of your individual investors? 14 15 DOCTOR JARECKI: We have -- we are asked 16 about it and we do provide large holders, we provide information on large holders, yes. 17 COMMISSIONER SOMMERS: Thank you. 18 MS. MASTERS: So in answer to the 19 20 question, do I believe that limits should apply to 21 over-the-counter positions, as well as exchange positions, yes is the answer. Had you asked the 22

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 question, how feasible is that a year ago, I might 2 have paused before answering. But I do think that 3 in the form of the special call, rushed and exhausting as it certainly was for all parties, 4 5 the CFTC has set an important precedent and could institutionalize that process, higher frequency, 6 7 more standardization, hopefully rendering it more a lot electronic, which would require work from 8 9 both sides, obviously, I think it's very feasible, 10 because you have the makings of all of the 11 necessary information there. 12 COMMISSIONER SOMMERS: I just want to 13 clarify that we're getting all of your positions, your entire book in OTC positions so that we could 14 take all of that into consideration for what we 15 would clarify as the whole -- the entire market? 16 17 MS. MASTERS: Correct. 18 COMMISSIONER SOMMERS: Okay. 19 MR. CASTURO: Yes; I would again echo 20 that, looking at the entire traded spectrum is the 21 proper approach, and only then do you get to the 22 true answers on who's holding positions that may

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

be deemed excessive. I think it's very feasible. 1 2 Again, the special call data is certainly -- I can 3 accurately comment on Goldman Sachs, you're getting all and accurate information. 4 5 MR. SLOCUM: Yeah; the Public Citizen supports, you know, considering the position 6 limits across all the markets, the OTC markets 7 8 have a lot of action in them now and it's crucial 9 that the action in that market be taken into 10 account when setting the position limits. 11 COMMISSIONER SOMMERS: My other question 12 is a little bit off of the topic of position limits, but it goes back to something that one of 13 14 our participants yesterday talked about. 15 Commercial participants that use swap dealers or use the OTC markets to hedge their risk indicated 16 17 that they post no margin and that it is cheaper 18 for them to use swap dealers to hedge their risk, 19 and I'm assuming that some of these large 20 commercial participants are your clients, and maybe some of these people are both of your 21 22 clients. How do you know that you are not both

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 using the same collateral to back up the positions 2 that these commercial counterparties have with 3 each of you at the same time? MS. MASTERS: So, first of all, there 4 5 are certain customers, commercial customers of J.P. Morgan and any other major bank in this space 6 7 who have unsecured lines under which to do the 8 hedging activity. There are many others that have 9 secured lines where the collateral, the margin can 10 range from cash and government securities all the 11 way up to property, plant, equipment, commodity, 12 molecules in the ground, et cetera. 13 When it comes to evaluating whether or 14 not and how much of an unsecured exposure to take to a commercial counterparty, any bank, J.P. 15 Morgan certainly, would first conduct a thorough 16 17 credit analysis of the credit worthiness of that company. So we would look at the totality of its 18 assets and liabilities, its cash flows situation, 19 20 et cetera. And very often we find that when hedging activity is being undertaken, there's a 21 22 component of what we refer to as right way risk.

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

Right way risk reflects a situation where someone 1 2 is buying protection, for example, a gas producer 3 hedging his gas production, buys a gas swap from J.P. Morgan. Under the mechanics of that swap, 4 5 our exposure to him increases as gas prices rise. 6 Of course, a gas producer is a more 7 credit worthy entity, it has higher enterprise 8 value if gas prices are higher. So just as our 9 exposure rises, so does the credit worthiness of that company. So we are able to make value 10 11 judgments along those lines to decide how much 12 exposure we have. 13 As it relates to how can we be 14 comfortable that a company is not doubling up and tripling up on all of its activity, that's all 15 about knowing your client and having a deep and 16 confidential credit relationship with your 17 customer so that you understand the nature of 18 19 their business, the nature of their hedging 20 activity. And just as you would evaluate when 21 you're making a loan to the company, that they're 22 not quietly taking loans from many others that you

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 don't know about, you would have the same dialogue 2 about what their hedging activity is, too. 3 DOCTOR JARECKI: I'd like to just add, if I may, that in the businesses that we do, we do 4 5 not have any customers with unsecured lines. Our customers don't even put up margin with us, they 6 7 put up 100 percent of the amount of money that is 8 required to purchase their commodity. So it's not 9 -- they get far less leverage with us. They don't 10 even get the five or six percent they would get 11 with the exchange, which purports them to sell out 12 when the market falls. They put up with us 100 13 percent. And this is -- therefore, it's not 14 15 surprising that our kind of customers, and I'm not familiar with the folks who take and give 16 17 unsecured lines because our company is too small to tolerate this, but they don't go anywhere when 18 19 the markets fall, they just stay there and say, 20 okay, we'll wait until it goes back up. CHAIRMAN GENSLER: Thank you. 21 22 MR. CASTURO: I would just like to add

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 that the special call data also gives access to 2 over-the-counter trades that are enacted by our 3 commercial client. So to the extent that a large commercial client may be having exposure that is 4 5 even beyond what their commercial or physical exposure is, you would have access to that data, 6 7 as well, so it would re-enforce knowing your 8 client even at the regulatory level. And 9 secondly, the notion of unsecured lines in right 10 way risk really is our credit department's 11 practice in evaluating commercial clients. It's 12 not the practice to evaluate non-commercial clients in the same manner, those are largely 100 13 14 percent collateralized. 15 MR. SLOCUM: If I may add something, I 16 think that I have a public policy problem with 17 allowing entities like Goldman and J.P. Morgan to subsidize their very lucrative swaps business by 18 19 using the regulated exchanges essentially to hedge 20 their own risk. And I think that that's why it's so crucial that Congress and the CFTC get control 21

over the OTC market.

22

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

I don't think I need to talk to the CFTC 1 2 about the role that counterparty risk played in 3 the current economic crisis. My esteemed colleagues wouldn't be here today but for the 4 5 generosity of Congress using the outstanding debt of the American people to bale out AIG and other 6 7 entities when they got in over their heads in 8 deregulated markets. And so I think that's the 9 crux of the issue here, that a very lucrative 10 business line for these banks, they're hedging 11 that for themselves in the regulated markets while 12 wanting to preserve all of the benefits that an unregulated OTC market provides for their bottom 13 14 line. 15 CHAIRMAN GENSLER: Commissioner Sommers. 16 COMMISSIONER SOMMERS: I'll go back to 17 that. 18 CHAIRMAN GENSLER: Thank you. I suspect we'll have a few rounds here. Commissioner 19 20 Chilton. COMMISSIONER CHILTON: Thanks, Mr. 21 22 Chairman. Doctor Jarecki, you mentioned as part

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

of your reason that you didn't think there was an impact on oil prices, that coal and steel were increasing, not traded, et cetera, but don't you think that coal and steel are impacted by oil prices?

DOCTOR JARECKI: Well, there's an awful 6 7 lot of things -- you would have to take -- to 8 believe that, you would have to look at things 9 like real estate prices that were moving upwards 10 at the same time, and at many other objects. If 11 you looked at the general level of prices during 12 those dramas, you could say happened at the same time, I guess it was caused by, but I'm so fearful 13 14 of talking anymore Latin here that I won't say 15 post hoc ergo propter hoc. But the --16 CHAIRMAN GENSLER: I assure you, I 17 understood your Latin, but it wasn't in Latin, I 18 understood it. 19 DOCTOR JARECKI: But it's true that 20 things move together, but you don't know which is the chicken and which is the egg. What is 21

22 important to see is, in the chart on page 12 which

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 I've shown, which is, as money poured into these 2 funds, that was not coupled with the increase in 3 prices. It's, in many cases, negatively correlated, and there would be -- I think a burden 4 5 would be on somebody to demonstrate the causative issues. I'm not arguing that they hung out 6 7 together at some times, but there were many times 8 that they didn't hang out together. COMMISSIONER CHILTON: So you think that 9 the passive longs, and you'll agree that there has 10 11 been an increase in passive longs, but you don't 12 think they have any impact on the market, and you think the only ones that we should be concerned 13 about are those who take physical delivery of 14 15 products? 16 DOCTOR JARECKI: I'm not familiar, and I 17 know the history of markets for 100 or 200 years. I'm not familiar with speculations or 18 19 manipulations that act solely in the futures 20 markets without activity. In the physical markets, the world I knew best in this 21 22 manipulative thing were the Hunt Brothers, who

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

took billions of dollars worth of silver, hid it 1 2 from the public, moved it out of the exchanges so 3 that they could pretend that there were -- that there was a diminished physical supply, then took 4 5 a broker in a loud, red, check jacket, had him go on to the exchange floor and say, limit up bed for 6 7 1,000 lots, that was a manipulation, that was an 8 effort to cause the price to go up so they could 9 take their physicals and back a whole bunch of 10 silver back bonds with it. 11 But there aren't histories. Whether you go to secreten curio (?) I could name you, I'm 12 13 sorry, these are all the people that have done the 14 great dramas, Sumi Toma, they've all done their 15 things in the physical markets. 16 And you can have a short manipulation, a week, a day, an hour, somebody can go into the 17 18 exchange with a loud check jacket, and sure 19 enough, the markets went up, limit up, because he was bidding limit up for 1,000 lots, but it's not 20

22 that can last over the extensive period of time

21

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

something that can last, and it's not something

1 that that bubble lasted.

2 COMMISSIONER CHILTON: Okay, thank you. 3 Mr. Slocum, you mentioned that you thought we should have position limits in all markets, and 4 5 since Doctor Jarecki just raised silver, I'll ask about the metals complex. And I know that's not 6 7 your specific area of expertise, but you're an 8 expert in these markets in general, and it's my 9 view that, you know, what's good for the goose and 10 that it would make sense to do it for all of 11 these; do you have an opinion on that? 12 MR. SLOCUM: Yeah, I think I agree with 13 you. Like I said, my area of focus is on energy markets, but it would make a lot of sense for the 14 15 Commission to be consistent with all commodities under its jurisdiction. You know, I have 16 17 particular concern in the emerging pollution derivatives markets, and I hope that the 18 19 Commission embraces its hopefully new authority 20 over those markets. But, yeah, I think that all of these 21

22 anti- speculation and pro-competitive regulatory

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 actions by the Commission should apply to all of 2 the commodities under your jurisdiction. 3 COMMISSIONER CHILTON: Let me just --I'm going to run out of time, so I'll just go back 4 5 to you still, Mr. Slocum. I think there's some merit in the argument that some of the exchanges 6 gave us yesterday that if we just do position 7 8 limits here, and I'm not prejudging what we will 9 or won't do, but if we just do that, there is some possibility that, theoretical at least, that 10 11 positions could move OTC and that it would be less 12 transparent. That's not what we're trying to do, we're trying to create more transparency. So I've 13 14 said that I think, you know, Congress needs to act to give us this OTC authority, too, but I wanted 15 to know your view, and maybe you can elaborate on 16 17 that point.

18 MR. SLOCUM: I think that any time that 19 industries or businesses or individuals throughout 20 history have been threatened with enhanced 21 transparency measures, the first line of defense 22 is always the I'm going to flee defense, and I

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 don't know that I fully buy that for commodity
2 markets.

I think that given the precarious state of financial markets in general, I think that those entities that try to become the Cayman Islands of commodities regulation are not going to be looked upon favorably.

8 I think that given the fact that the 9 global community is acting fairly aggressively 10 finally over tax havens, I think that you see that 11 there is a recognition among countries, even 12 developing countries, that a race to the bottom 13 from a regulatory perspective is not conducive to 14 long term economic development. So I do not buy 15 the argument that if we employ sensible regulations that folks are going to flee to some 16 17 other country, I'm not convinced of that. 18 COMMISSIONER CHILTON: I know my time is 19 up, but I did want to make sure that people 20 understood. But you do think that Congress should approve greater oversight of OTC markets for the 21

22 CFTC?

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 MR. SLOCUM: No question. 2 COMMISSIONER CHILTON: Okay. 3 MR. SLOCUM: And we have been communicating that very loud and clear to 4 5 Congress. COMMISSIONER CHILTON: Thanks. 6 CHAIRMAN GENSLER: Thank you. Doctor 7 8 Jarecki mentioned that he thought -- and what he 9 does, and he's a passive mechanic, so my question 10 for Ms. Masters and Mr. Casturo is, in running 11 your commodity swap businesses, are you just 12 passive mechanics at J.P. Morgan and Goldman 13 Sachs? MR. CASTURO: Well, to the extent that 14 15 we offer swaps to index investors, we largely have a similar profile as an investor in an index fund. 16 They make the decisions, we don't, and we -- while 17 18 we make them a risk price to engage in that 19 transaction, we, in most cases, immediately hedge 20 that risk either by offsetting it with some of our commercial participants, and that's actually quite 21 22 common, or by using the futures exchanges in the

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

interim to offset that risk. But it's largely
 passive from our perspective. We're just a pass
 through.

MS. MASTERS: I think if you take our 4 5 business as a whole, there are a number of different components, and facilitating index 6 7 investors is one area where I think you could 8 accurately characterize the business as being 9 closest to a passive facilitation role. Can't 10 quite get to the passive mechanic phraseology, but 11 you know what I mean.

