Public Statements & Remarks

Remarks of CFTC Commissioner Brian D. Quintenz at FIA Asia 2018 

November 29, 2018

[Delivered in Singapore November 28, 2018]




Thank you for that very kind welcome.  Before I begin, let me quickly say that the views contained in this speech are my own and do not represent the views of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (Commission or CFTC).


Let me just say a word about how impressed I am with our host jurisdiction.  Singapore is a global hub for finance, trade, technology, and culture.  Home to 5.6 million residents, this diverse city-state has achieved an unparalleled degree of economic prosperity.  In 2018, the per-person income in Singapore was 321% of the global average.[1]  And yet, Singapore’s extraordinary economic growth and high standards of living were not always a fait accompli.  In 1970, the per-person income was 54% of the global average.  The dynamic success of the Singaporean economy may have something to do with the consistency of its commitment to economic freedoms over that period of time.


In 1970, Singapore had the third freest economy in the world; in 2018, Singapore’s economy is ranked as the second freest.  This ranking is based on many factors, including a nation’s protection of private property, judicial effectiveness, government integrity, and the degree of freedom present with respect to labor, investment, and trade.[2]  In fact, over the past 50 years, Singapore has consistently ranked highly across all of those metrics.  I do not believe it is a coincidence that during that time frame, the Singaporean economy has also thrived.  Nor do I think it is a coincidence that the world’s major financial centers – New York, London, Hong Kong – are also located in nations ranked highly for their economic freedoms.[3]


Growth and prosperity are cultivated in free markets, where participants from around the globe can compete on a level playing field based on the merits of their own products and services.  Yet, it is important to remember that a “free market” is not synonymous with an unregulated one.  Quite the contrary; businesses and innovators are attracted to nations with a strong commitment to the rule of law, the protection of private property, and low tolerance for corruption and fraud.  

The world’s most prosperous markets are frequently located in countries with their own unique legal framework and local market customs, but each is committed to protecting economic freedoms and encouraging growth.  


These markets, also not coincidentally, tend to be the global hubs for a large degree of the world’s derivatives activity.  It is a priority for the CFTC, the agency responsible for overseeing the derivatives markets in the United States, to work with other regulators to enhance the health and resiliency of the global derivatives market, and ensure that economic activity and risk management can occur across jurisdictions, without concerns of market fragmentation caused by regulatory overreach.


A New Philosophical Approach


A little over two months ago, Chairman Giancarlo visited Singapore to present his vision for the cross-border regulation of the global swaps market; a vision committed to reversing the agency’s prior, overly expansive extraterritorial approach that has, at times, caused market fragmentation and subjected market participants to duplicative, overlapping, costly, and operationally complex regulation.  Subsequent to his visit, the Chairman published a White Paper with specific recommendations to improve the CFTC’s current cross-border approach.[4]


Today, I want to build upon the Chairman’s message by expressing my strong support for revisiting and updating the CFTC’s cross-border framework to better reflect the current realities of the derivatives markets.  


But first, let me take a moment and align myself fully with the form and manner by which the Chairman launched his views.  Recently, a counterpart of mine visited Asia and took issue with the release of the White Paper, calling it an arrow apart from its bundle, suggesting that since it was released as a solo effort, not as a proposed rule, and without his input, it was weak.


I disagree.  Regulatory white papers can play very productive roles in policy formation and international cooperation through their philosophical, non-legal, and pro-dialogue format that helps signal direction and build consensus.  It is my belief that a majority of the Commissioners at the CFTC will indeed find a consensus on restructuring the agency’s cross border approach in the coming months.


When the CFTC first adopted its cross-border guidance in 2013, it had raced ahead of other G-20 nations in the implementation of post-crisis swaps reforms.  Perhaps it is not surprising then that the guiding principle of the 2013 guidance seemed to be the belief that almost every swap a U.S. person enters into, regardless of location or counterparty, should be subject to, and presumably protected by, CFTC regulation.   


Five years later, the world looks very different, and not only because a different philosophical mindset is now installed across U.S. financial regulatory bodies.  Today, the world’s largest swap markets have made substantial progress toward implementing the G-20 commitments, including trade reporting, clearing, margin for uncleared swaps, and heightened capital requirements for uncleared derivatives.  In light of this significant progress, the 2013 guidance, a legally tenuous construct to begin with, is now unequivocally outdated.  We must acknowledge and embrace the comparable regulation present in other jurisdictions and other regulators’ greater supervisory interests in regulating the swaps activities within their own local markets. 


Chairman Giancarlo’s White Paper identifies a number of foundational principles upon which the CFTC’s regulation of cross-border swaps activity should be built.  Perhaps the most important of these principles, and the prism through which all extraterritorial reach by the CFTC must be viewed, is the statutory directive from Congress that the agency may only regulate those activities outside the United States that “have a direct and significant connection with activities in, or effect on commerce of, the United States.”[5]  If it was not apparent in 2013, it should be apparent now, not necessarily every swap that involves a U.S. person or U.S. personnel has a “direct and significant” connection with U.S. commerce that should trigger the application of CFTC rules.  


Building upon this principle, the White Paper rightfully distinguishes between swaps reforms intended to address the systemic risk reforms at the heart of Dodd-Frank, such as margin and clearing, and those reforms designed to address market trading practices, such as methods of trade execution.  Generally, reforms targeting systemic risk and its transmission across jurisdictions are intended to address activities that may have a “direct and significant” effect on the U.S. economy and therefore may be more likely to warrant the application of CFTC regulations.  On the other hand, reforms pertaining to market structure or trading platform practices have a more attenuated connection with systemic risk mitigation.  Countries may choose to enact market structure reforms that reflect the characteristics of their local markets and which, while different from the CFTC’s approach, may nonetheless achieve the goals of the G-20 reforms. 


To that end, I support the White Paper’s approach toward substituted compliance determinations that differentiates between these two types of reforms, applying a strong comparability standard to the first, while applying a more flexible standard to the latter.  More generally, I support a substituted compliance framework that measures comparability by whether the particular legal regime achieves comparable outcomes, instead of requiring a finding of comparability on a provision-by-provision basis.  Indeed, in 2013, the G-20 recognized the necessity of regulatory deference to other jurisdictions “when it is justified by the quality of their respective regulatory and enforcement regimes, based on similar outcomes.”[6]  I believe a holistic, outcomes-based approach to substituted compliance respects the sovereignty of foreign jurisdictions to implement the G-20 reforms as they see fit for their markets.  In my view, this comprehensive, outcomes-based approach will only increase the efficacy of the G-20 reforms and strengthen the global commitment to a transparent, well-regulated, liquid swaps market. 


In light of the significant progress toward implementing the G-20 goals, the White Paper also differentiates between jurisdictions that have largely adopted G-20 reforms comparable to the CFTC regime, so called “comparable jurisdictions,” and other jurisdictions where implementation is incomplete or substantively different, so called, “non-comparable jurisdictions.”  Generally, the White Paper suggests that whenever possible the CFTC should exercise deference with respect to comparable jurisdictions, reserving a more stringent application of CFTC regulations for non-comparable jurisdictions.  I support this differentiation and believe it strikes the appropriate balance between the CFTC’s regulatory mission and showing comity to competent non-U.S. regulators.


With these principles in mind, the White Paper proposes refinements to the CFTC’s cross-border approach that would differentiate between systemic risk versus market structure reforms and comparable versus non-comparable jurisdictions.  I want to briefly discuss the White Paper’s proposed approach to the treatment of non-U.S. clearing and trading venues, as well as swap dealer registration and the regulations which follow personnel as opposed to firms.


Registration of Non-U.S. Central Counterparties (CCPs)


In the area of CCP oversight, the CFTC has applied a policy of deference to non-U.S. CCPs providing access to U.S. persons.  For example, with respect to swaps clearing activities, the CFTC has exempted four non-U.S. swaps CCPs from registering as a designated clearing organization (DCO), because they are located in jurisdictions with “comparable, comprehensive supervision and regulation.”[7] These exemptions permit non-U.S. CCPs to clear proprietary swaps positions for U.S. clearing members and their affiliates, but do not allow customer clearing – meaning, U.S. customers cannot clear through these non-U.S. CCPs. 