12 I think, however, there are other areas 13 where we're acting more in our own capacity, and 14 in those -- just to be clear, I think our position 15 is that while we are acting in our own proprietary capacity, we should be subject to the exact same 16 17 restrictions that any other entity for any reason 18 is subjected to by the CFTC or an exchange or any other authorized body. So we're not asking for 19 special treatment other than in the situation 20 where we are facilitating business for others. 21 22 CHAIRMAN GENSLER: See, I think this

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

might be at the core of, frankly, our difference. 1 2 I don't see a Goldman Sachs swap desk or a J.P. 3 Morgan swap desk as a passive mechanic, and the billions of dollars of transactions that you do 4 5 just as a passive mechanic, or the billions of dollars of profits, or the billions of dollars of 6 7 compensation wouldn't be a passive mechanics. I 8 mean it is a highly sophisticated risk business, 9 and it's an important component of our financial 10 markets, a very important component of our 11 financial markets, but not a passive mechanics 12 component. 13 And so that's why, when I think about

14 your earlier question or comment that I'm going to now question, is, you thought that we should apply 15 16 position limits on end users, which is very 17 encouraging, and there's some common ground here, 18 but then you thought it shouldn't be applied on 19 the aggregators, the aggregators of risk, the swap 20 dealers, and so I want to come back to that and ask why that is, because I don't think it's just a 21 22 passive business, you know, I don't think the

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 American public thinks it's just a passive

2 business either.

3 MS. MASTERS: So to clarify, I'm not suggesting that an entity because it is in the 4 5 swap dealing business should be entirely exempted. I am, however, suggesting that, with the benefit 6 7 of full transparency, which rules are recommending 8 here, you will be able to clearly identify and 9 delineate those situations where we are seeking to 10 lay off risks that we are assuming from one 11 customer and intermediating. And to the extent 12 that we're unable to convince you of that, then you can classify it as non- passive or 13 14 non-intermediating business and apply limits or 15 other rules as necessary. 16 We are offering and have provided the 17 necessary transparency for you to be able to evaluate that in the special call and on a 18 19 hopefully continuing basis. So I think you will

20 be in a position to, in your own rights, evaluate,

21 rather than just taking our word for it.

22 So I think it is absolutely the case

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

that we do play a major facilitating role for 1 2 hundreds, if not thousands of clients around the 3 globe, it is a complex business, we hedge options with futures, we hedge power with natural gas, we 4 5 hedge jet fuel with WTI, et cetera, and so we're going to have to have some language whereby we 6 7 explain to each other what do we mean by 8 intermediation because it's not just plus one and 9 minus one, it is more complicated than that, as 10 you correctly point out. But it is not so 11 complicated that it cannot be conveyed. And with 12 the transparency that you will have, i.e., total transparency, I have no doubt that we would be 13 able to achieve the needed goal. But again, where 14 15 we're not intermediating, we shouldn't be exempt 16 from anything. MR. CASTURO: Yes; I'd just like to 17

17 MR. CASTORO: Yes; I'd just like to 18 clarify my earlier comments here that we might be 19 seen as being on a different side of the issue 20 here. I was only referring to our capacity as 21 providing a swap to an index investor in terms of 22 that particular activity being relatively passive,

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 right. Our broader business, I would agree, does 2 involve us taking some risk. And the suggestion 3 by Ms. Masters, I would agree with, as well, that our capacity to engage in that speculative risk 4 5 element of our business should be limited, like every other counterparty, and that's every other 6 7 entity in that space by the position limits that 8 we're proposing.

9 CHAIRMAN GENSLER: I appreciate both of your comments because I'm really grappling with 10 11 the common ground of applying position limits on 12 the end users and aggregating, and I think it would be very tangible and fruitful suggestions 13 about using the special call. But I'm still 14 15 personally grappling with why the swap dealers would be outside of that, and I'm hearing, well, 16 maybe they wouldn't be outside of it, but maybe 17 you're suggesting part of your business would be 18 outside of it. I'm sorry. 19

20 MR. SLOCUM: Mr. Chairman, if I can just 21 add something very quickly. I had the pleasure of 22 reading through Goldman Sach's 10K report for its

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

GSCI index, and not to pick on you, but -- and it 1 2 was a page turner, but in the disclosure for this 3 10K annual report, because it's to the SEC, which is a shareholder rights agency, it has a 4 5 disclaimer in there for potential investors in the index fund saying, you know, we invest as a 6 7 passive investor in this basket of 24 commodities, 8 but, by the way, Goldman Sachs has other 9 affiliates that will be taking active proprietary 10 trading in these same commodities, and we need to 11 let you know that, that we are -- we have a large 12 business involved with that. 13 And so looking at these activities in 14 isolation I don't think provides an accurate reflection of a company's footprint in the 15 marketplace. And I think that's why, in my 16 opening statements, I talked about the CFTC 17 examining the totality of banks and other 18 19 financial firm's involvement in these markets, in 20 all of these different affiliate components. DOCTOR JARECKI: I'm so relieved to hear 21 22 that there is unanimity here about the

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 appropriateness of considering our business only 2 an end user business. Our firm has no trading 3 profit. We do 100 percent of our trades for our customers, and that is the only group for whom we 4 5 trade. So apparently there is now a unanimity, if there's not a trading profit, then surely one 6 7 would not be involved in position limits, and I'm 8 very grateful for that unanimity. 9 CHAIRMAN GENSLER: I can only imagine you're speaking on behalf of the panelists because 10 11 you cannot be speaking on behalf of the 12 Commissioners. I am probably -- I know I have 13 some more questions, so with the patience of the 14 panelists and the next panel, I'm turning to 15 Commissioner Dunn, but alerting that we'll have at least a third round. 16 17 COMMISSIONER DUNN: I thought you were implying it would take a great deal of patience 18 for me to answer a question. I'm kind of -- I 19 20 think this is a great panel, we're learning a great deal here. Doctor Jarecki, I hope we don't 21 22 end up prescribing a placebo, but even if we do,

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 we know placebos have an impact on the patient, 2 and it takes constant re-examining of what goes 3 on, and that is, again, something that's going to take a lot of time, and some of your suggestions 4 5 on what we ought to be doing is that there's a follow-up, that anything that we do will have an 6 7 impact on the marketplace, and we must be assured 8 that we go back and revisit that, that's the 9 reason why Congress reauthorizes every -periodically, five years or so, and so -- and 10 11 that's why we get new people on the Commission, as 12 well. 13 But I'd like to hear from all of you 14 about what drives the passive or speculator investor. Mr. Casturo, you talk about they push 15 the market back into balance, and you delineate 16

17 between a macro and a micro.

Doctor Jarecki, you talk about a hedging really for inflation, and the fact that there are -- we think there are going to be better times there, and so we think that commodities like oil and metals, et cetera, are going to go up in

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 price, and there are optimists that we might call 2 on that that are investing for the long term or 3 they're hedging their concerns about inflation. But often times when we see some of 4 5 these hedge investments that were out there, they may be only relegated to the sophisticated 6 7 investor that's out there, and I'd like to 8 understand, Mr. Slocum, what do you see the role 9 for the mom and pop type investors, the kind that 10 the doctor represents? So if I could hear from 11 all the panelists on ---12 DOCTOR JARECKI: May I start with that? 13 At the risk of appearing excessively academic, I 14 have to go back to Lord Keynes, who spoke about --15 who spoke exactly about the topic that you're talking about. And he led us to believe that 16 17 there was a natural profit in the commodity market 18 for the speculator, for the group -- the aggregate 19 of all speculators, because, he said, the farmer 20 looks out at his land and he's planted it, and he's kind of happy with how it is, and the weather 21 22 is good, and the prices are high, and he becomes

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 panicky that he's going to -- that the prices will 2 go down and he'll lose, and so he's willing to 3 sell at a -- sell for a one year delivery, that is, sell for when he gets harvested. 4 5 The baker has no interest in buying wheat at that moment, he wants to buy it a week or 6 two before he uses it because if grain prices are 7 8 excessively high, he'll bring bread prices up. 9 Keynes said that this was the normal condition and said that there was a normal 10 11 backwardation, that is, that forward prices would 12 be lower than expectation because of the farmer and the producer's desire to sell. That means 13 14 that there is naturally the commercial --- the producer is short, and the commercial who wants to 15 buy something is -- he is long only in the nearby. 16 17 That time period, somebody is paying for. And 18 that payment, which is the payment of backwardation, and I don't mean price 19 20 backwardation, but expectation backwardation, I don't want to get too technical, that is what 21 22 comes out of the market.

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

And it is -- the speculators are being 1 2 paid to diminish the anxiety of the producers. 3 This is true in the oil markets, it's true in every market. And I don't know if I've been 4 5 useful in making that comment about that distinction between the natural speculative long 6 and the natural producer short. Thank you. 7 8 MS. MASTERS: Today's investors are 9 accessing the commodity markets through a number 10 of different channels. The one in which you most 11 regularly see, the smaller retail investor 12 represented is by our ETF's. And as you know, 13 ETF's have grown wildly in popularity in recent years, and specifically, ETF's reference in 14 15 commodities, natural gas, crude oil have been 16 amongst those and so the strong representation of the individual investor in those areas. 17 18 As it relates to index or swap investors 19 that are facilitated by the swap dealers, 20 generally speaking, those investors are large institutional investors who very often represent 21 22 the interests of the retail individual in the form

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 of, for example, they might be a pension plan, or 2 an endowment, or some other institutional money 3 manager managing money on behalf of a pool of individuals. There are also other sophisticated 4 5 investors in the form of Sovereign Wealth Funds, for example, who have used the same investment 6 7 vehicles, so there's a whole spectrum. 8 And then at the most sophisticated end 9 of the spectrum, where you very rarely find 10 activity in the passive index type of strategy, 11 and rather you see much more directed and 12 individualized strategies, both long and short, in the hedge fund community. So there's a whole 13 14 spectrum of different types of investor at play 15 here, and each of them provides liquidity in their 16 own way. MR. CASTURO: Commissioner Dunn, I'm 17 glad you asked that question because I think this

18 glad you asked that question because I think this 19 is the basis for a lot of the misunderstanding 20 about how these markets work. I've done a lot of 21 thinking about this. To go back to Doctor 22 Jarecki's mention of Lord Keynes and his theory,

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 really what's going on there, there is an 2 imbalance between the producer's desire to hedge 3 and the consumer's desire to hedge on a forward basis, and that's because the consumers are very 4 5 diversified, they're individuals like you and I that are not organized enough to think about how 6 much their commodity prices are going to be in a 7 8 year, or big enough to act individually to do 9 that. The case of the index investor is almost 10 like representing a collective group of those 11 consumers, particularly if you look at who makes 12 up these index investors, they're largely endowments and pension funds that represent a 13 larger group of people, who actually have all the 14 15 shorts in the commodity markets, they have the exposure that if prices go up, they're the ones 16 17 that are going to have to bear the cost. 18 In the wheat example, the baker just passing onto the consumer. So those entities, in 19 20 a sense, represent the hedging interest of a broader group of consumers that are required in 21

22 the marketplace to offset the producer's desire to

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

hedge price risk to the down side. So I think
 that's the key point that you want to consider in
 terms of what they make.

Now, with regard to my testimony, we're 4 5 distinguishing that group from what we would call true speculators, which are those that are more 6 7 price sensitive and try to take advantage of 8 perceived distortions from fundamentals and bring the market back into line. That's a group that 9 10 will enact -- again, in the futures space, they're 11 only talking about future perception of 12 fundamentals, which is, again, hard to quantify. But that speculative interest is more -- is where 13 14 you get into the balancing that I'm talking about 15 in my written testimony, where if there is any 16 perceived distortion that there might be in a 17 futures market in terms of prices and fundamentals, the speculators come in and bring 18 that market back into line. 19 20 Now, ultimately, all these groups are governed by true physical spot fundamentals when a 21 22 contract goes into expiration and converges to the

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

cash market price. Where there is true consumer
 -- end user consumer and produce -- and producers
 meeting in the cash markets.

4 MR. SLOCUM: Again, I want to reiterate 5 concerns that Public Citizen has when entities 6 like large, sophisticated financial institutions 7 wear a lot of different hats at the same time and 8 pretend like different affiliates have no 9 communication with other affiliates.

10 I started my career at Public Citizen in 11 the year 2000, and something called the California 12 Energy Crisis was going on, and I learned what 13 derivatives were from sifting through Enron's 14 financials. And one of the things that Enron did was, it created this electronic trading platform 15 called Enron Online, and it said to all of its 16 17 competitors, here, look at this fun, new exchange, 18 let's use this instead of those old, rickety, out 19 dated pit exchanges, and what Enron was doing was, 20 collecting information on what its competitors were doing in the markets, and its competitors 21 22 didn't know that at the time, and Enron was making

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 corresponding bets.

2 I find it hard to believe that banks as 3 successful and as sophisticated as these are not sifting through the mountains of data that they 4 5 have access to as part of their brokering activities, as part of their handling passive 6 7 investments in these markets, and that they are 8 not communicating that with proprietary trading 9 operations.