The White Paper recommends expanding the use of this exemptive authority for non-U.S. CCPs that do not pose substantial risk to the U.S. financial system.[8]  Specifically, where a foreign jurisdiction has implemented comparable CCP regulation, in addition to proprietary clearing by U.S. clearing members, exempt CCPs would be permitted to provide swaps clearing services to U.S. customers through non-U.S. clearing members, without triggering DCO or FCM registration. In that situation, local bankruptcy laws would apply to the funds of the U.S. customers who wished to participate in the foreign market.  This approach mirrors the CFTC’s historical cross-border approach for futures clearing and I support exploring its potential application to the swaps markets as well.  Given the professional nature of the swaps market, I believe this approach would appropriately give sophisticated, institutional market participants the commercial choice whether to rely on local, non-U.S. bankruptcy law protections or instead choose to do business with U.S. FCMs subject to U.S. bankruptcy law protections. 


I agree with the White Paper’s view that CCPs posing a substantial risk to the U.S. financial system should continue to be registered with the CFTC.  But I also support the White Paper’s position that although these non-U.S. CCPs would be CFTC registrants, the home country regulator should still have supervisory primacy, with the CFTC primarily focused on U.S. clearing activity.[9]  In addition, determining what constitutes a “substantial risk” to the U.S. financial system, I believe, should focus on the CCP’s U.S.-facing swaps clearing activity.  While there are many metrics by which to measure a CCP’s significance to the U.S. markets, I think one particularly meaningful factor may be the amount of swaps initial margin posted by U.S. clearing members to the non-U.S. CCP.  The greater the amount and/or percentage of the non-U.S. CCP’s total swaps initial margin that is posted by U.S. clearing members, the greater the potential exposure the non-U.S. CCP poses to the United States.  I look forward to working with staff to develop a clearer definition of the “substantial risk” standard – one that is appropriately tailored and narrowly focused on those non-U.S. CCPs posing true, substantial risk to the U.S. financial system and not just a generic view towards any entity’s universal size.  


Registration of Swap Execution Facilities


In addition to expanding the exemptive relief available to non-U.S. CCPs in comparable jurisdictions, the White Paper also seeks to combat market fragmentation through its proposed treatment of non-U.S. swaps trading venues.  I support the White Paper’s general view that swaps trading venues subject to comparable regulation abroad should be exempt from swap execution facility (SEF) registration with the CFTC.  In this regard, the CFTC’s 2017 Order exempting certain trading facilities in the European Union (EU) from SEF registration on the basis of comparable regulation under EU law serves as an excellent model for future Commission action.[10]  The EU reciprocated this finding of comparability, such that U.S. and EU trading participants now have their choice of executing swaps on either EU or U.S. platforms.[11]


The White Paper also revisits the SEF registration requirement for non-U.S. swaps trading venues in non-comparable jurisdictions.  Although DMO issued guidance in 2013 providing a range of factors that may trigger SEF registration for platforms outside the U.S., non-U.S. platforms remain concerned that a single U.S. person executing a swap could trigger registration.[12]  In my view, requiring SEF registration due to the participation of a few U.S. persons is not appropriate.  In that scenario, I do not believe the requisite “direct and significant” effect on U.S. commerce is present such that the CFTC should extend its oversight and devote its resources to the regulation of the foreign platform.  This is why I support the approach suggested in the White Paper that U.S. persons should be allowed to access non-U.S. platforms in non-comparable jurisdictions without triggering SEF registration subject to a materiality threshold.  In determining this materiality threshold, I think it would be appropriate to look at a number of factors, including the percentage of the venue’s trading volume executed by U.S. persons, as well as whether the venue directly solicits U.S. participation.  


Swap Dealer Registration


Another significant issue addressed by the White Paper is the identification of which swaps a non-U.S. person must count toward its de minimis threshold for purposes of determining whether it may need to register as a swap dealer. 


With respect to comparable jurisdictions, the White Paper recommends that non-U.S. persons, including foreign consolidated subsidiaries (FCS) whose ultimate parent is a U.S. person, only count their swap dealing activity with U.S. persons and guaranteed entities, with certain exceptions.[13]  This approach contrasts with a 2016 cross-border proposal that was never finalized by the Commission.  The 2016 proposal would have treated FCS like U.S. persons and required them to include both their U.S.- and non-U.S.-facing swap dealing activity in their de minimis count – in effect, requiring these entities to include dealing activity occurring entirely outside the United States between two non-U.S. persons in their calculation.  The 2016 proposal found that this non-U.S. activity had a “direct and significant” effect on the U.S. financial system because the swap activity of the FCS created a direct risk to the U.S. parent due to the consolidated financial reporting required by U.S. GAAP.[14]


I think the more limited approach recommended in the White Paper is appropriate for two reasons.  From a pragmatic perspective, the White Paper recognizes that comparable jurisdictions have the primary supervisory interest in regulating the swap activity occurring within their home countries by their own domestic entities.  If the CFTC attempts to reach this activity, those jurisdictions may similarly attempt to regulate subsidiaries located within the U.S., thereby subjecting those U.S. firms to overlapping, duplicative, and costly regulation.  In my view, the optimal solution is for the CFTC and comparable jurisdictions to recognize and defer to one another’s regulatory authority over swaps activity that does not directly involve our respective domestic firms.  Second, I think the White Paper’s approach is consistent with the CFTC’s Congressional mandate, which does not charge the agency with the regulation of firms on a consolidated-basis, but instead contemplates the regulation of firms on an entity-by-entity basis.  


With respect to swap dealing activity in non-comparable jurisdictions, the White Paper proposes some possible approaches and solicits feedback.  For example, it suggests that FCS that are part of bank holding companies (BHC-FCS) should only be required to include their dealing activity with U.S. persons in their de minimis count.[15]  I think this outcome may be appropriate, given that these BHCs are already subject to consolidated supervision and regulation by U.S. prudential regulators.[16]


For non-bank, financial FCS operating in non-comparable jurisdictions, the CFTC could take into consideration whether the firm has been designated as “systemically significant” by the Financial Stability Oversight Council.  If the non-bank FCS is part of a financial conglomerate that has been designated as systemically significant to the U.S. financial system, its swaps activities, due to their nature and scale, are more likely to have a “direct and significant” effect on U.S. commerce such that CFTC oversight is warranted.  In those circumstances, it may be appropriate to require the FCS to include its swap activities with both U.S. and non-U.S. persons in its de minimis count. 


The discussion of the proper treatment of FCS in the White Paper has begun a larger conversation and I look forward to working with staff and market participants to calibrate the swap dealer registration requirement appropriately. 


Arrange, Negotiate and Execute (ANE)


The White Paper also raises questions regarding how the CFTC defines its jurisdiction, specifically, whether its regulation of some cross-border activities should be based upon the status of one or both of the counterparties as U.S. persons, or whether it should take a territorial view of transactions for the application of some regulations.


The suggestion of a territorial approach to regulation has always prompted robust debate, most notably with respect to the treatment of swaps between a CFTC-registered, non-U.S. swap dealer and a non-U.S. person, when the non-U.S. dealer regularly uses personnel located in the United States to “arrange, negotiate, or execute” the trade – so called “ANE Transactions.”


ANE Transactions were not directly addressed in the Commission’s 2013 guidance, but a staff advisory issued that year suggested that non-U.S. swap dealers must comply with certain transaction-level requirements, like clearing, margin, or trade reporting, with respect to ANE transactions.[17]  The publication of the staff advisory created uncertainty over when the involvement of U.S. personnel might trigger the full panoply of CFTC swap regulations.[18]  Within 12 days of the advisory’s publication, CFTC staff issued a no-action letter relieving non-U.S. SDs from complying with certain transaction-level requirements for their ANE transactions.[19]   


The White Paper revisits the ANE issue, suggesting that swaps trading in the U.S. should be subject to U.S. swaps trading rules, regardless of whether the counterparties are U.S. persons.[20]   To the extent transaction-level requirements attach to the trade, the White Paper contemplates that out of deference to comparable jurisdictions, the CFTC might make substituted compliance available.[21]  The White Paper also requests feedback on this concept, recognizing that there are a variety of fact patterns implicated by ANE transactions, and desiring to avoid the fragmentation of the U.S. swap market.[22]


It is a credible proposition to state that the involvement of U.S. personnel in a trade should implicate some U.S.-based regulations.  The challenge is how to define that involvement and how broadly it should implicate our rules.  Thus, the concept of an ANE standard raises three questions in my mind. 


Definitionally, what types of activities should be captured by an “arrange, negotiate, or execute” standard? 


Then, based upon this definition, how can the CFTC develop a standard that is administrable by non-U.S. firms? 