10 When you have affiliates doing a lot of 11 different things, you've got lots of opportunities to benefit from all of that different information 12 13 in the marketplace. And I think that we ought to have regulators take a look at that and determine 14 15 how much of a concern that is to market integrity. 16 CHAIRMAN GENSLER: I thank you, 17 Commissioner Dunn. I noted there was one question across the panel. I have to ask if we can try to 18 just help us out, get our questions in. But, 19 20 Commissioner Sommers. COMMISSIONER SOMMERS: Thank you, Mr. 21

22 Chairman. I just want to clarify back to my last

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1	line of questioning something that Mr. Slocum said
2	in an answer, that you have a problem with swap
3	dealers using the futures markets to hedge their
4	risk, and I want to dig a little deeper there.
5	You have a problem with them internally netting or
6	you have a problem with them acting as an
7	intermediary between these commercial
8	participants?
9	MR. SLOCUM: From my understanding of
10	the market, there are risks associated with them
11	accepting bets from entities, particularly those
12	entities that are not posting any collateral, and
13	that the corresponding bets that are being placed
14	in a regulated exchange are to shield the swap
15	dealer from the risks associated with that trade.
16	Is that an accurate description of what's going
17	on? I've got folks at the table that probably
18	could give me an accurate description of that.
19	MS. MASTERS: I don't understand the
20	point, but that isn't an accurate description of
21	what's going on. To reiterate, when we take
22	unsecured exposure to a counterparty, after

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

careful analysis, J.P. Morgan is at risk to the 1 2 consequences of getting that analysis wrong, first 3 of all, and not the exchange, and not a regulated market. What we are doing when we hedge our 4 5 market risk position on the exchange is, we are laying off our exposure to, for example, the oil 6 7 price. So our market risk is transferred to the 8 exchange, the counterparty risk is retained 9 between us and our over-the-counter derivative 10 counterpart. 11 COMMISSIONER SOMMERS: Thank you. I 12 also wanted to talk a little bit about both of your suggestions that we look through to the end 13 14 user or your counterparties, and thought maybe it 15 would be helpful if you compared it to on exchange business, and to ask you if what you're asking for 16 is the same treatment that floor brokers get on 17 exchange? 18 19 MS. MASTERS: Can you run that one by us 20 again? Sorry. COMMISSIONER SOMMERS: So that a floor 21 22 broker on exchange is just acting as an

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

intermediary, so they're not carrying positions and they're not subject to the position limit the end user, that they're acting as an intermediary for.

5 MS. MASTERS: Okay, now I understand, sorry. Just to clarify, we are not acting as 6 agents, we are acting as principals when we 7 8 operate in these markets. And the distinction 9 here is that very often we assume basis risk 10 between the risk we take on and the risk we lay 11 off in the futures market or on the exchange, for 12 example, the basis between long dated or short 13 dated exposure, between jet fuel and WTI and so 14 on. So we would have to use a language to translate our exposures that we assume in the 15 16 over-the- counter land into futures equivalence. 17 Indeed, today, in your special call, you ask us to do that. So, for example, all of our 18 business with airlines, for example, which is 19 20 usually denominated in jet fuel over-the-counter, will be asked to be translated into futures 21 22 equivalent contracts in either WTI or gas/oil, for

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

example, and that is one translation mechanism 1 2 that can be used. 3 So it's not quite the same treatment that somebody who's a pure agent would receive, it 4 5 requires some translation, but there's an economic analogy, I guess. 6 7 MR. CASTURO: Yes, I would agree with 8 that entirely. I really have nothing significant 9 to add. 10 DOCTOR JARECKI: I'd point out for --11 sake that those who like us buy only futures for 12 our clients, while the fund that we do it in may 13 have its own separate existence. We are fully, 14 from an economic standpoint, fully agents for our 15 clients. 16 CHAIRMAN GENSLER: Commissioner Chilton. COMMISSIONER CHILTON: Thanks, Mr. 17 Chairman. Do any of you believe that large OTC 18 19 contracts don't impact or can't have a possibility 20 of impacting the exchanges that we currently oversee, the regulated exchanges? Everybody 21 22 believes that they can't have an impact, okay. So

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 some of you, most of you I think, have called for
2 OTC clearing of standardized products; how do we
3 come up with that definition? What is a
4 standardized product? And what sort of thing
5 should we be careful about in developing such a
6 definition? All of you.

MS. MASTERS: I'll take a stab at that. 7 8 I think the risk of getting the definition wrong 9 is that you encourage or force, in the worse case 10 scenario, contracts that a clearing system or an 11 exchange doesn't really have the tools to risk 12 manage, to be accepted into that forum, and thereby, you undermine the stability of the 13 clearinghouse itself, which obviously defeats the 14 purpose and will create more systemic risk than 15 16 you're avoiding in the first place.

17 So we need to start at a point of 18 contract definition from the perspective of, are 19 the sources of risk in that position adequately 20 understood by a potential clearer, such that they 21 are able to offer clearing services with 22 credibility. And I think that it -- off the top

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 of my head, I don't have the perfect definition, 2 but I can conceive of coming up with definitions 3 that would define standardized products as those where clearing services are offered by one or more 4 5 central clearinghouse, where prices on those contracts are quoted by, you know, more than one 6 entity, perhaps visible electronically or quoted 7 8 by multiple parties. 9 Those types of definition would I think lead you in roughly the right direction. There's 10 11 a lot more detail and work that would need to be 12 done, but that's I think the sort of thing that 13 would be feasible. MR. CASTURO: I would add that the 14 15 exchanges that were represented here yesterday, it's in their interest to try to define what 16 standardized is and create futures contracts for 17 18 anything and everything that would make sense to 19 be cleared already. They've probably undergone 20 that exercise and tried to do it, we know that they have. The risk is to try to force more 21 22 things into that system that the exchanges already

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

haven't tried would be at the detriment of taking 1 2 away the flexibility, beneficial flexibility that 3 we heard the commercial participants identify in using somewhat non-standardized approaches that 4 5 are possible through the OTC markets. 6 MS. MASTERS: I would add just one quick 7 thing, which is, by comparison to other asset 8 classes in which derivatives are traded, as a 9 general observation, commodity markets already use 10 a higher degree of central clearing between 11 counterparties than most other derivative markets 12 have done historically, so we're well ahead, for example, relative to the credit derivative 13 14 markets. 15 Perhaps that's a function of the 16 volatility inherent in commodity prices, the less than stellar credit worthiness of certain 17 18 commodity market participants because of their small sizes and so on. I can't give you a 19 20 definitive answer, but it's certainly the case that a significant amount of clearing already goes 21 22 on today.

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

COMMISSIONER CHILTON: I want to just, 1 2 and I'll get to Mr. Slocum, but Mr. Casturo, so 3 are you suggesting that it would be a poor idea to let the exchanges determine what standardization 4 5 is and clearinghouses determine what 6 standardization is? 7 MR. CASTURO: No, on the contrary. I 8 actually think it's a good idea. I think that's 9 been there traditionally ---10 COMMISSIONER CHILTON: Will that capture 11 everybody that ---12 MR. CASTURO: -- and they -- they're in 13 the industry of trying to evaluate what makes 14 sense to bringing an exchange. 15 COMMISSIONER CHILTON: But will that capture everybody that you think we need to 16 capture? I mean they're going to do it only if 17 18 it's economic for them. You know, we would be 19 looking at it from a transparency perspective, a 20 counterparty risk perspective, you know, we've got a little bit different motive that doesn't involve 21 22 the world profit.

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 MR. CASTURO: Yes, I recognize that, and 2 I think from a regulatory perspective, your role 3 is going to be very much enhanced by what we're proposing in terms of having access to the trades 4 5 that are non-standardized that occur in the OTC space. You'll still have the reporting and the 6 7 ability to monitor those activities even if they 8 are not on an exchange. 9 COMMISSIONER CHILTON: Okay. Mr. Slocum, I'm sorry. 10 11 MR. SLOCUM: Yeah -- no; I think that 12 it's very important that the CFTC be the entity making that determination of what a standardized 13 versus a non- standardized OTC contract. I think 14 15 that the potential for classifying contracts to 16 avoid transparency and regulation is too important to leave that decision to exchanges. I would like 17 to see the CFTC make that determination. I think 18 19 that the basics of the administration's policy on 20 this issue is an excellent beginning. 21 You know, I maintain that one way to 22 create an economic disincentive towards finding

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 complex ways to structure OTC contracts to make 2 them non-standardized is to play some sort of 3 margin requirement on non-standardized OTC 4 contracts so that you don't have this issue where, 5 as we've heard today, folks can go into the OTC 6 market, put up no collateral, and become a market 7 participant.

8 I also think that in terms of enhancing 9 disclosure, I think that one thing I neglected to 10 mention in some of my opening comments is adding 11 more detail, or adding swaps and indexes on a 12 company specific basis in the commitment of trader reports that the CFTC releases each week. I know 13 14 that there are considerations now about enhancing 15 the type of disclosure, and I think that that 16 would be an important addition to those weekly 17 reports.

18 COMMISSIONER CHILTON: Thank you.
19 CHAIRMAN GENSLER: Thank you. We are
20 going to go a third round. I'm going to try -- I
21 have five questions, I'm going to try to do two of
22 them that you're going to maybe just follow up on.

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 But these are really going to be, with all respect 2 to Doctor Jarecki and Mr. Slocum, I want to just 3 turn and take the opportunity to talk about overthe-counter derivatives regulation, because we 4 5 have these two swap dealers in front of us. 6 I was encouraged, there's a lot that we 7 believe working with Congress we have to do. We 8 have to regulate the dealers and have a full 9 regulatory regime. And I think I heard earlier, 10 if you want to disagree, tell me, but that you're 11 supportive of Congress moving forward and 12 regulating the over-the-counter derivatives 13 marketplace for capital and margin requirements 14 for the dealers. 15 We are also calling for business conduct standards and transparency and record keeping and 16 reporting, where the SEC and the CFTC would have a 17 18 lot of authorities there. 19 We are also, though, calling for 20 standardized products to come into centralized clearing and onto exchanges. And I'd like to --21 22 my first two questions are focusing on some

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

differences I think I heard. I think I heard 1 2 generally support for a lot of that, but where 3 there are two differences I'd like to get some thoughts on is, I think I'm hearing and reading in 4 5 your testimony that you think on posting of collateral, that the dealer should do that, and 6 maybe the dealer should do that possibly with some 7 8 end users, but a lot of end users corporate 9 customers shouldn't have to post collateral. 10 I think that -- and I'm particularly 11 concerned because that seems like it might be a 12 very significant motivation that everybody would try to say it's a customized swap with an end user 13 14 and that we would not lower risk in the system. 15 And on that point, Ms. Masters, you 16 actually said J.P. Morgan was at risk of getting it wrong when I think Commissioner Sommers might 17 have been talking about this, but ultimately the 18 19 America public are at risk of J.P. Morgan getting 20 it wrong. Both of these institutions are large financial institutions that -- we can debate 21 22 whether they're going to be systemically relevant,

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 but I think most Americans would say if J.P. 2 Morgan gets it wrong, the American public might be 3 on the hook in some way. The second difference that I heard was something about exchange trading. 4 5 I don't know if I really understood the point, but I heard Ms. Masters say at one point you're not 6 7 sure the benefits of exchange trading for swaps, 8 so I'd like to just hear that a little bit more if 9 I misunderstood it. But I, for one, think there's 10 a huge benefit for tens of thousands of end users 11 to get the transparency from exchanges and seeing 12 the standardized product and the pricing on a real 13 time basis to see that. It may shift the information advantage 14 15 away from Goldman Sachs and J.P. Morgan to tens of thousands end users, but I see an advantage. 16 17 My third question, just for now, and then I do have two follow-ups then, is when credit 18 19 default swaps. And, Ms. Masters, I understand you 20 were actually at J.P. Morgan when these products were first formed and founded, so you have a 21 22 personal and distinct history; I don't know if you

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

would say you're a co-originator or innovative,
 but you were at least at J.P. Morgan when it was
 originated.

In these days, I don't know how much, 4 5 you know, you want to take into the birthing of that product. But my question really is, beyond 6 7 everything else we're doing, do you think credit 8 default swaps have such unique characteristics 9 that when we're working with Congress, there 10 should be additional safeguards beyond everything 11 else that we've talked about? So those -- I know 12 it's a lot, but however you want to try to help us 13 on these three questions.

MS. MASTERS: Okay. So if I understood it, the first question related to whether or not we agreed or fully supported the notion that all standardized contracts should be traded on exchange and/or centrally ---

19 CHAIRMAN GENSLER: That's correct.

20 MS. MASTERS: -- and/or centrally

21 cleared. Speaking for J.P. Morgan, I can

22 certainly reflect that we do support the mandatory

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

clearing of standardized contracts between dealers and any other systemically relevant entity, whether they be a corporation, a hedge fund, or anyone else, to be determined as to whether they are systemically consequential by the appropriate regulator.