Finally, assuming some level of U.S. personnel involvement should trigger CFTC regulations, which regulations should apply?  The answer to this last question is particularly important because a single trade could become subject to two sets of conflicting regulatory requirements.  Therefore, the CFTC should weigh carefully if its supervisory interest in a trade outweighs that of a non-U.S. regulator(s) who directly oversees the counterparties. 


With respect to the first question, I believe the ANE standard should focus on client-facing, sales and trading activity, as opposed to incidental activity, by U.S. personnel.  For example, if a trader in London communicates with a colleague in New York about market color or the logistics of a potential trade with, for instance, a Brazilian counterparty, I do not believe that should implicate the ANE standard.  In that example, U.S. personnel have not directly communicated with a counterparty and I do not believe it is appropriate to capture internal advice or communication as ANE activity. 


Another potential fact pattern is the involvement of U.S. personnel to facilitate trading outside the business hours of non-U.S. jurisdictions.  In this situation, the use of U.S. personnel seems to be incidental, because the trade is initiated between non-U.S. counterparties, but due to convenience and differences in active trading hours across markets, the involvement of U.S. personnel may be required.    


On the other side of the spectrum, one could imagine two non-U.S. firms with offices in New York whose respective traders initiate, negotiate, and execute all terms of a trade.  In that instance, U.S. personnel are the primary catalysts of the trade.  The involvement of U.S. personnel in the trade is not incidental, it is absolutely necessary to the trade’s execution.


Clearly, there is a broad spectrum of activity that may or may not implicate an ANE construct.  The question then becomes, can the CFTC distill this activity into a clear, administrable standard?  Non-U.S. swap dealers must be able to operationalize the standard in an efficient manner.  Requiring a facts and circumstances analysis every time U.S. personnel could potentially be involved in a trade is not feasible for real-time trading.  I believe that, if it were to be adopted, any ANE standard must provide market participants with clarity about what regulations will apply to a swap transaction from its inception – changing the regulatory treatment of a transaction midway through its negotiation creates operational complexity and legal uncertainty. 


One possible way to create this clarity is to avoid the application of the ANE standard on a trade-by-trade basis and instead try to establish general rules based on specific counterparty relationships.  For example, perhaps a non-U.S. counterparty that has its primary trading relationship with a trader of a non-U.S. swap dealer in London should be viewed differently than a non-U.S. counterparty that has a primary trading relationship with personnel in the U.S. branch of that same swap dealer. 


Finally, to what rule set should an ANE standard apply?


One could look to the White Paper’s distinction between risk-based and market structure reforms in determining what regulations should apply to the trade between two non-U.S. persons.  The CFTC should also consider that certain regulatory requirements are closely tied together.  For example, although the trade execution requirement is generally thought of as a market structure reform, in the U.S. it is intertwined with the clearing mandate – a systemic risk reform.  Also, in practice, given the difference in pricing between bilateral and cleared trades, it could be difficult for non-U.S. firms to separate the two requirements.  Therefore, if the CFTC suggests that a broad ANE standard applied on a trade-by-trade basis should trigger our SEF execution requirements, this determination could also implicate the associated systemic risk requirements of our clearing rules. 


This may be a less deferential approach than is appropriate.  Given that the risk of these trades in question primarily resides between two non-U.S. persons, perhaps the CFTC has less of a supervisory interest in applying its clearing, trade execution, and uncleared margin requirements to the trade than it does in applying its business conduct standards to the activities of the U.S. employee.  Said differently, it may be better to apply the SEF execution mandate in the same way as other systemic risk rules, rather than to invoke the clearing mandate between two non-U.S. persons due to the the trade-by-trade application of market structure reforms.


All of these aspects of the ANE issue – or any jurisdictional definition construct for that matter – should be carefully considered so that we do not inadvertently make it too costly or operationally complex for U.S. personnel to support the activity of a non-U.S. dealer servicing its non-U.S. client.  I encourage market participants to provide thoughtful comments on this issue, taking into account how the regulation of ANE transactions could work under a revised, rationalized cross-border framework. 




Ten years after the financial crisis, the world’s largest derivatives markets have made substantial progress toward achievement of the G-20 objectives.  In order to appreciate the economic freedoms others have created and maintained, we must recognize and defer to those jurisdictions’ various judgements and approaches.  I am hopeful that the CFTC and other like-minded regulator can work together to fully realize the underlying goal of all of our reform efforts – the creation of a well-regulated, global swap marketplace, known for its regulatory deference and harmonious cooperation.