That makes sense to us, and that would 7 8 attack and tackle and reduce the vast, vast, vast 9 majority of the systemic risk in the system, 10 certainly would have tackled the risks that have 11 subsequently become infamous over the course of 12 the last 12 months. We do have a point of 13 difference, and that is that we do not believe that end users should be forced or mandated to 14 15 centrally clear their business. And the reason for that -- they should certainly have the right 16 and the ability to do that. But the reason for 17 not mandating that is that many of our end 18 19 customers, corporations, small and large alike, 20 simply do not have the business model that accommodates exchange trading as a way of life. 21 22 And the most obvious area in which

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

there's a difference is that typically, as I 1 2 describe earlier, those companies need to pledge 3 as collateral things like plant, property, equipment, commodity, molecules in the ground and 4 5 so on, and those are just not acceptable forms of collateral for central clearinghouses or 6 7 exchanges, and likely never will be. 8 If you remove the ability for those 9 companies to tap into that sort of liquidity, you 10 force them to curtail their business activities, 11 they will have less access to credit, and 12 generally this is a sector of the economy that is 13 not overly leveraged presently. CHAIRMAN GENSLER: If I might, isn't it 14 15 true that they're currently being charged --- in their current swap business, they're being charged 16 for the risk and also the credit, so they are 17 18 being charged for that currently? 19 MS. MASTERS: Yes, absolutely. 20 CHAIRMAN GENSLER: Absolutely, that's what you -- but -- so what we're really just 21 22 saying, as regulators and working with Congress,

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 is, we want to lower risk on the standard product 2 to be posting margin, like the futures exchanges, 3 but on the customized products, then they would be posting margin, of course, with their 4 5 counterparty, the swap dealer, or maybe it is non-liquid collateral, but having some lowering of 6 7 risk through collateral arrangements? 8 MS. MASTERS: For the corporate end 9 user, the distinction between a customized product 10 and a standardized product in this context really 11 doesn't make that much difference from the point 12 of view of how easy it is for them to pledge 13 liquid cash and government securities as 14 collateral. 15 CHAIRMAN GENSLER: Did you have a view 16 on credit default swap before Mr. Casturo? I'm 17 giving myself luxury because I'm trying to avoid a fourth round. And I'll give all of you luxury, 18 19 too. 20 MS. MASTERS: I think I understood the question to be whether credit default swaps have 21 22 unique characteristics that ---

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 CHAIRMAN GENSLER: Is there anything in 2 addition that we should consider? Some people 3 same ban them all together, some people say ban naked credit default swaps, some say you have to 4 5 have insurable interest, but maybe there's some -and again, it's just the coincidence that you were 6 7 at J.P. Morgan when these were founded and I 8 thought I'd ask you. 9 MS. MASTERS: I think that -- my view on the subject is that credit derivatives are a 10 11 product that have enormous benefits and should not 12 be ruled out of existence. And we need to be careful in distinguishing between the value of a 13 14 tool itself and the propensity for individual 15 companies to misuse that tool. 16 We definitely saw some instances of 17 those tools being used very inappropriately from a 18 risk and a systemic risk point of view during the 19 course of this crisis. In my view, the way to 20 tackle that is to ensure that major market participants, whether they're dealing in credit 21 22 default swaps or any other form of derivative are

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 appropriately supervised and regulated, and hence, 2 our support for a systemic risk regulator, whoever 3 that may be, to be determined, but someone to oversee the activities of systemically relevant 4 5 companies in the over-the-counter derivative markets. I think that statement applies just as 6 7 equally to interest rate swaps as it does to 8 credit derivatives I don't think there's anything 9 inherently or uniquely different about a 10 derivative applied to credit as opposed to a 11 derivative applied to equities or commodities or 12 anything else. 13 MR. CASTURO: Yeah; two points I'd like to make. First of all, regarding non-standard 14 products and whether they should be on exchanges 15

16 or forced on exchanges, I want to make the point 17 that we're not solely or even primarily arguing 18 for our own self-benefit that these things should 19 remain an over-the-counter transaction. 20 We heard the testimony of commercial 21 participants yesterday that identified that the

benefit the commercial participant gets by having

22

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

this arrangement, and again, reiterate the notion of right way risk, that it's not introducing a greater systemic risk to the system because the capacity for these commercial participants to be able to make payment is in line with the way the market moves.

And, in fact, even though there are some 7 8 charges involved with the way we treat these, they 9 are lower than what they would be in a 10 standardized exchange model, which actually 11 benefits these commercial participants and 12 ultimately benefits the users of the commodities 13 that they produce, because lower cost to them equates the lower cost to the consumer. 14 The 15 second point I want to make is regarding the exchange trading for swaps and a potential 16 17 information advantage the dealer may have by maintaining that environment. 18

19 I think we've heard the testimony here 20 from just about everybody that we're all in favor 21 of increased transparency. So to the extent that 22 that swap activity has been shielded from public

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

domain, we're offering that up in terms of special 1 2 call data to be more frequently gathered and 3 disseminated. Although one point I would make is, we 4 5 would -- we maintain that the confidentiality of any individual client always be maintained. 6 7 CHAIRMAN GENSLER: I fear my time is up, 8 I'm going to hand off to Commissioner Dunn. 9 COMMISSIONER DUNN: Chairman has a great deal of prerogative when it comes to his own time. 10 11 CHAIRMAN GENSLER: You have as many 12 minutes as I had, or more if you want. 13 COMMISSIONER DUNN: How many was that 14 Jas, did you keep track? Let me zero again on Mr. 15 Casturo and Ms. Masters. And Mr. Slocum had brought up the overlapping of activities of being 16 17 a CPA, of being an advisor, predicting what's going to happen in the future, of having a trading 18 arm within institutions, and then trading on 19 20 behalf of counterparty ---MS. MASTERS: There are several areas 21 22 where firewall type concepts are applicable. The

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 first of these is relating to research. So
2 there's been some commentary around whether or not
3 investment banks put out research and might have
4 privileged access to that ahead of time, position
5 themselves accordingly and so on.

6 As you know, there was a research 7 settlement impacting the equity market some years 8 ago. While those rules do not explicitly apply to 9 commodity markets, certainly the practice at J.P. 10 Morgan, and it is my understanding that it is the 11 practice at other major investment banks, that 12 similar rules are, in fact, imposed on the separation of research in commodities just as they 13 are in equities. So, for example, our research 14 15 ___

16 COMMISSIONER DUNN: Who oversees those? 17 MS. MASTERS: Internal compliance; so if 18 our research department publishes something, it 19 goes to the customer and does not go to the 20 trading desk until after it's gone out to the 21 broad customer base. One main area, as it relates 22 to proprietary trading activities, those are

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 walled off and separated from the client facing or 2 market making desks. So, again, that is monitored 3 or imposed by internal compliance to ensure that 4 those separations are kept there. And there are 5 separations and systems and other things, not just 6 a physical separation of individuals.

7 MR. CASTURO: Goldman Sachs operates 8 under the same principals. And with regards to 9 research, that distinction and firewall separation 10 between the research arm and the trading arm, 11 though it's not currently mandated, it's been 12 withheld at Goldman to the same standards as it is 13 within the equity markets.

MR. SLOCUM: May I just add something? 14 15 I think that, with all due respect, I think that internal controls like that are completely 16 17 meaningless. With no penalties for non-compliance, with no third party assessment of 18 these internal controls, I think that there are 19 20 serious risks to the public and to market integrity unless we've got government regulators 21 22 drawing up these rules, enforcing these firewalls,

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 again, with all due respect. But I just do not 2 think that internal firewalls have a history of 3 being effective in industries. MS. MASTERS: You've obviously never 4 5 experienced them, but to the extent that they were regulatorily imposed, I don't think that would be 6 7 a problem. 8 MR. CASTURO: Agreed. 9 COMMISSIONER DUNN: When we did our special call, we found that some of those folks 10 11 that we had categorized in one area were, in fact, 12 should have been categorized in another area. Who 13 do you feel should be responsible for the 14 delineation of what category you fall in; should 15 it be the CFTC, should it be the -- if you're representing a group of folks, the persons that 16 represents them, or individually? And I'd ask for 17 all of you on that. 18 19 MR. CASTURO: I think the regulator is 20 in the right position to make that distinction. Obviously, it would be done on a basis where they 21

22 would need to quality by certain criteria to be

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 classified in a certain category or not. 2 MS. MASTERS: I agree. 3 DOCTOR JARECKI: There is a bit of a problem, I think, because there is an effort, I 4 5 know, on the part of the administration to harmonize the activities of the securities 6 7 regulators and the commodities regulators. And 8 even in these concepts, we have here the concept 9 that the non-commercials are speculators, whereas 10 in the SEC definition, there is a distinction made 11 between speculators and investors. 12 The general -- of course, we recognize we're in a funny world, I appreciate the 13 Chairman's concern that this not be seen as a 14 15 price control discussion, but we really can't 16 ignore the fact that the stomach of probably 17 everybody is, wouldn't it be nice if commodity prices were low and security prices were high, and 18 19 how can the human race, when it has that feeling 20 in its stomach, really ignore that when it's trying to regulate? 21 22 I apologize, I'm not trying to argue

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

with the Chairman, but recognize your own stomachs 1 2 and you will see the merits of that worry. 3 COMMISSIONER DUNN: I argue with him all the time, that's fine. I just got a statement 4 5 here that Mr. Slocum, in your prepared testimony, say Public Citizen was similarly encouraged by the 6 7 Obama Administration's plan, developed the support 8 of the CFTC to establish regulatory proposals for 9 over-the-counter derivatives markets that would 10 require other things, all standardized OTC energy 11 contracts to clear through the exchange related by 12 the CFTC. Well, you're saying it's the CFTC 13 support. What we have was a letter from the Secretary, the Treasury, to some members of 14 15 Congress that outlined how we might operate. 16 We are an independent body here. Each 17 of these Commissioners may have different thoughts 18 on that. I happen to set on the dias as the 19 Acting Chairman with Chairman Shapiro and 20 Secretary Geitner, release that, now that, after the fact, I can tell the rest of the story. 21 22 I got a good deal of encouragement and

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 information on derivatives from our now Chairman, 2 and I appreciate that. In exchange, I let him in 3 on the intricacies of the wheat convergence, so it worked out. But please keep in mind that the 4 5 Commissioners all have their own thought on these things, and when things come out and says the 6 7 Commission says this, the Commission -- find out 8 who the Commission is.

9 MR. SLOCUM: My apologies. I should not 10 have indicated that the independent Commission was 11 in lockstep with the administration, but rather in 12 consultation with the administration on providing 13 maybe input and feedback on the development of 14 policies.

15 CHAIRMAN GENSLER: I again find myself 16 in association with Commissioner Dunn, as I did 17 yesterday, on the subject of co-location, which 18 was my fifth question, but he got my fourth one, 19 so hopefully somebody will get it. We'll get back 20 to co-location. Commissioner Sommers. COMMISSIONER SOMMERS: Thank you, Mr. 21 22 Chairman. I wanted to ask both Ms. Masters and

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 Mr. Casturo about global standards, and when we 2 are looking at all of these different issues, not 3 just position limits, but looking at standardization of OTC derivatives and just the 4 5 overall regulation of OTC derivatives, I'm assuming you both operate globally, and if you 6 7 could just comment on the importance of global 8 standards.

9 MS. MASTERS: They're critical. If you have inconsistent rules, business will, like 10 11 water, flow to the easiest way out. And if you 12 have certain regimes overseas that are not as 13 transparent, but easier to execute in, because of 14 the absence of limits and regulation, whether we like it or not, and this is not a threat, it's not 15 if you do this, then we will go there, it's a 16 prediction, the business will flow there. And 17 there are a number of commercial entities around 18 19 the world that are eyeing with interest these 20 developments, with a view to seizing the commercial opportunity to essentially steal away 21 22 the lead that the American futures and derivatives

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 markets have if there is inconsistent application. 2 So I think it's -- and the negative of that would 3 be that business would end up being done in jurisdictions where there's much less customer 4 5 protection and less transparency, and it may end up being done by non-U.S. persons, depending, 6 7 which would obviously be a massive competitive 8 loss for this economy. 9 MR. CASTURO: I would agree that it's critical that there's a consistent approach. It's 10 11 very much akin to the situation between the 12 futures market and the OTC markets. If you have two different venues to which trading can occur, 13 whether that's in format, like futures or OTC, or 14 in location between different jurisdictions, it's 15 16 not a good situation if there's different policies 17 applied to them. 18 DOCTOR JARECKI: -- one last comment on

19 that, which is that you can't ignore the fact 20 where the customers come from. We've given a list 21 of the categories of our customers. Forty-five 22 percent of our customers are foreign. For foreign

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1	customers to use foreign exchanges, with that
2	reference to the United States, it would be
3	trivial. It's sort of a fluke almost that so much
4	of this business today moves through American
5	enterprises, and that risk exists. And, as Ms.
6	Masters says, it's not a threat, it's just
7	reality, if they can't do it here, they'll go do
8	it somewhere which doesn't touch the United
9	States, because the foreigners themselves are
10	involved.
11	CHAIRMAN GENSLER: Commissioner Chilton.
12	COMMISSIONER CHILTON: Thanks, Mr.
12 13	COMMISSIONER CHILTON: Thanks, Mr. Chairman, thanks for doing the last round, and I
13	Chairman, thanks for doing the last round, and I
13 14	Chairman, thanks for doing the last round, and I don't have anything after this. And I also ask my
13 14 15	Chairman, thanks for doing the last round, and I don't have anything after this. And I also ask my colleagues' indulgence to some extent. I want to
13 14 15 16	Chairman, thanks for doing the last round, and I don't have anything after this. And I also ask my colleagues' indulgence to some extent. I want to go a little bit off subject here; first Mr.
13 14 15 16 17	Chairman, thanks for doing the last round, and I don't have anything after this. And I also ask my colleagues' indulgence to some extent. I want to go a little bit off subject here; first Mr. Slocum.
13 14 15 16 17 18	Chairman, thanks for doing the last round, and I don't have anything after this. And I also ask my colleagues' indulgence to some extent. I want to go a little bit off subject here; first Mr. Slocum. You've talked about the need to do
13 14 15 16 17 18 19	Chairman, thanks for doing the last round, and I don't have anything after this. And I also ask my colleagues' indulgence to some extent. I want to go a little bit off subject here; first Mr. Slocum. You've talked about the need to do have congressional statutory changes also in the

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 for the CFTC to have criminal authority. And, you 2 know, it's very difficult, these are complicated 3 markets, and when we have to take a case, bring a case to court, we often go to the Department of 4 5 Justice or other criminal authorities and they reject roughly two-thirds, roughly two-thirds of 6 7 the cases are rejected, not because they're not 8 meritorious cases, in fact, 100 percent of those 9 cases, 100 percent we win, but they're just very 10 complicated, and you have these U.S. attorneys and 11 others who maybe don't understand all these laws, 12 et cetera, so that's a change that they put in the House AG Committee bill, and I'm wondering whether 13 or not you've taken a look at this and if Public 14 Citizen thinks this is a good thing for Congress 15 to do also. 16

17 MR. SLOCUM: Yeah, Commissioner Chilton, 18 we have taken a look at that provision, and we 19 strongly support granting the CFTC criminal 20 authority in that. I think that, in addition to 21 the fact that too many referrals to the Department 22 of Justice are rejected, not because the case is

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

meritless, but because the DOJ does not fully understand the issue, but also, it would vastly strengthen the hand of the CFTC and your market monitoring staff.

5 If you confront entities that you suspect of violating the law, and you come to the 6 7 table with criminal authority, that is a very 8 strong negotiating tool, understanding that not 9 all prosecutions end in a trial or -- but are 10 often settled, I think anything we can do to 11 strengthen the hand of regulators in dealing with, 12 you know, often what are very sophisticated, deep 13 pocketed entities, I think is required. COMMISSIONER CHILTON: Thanks; do any of 14 15 the other panelists disagree with the general thrust of what Mr. Slocum said? Everybody agrees? 16 17 Okay. The last thing I wanted to say is, you know, it's tough, Doctor Jarecki, at times to be 18 19 commodity blind and to be price neutral, but maybe 20 not as tough as people would think.

21 I mean, you know, we all fill up our 22 cars with gas and everything, but people make a

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

living, farmers like high prices. I've worked for farmers before, dirt farmers, people who barely make a living, so they wanted high prices. You know, in the job that you're in, you have to make those distinctions, and I found it a lot easier than I thought actually.

7 And so what concerns me is not whether or not as much as they're high or they're low or 8 9 if it's this commodity or that one, but ensuring 10 that the markets are operating efficiently and 11 effectively, that we're doing everything we can, 12 not just to react to problems that we see, not to get a report and then react to it, but to look 13 14 around the corner, to be nimble and quick, and I 15 don't think we've done that as regulators, not 16 necessarily anybody on this panel, but in general, 17 in the last, you know, dozen years. I think we've been a little bit more lax, and maybe there were 18 19 some good things that came about of that, but 20 there's also collateral damage that lays all across the economic landscape from that sort of 21 22 approach. So I think what we're doing now is

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

being a little bit more proactive, I think that is a shift in general, not necessarily just here, but in government.

I do support many of the things the 4 5 administration proposed with regard to the Reg Reform Proposal, and I think it's a good thing. 6 Ι 7 think it's a good thing for markets and I think 8 it's a good thing for consumers, too. Thanks. 9 CHAIRMAN GENSLER: Thank you, 10 Commissioner Chilton. We're not going to have a 11 fourth round, but I've gotten permission from a 12 number of my Commissioners, I didn't ask Bart. I

just want to mention the fourth question I had Commissioner Dunn raised, and I think it's a very important one about firewalls, and I was encouraged by what at least two large banking institutions said on that subject.

But I think that the Commission will probably move forward and sort of think more about this and whether, in a regulatory context rather than a voluntary context, we try to put something appropriate under our statute in place. And the

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

fifth one is just -- is a follow-up, if you can 1 2 come back to us, and it's really to the two 3 panelists in the middle. But yesterday, again, Commissioner Dunn had raised it, but it was 4 5 something very much in the newspapers, as well, about the location, it's a very technical thing, 6 7 the location of terminals, or the co-location of 8 servers for big investment banks and banks near 9 the servers of the exchanges themselves, what's 10 called co- locations, so that you could get 11 advantages and rapid advantages that might be down 12 into the milliseconds, and so that markets are fair to all participants and not just the one that 13 14 has the computer three inches away from the server 15 instead of 100 feet away from the server. 16 I certainly associated myself with 17 Commissioner Dunn yesterday, and I think this 18 Commission is going to want to talk to the 19 exchanges and talk to the market and really 20 understand whether it's appropriate and whether there needs to be some standards set so that 21 22 there's, you know, in the concept of what's called

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 co-location or rapid transaction. 2 MS. MASTERS: That was actually news to 3 me for the record. 4 CHAIRMAN GENSLER: News? 5 MS. MASTERS: The existence of, or the 6 embracing of co-location opportunities. 7 CHAIRMAN GENSLER: Well, maybe one of 8 your competitors had something on you there, Ms. 9 Masters, I don't know. 10 MS. MASTERS: They -- apparently it 11 explains a lot. 12 CHAIRMAN GENSLER: I see; I don't know 13 if Mr. Casturo wants to respond to Ms. Masters on 14 that. 15 MR. CASTURO: No, I have no comment. 16 CHAIRMAN GENSLER: I see; that maybe 17 explains a lot. 18 MR. CASTURO: As you suggested. 19 CHAIRMAN GENSLER: Well, we'll be 20 looking into that then. But I think this has been enormously beneficial to the public, to the 21 22 Commission, it was to inform the public, inform

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 the Commission. There are a number of areas where 2 there's support for moving ahead from position 3 limits, and as we know, there's a number of differences, but it's all in all very helpful. 4 5 We're going to take a short break, five to ten minutes, but no more than ten minutes. We just 6 7 need to give everybody a chance, but then if our 8 other witnesses can come up and -- we thank 9 everybody for their patience. 10 (Recess) 11 CHAIRMAN GENSLER: I thank you for that 12 recess. I'm going to call the Commission back in 13 order or whatever our lawyers tell me I'm supposed to say somewhere here, David usually tells me. If 14 15 we might turn to our next panel of witnesses, as I did earlier, and I thank you for having the 16 17 patience to sit through a full, but a very helpful panel. Your written statements will be in the 18 19 record and we'll keep the record open, as well, 20 through August 12 for any additional follow-up, but if you could try to help us and summarize your 21 22 statement. We've all had an opportunity to read

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

it even if it was a little late last night. But 1 2 summarize in five minutes and then we'll see how 3 many rounds we need for the Commissioners. But Mr. Lothian. 4 5 MR. LOTHIAN: Lothian. CHAIRMAN GENSLER: Lothian, thank you, 6 7 all right. 8 MR. LOTHIAN: My name is John Lothian 9 and I am here as a participant and observer and 10 commentator about the global futures and 11 derivatives markets. I want to thank the 12 Commission for inviting me to testify on the 13 important issues considered in today's hearings. 14 My futures industry career has spanned over 30 15 years since I started working for a soybean trader and broker as a 17 year old high school student. 16 17 I began watching the markets when the treasury futures at the Chicago Board of Trade were just 18 19 one year old, stock index futures were not yet 20 introduced, and the Chicago Board of Trade had over 50 percent of the volume of all yearly 21 22 futures traded globally.

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

The purposes of the futures markets are 1 2 two-fold, price discovery and risk transfer. The 3 price discovery process is made up of people with an economic interest in the underlying 4 5 commodities, bona fide hedgers, and those without speculators. 6 Traditionally, speculators have been 7 8 defined as individuals or firms seeking to profit 9 from anticipated increases or decreases in futures 10 prices. 11 Over the years, speculators have 12 dynamically used futures to take micro views on price movement of an underlying commodity or 13 financial contract or take a macro view of an 14 15 aspect of the national or global economy. High frequency electronic proprietary traders are 16 examples of those taking a micro view on trying to 17 profit from price movement. Index traders would 18 19 be the most relevant and dominant contemporary 20 example of those taking a macro view of prices and 21 the global economy. 22 Futures markets, price discovery, and

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

risk transfer functions allow for the supply and demand of a commodity or underlying instrument to be allocated or rationed over time. However, U.S. futures markets represent greater dynamics than just those of the specific contract specifications of the underlying commodity.

Wheat producers around the world look to 7 8 the benchmark prices and liquidity of the Chicago 9 soft red winter wheat futures for hedging and risk 10 management purposes. The same is true for the CME 11 Group's West Texas Intermediate crude oil traded 12 on the New York Mercantile Exchange for energy producers and consumers. These are global 13 benchmarks of global commodities with interlocking 14 15 pricing relationships and interchangeable uses. 16 The very concept of a finite supply of a

17 commodity flies in the face of the market function 18 of price and the dynamic substitutability of the 19 products. When the price of beef gets too high, 20 people eat more chicken and fish and less beef. 21 Consumers replace the high priced product with a 22 lower priced substitute that accomplishes the same

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

goal, thus reducing demand for the high priced 1 2 product. Producers of the high priced product, 3 seeing the reduced demand, will seek to increase the supply to the market while prices are still 4 5 high. This change in demand through substitution and increase in supply has the effect of bringing 6 7 prices back into normal relationships with 8 competing substitutes. The best cure for high 9 prices is high prices; the best cure for low 10 prices is low prices. 11 Excessive speculation is another topic 12 altogether. It is difficult to define and even more difficult to prevent. Traditionally, there 13 14 are position limits put on speculators to limit 15 the number of contracts they may control, thus 16 avoiding excessive speculation. However, these 17 limits are mere speed bumps, not the true limits 18 that they are intended to be. 19 Speculators and hedgers have always

found a way to manage their risk despite rules, laws, and negative public opinion. During the 1979 Russian grain embargo, when President

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

Carter's administration shut down trading for 1 2 several days and U.S. grain futures exchanges, 3 traders substituted by trading contracts on the Winnipeg Commodity Exchange. Rather than waiting 4 5 to offset their long positions at substantially lower prices when the U.S. Exchanges reopened and 6 7 began trading after a limit down move in prices, 8 some traders shorted Winnipeg grain futures 9 contracts to trade their positions. In an example 10 of the law of unintended consequences, price 11 discovery moved from Chicago to Winnipeg for 12 soybeans, corn, and wheat through the surrogates 13 of rape seed, feed wheat and other contracts. During the Civil War in the United 14 15 States, when Abraham Lincoln and his Treasury Secretary, Salmon Chase, became incensed at 16 17 excessive speculation of gold, they pressed passage of the Gold Bill of 1864, outlawing 18 delayed deliveries of gold. This law just had the 19 20 effect of moving trading from the Gilpin's News Room in New York to traders' offices and street 21 22 corners. The primitively organized gold futures

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

market of the 1860's simply moved to an over-the-1 2 counter market. 3 And in another example of the law of unintended consequences, this move probably 4 5 substantially aided the development of bucket shops, which were a severe problem in the late 6 7 1800's. 8 Finally, position limits for globally 9 traded substitutable commodities are just speed 10 bumps, which can slow down the speculative process 11 and make it more expensive for speculators, but 12 they are not the true limits of speculation on 13 commodities with a finite supply. 14 CHAIRMAN GENSLER: Thank you, Mr. 15 Lothian. 16 MR. LOTHIAN: Like Midlothian. 17 CHAIRMAN GENSLER: Lothian; that works, 18 too. MR. LOTHIAN: Yes. 19 20 CHAIRMAN GENSLER: Mr. Krenkel. MR. KRENKEL: Mr. Chairman and members 21 22 of the Commission, my name is Peter Krenkel, I am

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 the President of Natural Gas Exchange, Inc., also 2 known as ---3 CHAIRMAN GENSLER: You might want to move the mic a little bit closer. 4 5 MR. KRENKEL: Is that better? I am the President of Natural Gas Exchange, Inc., also 6 known as NGX. We are a Canadian company based in 7 Calgary with an office in Houston and have been 8 9 operating in electronic trading and clearing 10 facility for energy products since 1994. 11 We are a wholly owned subsidiary, the 12 TMX Group, which is a leading integrated multi class asset exchange group with a history that 13 14 dates back over 150 years. The group subsidiary operate cash and derivative markets for multiple 15 16 assets classes, including equities, fixed income, 17 and energy, and provide trading markets, clearing 18 facilities, data products and other services to 19 the global financial community. On behalf of NGX, 20 I want to express our appreciation to the 21 Commission for providing us with an opportunity to 22 participate in the hearing here today.