Thank you all very much.  It is an honor to have been with you this morning.


[1] Marian L. Tupy, Singapore:  The Power of Economic Freedom, HUMAN PROGRESS (Nov. 25, 2015),


[3] Id.

[4] Cross-Border Swaps Regulation Version 2.0:  A Risk-Based Approach with Deference to Comparable Non-U.S. Regulation, J. Christopher Giancarlo, CFTC Chairman (Oct. 1, 2018), (hereinafter White Paper).

[5] CEA Section 2(i).

[6] G20 Leaders’ Declaration, (Sept. 6, 2013),

[7] CEA Section 5b(h).  The four CCPs exempted from DCO registration for their swaps clearing activity are ASX Clear (Futures) Pty Limited, Japan Securities Clearing Corporation, Korea Exchange, Inc., and OTC Clearing Hong Kong Limited.  In addition, a non-U.S. futures CCP is only required to register with the CFTC if it seeks to clear for a CFTC-registered designated contract market.

[8] White Paper at 44.

[9] White Paper at 45.

[10] Order of Exemption, In the Matter of the Exemption of Multilateral Trading Facilities and Organised Trading Facilities Authorized Within the European Union from the Requirement to Register with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission as Swap Execution Facilities (Dec. 8, 2017), available at:

[11] European Commission, Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2017/2238 on the equivalence of the legal and supervisory framework applicable to designated contract markets and swap execution facilities in the United States of America in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council (Dec. 5, 2017), available at:

[12] CFTC Division of Market Oversight, Guidance on Application of Certain Commission Regulations to Swap Execution Facilities (Nov. 15, 2013),

[13] White Paper at 65.  Specifically, FCS and non-U.S. persons would be required to count swap dealing activity with U.S. persons and guaranteed entities, except swaps with guaranteed entities that are registered as swap dealers (or are affiliated with a registered swap dealer); (2) guaranteed entities that are guaranteed by a non-financial guarantor; or (3) foreign branches of U.S. banks that are registered as swap dealers.

[14] Cross-Border Application of the Registration Thresholds and External Business Conduct Standards Applicable to Swap Dealers and Major Swap Participants, 81 Fed. Reg. 71946, 71955 (Oct. 18, 2016).

[15] White Paper at 69.

[16] For example, generally bank holding companies must file quarterly or annual reports for each of their foreign subsidiaries, depending upon the subsidiary’s size, detailing the financial condition of the subsidiary, including the amount of their derivatives activity.  See Financial Statements of Foreign Subsidiaries of U.S. Banking Organizations—FR 2314 (Quarterly Report) and FY 2314S (Annual Report).  Bank holding companies must also file quarterly consolidated financial statements with the Federal Reserve.  See Consolidated Financial Statements for Holding Companies—FR Y-9C.  See also Bank Holding Company Supervision Manual, Division of Supervision and Regulation, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Sept. 2017),

[17] CFTC Staff Advisory No. 13-69 (Nov. 14, 2013),

[18] Application of Dodd-Frank Requirements to Swaps Between Non-U.S. Swap Dealers and Non-U.S. Counterparties, MONDAQ (Nov. 25, 2013); Press Release, Financial Services Committee Chairman Jeb Hensarling, Chairman Hensarling Statement on CFTC Cross-Border Swaps Announcement, Press Release (Nov. 15, 2013),

[19] No-Action Letter 13-71 (Nov. 26, 2013),  The no-action relief does not apply to non-U.S. swap dealers who are guaranteed affiliates or conduit affiliates.  This no-action letter has since been extended five times.  The latest no-action letter extends the relief indefinitely, until such point in time as the Commission takes future action to address which transaction-level requirements should apply to such transactions.  See No-Action Letter 17-36 (July 25, 2017),

[20] The White Paper would view the swap between two non-U.S. persons as a U.S. trade, because of the involvement of the U.S.-based agent or employee.  See White Pater at 76-81 (finding that “[t]he U.S. agent adds knowledge and expertise of local markets and conditions, which makes the swap effectively a U.S. trade.”).

[21] White Paper at 81.

[22] White Paper at 81.