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 As I mentioned, we provide trading and 2 clearing services for natural gas, electricity, 3 and oil products at various markets in North America. The focus of our business is in the 4 5 physical energy space, specializing in physical clearing of natural gas contracts. Our products 6 are designed to be fungible with the OTC markets. 7 8 We have a combination of reasonably well 9 established, but also operate a number of emerging 10 marketplaces. In terms of size, we're a 11 relatively small player in the overall North 12 American energy markets, but are very significant in the Canadian physical markets. 13 Our traded and cleared volumes are 14 15 currently 1140 BCF a month of natural gas, which we're very proud of, and it's a big number by 16 17 Canadian standards, but represents about one day of activity on the CME or ICE. In addition, five 18 terawatt hours of electricity and five million 19 20 barrels of crude oil. Just as a matter of interest, about 50 percent of Canadian gas and oil 21 22 production is actually exported through the U.S.,

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

so our energy markets are extricably linked, even
 though we're located in Canada.

With respect to the issues here today, rather than read, I thought I should summarize exactly what I think our positions are. First of all, with respect to significant price discovery contracts, we encourage the CFTC to get the scope right.

9 We do operate a lot of emerging contracts, and I don't believe that they would 10 11 necessarily be considered significant. So we may 12 have a few contracts that are deemed significant 13 and meet all the other criteria, but a lot of the 14 emerging contracts were really trying to just 15 gather business from the OTC markets. Putting 16 limits into place for those may not be 17 appropriate.

18 With respect to position limits, we 19 agree that -- we agree with position limits for 20 spot contracts and crude oil and natural gas, that 21 means up to the prompt month. We also believe 22 that the CFTC is the right authority to set those

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

limits, to ensure that they are fair and 1 2 transparent. The only comment we would make is 3 that the limits may need to be flexible and responsive as market conditions change. With 4 5 respect to anything forward, beyond the spot month, from an NGX perspective, we have very low 6 7 market share there. Putting position limits in 8 applicable to our exchange only would perhaps 9 serve to just drive that business away from the 10 exchange. So unless the position limits can be 11 applied to the OTC markets, they don't really make 12 sense for the amount of business we have in our 13 exchange. As far as the so called hedger 14 15 exemption, again, with respect to our business, we 16 have seen some non- commercial start to 17 participate in our market. They bring the welcome liquidity that's badly needed in some of our 18 19 energy contracts. Without liquidity, the business 20 tends to move into the bilateral or the OTC market, so in order for the exchanges and the 21 22 clearinghouses to be successful, we need

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 liquidity.

2 At present, the hedgers, we've not seen 3 nearly the volume impact that some of the other exchanges have, and our view is that, at this 4 5 time, there's no real need to change the hedger exemption requirements applicable to our markets. 6 7 Again, I think this is in addition to the testimony I filed, okay. I'll close here. 8 9 And I want to thank you for the opportunity to 10 share our views today, and I'm happy to answer any 11 questions that the exchange may have. 12 CHAIRMAN GENSLER: Thank you so much. 13 And our last witness, Mr. -- is it ---MR. FELESKY: Felesky. 14 15 CHAIRMAN GENSLER: Felesky. 16 MR. FELESKY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman 17 and fellow Commissioners. My name is Adam Felesky, Chief Executive Officer of BetaPro 18 19 Management, Inc., the Trustee and Manager of the 20 Horizon BetaPro ETF's, which are listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange and are the fastest growing 21 22 family of exchange traded funds in Canada.

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

I'd first like to thank the Commission 1 2 for this opportunity as an international ETF 3 provider to share our views as relates to the Commission's review of the application of position 4 5 limits and exemptions in the energy marketplace. 6 Specifically, we support any regulatory 7 action that would improve transparency of all 8 market participants, including ETF's in order to 9 eliminate the potential for excessive speculation 10 and market manipulation. The Horizons BetaPro 11 ETF's currently have assets in excess of \$2.5 12 billion amongst 38 ETF's, 14 of which are 13 commodity based and six of which are specifically linked to natural gas and crude oil. We 14 15 specialize in offering currency hedged exposure, both long and short, and we're the first managers 16 to offer such products for commodities in North 17 America. All of our ETF's are rebalanced daily, 18 which limits an investor's risk to the capital 19 20 invested. Several of our commodity based ETF's 21

22 have been or are the most actively traded

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

securities on the Toronto Stock Exchange, and
 currently they count for over 37 million shares
 traded each day. This translates in tremendous
 and substantial daily liquidity into the
 underlying futures market.

6 Our commodity based ETF's are in the 7 aggregate investments of thousands of investors 8 acting independently. And to our knowledge, no 9 one investor has indirectly obtained a significant 10 position in any one of our commodity based EFT's. 11 As an example, as of July 24, 2009, our energy 12 long EFT's, which had on average 35,000 unit 13 holders per ETF, held less than.51 contracts per 14 investor.

15 In addition, a majority of our commodity investors use our short ETF's to hedge the risk in 16 17 their long equity portfolios. As a further illustration, I'd like to speak to the role our 18 commodity ETF's had during the 2008 price 19 20 appreciation of crude oil to the high of \$147. We ironically launched the first leverage long and 21 22 short crude oil ETF's in North America on January

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

16, 2008. On that date, the price of oil was
 roughly \$90.

3 On July 11, 2008, when crude oil peaked at 147, only six months after we had launched 4 5 these products, our Horizons BetaPro NYMEX crude oil Bull Plus ETF held less than 100 million in 6 7 notional long exposure or 450 contracts, while our 8 Horizons BetaPro NYMEX crude oil Bear Plus fund 9 had soared to approximately 600 million in 10 notional short exposure, or short 3,850 contracts. 11 Clearly, our investor saw a significant 12 opportunity to hedge their long equity positions after such a dramatic increase in the price of 13 crude oil. Our data continues to show that our 14 15 commodity based ETF's attract sellers when 16 commodity prices are rising and buyers when 17 commodity prices are falling. 18 Instead of being a source of volatility,

19 our commodity based ETF's have proven to be a 20 source of price stability. For example, our 21 designated market maker has seen trading activity 22 levels were on counter to the price of crude oil

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 69 percent of the time since the inception of our 2 ETF's. To address the Commission's primary 3 concern regarding transparency and disclosure 4 about the positions held by individual investors, 5 we believe the focus should not be on the holdings 6 of the ETF, but on the holdings of its individual 7 investors.

8 To void any concerns about excessive 9 speculation or market manipulation, we suggest the 10 CFTC might want to consider the following; one, 11 requiring disclosure to the CFTC by ETF's of any 12 investors who indirectly hold investments with a 13 dollar value that is more than a specified level of the speculative limit on a regular basis; two, 14 15 mandating any investor in such ETF's to notify the manager if their investment at any time exceeds 16 100 percent of the current dollar value of the 17 speculative limit; and finally, three, requiring 18 19 the managers of such ETF's to have the ability to 20 force an investor to redeem all or a portion of their investment so that investors do not exceed 21 22 any speculative limit adopted by the CFTC.

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 We believe that implementing these 2 requirements, which will require the involvement 3 of the applicable regulatory authority such as the SEC, and in our case, the Ontario Securities 4 5 Commission, can provide a viable solution whereby the CFTC can effectively monitor the users of 6 7 ETF's without having an adverse impact on the 8 marketplace. In summary, we strongly believe that 9 our commodity based ETF's provide a cost 10 effective, transparent, liquid, limited risk 11 alternative for investors who want to access the 12 commodity markets while playing an integral role in enhancing the underlying liquidity of those 13 14 markets. 15 We also believe our commodity based ETF's are one of the most accessible investment 16 17 tools for the public who want to hedge against potential commodity appreciation. To ensure there 18 19 are no concerns about excessive speculation, 20 market manipulation regarding ETF's, we fully support any regulatory effort to increase 21

22 transparency of individual investor positions

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

within ETF's. Thank you, and I look forward to
your questions.

3 CHAIRMAN GENSLER: I thank our panelists. I'll try to also live with the five 4 5 minute rule and we'll see how many rounds we have. Even though the day is going on, we might have a 6 7 couple of rounds here. I was interested a little 8 bit, Mr. Krenkel, in what you said about operating 9 your exchange. You said that you're supportive of 10 setting position limits in the spot month or near 11 month, but I'm not sure I really followed where 12 you were on sort of a combined month approach, and 13 if you -- because so often where you sit is where 14 you stand. If you had our job, would you be 15 looking at setting position limits on a combined month basis to protect against concentrated 16 economic effects in these markets? 17 18 MR. KRENKEL: Right, yeah. We have, 19 just to give you a little perspective on my 20 answer, we have the bulk of our liquidity ---CHAIRMAN GENSLER: Again, you might pull 21 22 that a little closer.

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

MR. KRENKEL: -- the bulk of our 1 2 liquidity is really in the spot contracts on 3 natural gas. And we have a very large market share with the OTC market there. It makes sense 4 5 from our perspective to put position limits into place from a market perspective, also from a 6 7 clearing perspective. Once we get beyond month 8 two, we have a very small level of liquidity. 9 CHAIRMAN GENSLER: No, I understood that you all had a small liquidity, so it might not be 10 11 as relevant on your exchange, so I was looking for 12 if you -- as a market participant and in 13 knowledgeable markets, what do you think is 14 appropriate? 15 MR. KRENKEL: Right, yeah. I think if 16 you can manage those limits across the OTC market, 17 then they can be effective. If they apply to the exchange business only, you've recreated sort of 18 19 an unlevel playing field. 20 CHAIRMAN GENSLER: I think I understand. So, yes, if we could do position limits that 21 22 include over-the- counter derivatives, as well,

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 and find a way to do that ---

2 MR. KRENKEL: Right. 3 CHAIRMAN GENSLER: -- but your concern is greater if it was only on the traded markets? 4 5 MR. KRENKEL: Yeah, that's correct. 6 CHAIRMAN GENSLER: Mr. Felesky, in 7 reading your testimony, you talked about a concern 8 of what you said fractionalization, and our 9 earlier panel of witnesses, one member talked 10 about splintering of the market, and I'd like to 11 explore that a little bit more, because I think if 12 you had a diversity of investors, diversity of 13 speculators in a market, that the market might --14 that might promote liquidity rather than having 15 one or two or even three large participants who, 16 in a sense, are so concentrated, they might be 17 detracting from markets rather than enhancing markets. So I'd just like to understand your 18 19 thinking. 20 MR. FELESKY: Sure, thanks for the question. I think what we're referring to is, if 21 22 position limits were imposed and they were done at

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 the ETF level, for example, the majority of our 2 clients are Canadians, if the limit was imposed on 3 the ETF level, there would be the potential, depending what that limit was, that we would have 4 5 to take our existing exchange rate fund and create five or ten versions of that same fund to 6 facilitate the demand for those same investors. 7 8 So it's a fractionalization of the ETF's themselves. I don't see the end user being a 9 greater amount of individuals just because you've 10 increased the amount of ETF's. I think the end 11 12 user is still the same people. So the result is a way higher burden of cost to the investors because 13 14 you don't have the economy scales of that ETF. 15 CHAIRMAN GENSLER: But our agricultural 16 federal limits originally were set at ten percent 17 of the open interest up to a certain level, 25,000 18 contracts, and two and a half percent afterwards, so one could think there has to be at least a 19 20 minimum number of ten or 11 speculators on any side of the market because the inverse of ten 21 22 percent. Are you suggesting that a market that's

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 concentrated that only has three speculators is 2 more liquid than if you have 12, 15, 20? 3 MR. FELESKY: Absolutely not, I completely agree with your comments. My point is, 4 5 we have -- let's just take an example. For our natural gas products, we have 40,000 unit holders. 6 7 If we have -- if we create ten more of those same 8 ETF's, those 40,000 unit holders will just be 9 divided amongst those products, because they'll 10 have all the same investment objectives. So if 11 the 40,000 went to 50,000, which is more unit 12 holders, more speculators, that's a good thing, that's no different if it -- the effect into the 13 market is no different if it's one ETF or across 14 15 ten. 16 CHAIRMAN GENSLER: I'm going to switch over to Commissioner Dunn, but I may follow up 17 after at my next chance. 18 19 COMMISSIONER DUNN: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Peter, you are -- your home 20 regulator is from Alberta, Canada, is that ---21 22 MR. KRENKEL: Yeah, the Alberta

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 Securities Commission, yes. 2 COMMISSIONER DUNN: Alberta Securities 3 Commission; but you are also an ECM and recognized as a DCO? 4 5 MR. KRENKEL: That's correct, yes. COMMISSIONER DUNN: Okay. I'm 6 7 interested to know how that works. 8 MR. KRENKEL: Yeah; it's pretty 9 manageable for us as an organization. We, you 10 know, we're domiciled in Canada, we're in the 11 province of Alberta, hence, our lead regulator is 12 the Alberta Securities Commission. Their rules 13 and principals are actually quite closely aligned with those of the CFTC. We have clients, you 14 15 know, both sides of the border, do business across 16 the border, and so we chose the path of seeking 17 recognition with the CFTC, as well. 18 COMMISSIONER DUNN: When we promulgate 19 new regulations or change things, how does that 20 work with you and your lead regulator?

21 MR. KRENKEL: Well, I think, you know,
22 we'd have to understand exactly what direction you

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 were going, but it would apply to all our market 2 participants. We'd have to make, you know, the 3 necessary rule book changes and get our regulator 4 to cooperate with you. 5 COMMISSIONER DUNN: So you are saying in this age of globalization, it is really important 6 7 for us to have a good relationship with our sister 8 regulators in other countries; is that ---9 MR. KRENKEL: Yeah, and vice versa. 10 COMMISSIONER DUNN: And vice versa. We 11 often hear that, when we do something here in the 12 United States on our regulation, that that is 13 going to result in flight, that someone is going 14 to go to another country, and you've got a home 15 base, or you've got an operation in Houston; is 16 that ---17 MR. KRENKEL: Yes, we have an office there, yes. 18 19 COMMISSIONER DUNN: -- as well; do you see that as a viable threat, that if we make 20 things too onerous in the area of position limits 21

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

or other things, that folks may run to Canada to

22

1 other countries?

2 MR. KRENKEL: No, I don't think that's 3 likely to happen. Certainly, I don't think they can run to Canada. There may be other places in 4 5 the world that they can go to. My concern is more that they'll run away from the structured markets 6 7 into the OTC market either in Canada or the U.S. 8 COMMISSIONER DUNN: Adam, do you have 9 some thoughts on that? 10 MR. FELESKY: That's really outside of 11 our expertise as an ETF provider. 12 COMMISSIONER DUNN: John, I appreciated 13 your paper, and we've been referring to spec 14 limits as kind of a stop sign. You're calling it 15 just a speed bump. Could you kind of amplify on 16 that a little bit? MR. LOTHIAN: Well, if I can't --- if 17 there's a limit here, you know, say there's a 18 19 limit in wheat, I'm going to go find another wheat 20 market where I can lay off some of the positions to get that same exposure. Wheat, on a global 21 22 trade, for example, is a very fungible product.

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 Every country grows it and uses it.

2 Back when --- referring to the grain 3 embargo of '79, there was a USDA study that found that basically it's a fungible product world-wide, 4 5 and so us not selling to the Russians actually didn't deprive them of any wheat, it just meant 6 7 that a bunch of other trading partners traded here 8 or there. So if that's what's happening on a 9 commercial basis, that's what's going to happen on 10 an investment hedger basis, as well.

11 The, you know, if I'm a fund manager and 12 I'm up against position limits, I'm either going 13 to go to the OTC market to lay it off or I'm going 14 to go find another venue in a regulated market in 15 another location in order to do it. I'm not going 16 to send the money home, okay, I'm going to find 17 some place to invest it.

18 MR. FELESKY: Commissioner Dunn, I would 19 just add to that as -- John referred to the fund 20 manager. At the end of the day, the fund manager 21 of the ETF, the speculator is going to go where 22 there's liquidity. So the question is, if any

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 regulation was imposed that was so dire that the 2 liquidity moved somewhere else, and then I think it becomes more of a risk that the flows move 3 elsewhere, but until the liquidity moves 4 5 elsewhere, no one is going to move their business elsewhere. So it's a chicken in the egg, and I 6 7 think it's going to be more of a function of the 8 policy and how aggressive it is. 9 CHAIRMAN GENSLER: Commissioner Sommers. 10 COMMISSIONER SOMMERS: Thank you, Mr. 11 Chairman. I think I want to follow up on the same 12 line, but a concept that Mr. Lothian had in his 13 testimony with regard to exposure through cash 14 settled contracts rather than the physically 15 settled contracts, and to talk a little bit about 16 whether or not that is appropriate for people that 17 are just looking for passive exposure. If they're out of the physically delivered contract, does 18 19 that help? 20 MR. LOTHIAN: Well, I think it does. I mean the issue is that we've seen some of these 21 22 physically deliverable contracts have tremendous

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

exposure to this investment money. I think that that has changed the behavioral aspects of some of those commodities, because such a large dominant player is not acting by the rules of the market that I grew up with, okay. When the market goes up, you take profits, okay.

So basically, to use the wheat example 7 8 again, you have an index investor coming in 9 investing across a broad index, price of wheat 10 goes up, some other things might go down, some 11 other things might go up, we're not responding 12 like a traditional speculator and selling out the 13 wheat and taking profits, they're looking at the 14 entire index as a whole and saying, oh, things are 15 going up, we're going to invest more money.

And so you've got this aggregate demand type of approach to commodities as an asset class, which I believe has changed some of the dynamics of some of the markets. The markets are adapting to that, but it becomes critical when you get into the delivery period. And so I think cash settled contracts as proxies for that investment money is

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 a good thing so as not to interfere with the 2 delivery process. 3 COMMISSIONER SOMMERS: Thank you. Can the other panelists address that and what you 4 5 think about -- especially Mr. Felesky, the passive investment in cash settled contracts rather than 6 7 physically settled? 8 MR. FELESKY: I think a lot of the 9 panels yesterday and this morning spoke to the 10 fact that, in particular our business, in 11 commodity exchanged traded ETF's, our funds, for 12 the most part, are positioned in the nearby 13 futures contract on the long side. And the 14 effect, if any, is to, when we roll, is to sell 15 the nearby and buy the next one. So the net 16 effect to the end consumer in the physical market, 17 if anything, is a downward pressure on the nearby 18 contract. 19 MR. KRENKEL: I've got nothing further 20 to add.

21 MR. LOTHIAN: I'd just like to add to 22 that, though, that in some instances, the index

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 players have become such large, dominant players 2 that they are the fundamental in the marketplace, 3 and so the traders are playing the role, as it were, for the index players because that's the 4 5 dominant theme in the marketplace, that's the dominant flow in the marketplace, as opposed to 6 7 perhaps the cash futures convergence, and so that 8 element of it can get overwhelmed. In fact, you 9 know, several years ago, when we saw wheat prices 10 spike, part of the problem was that the pit 11 traders were all situated one way in the market to 12 take advantage of the role, and when Australia 13 said, hey, we have some problems with our crop and 14 some other problems cropped up around the world, 15 and all of a sudden the nearby prices shot up and 16 these wheat traders lost not only what they made 17 this year, but what they made last year, as well, 18 thus decreasing the available capital to, you know, absorb, you know, fluctuations in the 19 20 market. MR. FELESKY: If I could just add, 21

22 because I think this is a discussion that's had a

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

lot of commentary from the perspective of index 1 2 players and commodity ETF's and their impact and 3 roles; the one thing that I think everyone has to remember is that specifically contango, which is 4 5 the term referred to, futures prices being higher than the nearby, it's something that's existed in 6 7 the marketplace forever. In fact, crude oil is in 8 contango 60 percent of the time, and natural gas 9 is in contango over 80 percent of the time. And 10 then in particular, when you see huge price 11 appreciations, you'll tend to see larger 12 backwardation than the historic norms. 13 Conversely, when you have huge price depreciations, you're going to see larger 14 15 contangos than the norm, and that's just factually --16 CHAIRMAN GENSLER: Commissioner Chilton. 17 18 COMMISSIONER CHILTON: Thanks, Mr. 19 Chairman. Mr. Felesky, you've talked about 20 individual investors being monitored by the agency, but is there some level at all that you 21 22 think ETF's should be monitored? I mean at what

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 point --- do you think there should be some 2 additional regulation or do you think there 3 shouldn't be any at all? MR. FELESKY: I mean I really don't see 4 5 us any different in some ways as the swap dealer or the exchange that's effectively processing 6 7 trades. We, as an entity, are not making any 8 investment decisions, we're just an aggregate of 9 these thousands of investors. And if you impose 10 the limit specifically on the ETF itself instead 11 of the individual, I think you discriminate 12 against that tool versus the futures market, for 13 example. COMMISSIONER CHILTON: Eighty percent of 14 15 open interest is okay? 16 MR. FELESKY: Our view is that it's all 17 about the end user, and that if the end user is using the instruments to achieve a position that 18 19 exceeds the speculate limit that you set, 20 absolutely, they should be forced down to reduce their position. 21 22 COMMISSIONER CHILTON: Do you believe

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

that accountability levels have any deterrent 1 2 effect on ETF's trading currently? 3 MR. FELESKY: I think they do. I think everyone looks at different marketplaces to ensure 4 5 that their exposure isn't concentrated in one 6 exchange. 7 COMMISSIONER CHILTON: How about the 8 other panelists on that sort of line of 9 questioning? Mr. Lothian Mr. Krenkel. 10 MR. LOTHIAN: Well, the question that I 11 ask is, can I, as an investor, accomplish what I 12 want to accomplish in a different way? Can I 13 substitute an individual account with a broker buying gold as opposed to buying gold ETF, and the 14 15 answer to that is yes, okay. So what we have done is, we have created products which have made it 16 easier for people to be able to accomplish 17 18 specific investment goals. 19 If we prevent them from making it 20 easier, are they going to stop doing that? No, they're just going to have to pay a little bit 21 22 higher price or do it in a different way. Now,

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

futures trading is not for everyone, okay, that's 1 2 one of the reasons why we have products like ETF's 3 that take some of the risk out of that and manage it in a better way. Index funds do the same type 4 5 of a thing, particularly where they're having investors put up 100 percent of each and every 6 7 contract trading. So they're doing it in a 8 slightly different way that perhaps is a better 9 risk profile for those particular customers. 10 But are those customers, are those 11 investors going to say, well, you know what, China 12 is accumulating large amounts of commodities, and I think that this is going to go up for a while, 13 14 and I think the price of the dollar is going to go 15 down, and I want to own commodities. Now, am I 16 going to be stopped from doing that because I can't buy an ETF? No, I'm just going to go into 17 18 something else. 19 COMMISSIONER CHILTON: Mr. Krenkel. 20 MR. KRENKEL: Yeah; I mean we haven't

22 perhaps some of the other market participants have

21

seen the impact of the ETF's on our market that

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

seen, so we don't really ---

2 COMMISSIONER CHILTON: And you're mainly 3 spot month anyway. MR. KRENKEL: Exactly; and spot month 4 5 and in sight, so it's not a big concern for our market. But, yeah, my concern would be if they 6 7 are faced with position limits, does that just 8 result with them moving their business somewhere 9 else? 10 COMMISSIONER CHILTON: I mean just 11 something for you to think about. I mean, to me, 12 80 percent of anything is too much, so ---13 MR. KRENKEL: Yeah. COMMISSIONER CHILTON: But if you have a 14 15 large percentage, and whatever number it is, and 16 people understand that you have this large 17 percentage, in part because with an ETF, you're 18 reporting, it's more transparent, which I think is 19 good, and everybody knows when you're going to do 20 your role, you have to be crazy not to be thinking about that if you're in the market. So I think 21 22 it's having -- it can have at least a theoretical

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 possibility of having an impact. Anyway, my time 2 is about to expire, I won't let it beep on me. MR. FELESKY: I don't think any of us 3 would deny that there's a theoretical impact; in 4 5 fact, there is an impact. But I think the beauty of the marketplace, particularly our marketplace 6 7 in the commodity exchange rate fund is, it's 8 completely arbitragible between the physical 9 market, and this whole role phenomenon I think is 10 being dramatically overplayed as the physical 11 market can quickly take advantage of that, and we 12 saw that this spring with people putting an immense amount of commodity, particularly crude 13 14 oil, into storage. 15 CHAIRMAN GENSLER: If I could ask Mr. 16 Lothian; did I get it? 17 MR. LOTHIAN: You can't say it, can you? 18 CHAIRMAN GENSLER: John. MR. LOTHIAN: John. 19 20 CHAIRMAN GENSLER: How do you pronounce 21 your name? 22 MR. LOTHIAN: Lothian.

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 CHAIRMAN GENSLER: Lothian; Mr. Lothian, 2 do you think that, as I'm hearing this back and 3 forth and reading your testimony, did I hear that you feel that index investment has had an 4 5 influence on the marketplace? 6 MR. LOTHIAN: Yes. CHAIRMAN GENSLER: And as it relates to 7 8 the wheat market, if I can just get your expert 9 advice there, do you think that it's been a 10 contributing factor to the lack of wheat 11 convergence at times, you know, in this past 12 couple of years as wheat convergence problems have 13 existed? MR. LOTHIAN: I think that there's a 14 15 number of factors that are involved with the wheat convergence problems. I think that the large 16 17 passive long in the market is a factor. You know, one of the things that I believe has happened 18 because of the billions of dollars that have 19 20 flowed into index funds is that, you have an 21 algebra problem, okay, you have a lot of X and not 22 enough Y, okay, and in particular, because you've

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

had all of this money flow in, you kind of have a
 natural balance of long hedgers and short hedgers,
 okay.

So here you have a natural long, 4 5 passive, non- manipulative that's in the marketplace, and there's a natural short hedge 6 7 that's going to participate in the market that's 8 going to match up with that long hedge, okay. So 9 as you get more and more money flowing into this 10 market, the quality of the short hedger 11 capitalization, you know, whatever, decreases, 12 okay. And that, I believe, leads to increased volatility, okay. 13

There's other things that, you know, is 14 15 there a concentration in, you know, in the grain elevator business and all of that, are there 16 17 enough locations that are actively participating 18 in this, are those locations making more money 19 pumping out corn, you know, through them, or 20 soybeans, or other products as opposed to wheat? It's great that, you know, you can make a nickel, 21 22 you know, storing wheat, but can I make a dime

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

three times over doing something else? And if you
 don't have enough capacity to be able to switch
 and manage that, then you're going to have some
 problems.

5 You know, there's a lot of participants in the market. I mean we talk about high 6 7 frequency traders and all this kind of stuff that 8 are participating in the market that are just 9 looking for certain algorithms and patterns and 10 all of this kind of thing as opposed to people 11 that had more of an opinion about the market. 12 CHAIRMAN GENSLER: Let me, because I 13 might only get one more question, so I thank you, but I heard a yes, you think that ---14 15 MR. LOTHIAN: It's a factor. CHAIRMAN GENSLER: -- it's a factor. 16 17 Could I turn back to Mr. Felesky and follow up on Commissioner Chilton's question about whether 18 19 there's any size that could be too large, and ask 20 you again to think about clearinghouses and markets, exchanges, both clearinghouses and 21 22 exchanges, not when the skies are clear and the

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 sun is out, but when we get to stormy times, or 2 when we get to hurricane season like we've seen in 3 financial markets in the last nine months. Isn't it the case that a large concentrated position, 4 5 whether it's 80 percent, 50 percent, or even 20 percent is harder to liquidate and distorts the 6 7 market more in stormy times than if it's a two percent position, or an eight percent position? 8 9 MR. FELESKY: I think a couple things; one, I think you're assuming that if the end unit 10 11 holder who is our end client, if he's not in our 12 fund, he's not participating in any other manner. 13 CHAIRMAN GENSLER: I wasn't assuming 14 anything except for I was wondering whether a 50 15 or 80 percent market participant, whether it's an ETF, whether it's a swap dealer, whether it's a 16 17 hedge fund, anybody, needs to liquidate in a difficult market environment, whether you think 18 the CFTC should take that into consideration when 19 20 we're thinking about position limits. MR. FELESKY: I have no problem with 21 22 that as a consideration in your discussions.

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 CHAIRMAN GENSLER: Thank you. 2 Commissioner Dunn. 3 COMMISSIONER DUNN: Thank you. Mr. Felesky, in your written testimony, you indicated 4 5 that if there is any direct impact emanating from your long commodity based ETF activities, that it 6 7 would exert a downward effect on price and a 8 moderate upward price pressure. If true, does 9 this downward pressure tend to distort -- to be a 10 distortion of price discovery process? 11 MR. FELESKY: A couple things; one is 12 how the mechanic of our product actually works, I think is what I was referring to in our long ETF's 13 14 ruling from the current nearby to the next, which would impact the nearby contract by pushing that 15 16 price down. How that converged to spot I guess is 17 the question, and I'll leave it to experts in the 18 industry to talk specifically about that. 19 However, I think the other question or 20 the other data points you can look at is just our history of our asset flows, which, you know, 21 22 through the whole dramatic increase in commodity

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1	prices, saw huge net inflows in our short ETF's
2	resulting in downward pressure of selling as the
3	commodity appreciated, and conversely you're
4	seeing a support in commodity prices today as our
5	flows come in from the buy side. That said,
6	natural gas as an example, both in Canada and our
7	competitor here in the United States, we've seen
8	substantial inflows of assets, but natural gas has
9	still managed to fall approximately 40 percent in
10	that time.
11	COMMISSIONER DUNN: Mr. Lothian, you say
12	in your testimony here that position limits should
13	be set dramatically by the Commission.
14	MR. LOTHIAN: Dynamically.
15	COMMISSIONER DUNN: Dynamically, excuse
16	me, by the Commission, not dramatically. It may
17	be some dramatically. On a regular, pre-defined
18	interval, the Commission should take into
19	consideration the size of the participation of
20	commercial and financial hedgers and the
21	volatility of the market.
22	The Commission should have the ability

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 to set divergent position limits for long and 2 short speculators. When prices rise, the 3 Commission should set the short speculative position limits at higher levels than long 4 5 position limits; the position limits for speculators should be a fixed number of contracts 6 7 for that particular interval; and limits should be 8 applied to all months with different intervals set 9 separately for delivery months, spreads should be 10 counted on gross basis against the limit, meaning 11 a long and short is two contracts, and that's 12 something I'd like to explore, but how onerous 13 would it be for the Commission to do that? How many people are we going to need? You and I have 14 15 talked in the past about the resources we have 16 here. 17 MR. LOTHIAN: Right; I think that that

18 is something that an advisory committee made up of 19 industry participants across the spectrum could 20 make a recommendation to the Commission on. I 21 think that's where the expertise would be and 22 could be utilized for setting the dynamic limits,

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 that is.

2 COMMISSIONER DUNN: Could you amplify a 3 little bit on counting the spread? MR. LOTHIAN: Well, you can put on a 4 5 very large position when you have a spread on as opposed to an outright position. And a spread is 6 7 not necessarily a -- is not necessarily less 8 risky. In fact, if you look at the disclosure 9 document you have to sign when you open an 10 account, it'll tell you just that as much, okay. 11 There's a lot of people that have the 12 idea that just because they're spread, that 13 they're somehow protected. I have some nasty stories to tell about spreads that -- for a 14 15 non-public hearing. But the -- I think that 16 people tend to put on larger positions on spreads 17 because they feel like they have less risk, and that's not always the case, so I think that it 18 needs to be -- it needs to be measured in a way 19 20 that represents that risk that they're taking. COMMISSIONER DUNN: (off mike) 21 22 CHAIRMAN GENSLER: Commissioner Sommers.

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 COMMISSIONER SOMMERS: I'm going to 2 continue actually down that same path, because I 3 had questions from yesterday with regard to how we set limits, making it fair for the marketplaces. 4 5 Do you set the limits based on open interest on each market so that each market has different 6 7 position limits, or you know, so your dynamic rate 8 is interesting to me, if you could talk a little 9 bit ---

10 MR. LOTHIAN: Well, I think that you 11 need to take a look at the entire marketplace, 12 both the regulated futures markets and the OTC. You know, we talk about the CME having 95 percent 13 14 of the U.S. futures market, but when you look at 15 the greater market in which they are trading, both 16 from a, you know, OTC market, cash market, and 17 global market, it's a much broader playing field. 18 And likewise, you have to look at the 19 cash market, you have to look at the OTC market, 20 as well. It's very easy to do an exchange for a 21 physical type of transaction, offsetting your

22 futures position by interacting with somebody in

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 the cash market. So the pool that you're looking 2 at, if you say you have 80 percent of the futures 3 market, you know, it might be just that your 4 denominator is wrong.

5 COMMISSIONER SOMMERS: Thank you. My next question is for Mr. Krenkel, and it's with 6 regard to your comment and your testimony on the 7 8 significant price discovery contracts and how that 9 -- how that impacts you as an ECM and the unintended consequences of an ECM that have 10 11 participation from emerging markets; if you could 12 talk a little bit about that.

13 MR. KRENKEL: Yeah; as I said earlier, 14 our contracts are really all designed to be fully 15 fungible with the OTC activity. In fact, they're interchangeable in a lot of client's books. So 16 17 what we're simply looking for is a situation where 18 there are some limits over here that do not apply 19 to the dark part of the market, hence, the 20 unintended consequences that it drives business 21 away unintentionally, so that was my concern. 22 We do --- with respect to the emerging

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 markets, we list a number of contracts where 2 they're new, we're trying to standardize some 3 things at different market centers, we're trying to shepherd the business onto the exchange and 4 5 into the structured clearinghouse. I don't think it's appropriate to reach down to those and start 6 7 applying limits. It'll potentially harm the 8 development of the markets in terms of bringing 9 that business to the exchanges and the 10 clearinghouse, so that was really at the root of 11 my comments. 12 COMMISSIONER SOMMERS: So just to 13 clarify, until they become fungible, the limits 14 aren't appropriate? 15 MR. KRENKEL: Yeah; I feel until they become more liquid, the limits may not be 16 17 appropriate, may actually be detrimental to development of the market. Liquidity is really 18 19 the key for us, and for any exchange, for that 20 matter, but it really makes the exchange function and allows the clearinghouse to operate, so we 21 22 don't want to see anything that drives liquidity

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 away from -- particularly in an emerging market, a
2 new product for us.

3 CHAIRMAN GENSLER: Commissioner Chilton. COMMISSIONER CHILTON: Thank you, Mr. 4 5 Chairman. Mr. Lothian, let me go back to this 80 percent, and forget that it's 80, say it's just a 6 7 large percentage of an ETF, and I don't want to 8 pick on our panelists, let's just say you know 9 that it's coming up, you know that there's a role 10 coming up, what do other traders in the market do 11 with that information, if anything, or what could 12 they potentially do?

13 MR. LOTHIAN: Well, it's kind of like an 14 annuity to them because they know that it's there, it's contractually within the agreement of the ETF 15 or the fund or whatever. In fact -- I mean, you 16 17 know, if I were more involved in that, I would say -- what I would do is, go and invest in those 18 19 ETF's and go and invest in those index funds and make sure that I knew exactly what the rules were 20 for how they were going to do it and then make 21 22 sure that I took that in consideration for my

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 trading.

2 It's kind of like selling premium, 3 though, with options, it works until it doesn't work, and as the experience -- the wheat traders 4 5 back in, I don't know, 2006 found out, that, you know, you can collect a lot of premium, but then 6 7 something can happen that changes the rules and 8 you can lose it all and more. So, you know, it's 9 not a riskless trade by any means. 10 COMMISSIONER CHILTON: And to pick up on 11 what Commissioner Dunn and Commissioner Sommers 12 were asking you about with regard to, you know, predefined intervals of setting the position 13 14 limit, I'm curious whether or not you think 15 there's any sense in a hard cap position limit 16 that might be in tandem with a percentage, as 17 Commissioner Sommers is talking about, of open interest. Maybe this level, except, you know, in 18 this circumstance, because in some of these small, 19 you know, fairly liquid markets, you might have a 20 high percentage of open interest. I'm just 21 22 curious as to your thoughts.

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 MR. LOTHIAN: You know, again, I think 2 that it's difficult to even talk about real 3 effective hard limits when you don't have a view of the entire market. So if the CFTC doesn't have 4 5 a real good view of what the OTC market size is, and a good feel on the cash, then it's very easy 6 7 to set the wrong parameters or the wrong limit for 8 that. So I think that you guys need, you know, 9 additional authority over those parts of the 10 market. 11 Greater transparency is a great thing, 12 it brings more people into the price discovery process, but it's -- there's a broader market out 13 there than just the future, so it's very -- it's 14 15 difficult. That's why I think it just needs to be a little bit more dynamic. And as I said in my 16 17 comments here, when the markets go up, they're advertising for selling, and so we need to perhaps 18 19 be a little bit more responsive in terms of limits 20 like that to allow a greater speculative of

21 interest even to participate in the market, to 22 help, you know, stabilize things.

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

COMMISSIONER CHILTON: So sort of like 1 2 some of the other panelists have suggested, 3 whatever we do or potentially do needs to be done sort of in tandem with additional legislative 4 5 authority from Congress, otherwise, it could have some unintended consequences, at least holds the 6 7 possibility of that. 8 MR. LOTHIAN: Right, absolutely. I 9 mean, for example, the Commitment of Traders 10 Report, you know, it's tremendous information, but 11 I think it only tells part of the story, and it 12 could tell an exact opposite story if I could see the rest of the market and what was going on, so 13 14 it can be very misleading. 15 COMMISSIONER CHILTON: Okay, thank you. MR. FELESKY: If I could just add to 16 17 John's comment about the role of speculators and how we define that, that our investors, I should 18 19 say, played again in 2008, if you look at our 20 flows, you look at our major competitor here in the United States, who I think is testifying next 21 22 week, it's the same experience. They were a

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1 source of price stability. We were all selling 2 into the dramatic commodity price appreciation in 3 2008. It's just that's what the data is. CHAIRMAN GENSLER: Can I just check 4 5 whether my Commissioners want another -- do you have a question? Well, I'm going to thank all of 6 7 our witnesses. It's just been fabulous to hear 8 from you, to get your perspective. I think we 9 might want to follow up, John, you said you wanted 10 to say something to us in private about spreads, 11 because I don't want to leave that out there, if 12 there is something that this Commission needs to 13 hear, we'd like to hear that. 14 But thank all of you and thank our 15 earlier panelists, as well. We're going to, as a 16 Commission, come back together in public hearing 17 on August 5th at 9:00 a.m. That's probably going to be a full day, because, as it turns out, on the 18 19 last day, some people, you know, want to get in, 20 and we might have to have three panels on that 21 day.

22 I think, again, it's just been very

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

helpful. There seems to be a diverse -- within this diversity of opinion, still support from the exchanges yesterday and even support from some of the major market participants today, and another exchange for us to consider -- seriously consider position limits. There's a lot of debate around who said it, what are the numbers, and whether there are appropriate exemptions. But this has been very helpful for all of us here today, so I think this Commission stands adjourned. (Whereupon, at 12:34 p.m., the PROCEEDINGS were adjourned.) * * * *

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100

1	CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC
2	I, Carleton J. Anderson, III do hereby
3	certify that the forgoing electronic file when
4	originally transmitted was reduced to text at my
5	direction; that said transcript is a true record
6	of the proceedings therein referenced; that I am
7	neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by
8	any of the parties to the action in which these
9	proceedings were taken; and, furthermore, that I
10	am neither a relative or employee of any attorney
11	or counsel employed by the parties hereto, nor
12	financially or otherwise interested in the outcome
13	of this action.
14	/s/Carleton J. Anderson, III
15	
16	
17	Notary Public in and for the
18	Commonwealth of Virginia
19	Commission No. 351998
20	Expires: November 30, 2012
21	
22	

ANDERSON COURT REPORTING 706 Duke Street, Suite 100